2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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2016-02-14 20:12:05 +00:00
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#include <assert.h>
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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#include <limits.h>
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2017-01-30 19:52:27 +00:00
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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2016-02-14 20:12:05 +00:00
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#if !defined(BN_ULLONG)
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// bn_div_words divides a double-width |h|,|l| by |d| and returns the result,
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// which must fit in a |BN_ULONG|.
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2016-02-14 20:12:05 +00:00
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static BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d) {
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BN_ULONG dh, dl, q, ret = 0, th, tl, t;
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int i, count = 2;
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if (d == 0) {
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return BN_MASK2;
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}
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i = BN_num_bits_word(d);
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assert((i == BN_BITS2) || (h <= (BN_ULONG)1 << i));
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i = BN_BITS2 - i;
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if (h >= d) {
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h -= d;
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}
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if (i) {
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d <<= i;
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h = (h << i) | (l >> (BN_BITS2 - i));
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l <<= i;
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}
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dh = (d & BN_MASK2h) >> BN_BITS4;
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dl = (d & BN_MASK2l);
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for (;;) {
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if ((h >> BN_BITS4) == dh) {
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q = BN_MASK2l;
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} else {
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q = h / dh;
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}
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th = q * dh;
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tl = dl * q;
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for (;;) {
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t = h - th;
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if ((t & BN_MASK2h) ||
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((tl) <= ((t << BN_BITS4) | ((l & BN_MASK2h) >> BN_BITS4)))) {
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break;
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}
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q--;
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th -= dh;
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tl -= dl;
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}
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t = (tl >> BN_BITS4);
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tl = (tl << BN_BITS4) & BN_MASK2h;
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th += t;
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if (l < tl) {
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th++;
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}
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l -= tl;
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if (h < th) {
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h += d;
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q--;
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}
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h -= th;
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if (--count == 0) {
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break;
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}
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ret = q << BN_BITS4;
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2017-10-12 04:55:18 +01:00
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h = (h << BN_BITS4) | (l >> BN_BITS4);
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2016-02-14 20:12:05 +00:00
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l = (l & BN_MASK2l) << BN_BITS4;
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}
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ret |= q;
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return ret;
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}
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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#endif // !defined(BN_ULLONG)
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2016-02-14 20:12:05 +00:00
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2016-02-11 22:10:16 +00:00
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static inline void bn_div_rem_words(BN_ULONG *quotient_out, BN_ULONG *rem_out,
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BN_ULONG n0, BN_ULONG n1, BN_ULONG d0) {
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// GCC and Clang generate function calls to |__udivdi3| and |__umoddi3| when
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// the |BN_ULLONG|-based C code is used.
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//
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// GCC bugs:
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// * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=14224
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// * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=43721
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// * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=54183
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// * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58897
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// * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=65668
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//
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// Clang bugs:
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// * https://llvm.org/bugs/show_bug.cgi?id=6397
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// * https://llvm.org/bugs/show_bug.cgi?id=12418
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//
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// These issues aren't specific to x86 and x86_64, so it might be worthwhile
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// to add more assembly language implementations.
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2017-12-08 02:11:24 +00:00
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#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_X86) && \
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(defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__))
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__asm__ volatile("divl %4"
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: "=a"(*quotient_out), "=d"(*rem_out)
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: "a"(n1), "d"(n0), "rm"(d0)
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: "cc");
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#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && \
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(defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__))
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__asm__ volatile("divq %4"
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: "=a"(*quotient_out), "=d"(*rem_out)
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: "a"(n1), "d"(n0), "rm"(d0)
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: "cc");
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2016-02-11 22:10:16 +00:00
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#else
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#if defined(BN_ULLONG)
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BN_ULLONG n = (((BN_ULLONG)n0) << BN_BITS2) | n1;
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*quotient_out = (BN_ULONG)(n / d0);
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#else
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*quotient_out = bn_div_words(n0, n1, d0);
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#endif
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*rem_out = n1 - (*quotient_out * d0);
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#endif
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}
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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2017-11-03 20:06:33 +00:00
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// BN_div computes "quotient := numerator / divisor", rounding towards zero,
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// and sets up |rem| such that "quotient * divisor + rem = numerator" holds.
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//
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// Thus:
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2017-11-03 20:06:33 +00:00
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//
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// quotient->neg == numerator->neg ^ divisor->neg
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// (unless the result is zero)
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// rem->neg == numerator->neg
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// (unless the remainder is zero)
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//
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// If |quotient| or |rem| is NULL, the respective value is not returned.
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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//
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// This was specifically designed to contain fewer branches that may leak
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// sensitive information; see "New Branch Prediction Vulnerabilities in OpenSSL
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// and Necessary Software Countermeasures" by Onur Acıçmez, Shay Gueron, and
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// Jean-Pierre Seifert.
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2017-11-03 20:06:33 +00:00
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int BN_div(BIGNUM *quotient, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *numerator,
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const BIGNUM *divisor, BN_CTX *ctx) {
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int norm_shift, loop;
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BIGNUM wnum;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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BN_ULONG *resp, *wnump;
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BN_ULONG d0, d1;
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int num_n, div_n;
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2018-01-23 23:51:42 +00:00
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// This function relies on the historical minimal-width |BIGNUM| invariant.
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// It is already not constant-time (constant-time reductions should use
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// Montgomery logic), so we shrink all inputs and intermediate values to
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// retain the previous behavior.
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// Invalid zero-padding would have particularly bad consequences.
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int numerator_width = bn_minimal_width(numerator);
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int divisor_width = bn_minimal_width(divisor);
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if ((numerator_width > 0 && numerator->d[numerator_width - 1] == 0) ||
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(divisor_width > 0 && divisor->d[divisor_width - 1] == 0)) {
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2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED);
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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return 0;
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}
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if (BN_is_zero(divisor)) {
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2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO);
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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return 0;
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}
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BN_CTX_start(ctx);
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2017-11-03 20:06:33 +00:00
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BIGNUM *tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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BIGNUM *snum = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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BIGNUM *sdiv = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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BIGNUM *res = NULL;
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if (quotient == NULL) {
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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res = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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} else {
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2017-11-03 20:06:33 +00:00
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res = quotient;
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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}
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2017-11-03 20:06:33 +00:00
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if (sdiv == NULL || res == NULL) {
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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goto err;
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}
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// First we normalise the numbers
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2017-11-03 20:06:33 +00:00
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norm_shift = BN_BITS2 - (BN_num_bits(divisor) % BN_BITS2);
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if (!BN_lshift(sdiv, divisor, norm_shift)) {
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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goto err;
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}
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2018-01-15 10:23:24 +00:00
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bn_set_minimal_width(sdiv);
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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sdiv->neg = 0;
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norm_shift += BN_BITS2;
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2017-11-03 20:06:33 +00:00
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if (!BN_lshift(snum, numerator, norm_shift)) {
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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goto err;
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}
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2018-01-15 10:23:24 +00:00
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bn_set_minimal_width(snum);
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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snum->neg = 0;
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// Since we don't want to have special-case logic for the case where snum is
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// larger than sdiv, we pad snum with enough zeroes without changing its
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// value.
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2018-01-15 10:23:24 +00:00
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if (snum->width <= sdiv->width + 1) {
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if (!bn_wexpand(snum, sdiv->width + 2)) {
|
2016-08-03 05:21:18 +01:00
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goto err;
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}
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2018-01-15 10:23:24 +00:00
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for (int i = snum->width; i < sdiv->width + 2; i++) {
|
2016-08-03 05:21:18 +01:00
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snum->d[i] = 0;
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}
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2018-01-15 10:23:24 +00:00
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snum->width = sdiv->width + 2;
|
2016-08-03 05:21:18 +01:00
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} else {
|
2018-01-15 10:23:24 +00:00
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if (!bn_wexpand(snum, snum->width + 1)) {
|
2016-08-03 05:21:18 +01:00
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goto err;
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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}
|
2018-01-15 10:23:24 +00:00
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snum->d[snum->width] = 0;
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snum->width++;
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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}
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2018-01-15 10:23:24 +00:00
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div_n = sdiv->width;
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num_n = snum->width;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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loop = num_n - div_n;
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// Lets setup a 'window' into snum
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|
|
|
// This is the part that corresponds to the current
|
|
|
|
|
// 'area' being divided
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
wnum.neg = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
wnum.d = &(snum->d[loop]);
|
2018-01-15 10:23:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
wnum.width = div_n;
|
|
|
|
|
// only needed when BN_ucmp messes up the values between width and max
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
|
wnum.dmax = snum->dmax - loop; // so we don't step out of bounds
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
|
// Get the top 2 words of sdiv
|
2018-01-15 10:23:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
// div_n=sdiv->width;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
d0 = sdiv->d[div_n - 1];
|
|
|
|
|
d1 = (div_n == 1) ? 0 : sdiv->d[div_n - 2];
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
|
// pointer to the 'top' of snum
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
wnump = &(snum->d[num_n - 1]);
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
|
// Setup to 'res'
|
2017-11-03 20:06:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
res->neg = (numerator->neg ^ divisor->neg);
|
|
|
|
|
if (!bn_wexpand(res, loop + 1)) {
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-01-15 10:23:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
res->width = loop - 1;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
resp = &(res->d[loop - 1]);
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
|
// space for temp
|
2017-11-03 20:06:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
if (!bn_wexpand(tmp, div_n + 1)) {
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-15 10:23:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
// if res->width == 0 then clear the neg value otherwise decrease
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
|
// the resp pointer
|
2018-01-15 10:23:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
if (res->width == 0) {
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
res->neg = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
|
resp--;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-11-03 20:06:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
for (int i = 0; i < loop - 1; i++, wnump--, resp--) {
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
BN_ULONG q, l0;
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
|
// the first part of the loop uses the top two words of snum and sdiv to
|
|
|
|
|
// calculate a BN_ULONG q such that | wnum - sdiv * q | < sdiv
|
2017-11-03 20:06:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
BN_ULONG n0, n1, rm = 0;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
n0 = wnump[0];
|
|
|
|
|
n1 = wnump[-1];
|
|
|
|
|
if (n0 == d0) {
|
|
|
|
|
q = BN_MASK2;
|
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
|
// n0 < d0
|
2017-11-03 20:06:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
bn_div_rem_words(&q, &rm, n0, n1, d0);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
2016-02-11 22:10:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
#ifdef BN_ULLONG
|
|
|
|
|
BN_ULLONG t2 = (BN_ULLONG)d1 * q;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
2017-11-03 20:06:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
if (t2 <= ((((BN_ULLONG)rm) << BN_BITS2) | wnump[-2])) {
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2015-02-11 06:16:26 +00:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
q--;
|
2017-11-03 20:06:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
rm += d0;
|
|
|
|
|
if (rm < d0) {
|
|
|
|
|
break; // don't let rm overflow
|
2015-02-11 06:16:26 +00:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
t2 -= d1;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
|
#else // !BN_ULLONG
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
BN_ULONG t2l, t2h;
|
|
|
|
|
BN_UMULT_LOHI(t2l, t2h, d1, q);
|
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
2017-11-03 20:06:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
if (t2h < rm ||
|
|
|
|
|
(t2h == rm && t2l <= wnump[-2])) {
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2015-02-11 06:16:26 +00:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
q--;
|
2017-11-03 20:06:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
rm += d0;
|
|
|
|
|
if (rm < d0) {
|
|
|
|
|
break; // don't let rm overflow
|
2015-02-11 06:16:26 +00:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
if (t2l < d1) {
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
t2h--;
|
2015-02-11 06:16:26 +00:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
t2l -= d1;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
|
#endif // !BN_ULLONG
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
l0 = bn_mul_words(tmp->d, sdiv->d, div_n, q);
|
|
|
|
|
tmp->d[div_n] = l0;
|
|
|
|
|
wnum.d--;
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
|
// ingore top values of the bignums just sub the two
|
|
|
|
|
// BN_ULONG arrays with bn_sub_words
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
if (bn_sub_words(wnum.d, wnum.d, tmp->d, div_n + 1)) {
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
|
// Note: As we have considered only the leading
|
|
|
|
|
// two BN_ULONGs in the calculation of q, sdiv * q
|
|
|
|
|
// might be greater than wnum (but then (q-1) * sdiv
|
|
|
|
|
// is less or equal than wnum)
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
q--;
|
|
|
|
|
if (bn_add_words(wnum.d, wnum.d, sdiv->d, div_n)) {
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
|
// we can't have an overflow here (assuming
|
|
|
|
|
// that q != 0, but if q == 0 then tmp is
|
|
|
|
|
// zero anyway)
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
(*wnump)++;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
|
// store part of the result
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
*resp = q;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-11-03 20:06:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-15 10:23:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
bn_set_minimal_width(snum);
|
2017-11-03 20:06:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (rem != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
|
// Keep a copy of the neg flag in numerator because if |rem| == |numerator|
|
|
|
|
|
// |BN_rshift| will overwrite it.
|
|
|
|
|
int neg = numerator->neg;
|
|
|
|
|
if (!BN_rshift(rem, snum, norm_shift)) {
|
2015-02-16 08:57:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-11-03 20:06:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
if (!BN_is_zero(rem)) {
|
|
|
|
|
rem->neg = neg;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-11-03 20:06:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-15 10:23:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
bn_set_minimal_width(res);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int BN_nnmod(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (!(BN_mod(r, m, d, ctx))) {
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
if (!r->neg) {
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
|
// now -|d| < r < 0, so we have to set r := r + |d|.
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
return (d->neg ? BN_sub : BN_add)(r, r, d);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
Make BN_mod_*_quick constant-time.
As the EC code will ultimately want to use these in "words" form by way
of EC_FELEM, and because it's much easier, I've implement these as
low-level words-based functions that require all inputs have the same
width. The BIGNUM versions which RSA and, for now, EC calls are
implemented on top of that.
Unfortunately, doing such things in constant-time and accounting for
undersized inputs requires some scratch space, and these functions don't
take BN_CTX. So I've added internal bn_mod_*_quick_ctx functions that
take a BN_CTX and the old functions now allocate a bit unnecessarily.
RSA only needs lshift (for BN_MONT_CTX) and sub (for CRT), but the
generic EC code wants add as well.
The generic EC code isn't even remotely constant-time, and I hope to
ultimately use stack-allocated EC_FELEMs, so I've made the actual
implementations here implemented in "words", which is much simpler
anyway due to not having to take care of widths.
I've also gone ahead and switched the EC code to these functions,
largely as a test of their performance (an earlier iteration made the EC
code noticeably slower). These operations are otherwise not
performance-critical in RSA.
The conversion from BIGNUM to BIGNUM+BN_CTX should be dropped by the
static linker already, and the unused BIGNUM+BN_CTX functions will fall
off when EC_FELEM happens.
Update-Note: BN_mod_*_quick bounce on malloc a bit now, but they're not
really used externally. The one caller I found was wpa_supplicant
which bounces on malloc already. They appear to be implementing
compressed coordinates by hand? We may be able to convince them to
call EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp.
Bug: 233, 236
Change-Id: I2bf361e9c089e0211b97d95523dbc06f1168e12b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25261
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-01-24 20:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
// bn_mod_sub_words sets |r| to |a| - |b| (mod |m|), using |tmp| as scratch
|
|
|
|
|
// space. Each array is |num| words long. |a| and |b| must be < |m|. Any pair of
|
|
|
|
|
// |r|, |a|, and |b| may alias.
|
|
|
|
|
static void bn_mod_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
|
|
|
|
|
const BN_ULONG *m, BN_ULONG *tmp, size_t num) {
|
|
|
|
|
// r = a - b
|
|
|
|
|
BN_ULONG borrow = bn_sub_words(r, a, b, num);
|
|
|
|
|
// tmp = a - b + m
|
|
|
|
|
bn_add_words(tmp, r, m, num);
|
|
|
|
|
bn_select_words(r, 0 - borrow, tmp /* r < 0 */, r /* r >= 0 */, num);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// bn_mod_add_words sets |r| to |a| + |b| (mod |m|), using |tmp| as scratch
|
|
|
|
|
// space. Each array is |num| words long. |a| and |b| must be < |m|. Any pair of
|
|
|
|
|
// |r|, |a|, and |b| may alias.
|
|
|
|
|
static void bn_mod_add_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
|
|
|
|
|
const BN_ULONG *m, BN_ULONG *tmp, size_t num) {
|
|
|
|
|
// tmp = a + b. Note the result fits in |num|+1 words. We store the extra word
|
|
|
|
|
// in |carry|.
|
|
|
|
|
BN_ULONG carry = bn_add_words(tmp, a, b, num);
|
|
|
|
|
// r = a + b - m. We use |bn_sub_words| to perform the bulk of the
|
|
|
|
|
// subtraction, and then apply the borrow to |carry|.
|
|
|
|
|
carry -= bn_sub_words(r, tmp, m, num);
|
|
|
|
|
// |a| and |b| were both fully-reduced, so we know:
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
|
// 0 + 0 - m <= r < m + m - m
|
|
|
|
|
// -m <= r < m
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
|
// If 0 <= |r| < |m|, |r| fits in |num| words and |carry| is zero. We then
|
|
|
|
|
// wish to select |r| as the answer. Otherwise -m <= r < 0 and we wish to
|
|
|
|
|
// return |r| + |m|, or |tmp|. |carry| must then be -1 or all ones. In both
|
|
|
|
|
// cases, |carry| is a suitable input to |bn_select_words|.
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
|
// Although |carry| may be one if |bn_add_words| returns one and
|
|
|
|
|
// |bn_sub_words| returns zero, this would give |r| > |m|, which violates are
|
|
|
|
|
// input assumptions.
|
|
|
|
|
assert(carry == 0 || carry == (BN_ULONG)-1);
|
|
|
|
|
bn_select_words(r, carry, tmp /* r < 0 */, r /* r >= 0 */, num);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static BIGNUM *bn_scratch_space_from_ctx(size_t width, BN_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
|
|
|
BIGNUM *ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
if (ret == NULL ||
|
|
|
|
|
!bn_wexpand(ret, width)) {
|
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
ret->neg = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
ret->width = width;
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// bn_resized_from_ctx returns |bn| with width at least |width| or NULL on
|
|
|
|
|
// error. This is so it may be used with low-level "words" functions. If
|
|
|
|
|
// necessary, it allocates a new |BIGNUM| with a lifetime of the current scope
|
|
|
|
|
// in |ctx|, so the caller does not need to explicitly free it. |bn| must fit in
|
|
|
|
|
// |width| words.
|
|
|
|
|
static const BIGNUM *bn_resized_from_ctx(const BIGNUM *bn, size_t width,
|
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
|
|
|
if ((size_t)bn->width >= width) {
|
|
|
|
|
// Any excess words must be zero.
|
|
|
|
|
assert(bn_fits_in_words(bn, width));
|
|
|
|
|
return bn;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
BIGNUM *ret = bn_scratch_space_from_ctx(width, ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
if (ret == NULL ||
|
|
|
|
|
!BN_copy(ret, bn) ||
|
|
|
|
|
!bn_resize_words(ret, width)) {
|
2018-02-10 18:53:02 +00:00
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
Make BN_mod_*_quick constant-time.
As the EC code will ultimately want to use these in "words" form by way
of EC_FELEM, and because it's much easier, I've implement these as
low-level words-based functions that require all inputs have the same
width. The BIGNUM versions which RSA and, for now, EC calls are
implemented on top of that.
Unfortunately, doing such things in constant-time and accounting for
undersized inputs requires some scratch space, and these functions don't
take BN_CTX. So I've added internal bn_mod_*_quick_ctx functions that
take a BN_CTX and the old functions now allocate a bit unnecessarily.
RSA only needs lshift (for BN_MONT_CTX) and sub (for CRT), but the
generic EC code wants add as well.
The generic EC code isn't even remotely constant-time, and I hope to
ultimately use stack-allocated EC_FELEMs, so I've made the actual
implementations here implemented in "words", which is much simpler
anyway due to not having to take care of widths.
I've also gone ahead and switched the EC code to these functions,
largely as a test of their performance (an earlier iteration made the EC
code noticeably slower). These operations are otherwise not
performance-critical in RSA.
The conversion from BIGNUM to BIGNUM+BN_CTX should be dropped by the
static linker already, and the unused BIGNUM+BN_CTX functions will fall
off when EC_FELEM happens.
Update-Note: BN_mod_*_quick bounce on malloc a bit now, but they're not
really used externally. The one caller I found was wpa_supplicant
which bounces on malloc already. They appear to be implementing
compressed coordinates by hand? We may be able to convince them to
call EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp.
Bug: 233, 236
Change-Id: I2bf361e9c089e0211b97d95523dbc06f1168e12b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25261
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-01-24 20:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
int BN_mod_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m,
|
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (!BN_add(r, a, b)) {
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
return BN_nnmod(r, r, m, ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int BN_mod_add_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
|
|
|
|
|
const BIGNUM *m) {
|
Make BN_mod_*_quick constant-time.
As the EC code will ultimately want to use these in "words" form by way
of EC_FELEM, and because it's much easier, I've implement these as
low-level words-based functions that require all inputs have the same
width. The BIGNUM versions which RSA and, for now, EC calls are
implemented on top of that.
Unfortunately, doing such things in constant-time and accounting for
undersized inputs requires some scratch space, and these functions don't
take BN_CTX. So I've added internal bn_mod_*_quick_ctx functions that
take a BN_CTX and the old functions now allocate a bit unnecessarily.
RSA only needs lshift (for BN_MONT_CTX) and sub (for CRT), but the
generic EC code wants add as well.
The generic EC code isn't even remotely constant-time, and I hope to
ultimately use stack-allocated EC_FELEMs, so I've made the actual
implementations here implemented in "words", which is much simpler
anyway due to not having to take care of widths.
I've also gone ahead and switched the EC code to these functions,
largely as a test of their performance (an earlier iteration made the EC
code noticeably slower). These operations are otherwise not
performance-critical in RSA.
The conversion from BIGNUM to BIGNUM+BN_CTX should be dropped by the
static linker already, and the unused BIGNUM+BN_CTX functions will fall
off when EC_FELEM happens.
Update-Note: BN_mod_*_quick bounce on malloc a bit now, but they're not
really used externally. The one caller I found was wpa_supplicant
which bounces on malloc already. They appear to be implementing
compressed coordinates by hand? We may be able to convince them to
call EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp.
Bug: 233, 236
Change-Id: I2bf361e9c089e0211b97d95523dbc06f1168e12b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25261
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-01-24 20:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
|
|
|
|
|
int ok = ctx != NULL &&
|
2018-02-06 23:56:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
bn_mod_add_consttime(r, a, b, m, ctx);
|
Make BN_mod_*_quick constant-time.
As the EC code will ultimately want to use these in "words" form by way
of EC_FELEM, and because it's much easier, I've implement these as
low-level words-based functions that require all inputs have the same
width. The BIGNUM versions which RSA and, for now, EC calls are
implemented on top of that.
Unfortunately, doing such things in constant-time and accounting for
undersized inputs requires some scratch space, and these functions don't
take BN_CTX. So I've added internal bn_mod_*_quick_ctx functions that
take a BN_CTX and the old functions now allocate a bit unnecessarily.
RSA only needs lshift (for BN_MONT_CTX) and sub (for CRT), but the
generic EC code wants add as well.
The generic EC code isn't even remotely constant-time, and I hope to
ultimately use stack-allocated EC_FELEMs, so I've made the actual
implementations here implemented in "words", which is much simpler
anyway due to not having to take care of widths.
I've also gone ahead and switched the EC code to these functions,
largely as a test of their performance (an earlier iteration made the EC
code noticeably slower). These operations are otherwise not
performance-critical in RSA.
The conversion from BIGNUM to BIGNUM+BN_CTX should be dropped by the
static linker already, and the unused BIGNUM+BN_CTX functions will fall
off when EC_FELEM happens.
Update-Note: BN_mod_*_quick bounce on malloc a bit now, but they're not
really used externally. The one caller I found was wpa_supplicant
which bounces on malloc already. They appear to be implementing
compressed coordinates by hand? We may be able to convince them to
call EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp.
Bug: 233, 236
Change-Id: I2bf361e9c089e0211b97d95523dbc06f1168e12b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25261
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-01-24 20:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
return ok;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-02-06 23:56:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
int bn_mod_add_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
|
Make BN_mod_*_quick constant-time.
As the EC code will ultimately want to use these in "words" form by way
of EC_FELEM, and because it's much easier, I've implement these as
low-level words-based functions that require all inputs have the same
width. The BIGNUM versions which RSA and, for now, EC calls are
implemented on top of that.
Unfortunately, doing such things in constant-time and accounting for
undersized inputs requires some scratch space, and these functions don't
take BN_CTX. So I've added internal bn_mod_*_quick_ctx functions that
take a BN_CTX and the old functions now allocate a bit unnecessarily.
RSA only needs lshift (for BN_MONT_CTX) and sub (for CRT), but the
generic EC code wants add as well.
The generic EC code isn't even remotely constant-time, and I hope to
ultimately use stack-allocated EC_FELEMs, so I've made the actual
implementations here implemented in "words", which is much simpler
anyway due to not having to take care of widths.
I've also gone ahead and switched the EC code to these functions,
largely as a test of their performance (an earlier iteration made the EC
code noticeably slower). These operations are otherwise not
performance-critical in RSA.
The conversion from BIGNUM to BIGNUM+BN_CTX should be dropped by the
static linker already, and the unused BIGNUM+BN_CTX functions will fall
off when EC_FELEM happens.
Update-Note: BN_mod_*_quick bounce on malloc a bit now, but they're not
really used externally. The one caller I found was wpa_supplicant
which bounces on malloc already. They appear to be implementing
compressed coordinates by hand? We may be able to convince them to
call EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp.
Bug: 233, 236
Change-Id: I2bf361e9c089e0211b97d95523dbc06f1168e12b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25261
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-01-24 20:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
a = bn_resized_from_ctx(a, m->width, ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
b = bn_resized_from_ctx(b, m->width, ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
BIGNUM *tmp = bn_scratch_space_from_ctx(m->width, ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
int ok = a != NULL && b != NULL && tmp != NULL &&
|
|
|
|
|
bn_wexpand(r, m->width);
|
|
|
|
|
if (ok) {
|
|
|
|
|
bn_mod_add_words(r->d, a->d, b->d, m->d, tmp->d, m->width);
|
|
|
|
|
r->width = m->width;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
Make BN_mod_*_quick constant-time.
As the EC code will ultimately want to use these in "words" form by way
of EC_FELEM, and because it's much easier, I've implement these as
low-level words-based functions that require all inputs have the same
width. The BIGNUM versions which RSA and, for now, EC calls are
implemented on top of that.
Unfortunately, doing such things in constant-time and accounting for
undersized inputs requires some scratch space, and these functions don't
take BN_CTX. So I've added internal bn_mod_*_quick_ctx functions that
take a BN_CTX and the old functions now allocate a bit unnecessarily.
RSA only needs lshift (for BN_MONT_CTX) and sub (for CRT), but the
generic EC code wants add as well.
The generic EC code isn't even remotely constant-time, and I hope to
ultimately use stack-allocated EC_FELEMs, so I've made the actual
implementations here implemented in "words", which is much simpler
anyway due to not having to take care of widths.
I've also gone ahead and switched the EC code to these functions,
largely as a test of their performance (an earlier iteration made the EC
code noticeably slower). These operations are otherwise not
performance-critical in RSA.
The conversion from BIGNUM to BIGNUM+BN_CTX should be dropped by the
static linker already, and the unused BIGNUM+BN_CTX functions will fall
off when EC_FELEM happens.
Update-Note: BN_mod_*_quick bounce on malloc a bit now, but they're not
really used externally. The one caller I found was wpa_supplicant
which bounces on malloc already. They appear to be implementing
compressed coordinates by hand? We may be able to convince them to
call EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp.
Bug: 233, 236
Change-Id: I2bf361e9c089e0211b97d95523dbc06f1168e12b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25261
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-01-24 20:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
return ok;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int BN_mod_sub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m,
|
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (!BN_sub(r, a, b)) {
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
return BN_nnmod(r, r, m, ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-02-06 23:56:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
int bn_mod_sub_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
|
Make BN_mod_*_quick constant-time.
As the EC code will ultimately want to use these in "words" form by way
of EC_FELEM, and because it's much easier, I've implement these as
low-level words-based functions that require all inputs have the same
width. The BIGNUM versions which RSA and, for now, EC calls are
implemented on top of that.
Unfortunately, doing such things in constant-time and accounting for
undersized inputs requires some scratch space, and these functions don't
take BN_CTX. So I've added internal bn_mod_*_quick_ctx functions that
take a BN_CTX and the old functions now allocate a bit unnecessarily.
RSA only needs lshift (for BN_MONT_CTX) and sub (for CRT), but the
generic EC code wants add as well.
The generic EC code isn't even remotely constant-time, and I hope to
ultimately use stack-allocated EC_FELEMs, so I've made the actual
implementations here implemented in "words", which is much simpler
anyway due to not having to take care of widths.
I've also gone ahead and switched the EC code to these functions,
largely as a test of their performance (an earlier iteration made the EC
code noticeably slower). These operations are otherwise not
performance-critical in RSA.
The conversion from BIGNUM to BIGNUM+BN_CTX should be dropped by the
static linker already, and the unused BIGNUM+BN_CTX functions will fall
off when EC_FELEM happens.
Update-Note: BN_mod_*_quick bounce on malloc a bit now, but they're not
really used externally. The one caller I found was wpa_supplicant
which bounces on malloc already. They appear to be implementing
compressed coordinates by hand? We may be able to convince them to
call EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp.
Bug: 233, 236
Change-Id: I2bf361e9c089e0211b97d95523dbc06f1168e12b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25261
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-01-24 20:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
a = bn_resized_from_ctx(a, m->width, ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
b = bn_resized_from_ctx(b, m->width, ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
BIGNUM *tmp = bn_scratch_space_from_ctx(m->width, ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
int ok = a != NULL && b != NULL && tmp != NULL &&
|
|
|
|
|
bn_wexpand(r, m->width);
|
|
|
|
|
if (ok) {
|
|
|
|
|
bn_mod_sub_words(r->d, a->d, b->d, m->d, tmp->d, m->width);
|
|
|
|
|
r->width = m->width;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
return ok;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
int BN_mod_sub_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
|
|
|
|
|
const BIGNUM *m) {
|
Make BN_mod_*_quick constant-time.
As the EC code will ultimately want to use these in "words" form by way
of EC_FELEM, and because it's much easier, I've implement these as
low-level words-based functions that require all inputs have the same
width. The BIGNUM versions which RSA and, for now, EC calls are
implemented on top of that.
Unfortunately, doing such things in constant-time and accounting for
undersized inputs requires some scratch space, and these functions don't
take BN_CTX. So I've added internal bn_mod_*_quick_ctx functions that
take a BN_CTX and the old functions now allocate a bit unnecessarily.
RSA only needs lshift (for BN_MONT_CTX) and sub (for CRT), but the
generic EC code wants add as well.
The generic EC code isn't even remotely constant-time, and I hope to
ultimately use stack-allocated EC_FELEMs, so I've made the actual
implementations here implemented in "words", which is much simpler
anyway due to not having to take care of widths.
I've also gone ahead and switched the EC code to these functions,
largely as a test of their performance (an earlier iteration made the EC
code noticeably slower). These operations are otherwise not
performance-critical in RSA.
The conversion from BIGNUM to BIGNUM+BN_CTX should be dropped by the
static linker already, and the unused BIGNUM+BN_CTX functions will fall
off when EC_FELEM happens.
Update-Note: BN_mod_*_quick bounce on malloc a bit now, but they're not
really used externally. The one caller I found was wpa_supplicant
which bounces on malloc already. They appear to be implementing
compressed coordinates by hand? We may be able to convince them to
call EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp.
Bug: 233, 236
Change-Id: I2bf361e9c089e0211b97d95523dbc06f1168e12b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25261
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-01-24 20:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
|
|
|
|
|
int ok = ctx != NULL &&
|
2018-02-06 23:56:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
bn_mod_sub_consttime(r, a, b, m, ctx);
|
Make BN_mod_*_quick constant-time.
As the EC code will ultimately want to use these in "words" form by way
of EC_FELEM, and because it's much easier, I've implement these as
low-level words-based functions that require all inputs have the same
width. The BIGNUM versions which RSA and, for now, EC calls are
implemented on top of that.
Unfortunately, doing such things in constant-time and accounting for
undersized inputs requires some scratch space, and these functions don't
take BN_CTX. So I've added internal bn_mod_*_quick_ctx functions that
take a BN_CTX and the old functions now allocate a bit unnecessarily.
RSA only needs lshift (for BN_MONT_CTX) and sub (for CRT), but the
generic EC code wants add as well.
The generic EC code isn't even remotely constant-time, and I hope to
ultimately use stack-allocated EC_FELEMs, so I've made the actual
implementations here implemented in "words", which is much simpler
anyway due to not having to take care of widths.
I've also gone ahead and switched the EC code to these functions,
largely as a test of their performance (an earlier iteration made the EC
code noticeably slower). These operations are otherwise not
performance-critical in RSA.
The conversion from BIGNUM to BIGNUM+BN_CTX should be dropped by the
static linker already, and the unused BIGNUM+BN_CTX functions will fall
off when EC_FELEM happens.
Update-Note: BN_mod_*_quick bounce on malloc a bit now, but they're not
really used externally. The one caller I found was wpa_supplicant
which bounces on malloc already. They appear to be implementing
compressed coordinates by hand? We may be able to convince them to
call EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp.
Bug: 233, 236
Change-Id: I2bf361e9c089e0211b97d95523dbc06f1168e12b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25261
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-01-24 20:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
return ok;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int BN_mod_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m,
|
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
|
|
|
BIGNUM *t;
|
|
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
if (t == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (a == b) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (!BN_sqr(t, a, ctx)) {
|
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
|
if (!BN_mul(t, a, b, ctx)) {
|
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!BN_nnmod(r, t, m, ctx)) {
|
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int BN_mod_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (!BN_sqr(r, a, ctx)) {
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
|
// r->neg == 0, thus we don't need BN_nnmod
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
return BN_mod(r, r, m, ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int BN_mod_lshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n, const BIGNUM *m,
|
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
|
|
|
BIGNUM *abs_m = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!BN_nnmod(r, a, m, ctx)) {
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (m->neg) {
|
|
|
|
|
abs_m = BN_dup(m);
|
|
|
|
|
if (abs_m == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
abs_m->neg = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-02-06 23:56:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
ret = bn_mod_lshift_consttime(r, r, n, (abs_m ? abs_m : m), ctx);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
2015-04-22 18:50:28 +01:00
|
|
|
|
BN_free(abs_m);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-02-06 23:56:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
int bn_mod_lshift_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n, const BIGNUM *m,
|
Make BN_mod_*_quick constant-time.
As the EC code will ultimately want to use these in "words" form by way
of EC_FELEM, and because it's much easier, I've implement these as
low-level words-based functions that require all inputs have the same
width. The BIGNUM versions which RSA and, for now, EC calls are
implemented on top of that.
Unfortunately, doing such things in constant-time and accounting for
undersized inputs requires some scratch space, and these functions don't
take BN_CTX. So I've added internal bn_mod_*_quick_ctx functions that
take a BN_CTX and the old functions now allocate a bit unnecessarily.
RSA only needs lshift (for BN_MONT_CTX) and sub (for CRT), but the
generic EC code wants add as well.
The generic EC code isn't even remotely constant-time, and I hope to
ultimately use stack-allocated EC_FELEMs, so I've made the actual
implementations here implemented in "words", which is much simpler
anyway due to not having to take care of widths.
I've also gone ahead and switched the EC code to these functions,
largely as a test of their performance (an earlier iteration made the EC
code noticeably slower). These operations are otherwise not
performance-critical in RSA.
The conversion from BIGNUM to BIGNUM+BN_CTX should be dropped by the
static linker already, and the unused BIGNUM+BN_CTX functions will fall
off when EC_FELEM happens.
Update-Note: BN_mod_*_quick bounce on malloc a bit now, but they're not
really used externally. The one caller I found was wpa_supplicant
which bounces on malloc already. They appear to be implementing
compressed coordinates by hand? We may be able to convince them to
call EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp.
Bug: 233, 236
Change-Id: I2bf361e9c089e0211b97d95523dbc06f1168e12b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25261
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-01-24 20:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (!BN_copy(r, a)) {
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
Make BN_mod_*_quick constant-time.
As the EC code will ultimately want to use these in "words" form by way
of EC_FELEM, and because it's much easier, I've implement these as
low-level words-based functions that require all inputs have the same
width. The BIGNUM versions which RSA and, for now, EC calls are
implemented on top of that.
Unfortunately, doing such things in constant-time and accounting for
undersized inputs requires some scratch space, and these functions don't
take BN_CTX. So I've added internal bn_mod_*_quick_ctx functions that
take a BN_CTX and the old functions now allocate a bit unnecessarily.
RSA only needs lshift (for BN_MONT_CTX) and sub (for CRT), but the
generic EC code wants add as well.
The generic EC code isn't even remotely constant-time, and I hope to
ultimately use stack-allocated EC_FELEMs, so I've made the actual
implementations here implemented in "words", which is much simpler
anyway due to not having to take care of widths.
I've also gone ahead and switched the EC code to these functions,
largely as a test of their performance (an earlier iteration made the EC
code noticeably slower). These operations are otherwise not
performance-critical in RSA.
The conversion from BIGNUM to BIGNUM+BN_CTX should be dropped by the
static linker already, and the unused BIGNUM+BN_CTX functions will fall
off when EC_FELEM happens.
Update-Note: BN_mod_*_quick bounce on malloc a bit now, but they're not
really used externally. The one caller I found was wpa_supplicant
which bounces on malloc already. They appear to be implementing
compressed coordinates by hand? We may be able to convince them to
call EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp.
Bug: 233, 236
Change-Id: I2bf361e9c089e0211b97d95523dbc06f1168e12b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25261
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-01-24 20:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
for (int i = 0; i < n; i++) {
|
2018-02-06 23:56:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
if (!bn_mod_lshift1_consttime(r, r, m, ctx)) {
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
Make BN_mod_*_quick constant-time.
As the EC code will ultimately want to use these in "words" form by way
of EC_FELEM, and because it's much easier, I've implement these as
low-level words-based functions that require all inputs have the same
width. The BIGNUM versions which RSA and, for now, EC calls are
implemented on top of that.
Unfortunately, doing such things in constant-time and accounting for
undersized inputs requires some scratch space, and these functions don't
take BN_CTX. So I've added internal bn_mod_*_quick_ctx functions that
take a BN_CTX and the old functions now allocate a bit unnecessarily.
RSA only needs lshift (for BN_MONT_CTX) and sub (for CRT), but the
generic EC code wants add as well.
The generic EC code isn't even remotely constant-time, and I hope to
ultimately use stack-allocated EC_FELEMs, so I've made the actual
implementations here implemented in "words", which is much simpler
anyway due to not having to take care of widths.
I've also gone ahead and switched the EC code to these functions,
largely as a test of their performance (an earlier iteration made the EC
code noticeably slower). These operations are otherwise not
performance-critical in RSA.
The conversion from BIGNUM to BIGNUM+BN_CTX should be dropped by the
static linker already, and the unused BIGNUM+BN_CTX functions will fall
off when EC_FELEM happens.
Update-Note: BN_mod_*_quick bounce on malloc a bit now, but they're not
really used externally. The one caller I found was wpa_supplicant
which bounces on malloc already. They appear to be implementing
compressed coordinates by hand? We may be able to convince them to
call EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp.
Bug: 233, 236
Change-Id: I2bf361e9c089e0211b97d95523dbc06f1168e12b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25261
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-01-24 20:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
int BN_mod_lshift_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n, const BIGNUM *m) {
|
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
|
|
|
|
|
int ok = ctx != NULL &&
|
2018-02-06 23:56:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
bn_mod_lshift_consttime(r, a, n, m, ctx);
|
Make BN_mod_*_quick constant-time.
As the EC code will ultimately want to use these in "words" form by way
of EC_FELEM, and because it's much easier, I've implement these as
low-level words-based functions that require all inputs have the same
width. The BIGNUM versions which RSA and, for now, EC calls are
implemented on top of that.
Unfortunately, doing such things in constant-time and accounting for
undersized inputs requires some scratch space, and these functions don't
take BN_CTX. So I've added internal bn_mod_*_quick_ctx functions that
take a BN_CTX and the old functions now allocate a bit unnecessarily.
RSA only needs lshift (for BN_MONT_CTX) and sub (for CRT), but the
generic EC code wants add as well.
The generic EC code isn't even remotely constant-time, and I hope to
ultimately use stack-allocated EC_FELEMs, so I've made the actual
implementations here implemented in "words", which is much simpler
anyway due to not having to take care of widths.
I've also gone ahead and switched the EC code to these functions,
largely as a test of their performance (an earlier iteration made the EC
code noticeably slower). These operations are otherwise not
performance-critical in RSA.
The conversion from BIGNUM to BIGNUM+BN_CTX should be dropped by the
static linker already, and the unused BIGNUM+BN_CTX functions will fall
off when EC_FELEM happens.
Update-Note: BN_mod_*_quick bounce on malloc a bit now, but they're not
really used externally. The one caller I found was wpa_supplicant
which bounces on malloc already. They appear to be implementing
compressed coordinates by hand? We may be able to convince them to
call EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp.
Bug: 233, 236
Change-Id: I2bf361e9c089e0211b97d95523dbc06f1168e12b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25261
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-01-24 20:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
return ok;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
int BN_mod_lshift1(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (!BN_lshift1(r, a)) {
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return BN_nnmod(r, r, m, ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-02-06 23:56:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
int bn_mod_lshift1_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m,
|
Make BN_mod_*_quick constant-time.
As the EC code will ultimately want to use these in "words" form by way
of EC_FELEM, and because it's much easier, I've implement these as
low-level words-based functions that require all inputs have the same
width. The BIGNUM versions which RSA and, for now, EC calls are
implemented on top of that.
Unfortunately, doing such things in constant-time and accounting for
undersized inputs requires some scratch space, and these functions don't
take BN_CTX. So I've added internal bn_mod_*_quick_ctx functions that
take a BN_CTX and the old functions now allocate a bit unnecessarily.
RSA only needs lshift (for BN_MONT_CTX) and sub (for CRT), but the
generic EC code wants add as well.
The generic EC code isn't even remotely constant-time, and I hope to
ultimately use stack-allocated EC_FELEMs, so I've made the actual
implementations here implemented in "words", which is much simpler
anyway due to not having to take care of widths.
I've also gone ahead and switched the EC code to these functions,
largely as a test of their performance (an earlier iteration made the EC
code noticeably slower). These operations are otherwise not
performance-critical in RSA.
The conversion from BIGNUM to BIGNUM+BN_CTX should be dropped by the
static linker already, and the unused BIGNUM+BN_CTX functions will fall
off when EC_FELEM happens.
Update-Note: BN_mod_*_quick bounce on malloc a bit now, but they're not
really used externally. The one caller I found was wpa_supplicant
which bounces on malloc already. They appear to be implementing
compressed coordinates by hand? We may be able to convince them to
call EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp.
Bug: 233, 236
Change-Id: I2bf361e9c089e0211b97d95523dbc06f1168e12b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25261
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-01-24 20:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX *ctx) {
|
2018-02-06 23:56:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
return bn_mod_add_consttime(r, a, a, m, ctx);
|
Make BN_mod_*_quick constant-time.
As the EC code will ultimately want to use these in "words" form by way
of EC_FELEM, and because it's much easier, I've implement these as
low-level words-based functions that require all inputs have the same
width. The BIGNUM versions which RSA and, for now, EC calls are
implemented on top of that.
Unfortunately, doing such things in constant-time and accounting for
undersized inputs requires some scratch space, and these functions don't
take BN_CTX. So I've added internal bn_mod_*_quick_ctx functions that
take a BN_CTX and the old functions now allocate a bit unnecessarily.
RSA only needs lshift (for BN_MONT_CTX) and sub (for CRT), but the
generic EC code wants add as well.
The generic EC code isn't even remotely constant-time, and I hope to
ultimately use stack-allocated EC_FELEMs, so I've made the actual
implementations here implemented in "words", which is much simpler
anyway due to not having to take care of widths.
I've also gone ahead and switched the EC code to these functions,
largely as a test of their performance (an earlier iteration made the EC
code noticeably slower). These operations are otherwise not
performance-critical in RSA.
The conversion from BIGNUM to BIGNUM+BN_CTX should be dropped by the
static linker already, and the unused BIGNUM+BN_CTX functions will fall
off when EC_FELEM happens.
Update-Note: BN_mod_*_quick bounce on malloc a bit now, but they're not
really used externally. The one caller I found was wpa_supplicant
which bounces on malloc already. They appear to be implementing
compressed coordinates by hand? We may be able to convince them to
call EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp.
Bug: 233, 236
Change-Id: I2bf361e9c089e0211b97d95523dbc06f1168e12b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25261
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-01-24 20:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
Make BN_mod_*_quick constant-time.
As the EC code will ultimately want to use these in "words" form by way
of EC_FELEM, and because it's much easier, I've implement these as
low-level words-based functions that require all inputs have the same
width. The BIGNUM versions which RSA and, for now, EC calls are
implemented on top of that.
Unfortunately, doing such things in constant-time and accounting for
undersized inputs requires some scratch space, and these functions don't
take BN_CTX. So I've added internal bn_mod_*_quick_ctx functions that
take a BN_CTX and the old functions now allocate a bit unnecessarily.
RSA only needs lshift (for BN_MONT_CTX) and sub (for CRT), but the
generic EC code wants add as well.
The generic EC code isn't even remotely constant-time, and I hope to
ultimately use stack-allocated EC_FELEMs, so I've made the actual
implementations here implemented in "words", which is much simpler
anyway due to not having to take care of widths.
I've also gone ahead and switched the EC code to these functions,
largely as a test of their performance (an earlier iteration made the EC
code noticeably slower). These operations are otherwise not
performance-critical in RSA.
The conversion from BIGNUM to BIGNUM+BN_CTX should be dropped by the
static linker already, and the unused BIGNUM+BN_CTX functions will fall
off when EC_FELEM happens.
Update-Note: BN_mod_*_quick bounce on malloc a bit now, but they're not
really used externally. The one caller I found was wpa_supplicant
which bounces on malloc already. They appear to be implementing
compressed coordinates by hand? We may be able to convince them to
call EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp.
Bug: 233, 236
Change-Id: I2bf361e9c089e0211b97d95523dbc06f1168e12b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25261
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-01-24 20:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
int BN_mod_lshift1_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m) {
|
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
|
|
|
|
|
int ok = ctx != NULL &&
|
2018-02-06 23:56:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
bn_mod_lshift1_consttime(r, a, m, ctx);
|
Make BN_mod_*_quick constant-time.
As the EC code will ultimately want to use these in "words" form by way
of EC_FELEM, and because it's much easier, I've implement these as
low-level words-based functions that require all inputs have the same
width. The BIGNUM versions which RSA and, for now, EC calls are
implemented on top of that.
Unfortunately, doing such things in constant-time and accounting for
undersized inputs requires some scratch space, and these functions don't
take BN_CTX. So I've added internal bn_mod_*_quick_ctx functions that
take a BN_CTX and the old functions now allocate a bit unnecessarily.
RSA only needs lshift (for BN_MONT_CTX) and sub (for CRT), but the
generic EC code wants add as well.
The generic EC code isn't even remotely constant-time, and I hope to
ultimately use stack-allocated EC_FELEMs, so I've made the actual
implementations here implemented in "words", which is much simpler
anyway due to not having to take care of widths.
I've also gone ahead and switched the EC code to these functions,
largely as a test of their performance (an earlier iteration made the EC
code noticeably slower). These operations are otherwise not
performance-critical in RSA.
The conversion from BIGNUM to BIGNUM+BN_CTX should be dropped by the
static linker already, and the unused BIGNUM+BN_CTX functions will fall
off when EC_FELEM happens.
Update-Note: BN_mod_*_quick bounce on malloc a bit now, but they're not
really used externally. The one caller I found was wpa_supplicant
which bounces on malloc already. They appear to be implementing
compressed coordinates by hand? We may be able to convince them to
call EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp.
Bug: 233, 236
Change-Id: I2bf361e9c089e0211b97d95523dbc06f1168e12b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25261
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-01-24 20:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
return ok;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BN_ULONG BN_div_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w) {
|
|
|
|
|
BN_ULONG ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
int i, j;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!w) {
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
|
// actually this an error (division by zero)
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
return (BN_ULONG) - 1;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-15 10:23:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
if (a->width == 0) {
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
|
// normalize input for |bn_div_rem_words|.
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
j = BN_BITS2 - BN_num_bits_word(w);
|
|
|
|
|
w <<= j;
|
|
|
|
|
if (!BN_lshift(a, a, j)) {
|
|
|
|
|
return (BN_ULONG) - 1;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-15 10:23:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
for (i = a->width - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
|
2016-02-11 22:10:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
BN_ULONG l = a->d[i];
|
|
|
|
|
BN_ULONG d;
|
|
|
|
|
BN_ULONG unused_rem;
|
|
|
|
|
bn_div_rem_words(&d, &unused_rem, ret, l, w);
|
2017-10-12 04:55:18 +01:00
|
|
|
|
ret = l - (d * w);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
a->d[i] = d;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-15 10:23:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
bn_set_minimal_width(a);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
ret >>= j;
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BN_ULONG BN_mod_word(const BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w) {
|
2017-12-08 02:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
#ifndef BN_CAN_DIVIDE_ULLONG
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
BN_ULONG ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
|
BN_ULLONG ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (w == 0) {
|
|
|
|
|
return (BN_ULONG) -1;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-12-08 02:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
#ifndef BN_CAN_DIVIDE_ULLONG
|
|
|
|
|
// If |w| is too long and we don't have |BN_ULLONG| division then we need to
|
|
|
|
|
// fall back to using |BN_div_word|.
|
2016-06-09 19:57:56 +01:00
|
|
|
|
if (w > ((BN_ULONG)1 << BN_BITS4)) {
|
|
|
|
|
BIGNUM *tmp = BN_dup(a);
|
|
|
|
|
if (tmp == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
|
return (BN_ULONG)-1;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
ret = BN_div_word(tmp, w);
|
|
|
|
|
BN_free(tmp);
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-15 10:23:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
for (i = a->width - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
|
2017-12-08 02:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
#ifndef BN_CAN_DIVIDE_ULLONG
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
ret = ((ret << BN_BITS4) | ((a->d[i] >> BN_BITS4) & BN_MASK2l)) % w;
|
|
|
|
|
ret = ((ret << BN_BITS4) | (a->d[i] & BN_MASK2l)) % w;
|
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
|
ret = (BN_ULLONG)(((ret << (BN_ULLONG)BN_BITS2) | a->d[i]) % (BN_ULLONG)w);
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
return (BN_ULONG)ret;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-01-30 19:52:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int BN_mod_pow2(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, size_t e) {
|
2018-01-15 10:23:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
if (e == 0 || a->width == 0) {
|
2017-01-30 19:52:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
BN_zero(r);
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
size_t num_words = 1 + ((e - 1) / BN_BITS2);
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
|
// If |a| definitely has less than |e| bits, just BN_copy.
|
2018-01-15 10:23:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
if ((size_t) a->width < num_words) {
|
2017-01-30 19:52:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
return BN_copy(r, a) != NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
|
// Otherwise, first make sure we have enough space in |r|.
|
|
|
|
|
// Note that this will fail if num_words > INT_MAX.
|
2017-04-21 16:26:30 +01:00
|
|
|
|
if (!bn_wexpand(r, num_words)) {
|
2017-01-30 19:52:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
|
// Copy the content of |a| into |r|.
|
2017-01-30 19:52:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(r->d, a->d, num_words * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
|
// If |e| isn't word-aligned, we have to mask off some of our bits.
|
2017-01-30 19:52:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
size_t top_word_exponent = e % (sizeof(BN_ULONG) * 8);
|
|
|
|
|
if (top_word_exponent != 0) {
|
|
|
|
|
r->d[num_words - 1] &= (((BN_ULONG) 1) << top_word_exponent) - 1;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
|
// Fill in the remaining fields of |r|.
|
2017-01-30 19:52:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
r->neg = a->neg;
|
2018-01-15 10:23:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
r->width = (int) num_words;
|
|
|
|
|
bn_set_minimal_width(r);
|
2017-01-30 19:52:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int BN_nnmod_pow2(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, size_t e) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (!BN_mod_pow2(r, a, e)) {
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
|
// If the returned value was non-negative, we're done.
|
2017-01-30 19:52:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
if (BN_is_zero(r) || !r->neg) {
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
size_t num_words = 1 + (e - 1) / BN_BITS2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
|
// Expand |r| to the size of our modulus.
|
2017-04-21 16:26:30 +01:00
|
|
|
|
if (!bn_wexpand(r, num_words)) {
|
2017-01-30 19:52:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
|
// Clear the upper words of |r|.
|
2018-01-15 10:23:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memset(&r->d[r->width], 0, (num_words - r->width) * BN_BYTES);
|
2017-01-30 19:52:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
|
// Set parameters of |r|.
|
2017-01-30 19:52:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
r->neg = 0;
|
2018-01-15 10:23:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
r->width = (int) num_words;
|
2017-01-30 19:52:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
|
// Now, invert every word. The idea here is that we want to compute 2^e-|x|,
|
|
|
|
|
// which is actually equivalent to the twos-complement representation of |x|
|
|
|
|
|
// in |e| bits, which is -x = ~x + 1.
|
2018-01-15 10:23:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
for (int i = 0; i < r->width; i++) {
|
2017-01-30 19:52:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
r->d[i] = ~r->d[i];
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
|
// If our exponent doesn't span the top word, we have to mask the rest.
|
2017-01-30 19:52:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
size_t top_word_exponent = e % BN_BITS2;
|
|
|
|
|
if (top_word_exponent != 0) {
|
2018-01-15 10:23:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
r->d[r->width - 1] &= (((BN_ULONG) 1) << top_word_exponent) - 1;
|
2017-01-30 19:52:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-15 10:23:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
// Keep the minimal-width invariant for |BIGNUM|.
|
|
|
|
|
bn_set_minimal_width(r);
|
2017-01-30 19:52:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
|
// Finally, add one, for the reason described above.
|
2017-01-30 19:52:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
return BN_add(r, r, BN_value_one());
|
|
|
|
|
}
|