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boringssl/ssl/ssl_asn1.c

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Inital import. Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta). (This change contains substantial changes from the original and effectively starts a new history.)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license.
*
* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
*
* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
*
* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
* to make use of the Contribution.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
* OTHERWISE. */
#include <assert.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include <openssl/asn1_mac.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/obj.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
OPENSSL_DECLARE_ERROR_REASON(SSL, CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH);
OPENSSL_DECLARE_ERROR_REASON(SSL, UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION);
OPENSSL_DECLARE_ERROR_REASON(SSL, BAD_LENGTH);
OPENSSL_DECLARE_ERROR_FUNCTION(SSL, D2I_SSL_SESSION);
typedef struct ssl_session_asn1_st
{
ASN1_INTEGER version;
ASN1_INTEGER ssl_version;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING cipher;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING comp_id;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING master_key;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING session_id;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING session_id_context;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING key_arg;
ASN1_INTEGER time;
ASN1_INTEGER timeout;
ASN1_INTEGER verify_result;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING tlsext_hostname;
ASN1_INTEGER tlsext_tick_lifetime;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING tlsext_tick;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING psk_identity_hint;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING psk_identity;
Optionally, retain only SHA-256 of client cert. Adds an option to retain only the SHA256 of a client certificate in memory and in the serialized session state.
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
ASN1_OCTET_STRING peer_sha256;
ChannelID support. Implement ChannelID as both a client and server.
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
ASN1_OCTET_STRING original_handshake_hash;
Implement client side of TLS signed certificate stamps extension. https://crbug.com/389420 and 3.3 in rfc6962. Change-Id: Ib22bcd4e4bde5a314ed33e123e19a76cdb714da4 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1491 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2014-08-14 13:42:37 +01:00
ASN1_OCTET_STRING tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list;
Client-side OCSP stapling support. Remove the old implementation which was excessively general. This mirrors the SCT support and adds a single boolean flag to request an OCSP response with no responder IDs, extensions, or frills. The response, if received, is stored on the SSL_SESSION so that it is available for (re)validation on session resumption; Chromium revalidates the saved auth parameters on resume. Server support is unimplemented for now. This API will also need to be adjusted in the future if we implement RFC 6961. Change-Id: I533c029b7f7ea622d814d05f934fdace2da85cb1 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1671 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2014-08-27 21:42:38 +01:00
ASN1_OCTET_STRING ocsp_response;
Inital import. Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta). (This change contains substantial changes from the original and effectively starts a new history.)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
} SSL_SESSION_ASN1;
int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp)
{
#define LSIZE2 (sizeof(long)*2)
Client-side OCSP stapling support. Remove the old implementation which was excessively general. This mirrors the SCT support and adds a single boolean flag to request an OCSP response with no responder IDs, extensions, or frills. The response, if received, is stored on the SSL_SESSION so that it is available for (re)validation on session resumption; Chromium revalidates the saved auth parameters on resume. Server support is unimplemented for now. This API will also need to be adjusted in the future if we implement RFC 6961. Change-Id: I533c029b7f7ea622d814d05f934fdace2da85cb1 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1671 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2014-08-27 21:42:38 +01:00
int v1=0,v2=0,v3=0,v4=0,v5=0,v7=0,v8=0,v13=0,v14=0,v15=0,v16=0;
Inital import. Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta). (This change contains substantial changes from the original and effectively starts a new history.)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
unsigned char buf[4],ibuf1[LSIZE2],ibuf2[LSIZE2];
unsigned char ibuf3[LSIZE2],ibuf4[LSIZE2],ibuf5[LSIZE2];
int v6=0,v9=0,v10=0;
unsigned char ibuf6[LSIZE2];
long l;
SSL_SESSION_ASN1 a;
M_ASN1_I2D_vars(in);
if ((in == NULL) || ((in->cipher == NULL) && (in->cipher_id == 0)))
return(0);
/* Note that I cheat in the following 2 assignments. I know
* that if the ASN1_INTEGER passed to ASN1_INTEGER_set
* is > sizeof(long)+1, the buffer will not be re-OPENSSL_malloc()ed.
* This is a bit evil but makes things simple, no dynamic allocation
* to clean up :-) */
a.version.length=LSIZE2;
a.version.type=V_ASN1_INTEGER;
a.version.data=ibuf1;
ASN1_INTEGER_set(&(a.version),SSL_SESSION_ASN1_VERSION);
a.ssl_version.length=LSIZE2;
a.ssl_version.type=V_ASN1_INTEGER;
a.ssl_version.data=ibuf2;
ASN1_INTEGER_set(&(a.ssl_version),in->ssl_version);
a.cipher.type=V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
a.cipher.data=buf;
if (in->cipher == NULL)
l=in->cipher_id;
else
l=in->cipher->id;
if (in->ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION)
{
a.cipher.length=3;
buf[0]=((unsigned char)(l>>16L))&0xff;
buf[1]=((unsigned char)(l>> 8L))&0xff;
buf[2]=((unsigned char)(l ))&0xff;
}
else
{
a.cipher.length=2;
buf[0]=((unsigned char)(l>>8L))&0xff;
buf[1]=((unsigned char)(l ))&0xff;
}
a.master_key.length=in->master_key_length;
a.master_key.type=V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
a.master_key.data=in->master_key;
a.session_id.length=in->session_id_length;
a.session_id.type=V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
a.session_id.data=in->session_id;
a.session_id_context.length=in->sid_ctx_length;
a.session_id_context.type=V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
a.session_id_context.data=in->sid_ctx;
a.key_arg.length=in->key_arg_length;
a.key_arg.type=V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
a.key_arg.data=in->key_arg;
if (in->time != 0L)
{
a.time.length=LSIZE2;
a.time.type=V_ASN1_INTEGER;
a.time.data=ibuf3;
ASN1_INTEGER_set(&(a.time),in->time);
}
if (in->timeout != 0L)
{
a.timeout.length=LSIZE2;
a.timeout.type=V_ASN1_INTEGER;
a.timeout.data=ibuf4;
ASN1_INTEGER_set(&(a.timeout),in->timeout);
}
if (in->verify_result != X509_V_OK)
{
a.verify_result.length=LSIZE2;
a.verify_result.type=V_ASN1_INTEGER;
a.verify_result.data=ibuf5;
ASN1_INTEGER_set(&a.verify_result,in->verify_result);
}
if (in->tlsext_hostname)
{
a.tlsext_hostname.length=strlen(in->tlsext_hostname);
a.tlsext_hostname.type=V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
a.tlsext_hostname.data=(unsigned char *)in->tlsext_hostname;
}
if (in->tlsext_tick)
{
a.tlsext_tick.length= in->tlsext_ticklen;
a.tlsext_tick.type=V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
a.tlsext_tick.data=(unsigned char *)in->tlsext_tick;
}
if (in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint > 0)
{
a.tlsext_tick_lifetime.length=LSIZE2;
a.tlsext_tick_lifetime.type=V_ASN1_INTEGER;
a.tlsext_tick_lifetime.data=ibuf6;
ASN1_INTEGER_set(&a.tlsext_tick_lifetime,in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
}
if (in->psk_identity_hint)
{
a.psk_identity_hint.length=strlen(in->psk_identity_hint);
a.psk_identity_hint.type=V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
a.psk_identity_hint.data=(unsigned char *)(in->psk_identity_hint);
}
if (in->psk_identity)
{
a.psk_identity.length=strlen(in->psk_identity);
a.psk_identity.type=V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
a.psk_identity.data=(unsigned char *)(in->psk_identity);
}
Optionally, retain only SHA-256 of client cert. Adds an option to retain only the SHA256 of a client certificate in memory and in the serialized session state.
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
if (in->peer_sha256_valid)
{
a.peer_sha256.length = sizeof(in->peer_sha256);
a.peer_sha256.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
a.peer_sha256.data = in->peer_sha256;
}
ChannelID support. Implement ChannelID as both a client and server.
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
if (in->original_handshake_hash_len > 0)
{
a.original_handshake_hash.length = in->original_handshake_hash_len;
a.original_handshake_hash.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
a.original_handshake_hash.data = in->original_handshake_hash;
}
Inital import. Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta). (This change contains substantial changes from the original and effectively starts a new history.)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
Implement client side of TLS signed certificate stamps extension. https://crbug.com/389420 and 3.3 in rfc6962. Change-Id: Ib22bcd4e4bde5a314ed33e123e19a76cdb714da4 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1491 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2014-08-14 13:42:37 +01:00
if (in->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length > 0)
{
a.tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list.length =
in->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length;
a.tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
a.tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list.data =
in->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list;
}
Client-side OCSP stapling support. Remove the old implementation which was excessively general. This mirrors the SCT support and adds a single boolean flag to request an OCSP response with no responder IDs, extensions, or frills. The response, if received, is stored on the SSL_SESSION so that it is available for (re)validation on session resumption; Chromium revalidates the saved auth parameters on resume. Server support is unimplemented for now. This API will also need to be adjusted in the future if we implement RFC 6961. Change-Id: I533c029b7f7ea622d814d05f934fdace2da85cb1 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1671 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2014-08-27 21:42:38 +01:00
if (in->ocsp_response_length > 0)
{
a.ocsp_response.length = in->ocsp_response_length;
a.ocsp_response.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
a.ocsp_response.data = in->ocsp_response;
}
Inital import. Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta). (This change contains substantial changes from the original and effectively starts a new history.)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.version), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER);
M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.ssl_version), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER);
M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.cipher), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.session_id), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.master_key), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
if (in->key_arg_length > 0)
M_ASN1_I2D_len_IMP_opt(&(a.key_arg),i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
if (in->time != 0L)
M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.time),i2d_ASN1_INTEGER,1,v1);
if (in->timeout != 0L)
M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.timeout),i2d_ASN1_INTEGER,2,v2);
Optionally, retain only SHA-256 of client cert. Adds an option to retain only the SHA256 of a client certificate in memory and in the serialized session state.
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
if (in->peer != NULL && in->peer_sha256_valid == 0)
Inital import. Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta). (This change contains substantial changes from the original and effectively starts a new history.)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(in->peer,i2d_X509,3,v3);
M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&a.session_id_context,i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,4,v4);
if (in->verify_result != X509_V_OK)
M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.verify_result),i2d_ASN1_INTEGER,5,v5);
if (in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint > 0)
M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&a.tlsext_tick_lifetime, i2d_ASN1_INTEGER,9,v9);
if (in->tlsext_tick)
M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.tlsext_tick), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,10,v10);
if (in->tlsext_hostname)
M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.tlsext_hostname), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,6,v6);
if (in->psk_identity_hint)
M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.psk_identity_hint), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,7,v7);
if (in->psk_identity)
M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.psk_identity), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,8,v8);
Optionally, retain only SHA-256 of client cert. Adds an option to retain only the SHA256 of a client certificate in memory and in the serialized session state.
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
if (in->peer_sha256_valid)
M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.peer_sha256),i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,13,v13);
ChannelID support. Implement ChannelID as both a client and server.
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
if (in->original_handshake_hash_len > 0)
M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.original_handshake_hash),i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,14,v14);
Implement client side of TLS signed certificate stamps extension. https://crbug.com/389420 and 3.3 in rfc6962. Change-Id: Ib22bcd4e4bde5a314ed33e123e19a76cdb714da4 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1491 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2014-08-14 13:42:37 +01:00
if (in->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length > 0)
M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list),
i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 15, v15);
Client-side OCSP stapling support. Remove the old implementation which was excessively general. This mirrors the SCT support and adds a single boolean flag to request an OCSP response with no responder IDs, extensions, or frills. The response, if received, is stored on the SSL_SESSION so that it is available for (re)validation on session resumption; Chromium revalidates the saved auth parameters on resume. Server support is unimplemented for now. This API will also need to be adjusted in the future if we implement RFC 6961. Change-Id: I533c029b7f7ea622d814d05f934fdace2da85cb1 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1671 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2014-08-27 21:42:38 +01:00
if (in->ocsp_response_length > 0)
M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.ocsp_response), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 16, v16);
Inital import. Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta). (This change contains substantial changes from the original and effectively starts a new history.)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
M_ASN1_I2D_seq_total();
M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.version), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER);
M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.ssl_version), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER);
M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.cipher), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.session_id), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.master_key), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
if (in->key_arg_length > 0)
M_ASN1_I2D_put_IMP_opt(&(a.key_arg),i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,0);
if (in->time != 0L)
M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.time),i2d_ASN1_INTEGER,1,v1);
if (in->timeout != 0L)
M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.timeout),i2d_ASN1_INTEGER,2,v2);
Optionally, retain only SHA-256 of client cert. Adds an option to retain only the SHA256 of a client certificate in memory and in the serialized session state.
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
if (in->peer != NULL && in->peer_sha256_valid == 0)
Inital import. Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta). (This change contains substantial changes from the original and effectively starts a new history.)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(in->peer,i2d_X509,3,v3);
M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&a.session_id_context,i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,4,
v4);
if (in->verify_result != X509_V_OK)
M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&a.verify_result,i2d_ASN1_INTEGER,5,v5);
if (in->tlsext_hostname)
M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.tlsext_hostname), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,6,v6);
if (in->psk_identity_hint)
M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.psk_identity_hint), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,7,v7);
if (in->psk_identity)
M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.psk_identity), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,8,v8);
if (in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint > 0)
M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&a.tlsext_tick_lifetime, i2d_ASN1_INTEGER,9,v9);
if (in->tlsext_tick)
M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.tlsext_tick), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,10,v10);
Optionally, retain only SHA-256 of client cert. Adds an option to retain only the SHA256 of a client certificate in memory and in the serialized session state.
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
if (in->peer_sha256_valid)
M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.peer_sha256),i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,13,v13);
ChannelID support. Implement ChannelID as both a client and server.
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
if (in->original_handshake_hash_len > 0)
M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.original_handshake_hash),i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,14,v14);
Implement client side of TLS signed certificate stamps extension. https://crbug.com/389420 and 3.3 in rfc6962. Change-Id: Ib22bcd4e4bde5a314ed33e123e19a76cdb714da4 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1491 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2014-08-14 13:42:37 +01:00
if (in->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length > 0)
M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list),
i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 15, v15);
Client-side OCSP stapling support. Remove the old implementation which was excessively general. This mirrors the SCT support and adds a single boolean flag to request an OCSP response with no responder IDs, extensions, or frills. The response, if received, is stored on the SSL_SESSION so that it is available for (re)validation on session resumption; Chromium revalidates the saved auth parameters on resume. Server support is unimplemented for now. This API will also need to be adjusted in the future if we implement RFC 6961. Change-Id: I533c029b7f7ea622d814d05f934fdace2da85cb1 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1671 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2014-08-27 21:42:38 +01:00
if (in->ocsp_response > 0)
M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.ocsp_response), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 16, v16);
ChannelID support. Implement ChannelID as both a client and server.
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
Inital import. Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta). (This change contains substantial changes from the original and effectively starts a new history.)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
M_ASN1_I2D_finish();
}
SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const unsigned char **pp,
long length)
{
int ssl_version=0,i;
long id;
ASN1_INTEGER ai,*aip;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING os,*osp;
M_ASN1_D2I_vars(a,SSL_SESSION *,SSL_SESSION_new);
aip= &ai;
osp= &os;
M_ASN1_D2I_Init();
M_ASN1_D2I_start_sequence();
ai.data=NULL; ai.length=0;
M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_INTEGER,aip,d2i_ASN1_INTEGER);
if (ai.data != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(ai.data); ai.data=NULL; ai.length=0; }
/* we don't care about the version right now :-) */
M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_INTEGER,aip,d2i_ASN1_INTEGER);
ssl_version=(int)ASN1_INTEGER_get(aip);
ret->ssl_version=ssl_version;
if (ai.data != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(ai.data); ai.data=NULL; ai.length=0; }
os.data=NULL; os.length=0;
M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_OCTET_STRING,osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
if (ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION)
{
if (os.length != 3)
{
c.error=SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH;
fix coverity issue 966597 - error line is not always initialised (Imported from upstream's afe343c3a7077caeaad43a9f2ee7e5d7f70076e5)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
c.line=__LINE__;
Inital import. Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta). (This change contains substantial changes from the original and effectively starts a new history.)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
goto err;
}
id=0x02000000L|
((unsigned long)os.data[0]<<16L)|
((unsigned long)os.data[1]<< 8L)|
(unsigned long)os.data[2];
}
else if ((ssl_version>>8) >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
{
if (os.length != 2)
{
c.error=SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH;
fix coverity issue 966597 - error line is not always initialised (Imported from upstream's afe343c3a7077caeaad43a9f2ee7e5d7f70076e5)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
c.line=__LINE__;
Inital import. Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta). (This change contains substantial changes from the original and effectively starts a new history.)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
goto err;
}
id=0x03000000L|
((unsigned long)os.data[0]<<8L)|
(unsigned long)os.data[1];
}
else
{
c.error=SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION;
fix coverity issue 966597 - error line is not always initialised (Imported from upstream's afe343c3a7077caeaad43a9f2ee7e5d7f70076e5)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
c.line=__LINE__;
Inital import. Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta). (This change contains substantial changes from the original and effectively starts a new history.)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
goto err;
}
ret->cipher_id=id;
Set SSL_SESSION.cipher when parsing. This was done for the server when parsing a session ticket, but it wasn't done in the parsing function itself. That caused problems when high level code used the parsing function directly to set a session for the client code. See comments in internal bug 7091840. Change-Id: Iaa048c3df62cd9fe7a003af33805819e2556960a
2014-08-13 20:28:02 +01:00
ret->cipher = ssl3_get_cipher_by_value(ret->cipher_id & 0xffff);
if (ret->cipher == NULL)
{
c.error=SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER;
c.line = __LINE__;
goto err;
}
Inital import. Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta). (This change contains substantial changes from the original and effectively starts a new history.)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_OCTET_STRING,osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
if ((ssl_version>>8) >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
i=SSL3_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
else /* if (ssl_version>>8 == SSL2_VERSION_MAJOR) */
i=SSL2_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
if (os.length > i)
os.length = i;
if (os.length > (int)sizeof(ret->session_id)) /* can't happen */
os.length = sizeof(ret->session_id);
ret->session_id_length=os.length;
assert(os.length <= (int)sizeof(ret->session_id));
memcpy(ret->session_id,os.data,os.length);
M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_OCTET_STRING,osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
if (os.length > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
ret->master_key_length=SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
else
ret->master_key_length=os.length;
memcpy(ret->master_key,os.data,ret->master_key_length);
os.length=0;
M_ASN1_D2I_get_IMP_opt(osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,0,V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
if (os.length > SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH)
ret->key_arg_length=SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH;
else
ret->key_arg_length=os.length;
memcpy(ret->key_arg,os.data,ret->key_arg_length);
if (os.data != NULL) OPENSSL_free(os.data);
ai.length=0;
M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(aip,d2i_ASN1_INTEGER,1);
if (ai.data != NULL)
{
ret->time=ASN1_INTEGER_get(aip);
OPENSSL_free(ai.data); ai.data=NULL; ai.length=0;
}
else
ret->time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
ai.length=0;
M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(aip,d2i_ASN1_INTEGER,2);
if (ai.data != NULL)
{
ret->timeout=ASN1_INTEGER_get(aip);
OPENSSL_free(ai.data); ai.data=NULL; ai.length=0;
}
else
ret->timeout=3;
if (ret->peer != NULL)
{
X509_free(ret->peer);
ret->peer=NULL;
}
M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(ret->peer,d2i_X509,3);
os.length=0;
os.data=NULL;
M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,4);
if(os.data != NULL)
{
if (os.length > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH)
{
c.error=SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH;
fix coverity issue 966597 - error line is not always initialised (Imported from upstream's afe343c3a7077caeaad43a9f2ee7e5d7f70076e5)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
c.line=__LINE__;
Inital import. Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta). (This change contains substantial changes from the original and effectively starts a new history.)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
goto err;
}
else
{
ret->sid_ctx_length=os.length;
memcpy(ret->sid_ctx,os.data,os.length);
}
OPENSSL_free(os.data); os.data=NULL; os.length=0;
}
else
ret->sid_ctx_length=0;
ai.length=0;
M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(aip,d2i_ASN1_INTEGER,5);
if (ai.data != NULL)
{
ret->verify_result=ASN1_INTEGER_get(aip);
OPENSSL_free(ai.data); ai.data=NULL; ai.length=0;
}
else
ret->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
os.length=0;
os.data=NULL;
M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,6);
if (os.data)
{
ret->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strndup((char *)os.data, os.length);
OPENSSL_free(os.data);
os.data = NULL;
os.length = 0;
}
else
ret->tlsext_hostname=NULL;
os.length=0;
os.data=NULL;
M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,7);
if (os.data)
{
ret->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strndup((char *)os.data, os.length);
OPENSSL_free(os.data);
os.data = NULL;
os.length = 0;
}
else
ret->psk_identity_hint=NULL;
os.length=0;
os.data=NULL;
M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,8);
if (os.data)
{
ret->psk_identity = BUF_strndup((char *)os.data, os.length);
OPENSSL_free(os.data);
os.data = NULL;
os.length = 0;
}
else
ret->psk_identity=NULL;
ai.length=0;
M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(aip,d2i_ASN1_INTEGER,9);
if (ai.data != NULL)
{
ret->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint=ASN1_INTEGER_get(aip);
OPENSSL_free(ai.data); ai.data=NULL; ai.length=0;
}
else if (ret->tlsext_ticklen && ret->session_id_length)
ret->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = -1;
else
ret->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint=0;
os.length=0;
os.data=NULL;
M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,10);
if (os.data)
{
ret->tlsext_tick = os.data;
ret->tlsext_ticklen = os.length;
os.data = NULL;
os.length = 0;
}
else
ret->tlsext_tick=NULL;
Optionally, retain only SHA-256 of client cert. Adds an option to retain only the SHA256 of a client certificate in memory and in the serialized session state.
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
os.length=0;
os.data=NULL;
M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,13);
if (os.data && os.length == sizeof(ret->peer_sha256))
{
memcpy(ret->peer_sha256, os.data, sizeof(ret->peer_sha256));
ret->peer_sha256_valid = 1;
OPENSSL_free(os.data);
os.data = NULL;
}
ChannelID support. Implement ChannelID as both a client and server.
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
os.length=0;
os.data=NULL;
M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,14);
if (os.data && os.length < (int)sizeof(ret->original_handshake_hash))
{
memcpy(ret->original_handshake_hash, os.data, os.length);
ret->original_handshake_hash_len = os.length;
OPENSSL_free(os.data);
os.data = NULL;
}
Implement client side of TLS signed certificate stamps extension. https://crbug.com/389420 and 3.3 in rfc6962. Change-Id: Ib22bcd4e4bde5a314ed33e123e19a76cdb714da4 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1491 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2014-08-14 13:42:37 +01:00
os.length = 0;
os.data = NULL;
M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp, d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 15);
if (os.data)
{
if (ret->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list)
OPENSSL_free(ret->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list);
ret->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list = os.data;
ret->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length = os.length;
os.data = NULL;
}
Client-side OCSP stapling support. Remove the old implementation which was excessively general. This mirrors the SCT support and adds a single boolean flag to request an OCSP response with no responder IDs, extensions, or frills. The response, if received, is stored on the SSL_SESSION so that it is available for (re)validation on session resumption; Chromium revalidates the saved auth parameters on resume. Server support is unimplemented for now. This API will also need to be adjusted in the future if we implement RFC 6961. Change-Id: I533c029b7f7ea622d814d05f934fdace2da85cb1 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1671 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2014-08-27 21:42:38 +01:00
os.length = 0;
os.data = NULL;
M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp, d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 16);
if (os.data)
{
if (ret->ocsp_response)
OPENSSL_free(ret->ocsp_response);
ret->ocsp_response = os.data;
ret->ocsp_response_length = os.length;
os.data = NULL;
}
Implement client side of TLS signed certificate stamps extension. https://crbug.com/389420 and 3.3 in rfc6962. Change-Id: Ib22bcd4e4bde5a314ed33e123e19a76cdb714da4 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1491 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2014-08-14 13:42:37 +01:00
Inital import. Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta). (This change contains substantial changes from the original and effectively starts a new history.)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
M_ASN1_D2I_Finish(a,SSL_SESSION_free,SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION);
}
Reference in New Issue Copy Permalink