2015-07-29 02:34:45 +01:00
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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2015-12-25 20:34:23 +00:00
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#include <string.h>
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2015-07-29 02:34:45 +01:00
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#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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2016-06-02 20:42:01 +01:00
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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2015-07-29 02:34:45 +01:00
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#include "internal.h"
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2016-06-08 23:31:24 +01:00
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#include "../crypto/internal.h"
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2015-07-29 02:34:45 +01:00
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Move libssl's internals into the bssl namespace.
This is horrible, but everything else I tried was worse. The goal with
this CL is to take the extern "C" out of ssl/internal.h and move most
symbols to namespace bssl, so we can start using C++ helpers and
destructors without worry.
Complications:
- Public API functions must be extern "C" and match their declaration in
ssl.h, which is unnamespaced. C++ really does not want you to
interleave namespaced and unnamespaced things. One can actually write
a namespaced extern "C" function, but this means, from C++'s
perspective, the function is namespaced. Trying to namespace the
public header would worked but ended up too deep a rabbithole.
- Our STACK_OF macros do not work right in namespaces.
- The typedefs for our exposed but opaque types are visible in the
header files and copied into consuming projects as forward
declarations. We ultimately want to give SSL a destructor, but
clobbering an unnamespaced ssl_st::~ssl_st seems bad manners.
- MSVC complains about ambiguous names if one typedefs SSL to bssl::SSL.
This CL opts for:
- ssl/*.cc must begin with #define BORINGSSL_INTERNAL_CXX_TYPES. This
informs the public headers to create forward declarations which are
compatible with our namespaces.
- For now, C++-defined type FOO ends up at bssl::FOO with a typedef
outside. Later I imagine we'll rename many of them.
- Internal functions get namespace bssl, so we stop worrying about
stomping the tls1_prf symbol. Exported C functions are stuck as they
are. Rather than try anything weird, bite the bullet and reorder files
which have a mix of public and private functions. I expect that over
time, the public functions will become fairly small as we move logic
to more idiomatic C++.
Files without any public C functions can just be written normally.
- To avoid MSVC troubles, some bssl types are renamed to CPlusPlusStyle
in advance of them being made idiomatic C++.
Bug: 132
Change-Id: Ic931895e117c38b14ff8d6e5a273e868796c7581
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18124
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2017-07-18 21:34:25 +01:00
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namespace bssl {
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2017-08-29 21:33:21 +01:00
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// kMaxEmptyRecords is the number of consecutive, empty records that will be
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// processed. Without this limit an attacker could send empty records at a
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// faster rate than we can process and cause record processing to loop
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// forever.
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2015-08-22 06:35:43 +01:00
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static const uint8_t kMaxEmptyRecords = 32;
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2017-08-29 21:33:21 +01:00
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// kMaxEarlyDataSkipped is the maximum number of rejected early data bytes that
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// will be skipped. Without this limit an attacker could send records at a
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// faster rate than we can process and cause trial decryption to loop forever.
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// This value should be slightly above kMaxEarlyDataAccepted, which is measured
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// in plaintext.
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2016-11-29 18:36:45 +00:00
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static const size_t kMaxEarlyDataSkipped = 16384;
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2017-08-29 21:33:21 +01:00
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// kMaxWarningAlerts is the number of consecutive warning alerts that will be
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// processed.
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2016-06-02 20:42:01 +01:00
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static const uint8_t kMaxWarningAlerts = 4;
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2017-08-29 21:33:21 +01:00
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// ssl_needs_record_splitting returns one if |ssl|'s current outgoing cipher
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// state needs record-splitting and zero otherwise.
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2015-12-06 21:07:47 +00:00
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static int ssl_needs_record_splitting(const SSL *ssl) {
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2017-07-15 00:51:39 +01:00
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#if !defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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return !ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->is_null_cipher() &&
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2017-09-11 18:53:08 +01:00
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ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->ProtocolVersion() < TLS1_1_VERSION &&
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2015-12-06 21:07:47 +00:00
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(ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) != 0 &&
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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SSL_CIPHER_is_block_cipher(ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->cipher());
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2017-07-15 00:51:39 +01:00
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#else
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return 0;
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#endif
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2015-12-06 21:07:47 +00:00
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}
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2015-12-25 20:11:39 +00:00
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int ssl_record_sequence_update(uint8_t *seq, size_t seq_len) {
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2016-09-05 17:47:25 +01:00
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for (size_t i = seq_len - 1; i < seq_len; i--) {
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2015-12-25 20:11:39 +00:00
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++seq[i];
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if (seq[i] != 0) {
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return 1;
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}
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}
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
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return 0;
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}
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2015-07-29 02:34:45 +01:00
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size_t ssl_record_prefix_len(const SSL *ssl) {
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2016-12-21 21:06:54 +00:00
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size_t header_len;
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2016-08-02 21:22:34 +01:00
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if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
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2016-12-21 21:06:54 +00:00
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header_len = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
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2015-07-29 02:34:45 +01:00
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} else {
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2016-12-21 21:06:54 +00:00
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header_len = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
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2015-07-29 02:34:45 +01:00
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}
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2016-12-21 21:06:54 +00:00
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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return header_len + ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->ExplicitNonceLen();
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2015-07-29 02:34:45 +01:00
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}
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2016-06-08 23:31:24 +01:00
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size_t ssl_seal_align_prefix_len(const SSL *ssl) {
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2016-08-02 21:22:34 +01:00
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if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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return DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->ExplicitNonceLen();
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2016-12-21 21:06:54 +00:00
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}
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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size_t ret =
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SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->ExplicitNonceLen();
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2016-12-21 21:06:54 +00:00
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if (ssl_needs_record_splitting(ssl)) {
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2017-03-02 21:05:03 +00:00
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ret += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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ret += ssl_cipher_get_record_split_len(ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->cipher());
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2016-12-21 21:06:54 +00:00
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}
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return ret;
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2015-07-29 02:34:45 +01:00
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}
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2016-06-06 23:54:51 +01:00
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enum ssl_open_record_t tls_open_record(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_type, CBS *out,
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size_t *out_consumed, uint8_t *out_alert,
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uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
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2016-06-02 20:42:01 +01:00
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*out_consumed = 0;
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2015-07-29 02:34:45 +01:00
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CBS cbs;
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CBS_init(&cbs, in, in_len);
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2017-08-29 21:33:21 +01:00
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// Decode the record header.
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2015-07-29 02:34:45 +01:00
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uint8_t type;
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uint16_t version, ciphertext_len;
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2017-03-02 21:05:03 +00:00
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if (!CBS_get_u8(&cbs, &type) ||
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!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &version) ||
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!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &ciphertext_len)) {
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*out_consumed = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
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return ssl_open_record_partial;
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2015-07-29 02:34:45 +01:00
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}
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2017-09-11 18:53:08 +01:00
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bool version_ok;
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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if (ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->is_null_cipher()) {
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2017-08-29 21:33:21 +01:00
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// Only check the first byte. Enforcing beyond that can prevent decoding
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// version negotiation failure alerts.
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2016-11-08 19:28:24 +00:00
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version_ok = (version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR;
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} else {
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2017-09-11 18:53:08 +01:00
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version_ok = version == ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->RecordVersion();
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2016-11-08 19:28:24 +00:00
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}
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if (!version_ok) {
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2015-07-29 02:34:45 +01:00
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
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*out_alert = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
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return ssl_open_record_error;
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}
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2017-08-29 21:33:21 +01:00
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// Check the ciphertext length.
|
2015-11-19 01:41:11 +00:00
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if (ciphertext_len > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
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2015-07-29 02:34:45 +01:00
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
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*out_alert = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
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return ssl_open_record_error;
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}
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2017-08-29 21:33:21 +01:00
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// Extract the body.
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2015-07-29 02:34:45 +01:00
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CBS body;
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if (!CBS_get_bytes(&cbs, &body, ciphertext_len)) {
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2017-03-02 21:05:03 +00:00
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*out_consumed = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + (size_t)ciphertext_len;
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2015-07-29 02:34:45 +01:00
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return ssl_open_record_partial;
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}
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2017-03-02 21:05:03 +00:00
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ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, SSL3_RT_HEADER, in,
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SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
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2015-07-29 02:34:45 +01:00
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2016-11-29 18:36:45 +00:00
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*out_consumed = in_len - CBS_len(&cbs);
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2017-08-29 21:33:21 +01:00
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// Skip early data received when expecting a second ClientHello if we rejected
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// 0RTT.
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2016-11-29 18:36:45 +00:00
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if (ssl->s3->skip_early_data &&
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->is_null_cipher() &&
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2016-11-29 18:36:45 +00:00
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type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
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goto skipped_data;
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}
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2017-08-29 21:33:21 +01:00
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// Decrypt the body in-place.
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2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
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if (!ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->Open(out, type, version, ssl->s3->read_sequence,
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(uint8_t *)CBS_data(&body),
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CBS_len(&body))) {
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if (ssl->s3->skip_early_data && !ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->is_null_cipher()) {
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2016-11-29 18:36:45 +00:00
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ERR_clear_error();
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goto skipped_data;
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}
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2015-07-29 02:34:45 +01:00
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
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*out_alert = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
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return ssl_open_record_error;
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}
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2016-11-29 18:36:45 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-31 20:06:42 +01:00
|
|
|
ssl->s3->skip_early_data = false;
|
2016-06-02 20:42:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-12-25 20:11:39 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!ssl_record_sequence_update(ssl->s3->read_sequence, 8)) {
|
2015-07-29 02:34:45 +01:00
|
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
return ssl_open_record_error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-29 21:33:21 +01:00
|
|
|
// TLS 1.3 hides the record type inside the encrypted data.
|
2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->is_null_cipher() &&
|
2017-09-11 18:53:08 +01:00
|
|
|
ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->ProtocolVersion() >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
2017-08-29 21:33:21 +01:00
|
|
|
// The outer record type is always application_data.
|
2016-06-25 03:56:37 +01:00
|
|
|
if (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_OUTER_RECORD_TYPE);
|
|
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
return ssl_open_record_error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-06 23:54:51 +01:00
|
|
|
do {
|
|
|
|
if (!CBS_get_last_u8(out, &type)) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
|
|
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
return ssl_open_record_error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} while (type == 0);
|
2016-06-01 19:07:09 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-29 21:33:21 +01:00
|
|
|
// Check the plaintext length.
|
2016-06-06 23:54:51 +01:00
|
|
|
if (CBS_len(out) > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
|
2015-07-29 02:34:45 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
|
|
|
|
return ssl_open_record_error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-29 21:33:21 +01:00
|
|
|
// Limit the number of consecutive empty records.
|
2016-06-06 23:54:51 +01:00
|
|
|
if (CBS_len(out) == 0) {
|
2015-08-22 06:35:43 +01:00
|
|
|
ssl->s3->empty_record_count++;
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->s3->empty_record_count > kMaxEmptyRecords) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS);
|
|
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
|
|
return ssl_open_record_error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-29 21:33:21 +01:00
|
|
|
// Apart from the limit, empty records are returned up to the caller. This
|
|
|
|
// allows the caller to reject records of the wrong type.
|
2015-08-22 06:35:43 +01:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->empty_record_count = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-02 20:42:01 +01:00
|
|
|
if (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
|
2017-08-29 21:33:21 +01:00
|
|
|
// Return end_of_early_data alerts as-is for the caller to process.
|
2017-01-11 16:34:52 +00:00
|
|
|
if (CBS_len(out) == 2 &&
|
|
|
|
CBS_data(out)[0] == SSL3_AL_WARNING &&
|
|
|
|
CBS_data(out)[1] == TLS1_AD_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
|
|
|
|
*out_type = type;
|
|
|
|
return ssl_open_record_success;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-06 23:54:51 +01:00
|
|
|
return ssl_process_alert(ssl, out_alert, CBS_data(out), CBS_len(out));
|
2016-06-02 20:42:01 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->warning_alert_count = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-07-29 02:34:45 +01:00
|
|
|
*out_type = type;
|
|
|
|
return ssl_open_record_success;
|
2016-11-29 18:36:45 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
skipped_data:
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->early_data_skipped += *out_consumed;
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->s3->early_data_skipped < *out_consumed) {
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->early_data_skipped = kMaxEarlyDataSkipped + 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->s3->early_data_skipped > kMaxEarlyDataSkipped) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_SKIPPED_EARLY_DATA);
|
|
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
|
|
return ssl_open_record_error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ssl_open_record_discard;
|
2015-07-29 02:34:45 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-30 13:29:50 +01:00
|
|
|
static int do_seal_record(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_prefix, uint8_t *out,
|
2017-07-22 00:27:54 +01:00
|
|
|
uint8_t *out_suffix, uint8_t type, const uint8_t *in,
|
|
|
|
const size_t in_len) {
|
2017-06-30 13:29:50 +01:00
|
|
|
uint8_t *extra_in = NULL;
|
|
|
|
size_t extra_in_len = 0;
|
2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->is_null_cipher() &&
|
2017-09-11 18:53:08 +01:00
|
|
|
ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->ProtocolVersion() >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
2017-08-29 21:33:21 +01:00
|
|
|
// TLS 1.3 hides the actual record type inside the encrypted data.
|
2017-06-30 13:29:50 +01:00
|
|
|
extra_in = &type;
|
|
|
|
extra_in_len = 1;
|
2017-07-22 00:27:54 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
size_t suffix_len;
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->SuffixLen(&suffix_len, in_len, extra_in_len)) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
size_t ciphertext_len =
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->ExplicitNonceLen() + suffix_len;
|
|
|
|
if (ciphertext_len + in_len < ciphertext_len) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ciphertext_len += in_len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert(in == out || !buffers_alias(in, in_len, out, in_len));
|
|
|
|
assert(!buffers_alias(in, in_len, out_prefix, ssl_record_prefix_len(ssl)));
|
|
|
|
assert(!buffers_alias(in, in_len, out_suffix, suffix_len));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (extra_in_len) {
|
2017-06-30 13:29:50 +01:00
|
|
|
out_prefix[0] = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
out_prefix[0] = type;
|
2015-07-29 02:34:45 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-06-08 23:31:24 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-09-11 18:53:08 +01:00
|
|
|
uint16_t record_version = ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->RecordVersion();
|
2017-09-08 22:03:42 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-09-11 18:53:08 +01:00
|
|
|
out_prefix[1] = record_version >> 8;
|
|
|
|
out_prefix[2] = record_version & 0xff;
|
2017-07-22 00:27:54 +01:00
|
|
|
out_prefix[3] = ciphertext_len >> 8;
|
|
|
|
out_prefix[4] = ciphertext_len & 0xff;
|
2016-12-21 21:06:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-09-11 18:53:08 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->SealScatter(
|
|
|
|
out_prefix + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, out, out_suffix, type,
|
|
|
|
record_version, ssl->s3->write_sequence, in, in_len, extra_in,
|
|
|
|
extra_in_len) ||
|
2015-12-25 20:11:39 +00:00
|
|
|
!ssl_record_sequence_update(ssl->s3->write_sequence, 8)) {
|
2015-07-29 02:34:45 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-30 13:29:50 +01:00
|
|
|
ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_HEADER, out_prefix,
|
2017-03-02 21:05:03 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
|
2015-07-29 02:34:45 +01:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-30 13:29:50 +01:00
|
|
|
static size_t tls_seal_scatter_prefix_len(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t type,
|
2017-07-18 20:42:18 +01:00
|
|
|
size_t in_len) {
|
2017-06-30 13:29:50 +01:00
|
|
|
size_t ret = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && in_len > 1 &&
|
|
|
|
ssl_needs_record_splitting(ssl)) {
|
2017-08-29 21:33:21 +01:00
|
|
|
// In the case of record splitting, the 1-byte record (of the 1/n-1 split)
|
|
|
|
// will be placed in the prefix, as will four of the five bytes of the
|
|
|
|
// record header for the main record. The final byte will replace the first
|
|
|
|
// byte of the plaintext that was used in the small record.
|
2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
|
|
|
ret += ssl_cipher_get_record_split_len(ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->cipher());
|
2017-06-30 13:29:50 +01:00
|
|
|
ret += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 1;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
|
|
|
ret += ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->ExplicitNonceLen();
|
2016-06-08 23:31:24 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-06-30 13:29:50 +01:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-06-08 23:31:24 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-07-22 00:27:54 +01:00
|
|
|
static bool tls_seal_scatter_suffix_len(const SSL *ssl, size_t *out_suffix_len,
|
|
|
|
uint8_t type, size_t in_len) {
|
|
|
|
size_t extra_in_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->is_null_cipher() &&
|
2017-09-11 18:53:08 +01:00
|
|
|
ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->ProtocolVersion() >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
2017-08-29 21:33:21 +01:00
|
|
|
// TLS 1.3 adds an extra byte for encrypted record type.
|
2017-07-22 00:27:54 +01:00
|
|
|
extra_in_len = 1;
|
2017-07-18 20:42:18 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-07-22 00:27:54 +01:00
|
|
|
if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && // clang-format off
|
|
|
|
in_len > 1 &&
|
|
|
|
ssl_needs_record_splitting(ssl)) {
|
2017-08-29 21:33:21 +01:00
|
|
|
// With record splitting enabled, the first byte gets sealed into a separate
|
|
|
|
// record which is written into the prefix.
|
2017-07-22 00:27:54 +01:00
|
|
|
in_len -= 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->SuffixLen(out_suffix_len, in_len, extra_in_len);
|
2017-07-18 20:42:18 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-29 21:33:21 +01:00
|
|
|
// tls_seal_scatter_record seals a new record of type |type| and body |in| and
|
|
|
|
// splits it between |out_prefix|, |out|, and |out_suffix|. Exactly
|
|
|
|
// |tls_seal_scatter_prefix_len| bytes are written to |out_prefix|, |in_len|
|
|
|
|
// bytes to |out|, and |tls_seal_scatter_suffix_len| bytes to |out_suffix|. It
|
|
|
|
// returns one on success and zero on error. If enabled,
|
|
|
|
// |tls_seal_scatter_record| implements TLS 1.0 CBC 1/n-1 record splitting and
|
|
|
|
// may write two records concatenated.
|
2017-06-30 13:29:50 +01:00
|
|
|
static int tls_seal_scatter_record(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_prefix, uint8_t *out,
|
2017-07-22 00:27:54 +01:00
|
|
|
uint8_t *out_suffix, uint8_t type,
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
|
2015-12-06 21:07:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && in_len > 1 &&
|
|
|
|
ssl_needs_record_splitting(ssl)) {
|
2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
|
|
|
assert(ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->ExplicitNonceLen() == 0);
|
2017-06-30 13:29:50 +01:00
|
|
|
const size_t prefix_len = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-29 21:33:21 +01:00
|
|
|
// Write the 1-byte fragment into |out_prefix|.
|
2017-06-30 13:29:50 +01:00
|
|
|
uint8_t *split_body = out_prefix + prefix_len;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *split_suffix = split_body + 1;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-22 00:27:54 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!do_seal_record(ssl, out_prefix, split_body, split_suffix, type, in,
|
|
|
|
1)) {
|
2015-07-29 02:34:45 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-06-30 13:29:50 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-07-22 00:27:54 +01:00
|
|
|
size_t split_record_suffix_len;
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->SuffixLen(&split_record_suffix_len, 1, 0)) {
|
|
|
|
assert(false);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const size_t split_record_len = prefix_len + 1 + split_record_suffix_len;
|
2015-12-25 20:56:49 +00:00
|
|
|
assert(SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + ssl_cipher_get_record_split_len(
|
2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
|
|
|
ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->cipher()) ==
|
2017-06-30 13:29:50 +01:00
|
|
|
split_record_len);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-29 21:33:21 +01:00
|
|
|
// Write the n-1-byte fragment. The header gets split between |out_prefix|
|
|
|
|
// (header[:-1]) and |out| (header[-1:]).
|
2017-06-30 13:29:50 +01:00
|
|
|
uint8_t tmp_prefix[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH];
|
2017-07-22 00:27:54 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!do_seal_record(ssl, tmp_prefix, out + 1, out_suffix, type, in + 1,
|
|
|
|
in_len - 1)) {
|
2017-06-30 13:29:50 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
assert(tls_seal_scatter_prefix_len(ssl, type, in_len) ==
|
|
|
|
split_record_len + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 1);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(out_prefix + split_record_len, tmp_prefix,
|
|
|
|
SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 1);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(out, tmp_prefix + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 1, 1);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2015-07-29 02:34:45 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-22 00:27:54 +01:00
|
|
|
return do_seal_record(ssl, out_prefix, out, out_suffix, type, in, in_len);
|
2017-06-30 13:29:50 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int tls_seal_record(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len,
|
|
|
|
uint8_t type, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
|
|
|
|
if (buffers_alias(in, in_len, out, max_out_len)) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT);
|
2015-07-29 02:34:45 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-06-30 13:29:50 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
const size_t prefix_len = tls_seal_scatter_prefix_len(ssl, type, in_len);
|
2017-07-22 00:27:54 +01:00
|
|
|
size_t suffix_len;
|
|
|
|
if (!tls_seal_scatter_suffix_len(ssl, &suffix_len, type, in_len)) {
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (in_len + prefix_len < in_len ||
|
|
|
|
prefix_len + in_len + suffix_len < prefix_len + in_len) {
|
2017-06-30 13:29:50 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-07-22 00:27:54 +01:00
|
|
|
if (max_out_len < in_len + prefix_len + suffix_len) {
|
2017-06-30 13:29:50 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *prefix = out;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *body = out + prefix_len;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *suffix = body + in_len;
|
2017-07-22 00:27:54 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!tls_seal_scatter_record(ssl, prefix, body, suffix, type, in, in_len)) {
|
2017-06-30 13:29:50 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*out_len = prefix_len + in_len + suffix_len;
|
2015-07-29 02:34:45 +01:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-12-25 20:34:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-06-02 20:42:01 +01:00
|
|
|
enum ssl_open_record_t ssl_process_alert(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
|
2017-08-29 21:33:21 +01:00
|
|
|
// Alerts records may not contain fragmented or multiple alerts.
|
2016-06-02 20:42:01 +01:00
|
|
|
if (in_len != 2) {
|
|
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ALERT);
|
|
|
|
return ssl_open_record_error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-09-20 01:15:07 +01:00
|
|
|
ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, SSL3_RT_ALERT, in, in_len);
|
2016-06-02 20:42:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t alert_level = in[0];
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t alert_descr = in[1];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
uint16_t alert = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
|
|
|
|
ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, alert);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
|
|
|
|
if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->recv_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify;
|
|
|
|
return ssl_open_record_close_notify;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-29 21:33:21 +01:00
|
|
|
// Warning alerts do not exist in TLS 1.3.
|
2016-08-03 20:39:47 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ssl->s3->have_version &&
|
|
|
|
ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ALERT);
|
|
|
|
return ssl_open_record_error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-02 20:42:01 +01:00
|
|
|
ssl->s3->warning_alert_count++;
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->s3->warning_alert_count > kMaxWarningAlerts) {
|
|
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARNING_ALERTS);
|
|
|
|
return ssl_open_record_error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ssl_open_record_discard;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->recv_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_fatal_alert;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
char tmp[16];
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
|
|
|
|
BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%d", alert_descr);
|
|
|
|
ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
|
|
|
|
return ssl_open_record_fatal_alert;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
|
|
|
|
return ssl_open_record_error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
Move libssl's internals into the bssl namespace.
This is horrible, but everything else I tried was worse. The goal with
this CL is to take the extern "C" out of ssl/internal.h and move most
symbols to namespace bssl, so we can start using C++ helpers and
destructors without worry.
Complications:
- Public API functions must be extern "C" and match their declaration in
ssl.h, which is unnamespaced. C++ really does not want you to
interleave namespaced and unnamespaced things. One can actually write
a namespaced extern "C" function, but this means, from C++'s
perspective, the function is namespaced. Trying to namespace the
public header would worked but ended up too deep a rabbithole.
- Our STACK_OF macros do not work right in namespaces.
- The typedefs for our exposed but opaque types are visible in the
header files and copied into consuming projects as forward
declarations. We ultimately want to give SSL a destructor, but
clobbering an unnamespaced ssl_st::~ssl_st seems bad manners.
- MSVC complains about ambiguous names if one typedefs SSL to bssl::SSL.
This CL opts for:
- ssl/*.cc must begin with #define BORINGSSL_INTERNAL_CXX_TYPES. This
informs the public headers to create forward declarations which are
compatible with our namespaces.
- For now, C++-defined type FOO ends up at bssl::FOO with a typedef
outside. Later I imagine we'll rename many of them.
- Internal functions get namespace bssl, so we stop worrying about
stomping the tls1_prf symbol. Exported C functions are stuck as they
are. Rather than try anything weird, bite the bullet and reorder files
which have a mix of public and private functions. I expect that over
time, the public functions will become fairly small as we move logic
to more idiomatic C++.
Files without any public C functions can just be written normally.
- To avoid MSVC troubles, some bssl types are renamed to CPlusPlusStyle
in advance of them being made idiomatic C++.
Bug: 132
Change-Id: Ic931895e117c38b14ff8d6e5a273e868796c7581
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18124
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2017-07-18 21:34:25 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-07-18 20:42:18 +01:00
|
|
|
OpenRecordResult OpenRecord(SSL *ssl, Span<uint8_t> *out,
|
|
|
|
size_t *out_record_len, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
|
|
const Span<uint8_t> in) {
|
|
|
|
// This API is a work in progress and currently only works for TLS 1.2 servers
|
|
|
|
// and below.
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_in_init(ssl) ||
|
|
|
|
SSL_is_dtls(ssl) ||
|
|
|
|
ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) > TLS1_2_VERSION) {
|
|
|
|
assert(false);
|
|
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
return OpenRecordResult::kError;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CBS plaintext;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t type;
|
|
|
|
const ssl_open_record_t result = tls_open_record(
|
2017-08-03 20:02:34 +01:00
|
|
|
ssl, &type, &plaintext, out_record_len, out_alert, in.data(), in.size());
|
2017-07-18 20:42:18 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (result) {
|
|
|
|
case ssl_open_record_success:
|
2017-08-03 20:02:34 +01:00
|
|
|
if (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && type != SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
|
|
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
|
|
return OpenRecordResult::kError;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*out = MakeSpan(
|
|
|
|
const_cast<uint8_t*>(CBS_data(&plaintext)), CBS_len(&plaintext));
|
|
|
|
return OpenRecordResult::kOK;
|
2017-07-18 20:42:18 +01:00
|
|
|
case ssl_open_record_discard:
|
2017-08-03 20:02:34 +01:00
|
|
|
return OpenRecordResult::kDiscard;
|
2017-07-18 20:42:18 +01:00
|
|
|
case ssl_open_record_partial:
|
2017-08-03 20:02:34 +01:00
|
|
|
return OpenRecordResult::kIncompleteRecord;
|
2017-07-18 20:42:18 +01:00
|
|
|
case ssl_open_record_close_notify:
|
2017-08-03 20:02:34 +01:00
|
|
|
return OpenRecordResult::kAlertCloseNotify;
|
2017-07-18 20:42:18 +01:00
|
|
|
case ssl_open_record_fatal_alert:
|
2017-08-03 20:02:34 +01:00
|
|
|
return OpenRecordResult::kAlertFatal;
|
2017-07-18 20:42:18 +01:00
|
|
|
case ssl_open_record_error:
|
2017-08-03 20:02:34 +01:00
|
|
|
return OpenRecordResult::kError;
|
2017-07-18 20:42:18 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-03 20:02:34 +01:00
|
|
|
assert(false);
|
|
|
|
return OpenRecordResult::kError;
|
2017-07-18 20:42:18 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-22 00:27:54 +01:00
|
|
|
size_t SealRecordPrefixLen(const SSL *ssl, const size_t record_len) {
|
2017-07-18 20:42:18 +01:00
|
|
|
return tls_seal_scatter_prefix_len(ssl, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, record_len);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-22 00:27:54 +01:00
|
|
|
size_t SealRecordSuffixLen(const SSL *ssl, const size_t plaintext_len) {
|
|
|
|
assert(plaintext_len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
size_t suffix_len;
|
|
|
|
if (!tls_seal_scatter_suffix_len(ssl, &suffix_len, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA,
|
|
|
|
plaintext_len)) {
|
|
|
|
assert(false);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
assert(suffix_len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD);
|
|
|
|
return suffix_len;
|
2017-07-18 20:42:18 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bool SealRecord(SSL *ssl, const Span<uint8_t> out_prefix,
|
|
|
|
const Span<uint8_t> out, Span<uint8_t> out_suffix,
|
2017-07-22 00:27:54 +01:00
|
|
|
const Span<const uint8_t> in) {
|
2017-07-18 20:42:18 +01:00
|
|
|
// This API is a work in progress and currently only works for TLS 1.2 servers
|
|
|
|
// and below.
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_in_init(ssl) ||
|
|
|
|
SSL_is_dtls(ssl) ||
|
|
|
|
ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) > TLS1_2_VERSION) {
|
|
|
|
assert(false);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (out_prefix.size() != SealRecordPrefixLen(ssl, in.size()) ||
|
|
|
|
out.size() != in.size() ||
|
2017-07-22 00:27:54 +01:00
|
|
|
out_suffix.size() != SealRecordSuffixLen(ssl, in.size())) {
|
2017-07-18 20:42:18 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-07-22 00:27:54 +01:00
|
|
|
return tls_seal_scatter_record(ssl, out_prefix.data(), out.data(),
|
|
|
|
out_suffix.data(), SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA,
|
|
|
|
in.data(), in.size());
|
2017-07-18 20:42:18 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Move libssl's internals into the bssl namespace.
This is horrible, but everything else I tried was worse. The goal with
this CL is to take the extern "C" out of ssl/internal.h and move most
symbols to namespace bssl, so we can start using C++ helpers and
destructors without worry.
Complications:
- Public API functions must be extern "C" and match their declaration in
ssl.h, which is unnamespaced. C++ really does not want you to
interleave namespaced and unnamespaced things. One can actually write
a namespaced extern "C" function, but this means, from C++'s
perspective, the function is namespaced. Trying to namespace the
public header would worked but ended up too deep a rabbithole.
- Our STACK_OF macros do not work right in namespaces.
- The typedefs for our exposed but opaque types are visible in the
header files and copied into consuming projects as forward
declarations. We ultimately want to give SSL a destructor, but
clobbering an unnamespaced ssl_st::~ssl_st seems bad manners.
- MSVC complains about ambiguous names if one typedefs SSL to bssl::SSL.
This CL opts for:
- ssl/*.cc must begin with #define BORINGSSL_INTERNAL_CXX_TYPES. This
informs the public headers to create forward declarations which are
compatible with our namespaces.
- For now, C++-defined type FOO ends up at bssl::FOO with a typedef
outside. Later I imagine we'll rename many of them.
- Internal functions get namespace bssl, so we stop worrying about
stomping the tls1_prf symbol. Exported C functions are stuck as they
are. Rather than try anything weird, bite the bullet and reorder files
which have a mix of public and private functions. I expect that over
time, the public functions will become fairly small as we move logic
to more idiomatic C++.
Files without any public C functions can just be written normally.
- To avoid MSVC troubles, some bssl types are renamed to CPlusPlusStyle
in advance of them being made idiomatic C++.
Bug: 132
Change-Id: Ic931895e117c38b14ff8d6e5a273e868796c7581
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18124
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2017-07-18 21:34:25 +01:00
|
|
|
} // namespace bssl
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
using namespace bssl;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
size_t SSL_max_seal_overhead(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
|
|
|
|
return dtls_max_seal_overhead(ssl, dtls1_use_current_epoch);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
size_t ret = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
|
|
|
ret += ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->MaxOverhead();
|
2017-08-29 21:33:21 +01:00
|
|
|
// TLS 1.3 needs an extra byte for the encrypted record type.
|
2017-07-19 03:45:18 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->is_null_cipher() &&
|
2017-09-11 18:53:08 +01:00
|
|
|
ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->ProtocolVersion() >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
Move libssl's internals into the bssl namespace.
This is horrible, but everything else I tried was worse. The goal with
this CL is to take the extern "C" out of ssl/internal.h and move most
symbols to namespace bssl, so we can start using C++ helpers and
destructors without worry.
Complications:
- Public API functions must be extern "C" and match their declaration in
ssl.h, which is unnamespaced. C++ really does not want you to
interleave namespaced and unnamespaced things. One can actually write
a namespaced extern "C" function, but this means, from C++'s
perspective, the function is namespaced. Trying to namespace the
public header would worked but ended up too deep a rabbithole.
- Our STACK_OF macros do not work right in namespaces.
- The typedefs for our exposed but opaque types are visible in the
header files and copied into consuming projects as forward
declarations. We ultimately want to give SSL a destructor, but
clobbering an unnamespaced ssl_st::~ssl_st seems bad manners.
- MSVC complains about ambiguous names if one typedefs SSL to bssl::SSL.
This CL opts for:
- ssl/*.cc must begin with #define BORINGSSL_INTERNAL_CXX_TYPES. This
informs the public headers to create forward declarations which are
compatible with our namespaces.
- For now, C++-defined type FOO ends up at bssl::FOO with a typedef
outside. Later I imagine we'll rename many of them.
- Internal functions get namespace bssl, so we stop worrying about
stomping the tls1_prf symbol. Exported C functions are stuck as they
are. Rather than try anything weird, bite the bullet and reorder files
which have a mix of public and private functions. I expect that over
time, the public functions will become fairly small as we move logic
to more idiomatic C++.
Files without any public C functions can just be written normally.
- To avoid MSVC troubles, some bssl types are renamed to CPlusPlusStyle
in advance of them being made idiomatic C++.
Bug: 132
Change-Id: Ic931895e117c38b14ff8d6e5a273e868796c7581
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18124
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2017-07-18 21:34:25 +01:00
|
|
|
ret += 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_needs_record_splitting(ssl)) {
|
|
|
|
ret *= 2;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|