2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include <limits.h>
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2015-01-31 01:08:37 +00:00
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#include <string.h>
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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2017-04-28 22:47:06 +01:00
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#include "../delocate.h"
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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BIGNUM *BN_new(void) {
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BIGNUM *bn = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BIGNUM));
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if (bn == NULL) {
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2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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return NULL;
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}
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2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
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OPENSSL_memset(bn, 0, sizeof(BIGNUM));
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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bn->flags = BN_FLG_MALLOCED;
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return bn;
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}
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void BN_init(BIGNUM *bn) {
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2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
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OPENSSL_memset(bn, 0, sizeof(BIGNUM));
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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}
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void BN_free(BIGNUM *bn) {
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if (bn == NULL) {
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return;
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}
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2015-04-22 18:50:28 +01:00
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if ((bn->flags & BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA) == 0) {
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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OPENSSL_free(bn->d);
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}
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if (bn->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED) {
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OPENSSL_free(bn);
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} else {
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bn->d = NULL;
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}
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}
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void BN_clear_free(BIGNUM *bn) {
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char should_free;
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if (bn == NULL) {
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return;
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}
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if (bn->d != NULL) {
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if ((bn->flags & BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA) == 0) {
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OPENSSL_free(bn->d);
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2017-08-30 18:49:05 +01:00
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} else {
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OPENSSL_cleanse(bn->d, bn->dmax * sizeof(bn->d[0]));
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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}
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}
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should_free = (bn->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED) != 0;
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if (should_free) {
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OPENSSL_free(bn);
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2017-08-30 18:49:05 +01:00
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} else {
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OPENSSL_cleanse(bn, sizeof(BIGNUM));
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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}
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}
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BIGNUM *BN_dup(const BIGNUM *src) {
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BIGNUM *copy;
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if (src == NULL) {
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return NULL;
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}
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copy = BN_new();
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if (copy == NULL) {
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return NULL;
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}
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if (!BN_copy(copy, src)) {
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BN_free(copy);
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return NULL;
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}
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return copy;
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}
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BIGNUM *BN_copy(BIGNUM *dest, const BIGNUM *src) {
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if (src == dest) {
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return dest;
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}
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2017-04-21 16:26:30 +01:00
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if (!bn_wexpand(dest, src->top)) {
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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return NULL;
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}
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2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
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OPENSSL_memcpy(dest->d, src->d, sizeof(src->d[0]) * src->top);
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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dest->top = src->top;
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dest->neg = src->neg;
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return dest;
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}
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void BN_clear(BIGNUM *bn) {
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if (bn->d != NULL) {
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2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
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OPENSSL_memset(bn->d, 0, bn->dmax * sizeof(bn->d[0]));
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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}
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bn->top = 0;
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bn->neg = 0;
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}
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2017-04-28 22:47:06 +01:00
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DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(BIGNUM, BN_value_one) {
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2015-11-18 08:00:09 +00:00
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static const BN_ULONG kOneLimbs[1] = { 1 };
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2017-04-28 22:47:06 +01:00
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out->d = (BN_ULONG*) kOneLimbs;
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out->top = 1;
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out->dmax = 1;
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out->neg = 0;
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out->flags = BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA;
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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}
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// BN_num_bits_word returns the minimum number of bits needed to represent the
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// value in |l|.
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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unsigned BN_num_bits_word(BN_ULONG l) {
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Make BN_num_bits_word constant-time.
(The BN_num_bits_word implementation was originally written by Andy
Polyakov for OpenSSL. See also
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5154.)
BN_num_bits, by way of BN_num_bits_word, currently leaks the
most-significant word of its argument via branching and memory access
pattern.
BN_num_bits is called on RSA prime factors in various places. These have
public bit lengths, but all bits beyond the high bit are secret. This
fully resolves those cases.
There are a few places where BN_num_bits is called on an input where
the bit length is also secret. The two left in BoringSSL are:
- BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime calls it on the RSA private exponent.
- The timing "fix" to add the order to k in DSA.
This does *not* fully resolve those cases as we still only look at the
top word. Today, that is guaranteed to be non-zero, but only because of
the long-standing bn_correct_top timing leak. Once that is fixed (I hope
to have patches soon), a constant-time BN_num_bits on such inputs must
count bits on each word.
Instead, those cases should not call BN_num_bits at all. The former uses
the bit width to pick windows, but it should be using the maximum bit
width. The next patch will fix this. The latter is the same "fix" we
excised from ECDSA in a838f9dc7e6cc091237f0acbbe4953104104e815. That
should be excised from DSA after the bn_correct_top bug is fixed.
Thanks to Dinghao Wu, Danfeng Zhang, Shuai Wang, Pei Wang, and Xiao Liu
for reporting this issue.
Change-Id: Idc3da518cc5ec18bd8688b95f959b15300a57c14
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25184
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-01-22 15:44:50 +00:00
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// |BN_num_bits| is often called on RSA prime factors. These have public bit
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// lengths, but all bits beyond the high bit are secret, so count bits in
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// constant time.
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BN_ULONG x, mask;
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int bits = (l != 0);
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#if BN_BITS2 > 32
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x = l >> 32;
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mask = 0u - x;
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mask = (0u - (mask >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)));
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bits += 32 & mask;
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l ^= (x ^ l) & mask;
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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#endif
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Make BN_num_bits_word constant-time.
(The BN_num_bits_word implementation was originally written by Andy
Polyakov for OpenSSL. See also
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5154.)
BN_num_bits, by way of BN_num_bits_word, currently leaks the
most-significant word of its argument via branching and memory access
pattern.
BN_num_bits is called on RSA prime factors in various places. These have
public bit lengths, but all bits beyond the high bit are secret. This
fully resolves those cases.
There are a few places where BN_num_bits is called on an input where
the bit length is also secret. The two left in BoringSSL are:
- BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime calls it on the RSA private exponent.
- The timing "fix" to add the order to k in DSA.
This does *not* fully resolve those cases as we still only look at the
top word. Today, that is guaranteed to be non-zero, but only because of
the long-standing bn_correct_top timing leak. Once that is fixed (I hope
to have patches soon), a constant-time BN_num_bits on such inputs must
count bits on each word.
Instead, those cases should not call BN_num_bits at all. The former uses
the bit width to pick windows, but it should be using the maximum bit
width. The next patch will fix this. The latter is the same "fix" we
excised from ECDSA in a838f9dc7e6cc091237f0acbbe4953104104e815. That
should be excised from DSA after the bn_correct_top bug is fixed.
Thanks to Dinghao Wu, Danfeng Zhang, Shuai Wang, Pei Wang, and Xiao Liu
for reporting this issue.
Change-Id: Idc3da518cc5ec18bd8688b95f959b15300a57c14
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25184
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-01-22 15:44:50 +00:00
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x = l >> 16;
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mask = 0u - x;
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mask = (0u - (mask >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)));
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bits += 16 & mask;
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l ^= (x ^ l) & mask;
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x = l >> 8;
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mask = 0u - x;
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mask = (0u - (mask >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)));
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bits += 8 & mask;
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l ^= (x ^ l) & mask;
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x = l >> 4;
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mask = 0u - x;
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mask = (0u - (mask >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)));
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bits += 4 & mask;
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l ^= (x ^ l) & mask;
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x = l >> 2;
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mask = 0u - x;
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mask = (0u - (mask >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)));
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bits += 2 & mask;
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l ^= (x ^ l) & mask;
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x = l >> 1;
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mask = 0u - x;
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mask = (0u - (mask >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)));
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bits += 1 & mask;
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return bits;
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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}
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unsigned BN_num_bits(const BIGNUM *bn) {
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const int max = bn->top - 1;
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if (BN_is_zero(bn)) {
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return 0;
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}
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return max*BN_BITS2 + BN_num_bits_word(bn->d[max]);
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}
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unsigned BN_num_bytes(const BIGNUM *bn) {
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return (BN_num_bits(bn) + 7) / 8;
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}
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void BN_zero(BIGNUM *bn) {
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bn->top = bn->neg = 0;
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}
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int BN_one(BIGNUM *bn) {
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return BN_set_word(bn, 1);
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}
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int BN_set_word(BIGNUM *bn, BN_ULONG value) {
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if (value == 0) {
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BN_zero(bn);
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return 1;
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}
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2017-04-21 16:26:30 +01:00
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if (!bn_wexpand(bn, 1)) {
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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return 0;
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}
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bn->neg = 0;
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bn->d[0] = value;
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bn->top = 1;
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return 1;
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}
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2016-08-24 04:53:12 +01:00
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int BN_set_u64(BIGNUM *bn, uint64_t value) {
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#if BN_BITS2 == 64
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return BN_set_word(bn, value);
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#elif BN_BITS2 == 32
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if (value <= BN_MASK2) {
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return BN_set_word(bn, (BN_ULONG)value);
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}
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2017-04-21 16:26:30 +01:00
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if (!bn_wexpand(bn, 2)) {
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2016-08-24 04:53:12 +01:00
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return 0;
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}
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bn->neg = 0;
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bn->d[0] = (BN_ULONG)value;
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bn->d[1] = (BN_ULONG)(value >> 32);
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bn->top = 2;
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return 1;
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#else
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#error "BN_BITS2 must be 32 or 64."
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#endif
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}
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2016-03-09 03:09:40 +00:00
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int bn_set_words(BIGNUM *bn, const BN_ULONG *words, size_t num) {
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2017-04-21 16:26:30 +01:00
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if (!bn_wexpand(bn, num)) {
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2016-03-09 03:09:40 +00:00
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return 0;
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}
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2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
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OPENSSL_memmove(bn->d, words, num * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// |bn_wexpand| verified that |num| isn't too large.
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2016-03-09 03:09:40 +00:00
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bn->top = (int)num;
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bn_correct_top(bn);
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2016-03-11 03:16:02 +00:00
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bn->neg = 0;
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2016-03-09 03:09:40 +00:00
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return 1;
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}
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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int BN_is_negative(const BIGNUM *bn) {
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|
|
|
return bn->neg != 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void BN_set_negative(BIGNUM *bn, int sign) {
|
|
|
|
if (sign && !BN_is_zero(bn)) {
|
|
|
|
bn->neg = 1;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
bn->neg = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-04-21 16:26:30 +01:00
|
|
|
int bn_wexpand(BIGNUM *bn, size_t words) {
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
BN_ULONG *a;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-08-11 17:05:02 +01:00
|
|
|
if (words <= (size_t)bn->dmax) {
|
2017-04-21 16:26:30 +01:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (words > (INT_MAX / (4 * BN_BITS2))) {
|
2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_BIGNUM_TOO_LONG);
|
2017-04-21 16:26:30 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (bn->flags & BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA) {
|
2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_EXPAND_ON_STATIC_BIGNUM_DATA);
|
2017-04-21 16:26:30 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-02-07 19:36:04 +00:00
|
|
|
a = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BN_ULONG) * words);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
if (a == NULL) {
|
2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
2017-04-21 16:26:30 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(a, bn->d, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * bn->top);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-04-22 18:50:28 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(bn->d);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
bn->d = a;
|
2015-08-11 17:05:02 +01:00
|
|
|
bn->dmax = (int)words;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-04-21 16:26:30 +01:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-04-21 16:26:30 +01:00
|
|
|
int bn_expand(BIGNUM *bn, size_t bits) {
|
2015-08-11 17:05:02 +01:00
|
|
|
if (bits + BN_BITS2 - 1 < bits) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_BIGNUM_TOO_LONG);
|
2017-04-21 16:26:30 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2015-08-11 17:05:02 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
return bn_wexpand(bn, (bits+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void bn_correct_top(BIGNUM *bn) {
|
|
|
|
BN_ULONG *ftl;
|
|
|
|
int tmp_top = bn->top;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (tmp_top > 0) {
|
|
|
|
for (ftl = &(bn->d[tmp_top - 1]); tmp_top > 0; tmp_top--) {
|
|
|
|
if (*(ftl--)) {
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bn->top = tmp_top;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-08-02 18:09:19 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (bn->top == 0) {
|
|
|
|
bn->neg = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|