2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
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/* Copyright (c) 2015, Google Inc.
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*
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* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
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* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
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* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
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* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
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* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
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* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
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* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
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* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
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2015-09-15 06:48:04 +01:00
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/aead.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
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#include "../crypto/internal.h"
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2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
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#include "internal.h"
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
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#define FUZZER_MODE true
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#else
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#define FUZZER_MODE false
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#endif
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Move libssl's internals into the bssl namespace.
This is horrible, but everything else I tried was worse. The goal with
this CL is to take the extern "C" out of ssl/internal.h and move most
symbols to namespace bssl, so we can start using C++ helpers and
destructors without worry.
Complications:
- Public API functions must be extern "C" and match their declaration in
ssl.h, which is unnamespaced. C++ really does not want you to
interleave namespaced and unnamespaced things. One can actually write
a namespaced extern "C" function, but this means, from C++'s
perspective, the function is namespaced. Trying to namespace the
public header would worked but ended up too deep a rabbithole.
- Our STACK_OF macros do not work right in namespaces.
- The typedefs for our exposed but opaque types are visible in the
header files and copied into consuming projects as forward
declarations. We ultimately want to give SSL a destructor, but
clobbering an unnamespaced ssl_st::~ssl_st seems bad manners.
- MSVC complains about ambiguous names if one typedefs SSL to bssl::SSL.
This CL opts for:
- ssl/*.cc must begin with #define BORINGSSL_INTERNAL_CXX_TYPES. This
informs the public headers to create forward declarations which are
compatible with our namespaces.
- For now, C++-defined type FOO ends up at bssl::FOO with a typedef
outside. Later I imagine we'll rename many of them.
- Internal functions get namespace bssl, so we stop worrying about
stomping the tls1_prf symbol. Exported C functions are stuck as they
are. Rather than try anything weird, bite the bullet and reorder files
which have a mix of public and private functions. I expect that over
time, the public functions will become fairly small as we move logic
to more idiomatic C++.
Files without any public C functions can just be written normally.
- To avoid MSVC troubles, some bssl types are renamed to CPlusPlusStyle
in advance of them being made idiomatic C++.
Bug: 132
Change-Id: Ic931895e117c38b14ff8d6e5a273e868796c7581
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18124
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2017-07-18 21:34:25 +01:00
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namespace bssl {
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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SSLAEADContext::SSLAEADContext(uint16_t version_arg,
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const SSL_CIPHER *cipher_arg)
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: cipher_(cipher_arg),
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version_(version_arg),
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variable_nonce_included_in_record_(false),
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random_variable_nonce_(false),
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omit_length_in_ad_(false),
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omit_version_in_ad_(false),
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omit_ad_(false),
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xor_fixed_nonce_(false) {
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OPENSSL_memset(fixed_nonce_, 0, sizeof(fixed_nonce_));
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}
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SSLAEADContext::~SSLAEADContext() {}
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UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> SSLAEADContext::CreateNullCipher() {
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return MakeUnique<SSLAEADContext>(0 /* version */, nullptr /* cipher */);
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}
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UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> SSLAEADContext::Create(
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enum evp_aead_direction_t direction, uint16_t version, int is_dtls,
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const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, const uint8_t *enc_key, size_t enc_key_len,
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const uint8_t *mac_key, size_t mac_key_len, const uint8_t *fixed_iv,
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size_t fixed_iv_len) {
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2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
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const EVP_AEAD *aead;
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2016-10-28 22:17:14 +01:00
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size_t expected_mac_key_len, expected_fixed_iv_len;
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if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(&aead, &expected_mac_key_len,
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2017-05-24 21:54:35 +01:00
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&expected_fixed_iv_len, cipher, version,
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is_dtls) ||
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2016-10-28 22:17:14 +01:00
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/* Ensure the caller returned correct key sizes. */
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expected_fixed_iv_len != fixed_iv_len ||
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expected_mac_key_len != mac_key_len) {
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2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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return nullptr;
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2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
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}
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uint8_t merged_key[EVP_AEAD_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
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if (mac_key_len > 0) {
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/* This is a "stateful" AEAD (for compatibility with pre-AEAD cipher
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* suites). */
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if (mac_key_len + enc_key_len + fixed_iv_len > sizeof(merged_key)) {
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2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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return nullptr;
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2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
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}
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2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
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OPENSSL_memcpy(merged_key, mac_key, mac_key_len);
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OPENSSL_memcpy(merged_key + mac_key_len, enc_key, enc_key_len);
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OPENSSL_memcpy(merged_key + mac_key_len + enc_key_len, fixed_iv,
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fixed_iv_len);
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2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
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enc_key = merged_key;
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enc_key_len += mac_key_len;
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enc_key_len += fixed_iv_len;
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}
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> aead_ctx =
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MakeUnique<SSLAEADContext>(version, cipher);
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if (!aead_ctx) {
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2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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return nullptr;
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2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
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}
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if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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aead_ctx->ctx_.get(), aead, enc_key, enc_key_len,
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2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
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EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH, direction)) {
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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return nullptr;
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2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
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}
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assert(EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead) <= EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH);
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2017-07-15 00:36:07 +01:00
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static_assert(EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH < 256,
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"variable_nonce_len doesn't fit in uint8_t");
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len_ = (uint8_t)EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead);
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2015-10-29 17:19:56 +00:00
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if (mac_key_len == 0) {
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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assert(fixed_iv_len <= sizeof(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_));
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OPENSSL_memcpy(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_, fixed_iv, fixed_iv_len);
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aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len_ = fixed_iv_len;
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2015-12-10 04:02:39 +00:00
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if (cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305) {
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/* The fixed nonce into the actual nonce (the sequence number). */
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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aead_ctx->xor_fixed_nonce_ = true;
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aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len_ = 8;
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2015-12-10 04:02:39 +00:00
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} else {
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/* The fixed IV is prepended to the nonce. */
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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assert(fixed_iv_len <= aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len_);
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aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len_ -= fixed_iv_len;
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2015-12-10 04:02:39 +00:00
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}
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2015-06-21 20:13:57 +01:00
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/* AES-GCM uses an explicit nonce. */
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if (cipher->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM)) {
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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aead_ctx->variable_nonce_included_in_record_ = true;
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2015-06-21 20:13:57 +01:00
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}
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2016-05-24 17:43:04 +01:00
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/* The TLS 1.3 construction XORs the fixed nonce into the sequence number
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* and omits the additional data. */
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if (version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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aead_ctx->xor_fixed_nonce_ = true;
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aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len_ = 8;
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aead_ctx->variable_nonce_included_in_record_ = false;
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aead_ctx->omit_ad_ = true;
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assert(fixed_iv_len >= aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len_);
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2016-05-24 17:43:04 +01:00
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}
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2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
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} else {
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2016-06-16 11:38:04 +01:00
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assert(version < TLS1_3_VERSION);
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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aead_ctx->variable_nonce_included_in_record_ = true;
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aead_ctx->random_variable_nonce_ = true;
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aead_ctx->omit_length_in_ad_ = true;
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aead_ctx->omit_version_in_ad_ = (version == SSL3_VERSION);
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2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
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}
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return aead_ctx;
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}
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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size_t SSLAEADContext::ExplicitNonceLen() const {
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if (!FUZZER_MODE && variable_nonce_included_in_record_) {
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return variable_nonce_len_;
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2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
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}
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return 0;
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}
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2017-07-22 00:27:54 +01:00
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bool SSLAEADContext::SuffixLen(size_t *out_suffix_len, const size_t in_len,
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const size_t extra_in_len) const {
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if (is_null_cipher() || FUZZER_MODE) {
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*out_suffix_len = extra_in_len;
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return true;
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}
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return !!EVP_AEAD_CTX_tag_len(ctx_.get(), out_suffix_len, in_len,
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extra_in_len);
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2017-06-30 13:29:50 +01:00
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}
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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size_t SSLAEADContext::MaxOverhead() const {
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2017-07-22 00:27:54 +01:00
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return ExplicitNonceLen() +
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(is_null_cipher() || FUZZER_MODE
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? 0
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: EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(EVP_AEAD_CTX_aead(ctx_.get())));
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2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
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}
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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size_t SSLAEADContext::GetAdditionalData(uint8_t out[13], uint8_t type,
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uint16_t wire_version,
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const uint8_t seqnum[8],
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size_t plaintext_len) {
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if (omit_ad_) {
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2016-05-24 17:43:04 +01:00
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return 0;
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}
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2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
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OPENSSL_memcpy(out, seqnum, 8);
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2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
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size_t len = 8;
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out[len++] = type;
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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if (!omit_version_in_ad_) {
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out[len++] = static_cast<uint8_t>((wire_version >> 8));
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out[len++] = static_cast<uint8_t>(wire_version);
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2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
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}
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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if (!omit_length_in_ad_) {
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out[len++] = static_cast<uint8_t>((plaintext_len >> 8));
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out[len++] = static_cast<uint8_t>(plaintext_len);
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2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
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}
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return len;
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}
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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bool SSLAEADContext::Open(CBS *out, uint8_t type, uint16_t wire_version,
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const uint8_t seqnum[8], uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
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if (is_null_cipher() || FUZZER_MODE) {
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2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
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/* Handle the initial NULL cipher. */
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2016-06-06 23:54:51 +01:00
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CBS_init(out, in, in_len);
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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return true;
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2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
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}
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/* TLS 1.2 AEADs include the length in the AD and are assumed to have fixed
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* overhead. Otherwise the parameter is unused. */
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size_t plaintext_len = 0;
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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if (!omit_length_in_ad_) {
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size_t overhead = MaxOverhead();
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2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
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if (in_len < overhead) {
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/* Publicly invalid. */
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2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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return false;
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2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
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}
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plaintext_len = in_len - overhead;
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}
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uint8_t ad[13];
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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size_t ad_len =
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GetAdditionalData(ad, type, wire_version, seqnum, plaintext_len);
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2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
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/* Assemble the nonce. */
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uint8_t nonce[EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH];
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size_t nonce_len = 0;
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2015-12-10 04:02:39 +00:00
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/* Prepend the fixed nonce, or left-pad with zeros if XORing. */
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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if (xor_fixed_nonce_) {
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nonce_len = fixed_nonce_len_ - variable_nonce_len_;
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2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
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OPENSSL_memset(nonce, 0, nonce_len);
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2015-12-10 04:02:39 +00:00
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} else {
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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OPENSSL_memcpy(nonce, fixed_nonce_, fixed_nonce_len_);
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nonce_len += fixed_nonce_len_;
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2015-12-10 04:02:39 +00:00
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}
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/* Add the variable nonce. */
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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if (variable_nonce_included_in_record_) {
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if (in_len < variable_nonce_len_) {
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2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
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/* Publicly invalid. */
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2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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return false;
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2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
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}
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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OPENSSL_memcpy(nonce + nonce_len, in, variable_nonce_len_);
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in += variable_nonce_len_;
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in_len -= variable_nonce_len_;
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2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
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} else {
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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assert(variable_nonce_len_ == 8);
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OPENSSL_memcpy(nonce + nonce_len, seqnum, variable_nonce_len_);
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2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
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}
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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nonce_len += variable_nonce_len_;
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2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
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2015-12-10 04:02:39 +00:00
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/* XOR the fixed nonce, if necessary. */
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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if (xor_fixed_nonce_) {
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assert(nonce_len == fixed_nonce_len_);
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for (size_t i = 0; i < fixed_nonce_len_; i++) {
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nonce[i] ^= fixed_nonce_[i];
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2015-12-10 04:02:39 +00:00
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}
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}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-06 23:54:51 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Decrypt in-place. */
|
|
|
|
size_t len;
|
2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(ctx_.get(), in, &len, in_len, nonce, nonce_len, in,
|
|
|
|
in_len, ad, ad_len)) {
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
2016-06-06 23:54:51 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBS_init(out, in, len);
|
2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
|
|
|
return true;
|
2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
|
|
|
bool SSLAEADContext::SealScatter(uint8_t *out_prefix, uint8_t *out,
|
2017-07-22 00:27:54 +01:00
|
|
|
uint8_t *out_suffix, uint8_t type,
|
2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
|
|
|
uint16_t wire_version, const uint8_t seqnum[8],
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *extra_in, size_t extra_in_len) {
|
2017-07-22 00:27:54 +01:00
|
|
|
const size_t prefix_len = ExplicitNonceLen();
|
|
|
|
size_t suffix_len;
|
|
|
|
if (!SuffixLen(&suffix_len, in_len, extra_in_len)) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
|
2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
|
|
|
return false;
|
2017-06-30 13:29:50 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-07-22 00:27:54 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((in != out && buffers_alias(in, in_len, out, in_len)) ||
|
|
|
|
buffers_alias(in, in_len, out_prefix, prefix_len) ||
|
|
|
|
buffers_alias(in, in_len, out_suffix, suffix_len)) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT);
|
2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
|
|
|
return false;
|
2017-06-30 13:29:50 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
|
|
|
if (is_null_cipher() || FUZZER_MODE) {
|
2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Handle the initial NULL cipher. */
|
2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memmove(out, in, in_len);
|
2017-06-30 13:29:50 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memmove(out_suffix, extra_in, extra_in_len);
|
2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
|
|
|
return true;
|
2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
uint8_t ad[13];
|
2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
|
|
|
size_t ad_len = GetAdditionalData(ad, type, wire_version, seqnum, in_len);
|
2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Assemble the nonce. */
|
|
|
|
uint8_t nonce[EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH];
|
|
|
|
size_t nonce_len = 0;
|
2015-12-10 04:02:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Prepend the fixed nonce, or left-pad with zeros if XORing. */
|
2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
|
|
|
if (xor_fixed_nonce_) {
|
|
|
|
nonce_len = fixed_nonce_len_ - variable_nonce_len_;
|
2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memset(nonce, 0, nonce_len);
|
2015-12-10 04:02:39 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(nonce, fixed_nonce_, fixed_nonce_len_);
|
|
|
|
nonce_len += fixed_nonce_len_;
|
2015-12-10 04:02:39 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Select the variable nonce. */
|
2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
|
|
|
if (random_variable_nonce_) {
|
|
|
|
assert(variable_nonce_included_in_record_);
|
|
|
|
if (!RAND_bytes(nonce + nonce_len, variable_nonce_len_)) {
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* When sending we use the sequence number as the variable part of the
|
|
|
|
* nonce. */
|
2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
|
|
|
assert(variable_nonce_len_ == 8);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(nonce + nonce_len, seqnum, variable_nonce_len_);
|
2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
|
|
|
nonce_len += variable_nonce_len_;
|
2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Emit the variable nonce if included in the record. */
|
2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
|
|
|
if (variable_nonce_included_in_record_) {
|
|
|
|
assert(!xor_fixed_nonce_);
|
|
|
|
if (buffers_alias(in, in_len, out_prefix, variable_nonce_len_)) {
|
2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT);
|
2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
|
|
|
return false;
|
2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(out_prefix, nonce + fixed_nonce_len_,
|
|
|
|
variable_nonce_len_);
|
2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-12-10 04:02:39 +00:00
|
|
|
/* XOR the fixed nonce, if necessary. */
|
2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
|
|
|
if (xor_fixed_nonce_) {
|
|
|
|
assert(nonce_len == fixed_nonce_len_);
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < fixed_nonce_len_; i++) {
|
|
|
|
nonce[i] ^= fixed_nonce_[i];
|
2015-12-10 04:02:39 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-22 00:27:54 +01:00
|
|
|
size_t written_suffix_len;
|
|
|
|
bool result = !!EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal_scatter(
|
|
|
|
ctx_.get(), out, out_suffix, &written_suffix_len, suffix_len, nonce,
|
2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
|
|
|
nonce_len, in, in_len, extra_in, extra_in_len, ad, ad_len);
|
2017-07-22 00:27:54 +01:00
|
|
|
assert(!result || written_suffix_len == suffix_len);
|
|
|
|
return result;
|
2017-06-30 13:29:50 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
|
|
|
bool SSLAEADContext::Seal(uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len,
|
|
|
|
uint8_t type, uint16_t wire_version,
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t seqnum[8], const uint8_t *in,
|
|
|
|
size_t in_len) {
|
2017-07-22 00:27:54 +01:00
|
|
|
const size_t prefix_len = ExplicitNonceLen();
|
|
|
|
size_t suffix_len;
|
|
|
|
if (!SuffixLen(&suffix_len, in_len, 0)) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (in_len + prefix_len < in_len ||
|
|
|
|
in_len + prefix_len + suffix_len < in_len + prefix_len) {
|
2017-06-30 13:29:50 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
|
2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
|
|
|
return false;
|
2017-06-30 13:29:50 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-07-22 00:27:54 +01:00
|
|
|
if (in_len + prefix_len + suffix_len > max_out_len) {
|
2017-06-30 13:29:50 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
|
|
|
return false;
|
2017-06-30 13:29:50 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-22 00:27:54 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!SealScatter(out, out + prefix_len, out + prefix_len + in_len, type,
|
2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
|
|
|
wire_version, seqnum, in, in_len, 0, 0)) {
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-06-30 13:29:50 +01:00
|
|
|
*out_len = prefix_len + in_len + suffix_len;
|
2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bool SSLAEADContext::GetIV(const uint8_t **out_iv, size_t *out_iv_len) const {
|
|
|
|
return !is_null_cipher() &&
|
|
|
|
EVP_AEAD_CTX_get_iv(ctx_.get(), out_iv, out_iv_len);
|
2015-03-03 19:20:26 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
Move libssl's internals into the bssl namespace.
This is horrible, but everything else I tried was worse. The goal with
this CL is to take the extern "C" out of ssl/internal.h and move most
symbols to namespace bssl, so we can start using C++ helpers and
destructors without worry.
Complications:
- Public API functions must be extern "C" and match their declaration in
ssl.h, which is unnamespaced. C++ really does not want you to
interleave namespaced and unnamespaced things. One can actually write
a namespaced extern "C" function, but this means, from C++'s
perspective, the function is namespaced. Trying to namespace the
public header would worked but ended up too deep a rabbithole.
- Our STACK_OF macros do not work right in namespaces.
- The typedefs for our exposed but opaque types are visible in the
header files and copied into consuming projects as forward
declarations. We ultimately want to give SSL a destructor, but
clobbering an unnamespaced ssl_st::~ssl_st seems bad manners.
- MSVC complains about ambiguous names if one typedefs SSL to bssl::SSL.
This CL opts for:
- ssl/*.cc must begin with #define BORINGSSL_INTERNAL_CXX_TYPES. This
informs the public headers to create forward declarations which are
compatible with our namespaces.
- For now, C++-defined type FOO ends up at bssl::FOO with a typedef
outside. Later I imagine we'll rename many of them.
- Internal functions get namespace bssl, so we stop worrying about
stomping the tls1_prf symbol. Exported C functions are stuck as they
are. Rather than try anything weird, bite the bullet and reorder files
which have a mix of public and private functions. I expect that over
time, the public functions will become fairly small as we move logic
to more idiomatic C++.
Files without any public C functions can just be written normally.
- To avoid MSVC troubles, some bssl types are renamed to CPlusPlusStyle
in advance of them being made idiomatic C++.
Bug: 132
Change-Id: Ic931895e117c38b14ff8d6e5a273e868796c7581
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18124
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2017-07-18 21:34:25 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} // namespace bssl
|