boringssl/crypto/evp/evp_test.cc

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/*
* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
* project.
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2015 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* licensing@OpenSSL.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*/
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(push))
OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(disable: 4702))
#include <map>
#include <string>
#include <utility>
#include <vector>
OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(pop))
#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/digest.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include "../test/file_test.h"
// evp_test dispatches between multiple test types. PrivateKey tests take a key
// name parameter and single block, decode it as a PEM private key, and save it
// under that key name. Decrypt, Sign, and Verify tests take a previously
// imported key name as parameter and test their respective operations.
static const EVP_MD *GetDigest(FileTest *t, const std::string &name) {
if (name == "MD5") {
return EVP_md5();
} else if (name == "SHA1") {
return EVP_sha1();
} else if (name == "SHA224") {
return EVP_sha224();
} else if (name == "SHA256") {
return EVP_sha256();
} else if (name == "SHA384") {
return EVP_sha384();
} else if (name == "SHA512") {
return EVP_sha512();
}
t->PrintLine("Unknown digest: '%s'", name.c_str());
return nullptr;
}
Implement new SPKI parsers. Many consumers need SPKI support (X.509, TLS, QUIC, WebCrypto), each with different ways to set signature parameters. SPKIs themselves can get complex with id-RSASSA-PSS keys which come with various constraints in the key parameters. This suggests we want a common in-library representation of an SPKI. This adds two new functions EVP_parse_public_key and EVP_marshal_public_key which converts EVP_PKEY to and from SPKI and implements X509_PUBKEY functions with them. EVP_PKEY seems to have been intended to be able to express the supported SPKI types with full-fidelity, so these APIs will continue this. This means future support for id-RSASSA-PSS would *not* repurpose EVP_PKEY_RSA. I'm worried about code assuming EVP_PKEY_RSA implies acting on the RSA* is legal. Instead, it'd add an EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS and the data pointer would be some (exposed, so the caller may still check key size, etc.) RSA_PSS_KEY struct. Internally, the EVP_PKEY_CTX implementation would enforce the key constraints. If RSA_PSS_KEY would later need its own API, that code would move there, but that seems unlikely. Ideally we'd have a 1:1 correspondence with key OID, although we may have to fudge things if mistakes happen in standardization. (Whether or not X.509 reuses id-ecPublicKey for Ed25519, we'll give it a separate EVP_PKEY type.) DSA parsing hooks are still implemented, missing parameters and all for now. This isn't any worse than before. Decoupling from the giant crypto/obj OID table will be a later task. BUG=522228 Change-Id: I0e3964edf20cb795a18b0991d17e5ca8bce3e28c Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6861 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-31 02:40:40 +00:00
static int GetKeyType(FileTest *t, const std::string &name) {
if (name == "RSA") {
return EVP_PKEY_RSA;
}
if (name == "EC") {
return EVP_PKEY_EC;
}
if (name == "DSA") {
return EVP_PKEY_DSA;
}
t->PrintLine("Unknown key type: '%s'", name.c_str());
return EVP_PKEY_NONE;
}
static int GetRSAPadding(FileTest *t, int *out, const std::string &name) {
if (name == "PKCS1") {
*out = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
return true;
}
if (name == "PSS") {
*out = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
return true;
}
if (name == "OAEP") {
*out = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
return true;
}
t->PrintLine("Unknown RSA padding mode: '%s'", name.c_str());
return false;
}
using KeyMap = std::map<std::string, bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY>>;
static bool ImportKey(FileTest *t, KeyMap *key_map,
EVP_PKEY *(*parse_func)(CBS *cbs),
int (*marshal_func)(CBB *cbb, const EVP_PKEY *key)) {
Implement new SPKI parsers. Many consumers need SPKI support (X.509, TLS, QUIC, WebCrypto), each with different ways to set signature parameters. SPKIs themselves can get complex with id-RSASSA-PSS keys which come with various constraints in the key parameters. This suggests we want a common in-library representation of an SPKI. This adds two new functions EVP_parse_public_key and EVP_marshal_public_key which converts EVP_PKEY to and from SPKI and implements X509_PUBKEY functions with them. EVP_PKEY seems to have been intended to be able to express the supported SPKI types with full-fidelity, so these APIs will continue this. This means future support for id-RSASSA-PSS would *not* repurpose EVP_PKEY_RSA. I'm worried about code assuming EVP_PKEY_RSA implies acting on the RSA* is legal. Instead, it'd add an EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS and the data pointer would be some (exposed, so the caller may still check key size, etc.) RSA_PSS_KEY struct. Internally, the EVP_PKEY_CTX implementation would enforce the key constraints. If RSA_PSS_KEY would later need its own API, that code would move there, but that seems unlikely. Ideally we'd have a 1:1 correspondence with key OID, although we may have to fudge things if mistakes happen in standardization. (Whether or not X.509 reuses id-ecPublicKey for Ed25519, we'll give it a separate EVP_PKEY type.) DSA parsing hooks are still implemented, missing parameters and all for now. This isn't any worse than before. Decoupling from the giant crypto/obj OID table will be a later task. BUG=522228 Change-Id: I0e3964edf20cb795a18b0991d17e5ca8bce3e28c Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6861 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-31 02:40:40 +00:00
std::vector<uint8_t> input;
if (!t->GetBytes(&input, "Input")) {
return false;
}
CBS cbs;
CBS_init(&cbs, input.data(), input.size());
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(parse_func(&cbs));
Implement new SPKI parsers. Many consumers need SPKI support (X.509, TLS, QUIC, WebCrypto), each with different ways to set signature parameters. SPKIs themselves can get complex with id-RSASSA-PSS keys which come with various constraints in the key parameters. This suggests we want a common in-library representation of an SPKI. This adds two new functions EVP_parse_public_key and EVP_marshal_public_key which converts EVP_PKEY to and from SPKI and implements X509_PUBKEY functions with them. EVP_PKEY seems to have been intended to be able to express the supported SPKI types with full-fidelity, so these APIs will continue this. This means future support for id-RSASSA-PSS would *not* repurpose EVP_PKEY_RSA. I'm worried about code assuming EVP_PKEY_RSA implies acting on the RSA* is legal. Instead, it'd add an EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS and the data pointer would be some (exposed, so the caller may still check key size, etc.) RSA_PSS_KEY struct. Internally, the EVP_PKEY_CTX implementation would enforce the key constraints. If RSA_PSS_KEY would later need its own API, that code would move there, but that seems unlikely. Ideally we'd have a 1:1 correspondence with key OID, although we may have to fudge things if mistakes happen in standardization. (Whether or not X.509 reuses id-ecPublicKey for Ed25519, we'll give it a separate EVP_PKEY type.) DSA parsing hooks are still implemented, missing parameters and all for now. This isn't any worse than before. Decoupling from the giant crypto/obj OID table will be a later task. BUG=522228 Change-Id: I0e3964edf20cb795a18b0991d17e5ca8bce3e28c Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6861 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-31 02:40:40 +00:00
if (!pkey) {
return false;
}
std::string key_type;
if (!t->GetAttribute(&key_type, "Type")) {
return false;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey.get()) != GetKeyType(t, key_type)) {
t->PrintLine("Bad key type.");
return false;
}
// The key must re-encode correctly.
bssl::ScopedCBB cbb;
uint8_t *der;
size_t der_len;
Implement new SPKI parsers. Many consumers need SPKI support (X.509, TLS, QUIC, WebCrypto), each with different ways to set signature parameters. SPKIs themselves can get complex with id-RSASSA-PSS keys which come with various constraints in the key parameters. This suggests we want a common in-library representation of an SPKI. This adds two new functions EVP_parse_public_key and EVP_marshal_public_key which converts EVP_PKEY to and from SPKI and implements X509_PUBKEY functions with them. EVP_PKEY seems to have been intended to be able to express the supported SPKI types with full-fidelity, so these APIs will continue this. This means future support for id-RSASSA-PSS would *not* repurpose EVP_PKEY_RSA. I'm worried about code assuming EVP_PKEY_RSA implies acting on the RSA* is legal. Instead, it'd add an EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS and the data pointer would be some (exposed, so the caller may still check key size, etc.) RSA_PSS_KEY struct. Internally, the EVP_PKEY_CTX implementation would enforce the key constraints. If RSA_PSS_KEY would later need its own API, that code would move there, but that seems unlikely. Ideally we'd have a 1:1 correspondence with key OID, although we may have to fudge things if mistakes happen in standardization. (Whether or not X.509 reuses id-ecPublicKey for Ed25519, we'll give it a separate EVP_PKEY type.) DSA parsing hooks are still implemented, missing parameters and all for now. This isn't any worse than before. Decoupling from the giant crypto/obj OID table will be a later task. BUG=522228 Change-Id: I0e3964edf20cb795a18b0991d17e5ca8bce3e28c Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6861 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-31 02:40:40 +00:00
if (!CBB_init(cbb.get(), 0) ||
!marshal_func(cbb.get(), pkey.get()) ||
!CBB_finish(cbb.get(), &der, &der_len)) {
return false;
}
bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> free_der(der);
std::vector<uint8_t> output = input;
if (t->HasAttribute("Output") &&
!t->GetBytes(&output, "Output")) {
Implement new SPKI parsers. Many consumers need SPKI support (X.509, TLS, QUIC, WebCrypto), each with different ways to set signature parameters. SPKIs themselves can get complex with id-RSASSA-PSS keys which come with various constraints in the key parameters. This suggests we want a common in-library representation of an SPKI. This adds two new functions EVP_parse_public_key and EVP_marshal_public_key which converts EVP_PKEY to and from SPKI and implements X509_PUBKEY functions with them. EVP_PKEY seems to have been intended to be able to express the supported SPKI types with full-fidelity, so these APIs will continue this. This means future support for id-RSASSA-PSS would *not* repurpose EVP_PKEY_RSA. I'm worried about code assuming EVP_PKEY_RSA implies acting on the RSA* is legal. Instead, it'd add an EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS and the data pointer would be some (exposed, so the caller may still check key size, etc.) RSA_PSS_KEY struct. Internally, the EVP_PKEY_CTX implementation would enforce the key constraints. If RSA_PSS_KEY would later need its own API, that code would move there, but that seems unlikely. Ideally we'd have a 1:1 correspondence with key OID, although we may have to fudge things if mistakes happen in standardization. (Whether or not X.509 reuses id-ecPublicKey for Ed25519, we'll give it a separate EVP_PKEY type.) DSA parsing hooks are still implemented, missing parameters and all for now. This isn't any worse than before. Decoupling from the giant crypto/obj OID table will be a later task. BUG=522228 Change-Id: I0e3964edf20cb795a18b0991d17e5ca8bce3e28c Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6861 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-31 02:40:40 +00:00
return false;
}
if (!t->ExpectBytesEqual(output.data(), output.size(), der, der_len)) {
t->PrintLine("Re-encoding the key did not match.");
Implement new SPKI parsers. Many consumers need SPKI support (X.509, TLS, QUIC, WebCrypto), each with different ways to set signature parameters. SPKIs themselves can get complex with id-RSASSA-PSS keys which come with various constraints in the key parameters. This suggests we want a common in-library representation of an SPKI. This adds two new functions EVP_parse_public_key and EVP_marshal_public_key which converts EVP_PKEY to and from SPKI and implements X509_PUBKEY functions with them. EVP_PKEY seems to have been intended to be able to express the supported SPKI types with full-fidelity, so these APIs will continue this. This means future support for id-RSASSA-PSS would *not* repurpose EVP_PKEY_RSA. I'm worried about code assuming EVP_PKEY_RSA implies acting on the RSA* is legal. Instead, it'd add an EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS and the data pointer would be some (exposed, so the caller may still check key size, etc.) RSA_PSS_KEY struct. Internally, the EVP_PKEY_CTX implementation would enforce the key constraints. If RSA_PSS_KEY would later need its own API, that code would move there, but that seems unlikely. Ideally we'd have a 1:1 correspondence with key OID, although we may have to fudge things if mistakes happen in standardization. (Whether or not X.509 reuses id-ecPublicKey for Ed25519, we'll give it a separate EVP_PKEY type.) DSA parsing hooks are still implemented, missing parameters and all for now. This isn't any worse than before. Decoupling from the giant crypto/obj OID table will be a later task. BUG=522228 Change-Id: I0e3964edf20cb795a18b0991d17e5ca8bce3e28c Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6861 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-31 02:40:40 +00:00
return false;
}
// Save the key for future tests.
const std::string &key_name = t->GetParameter();
if (key_map->count(key_name) > 0) {
t->PrintLine("Duplicate key '%s'.", key_name.c_str());
return false;
}
(*key_map)[key_name] = std::move(pkey);
return true;
}
static bool TestEVP(FileTest *t, void *arg) {
KeyMap *key_map = reinterpret_cast<KeyMap*>(arg);
if (t->GetType() == "PrivateKey") {
return ImportKey(t, key_map, EVP_parse_private_key,
EVP_marshal_private_key);
}
Implement new SPKI parsers. Many consumers need SPKI support (X.509, TLS, QUIC, WebCrypto), each with different ways to set signature parameters. SPKIs themselves can get complex with id-RSASSA-PSS keys which come with various constraints in the key parameters. This suggests we want a common in-library representation of an SPKI. This adds two new functions EVP_parse_public_key and EVP_marshal_public_key which converts EVP_PKEY to and from SPKI and implements X509_PUBKEY functions with them. EVP_PKEY seems to have been intended to be able to express the supported SPKI types with full-fidelity, so these APIs will continue this. This means future support for id-RSASSA-PSS would *not* repurpose EVP_PKEY_RSA. I'm worried about code assuming EVP_PKEY_RSA implies acting on the RSA* is legal. Instead, it'd add an EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS and the data pointer would be some (exposed, so the caller may still check key size, etc.) RSA_PSS_KEY struct. Internally, the EVP_PKEY_CTX implementation would enforce the key constraints. If RSA_PSS_KEY would later need its own API, that code would move there, but that seems unlikely. Ideally we'd have a 1:1 correspondence with key OID, although we may have to fudge things if mistakes happen in standardization. (Whether or not X.509 reuses id-ecPublicKey for Ed25519, we'll give it a separate EVP_PKEY type.) DSA parsing hooks are still implemented, missing parameters and all for now. This isn't any worse than before. Decoupling from the giant crypto/obj OID table will be a later task. BUG=522228 Change-Id: I0e3964edf20cb795a18b0991d17e5ca8bce3e28c Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6861 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-31 02:40:40 +00:00
if (t->GetType() == "PublicKey") {
return ImportKey(t, key_map, EVP_parse_public_key, EVP_marshal_public_key);
Implement new SPKI parsers. Many consumers need SPKI support (X.509, TLS, QUIC, WebCrypto), each with different ways to set signature parameters. SPKIs themselves can get complex with id-RSASSA-PSS keys which come with various constraints in the key parameters. This suggests we want a common in-library representation of an SPKI. This adds two new functions EVP_parse_public_key and EVP_marshal_public_key which converts EVP_PKEY to and from SPKI and implements X509_PUBKEY functions with them. EVP_PKEY seems to have been intended to be able to express the supported SPKI types with full-fidelity, so these APIs will continue this. This means future support for id-RSASSA-PSS would *not* repurpose EVP_PKEY_RSA. I'm worried about code assuming EVP_PKEY_RSA implies acting on the RSA* is legal. Instead, it'd add an EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS and the data pointer would be some (exposed, so the caller may still check key size, etc.) RSA_PSS_KEY struct. Internally, the EVP_PKEY_CTX implementation would enforce the key constraints. If RSA_PSS_KEY would later need its own API, that code would move there, but that seems unlikely. Ideally we'd have a 1:1 correspondence with key OID, although we may have to fudge things if mistakes happen in standardization. (Whether or not X.509 reuses id-ecPublicKey for Ed25519, we'll give it a separate EVP_PKEY type.) DSA parsing hooks are still implemented, missing parameters and all for now. This isn't any worse than before. Decoupling from the giant crypto/obj OID table will be a later task. BUG=522228 Change-Id: I0e3964edf20cb795a18b0991d17e5ca8bce3e28c Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6861 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-31 02:40:40 +00:00
}
int (*key_op_init)(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
int (*key_op)(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len);
if (t->GetType() == "Decrypt") {
key_op_init = EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init;
key_op = EVP_PKEY_decrypt;
} else if (t->GetType() == "Sign") {
key_op_init = EVP_PKEY_sign_init;
key_op = EVP_PKEY_sign;
} else if (t->GetType() == "Verify") {
key_op_init = EVP_PKEY_verify_init;
key_op = nullptr; // EVP_PKEY_verify is handled differently.
} else {
t->PrintLine("Unknown test '%s'", t->GetType().c_str());
return false;
}
// Load the key.
const std::string &key_name = t->GetParameter();
if (key_map->count(key_name) == 0) {
t->PrintLine("Could not find key '%s'.", key_name.c_str());
return false;
}
EVP_PKEY *key = (*key_map)[key_name].get();
std::vector<uint8_t> input;
if (!t->GetBytes(&input, "Input")) {
return false;
}
// Set up the EVP_PKEY_CTX.
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY_CTX> ctx(EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(key, nullptr));
if (!ctx || !key_op_init(ctx.get())) {
return false;
}
if (t->HasAttribute("Digest")) {
const EVP_MD *digest = GetDigest(t, t->GetAttributeOrDie("Digest"));
if (digest == nullptr ||
!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(ctx.get(), digest)) {
return false;
}
}
if (t->HasAttribute("RSAPadding")) {
int padding;
if (!GetRSAPadding(t, &padding, t->GetAttributeOrDie("RSAPadding")) ||
!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx.get(), padding)) {
return false;
}
}
if (t->HasAttribute("PSSSaltLength") &&
!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(
ctx.get(), atoi(t->GetAttributeOrDie("PSSSaltLength").c_str()))) {
return false;
}
if (t->HasAttribute("MGF1Digest")) {
const EVP_MD *digest = GetDigest(t, t->GetAttributeOrDie("MGF1Digest"));
if (digest == nullptr ||
!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx.get(), digest)) {
return false;
}
}
if (t->GetType() == "Verify") {
std::vector<uint8_t> output;
if (!t->GetBytes(&output, "Output") ||
!EVP_PKEY_verify(ctx.get(), output.data(), output.size(), input.data(),
input.size())) {
// ECDSA sometimes doesn't push an error code. Push one on the error queue
// so it's distinguishable from other errors.
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(USER, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
return false;
}
return true;
}
size_t len;
std::vector<uint8_t> actual, output;
if (!key_op(ctx.get(), nullptr, &len, input.data(), input.size())) {
return false;
}
actual.resize(len);
if (!key_op(ctx.get(), actual.data(), &len, input.data(), input.size())) {
return false;
}
actual.resize(len);
if (!t->GetBytes(&output, "Output") ||
!t->ExpectBytesEqual(output.data(), output.size(), actual.data(), len)) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
CRYPTO_library_init();
if (argc != 2) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s <test file.txt>\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
KeyMap map;
return FileTestMain(TestEVP, &map, argv[1]);
}