boringssl/ssl/ssl_versions.cc

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Revise version negotiation logic on the C side. This is in preparation for upcoming experiments which will require supporting multiple experimental versions of TLS 1.3 with, on the server, the ability to enable multiple variants at once. This means the version <-> wire bijection no longer exists, even when limiting to a single SSL*. Thus version_to_wire is removed and instead we treat the wire version as the canonical version value. There is a mapping from valid wire versions to protocol versions which describe the high-level handshake protocol in use. This mapping is not injective, so uses of version_from_wire are rewritten differently. All the version-munging logic is moved to ssl_versions.c with a master preference list of all TLS and DTLS versions. The legacy version negotiation is converted to the new scheme. The version lists and negotiation are driven by the preference lists and a ssl_supports_version API. To simplify the mess around SSL_SESSION and versions, version_from_wire is now DTLS/TLS-agnostic, with any filtering being done by ssl_supports_version. This is screwy but allows parsing SSL_SESSIONs to sanity-check it and reject all bogus versions in SSL_SESSION. This reduces a mess of error cases. As part of this, the weird logic where ssl->version is set early when sending the ClientHello is removed. The one place where we were relying on this behavior is tweaked to query hs->max_version instead. Change-Id: Ic91b348481ceba94d9ae06d6781187c11adc15b0 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17524 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2017-06-20 15:55:02 +01:00
/* Copyright (c) 2017, Google Inc.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include "internal.h"
#include "../crypto/internal.h"
int ssl_protocol_version_from_wire(uint16_t *out, uint16_t version) {
switch (version) {
case SSL3_VERSION:
case TLS1_VERSION:
case TLS1_1_VERSION:
case TLS1_2_VERSION:
*out = version;
return 1;
case TLS1_3_DRAFT_VERSION:
case TLS1_3_EXPERIMENT_VERSION:
case TLS1_3_RECORD_TYPE_EXPERIMENT_VERSION:
Revise version negotiation logic on the C side. This is in preparation for upcoming experiments which will require supporting multiple experimental versions of TLS 1.3 with, on the server, the ability to enable multiple variants at once. This means the version <-> wire bijection no longer exists, even when limiting to a single SSL*. Thus version_to_wire is removed and instead we treat the wire version as the canonical version value. There is a mapping from valid wire versions to protocol versions which describe the high-level handshake protocol in use. This mapping is not injective, so uses of version_from_wire are rewritten differently. All the version-munging logic is moved to ssl_versions.c with a master preference list of all TLS and DTLS versions. The legacy version negotiation is converted to the new scheme. The version lists and negotiation are driven by the preference lists and a ssl_supports_version API. To simplify the mess around SSL_SESSION and versions, version_from_wire is now DTLS/TLS-agnostic, with any filtering being done by ssl_supports_version. This is screwy but allows parsing SSL_SESSIONs to sanity-check it and reject all bogus versions in SSL_SESSION. This reduces a mess of error cases. As part of this, the weird logic where ssl->version is set early when sending the ClientHello is removed. The one place where we were relying on this behavior is tweaked to query hs->max_version instead. Change-Id: Ic91b348481ceba94d9ae06d6781187c11adc15b0 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17524 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2017-06-20 15:55:02 +01:00
*out = TLS1_3_VERSION;
return 1;
case DTLS1_VERSION:
/* DTLS 1.0 is analogous to TLS 1.1, not TLS 1.0. */
*out = TLS1_1_VERSION;
return 1;
case DTLS1_2_VERSION:
*out = TLS1_2_VERSION;
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
}
/* The follow arrays are the supported versions for TLS and DTLS, in order of
* decreasing preference. */
static const uint16_t kTLSVersions[] = {
TLS1_3_EXPERIMENT_VERSION,
TLS1_3_RECORD_TYPE_EXPERIMENT_VERSION,
TLS1_3_DRAFT_VERSION,
Revise version negotiation logic on the C side. This is in preparation for upcoming experiments which will require supporting multiple experimental versions of TLS 1.3 with, on the server, the ability to enable multiple variants at once. This means the version <-> wire bijection no longer exists, even when limiting to a single SSL*. Thus version_to_wire is removed and instead we treat the wire version as the canonical version value. There is a mapping from valid wire versions to protocol versions which describe the high-level handshake protocol in use. This mapping is not injective, so uses of version_from_wire are rewritten differently. All the version-munging logic is moved to ssl_versions.c with a master preference list of all TLS and DTLS versions. The legacy version negotiation is converted to the new scheme. The version lists and negotiation are driven by the preference lists and a ssl_supports_version API. To simplify the mess around SSL_SESSION and versions, version_from_wire is now DTLS/TLS-agnostic, with any filtering being done by ssl_supports_version. This is screwy but allows parsing SSL_SESSIONs to sanity-check it and reject all bogus versions in SSL_SESSION. This reduces a mess of error cases. As part of this, the weird logic where ssl->version is set early when sending the ClientHello is removed. The one place where we were relying on this behavior is tweaked to query hs->max_version instead. Change-Id: Ic91b348481ceba94d9ae06d6781187c11adc15b0 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17524 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2017-06-20 15:55:02 +01:00
TLS1_2_VERSION,
TLS1_1_VERSION,
TLS1_VERSION,
SSL3_VERSION,
};
static const uint16_t kDTLSVersions[] = {
DTLS1_2_VERSION,
DTLS1_VERSION,
};
static void get_method_versions(const SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD *method,
const uint16_t **out, size_t *out_num) {
if (method->is_dtls) {
*out = kDTLSVersions;
*out_num = OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kDTLSVersions);
} else {
*out = kTLSVersions;
*out_num = OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kTLSVersions);
}
}
static int method_supports_version(const SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD *method,
uint16_t version) {
const uint16_t *versions;
size_t num_versions;
get_method_versions(method, &versions, &num_versions);
for (size_t i = 0; i < num_versions; i++) {
if (versions[i] == version) {
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int set_version_bound(const SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD *method, uint16_t *out,
uint16_t version) {
/* The public API uses wire versions, except we use |TLS1_3_VERSION|
* everywhere to refer to any draft TLS 1.3 versions. In this direction, we
* map it to some representative TLS 1.3 draft version. */
if (version == TLS1_3_DRAFT_VERSION ||
version == TLS1_3_EXPERIMENT_VERSION ||
version == TLS1_3_RECORD_TYPE_EXPERIMENT_VERSION) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION);
return 0;
}
Revise version negotiation logic on the C side. This is in preparation for upcoming experiments which will require supporting multiple experimental versions of TLS 1.3 with, on the server, the ability to enable multiple variants at once. This means the version <-> wire bijection no longer exists, even when limiting to a single SSL*. Thus version_to_wire is removed and instead we treat the wire version as the canonical version value. There is a mapping from valid wire versions to protocol versions which describe the high-level handshake protocol in use. This mapping is not injective, so uses of version_from_wire are rewritten differently. All the version-munging logic is moved to ssl_versions.c with a master preference list of all TLS and DTLS versions. The legacy version negotiation is converted to the new scheme. The version lists and negotiation are driven by the preference lists and a ssl_supports_version API. To simplify the mess around SSL_SESSION and versions, version_from_wire is now DTLS/TLS-agnostic, with any filtering being done by ssl_supports_version. This is screwy but allows parsing SSL_SESSIONs to sanity-check it and reject all bogus versions in SSL_SESSION. This reduces a mess of error cases. As part of this, the weird logic where ssl->version is set early when sending the ClientHello is removed. The one place where we were relying on this behavior is tweaked to query hs->max_version instead. Change-Id: Ic91b348481ceba94d9ae06d6781187c11adc15b0 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17524 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2017-06-20 15:55:02 +01:00
if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
version = TLS1_3_DRAFT_VERSION;
}
if (!method_supports_version(method, version) ||
!ssl_protocol_version_from_wire(out, version)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION);
return 0;
}
return 1;
Revise version negotiation logic on the C side. This is in preparation for upcoming experiments which will require supporting multiple experimental versions of TLS 1.3 with, on the server, the ability to enable multiple variants at once. This means the version <-> wire bijection no longer exists, even when limiting to a single SSL*. Thus version_to_wire is removed and instead we treat the wire version as the canonical version value. There is a mapping from valid wire versions to protocol versions which describe the high-level handshake protocol in use. This mapping is not injective, so uses of version_from_wire are rewritten differently. All the version-munging logic is moved to ssl_versions.c with a master preference list of all TLS and DTLS versions. The legacy version negotiation is converted to the new scheme. The version lists and negotiation are driven by the preference lists and a ssl_supports_version API. To simplify the mess around SSL_SESSION and versions, version_from_wire is now DTLS/TLS-agnostic, with any filtering being done by ssl_supports_version. This is screwy but allows parsing SSL_SESSIONs to sanity-check it and reject all bogus versions in SSL_SESSION. This reduces a mess of error cases. As part of this, the weird logic where ssl->version is set early when sending the ClientHello is removed. The one place where we were relying on this behavior is tweaked to query hs->max_version instead. Change-Id: Ic91b348481ceba94d9ae06d6781187c11adc15b0 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17524 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2017-06-20 15:55:02 +01:00
}
static int set_min_version(const SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD *method, uint16_t *out,
uint16_t version) {
/* Zero is interpreted as the default minimum version. */
if (version == 0) {
/* SSL 3.0 is disabled by default and TLS 1.0 does not exist in DTLS. */
*out = method->is_dtls ? TLS1_1_VERSION : TLS1_VERSION;
return 1;
}
return set_version_bound(method, out, version);
}
static int set_max_version(const SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD *method, uint16_t *out,
uint16_t version) {
/* Zero is interpreted as the default maximum version. */
if (version == 0) {
*out = TLS1_2_VERSION;
return 1;
}
return set_version_bound(method, out, version);
}
int SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t version) {
return set_min_version(ctx->method, &ctx->conf_min_version, version);
}
int SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t version) {
return set_max_version(ctx->method, &ctx->conf_max_version, version);
}
int SSL_set_min_proto_version(SSL *ssl, uint16_t version) {
return set_min_version(ssl->method, &ssl->conf_min_version, version);
}
int SSL_set_max_proto_version(SSL *ssl, uint16_t version) {
return set_max_version(ssl->method, &ssl->conf_max_version, version);
}
const struct {
uint16_t version;
uint32_t flag;
} kProtocolVersions[] = {
{SSL3_VERSION, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3},
{TLS1_VERSION, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1},
{TLS1_1_VERSION, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1},
{TLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2},
{TLS1_3_VERSION, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3},
};
int ssl_get_version_range(const SSL *ssl, uint16_t *out_min_version,
uint16_t *out_max_version) {
/* For historical reasons, |SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1| aliases |SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|, but
* DTLS 1.0 should be mapped to TLS 1.1. */
uint32_t options = ssl->options;
if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
options &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) {
options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
}
}
uint16_t min_version = ssl->conf_min_version;
uint16_t max_version = ssl->conf_max_version;
/* OpenSSL's API for controlling versions entails blacklisting individual
* protocols. This has two problems. First, on the client, the protocol can
* only express a contiguous range of versions. Second, a library consumer
* trying to set a maximum version cannot disable protocol versions that get
* added in a future version of the library.
*
* To account for both of these, OpenSSL interprets the client-side bitmask
* as a min/max range by picking the lowest contiguous non-empty range of
* enabled protocols. Note that this means it is impossible to set a maximum
* version of the higest supported TLS version in a future-proof way. */
int any_enabled = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kProtocolVersions); i++) {
/* Only look at the versions already enabled. */
if (min_version > kProtocolVersions[i].version) {
continue;
}
if (max_version < kProtocolVersions[i].version) {
break;
}
if (!(options & kProtocolVersions[i].flag)) {
/* The minimum version is the first enabled version. */
if (!any_enabled) {
any_enabled = 1;
min_version = kProtocolVersions[i].version;
}
continue;
}
/* If there is a disabled version after the first enabled one, all versions
* after it are implicitly disabled. */
if (any_enabled) {
max_version = kProtocolVersions[i-1].version;
break;
}
}
if (!any_enabled) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS_ENABLED);
return 0;
}
*out_min_version = min_version;
*out_max_version = max_version;
return 1;
}
static uint16_t ssl_version(const SSL *ssl) {
/* In early data, we report the predicted version. */
if (SSL_in_early_data(ssl) && !ssl->server) {
return ssl->s3->hs->early_session->ssl_version;
}
return ssl->version;
}
Revise version negotiation logic on the C side. This is in preparation for upcoming experiments which will require supporting multiple experimental versions of TLS 1.3 with, on the server, the ability to enable multiple variants at once. This means the version <-> wire bijection no longer exists, even when limiting to a single SSL*. Thus version_to_wire is removed and instead we treat the wire version as the canonical version value. There is a mapping from valid wire versions to protocol versions which describe the high-level handshake protocol in use. This mapping is not injective, so uses of version_from_wire are rewritten differently. All the version-munging logic is moved to ssl_versions.c with a master preference list of all TLS and DTLS versions. The legacy version negotiation is converted to the new scheme. The version lists and negotiation are driven by the preference lists and a ssl_supports_version API. To simplify the mess around SSL_SESSION and versions, version_from_wire is now DTLS/TLS-agnostic, with any filtering being done by ssl_supports_version. This is screwy but allows parsing SSL_SESSIONs to sanity-check it and reject all bogus versions in SSL_SESSION. This reduces a mess of error cases. As part of this, the weird logic where ssl->version is set early when sending the ClientHello is removed. The one place where we were relying on this behavior is tweaked to query hs->max_version instead. Change-Id: Ic91b348481ceba94d9ae06d6781187c11adc15b0 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17524 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2017-06-20 15:55:02 +01:00
int SSL_version(const SSL *ssl) {
uint16_t ret = ssl_version(ssl);
Revise version negotiation logic on the C side. This is in preparation for upcoming experiments which will require supporting multiple experimental versions of TLS 1.3 with, on the server, the ability to enable multiple variants at once. This means the version <-> wire bijection no longer exists, even when limiting to a single SSL*. Thus version_to_wire is removed and instead we treat the wire version as the canonical version value. There is a mapping from valid wire versions to protocol versions which describe the high-level handshake protocol in use. This mapping is not injective, so uses of version_from_wire are rewritten differently. All the version-munging logic is moved to ssl_versions.c with a master preference list of all TLS and DTLS versions. The legacy version negotiation is converted to the new scheme. The version lists and negotiation are driven by the preference lists and a ssl_supports_version API. To simplify the mess around SSL_SESSION and versions, version_from_wire is now DTLS/TLS-agnostic, with any filtering being done by ssl_supports_version. This is screwy but allows parsing SSL_SESSIONs to sanity-check it and reject all bogus versions in SSL_SESSION. This reduces a mess of error cases. As part of this, the weird logic where ssl->version is set early when sending the ClientHello is removed. The one place where we were relying on this behavior is tweaked to query hs->max_version instead. Change-Id: Ic91b348481ceba94d9ae06d6781187c11adc15b0 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17524 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2017-06-20 15:55:02 +01:00
/* Report TLS 1.3 draft version as TLS 1.3 in the public API. */
if (ret == TLS1_3_DRAFT_VERSION || ret == TLS1_3_EXPERIMENT_VERSION ||
ret == TLS1_3_RECORD_TYPE_EXPERIMENT_VERSION) {
Revise version negotiation logic on the C side. This is in preparation for upcoming experiments which will require supporting multiple experimental versions of TLS 1.3 with, on the server, the ability to enable multiple variants at once. This means the version <-> wire bijection no longer exists, even when limiting to a single SSL*. Thus version_to_wire is removed and instead we treat the wire version as the canonical version value. There is a mapping from valid wire versions to protocol versions which describe the high-level handshake protocol in use. This mapping is not injective, so uses of version_from_wire are rewritten differently. All the version-munging logic is moved to ssl_versions.c with a master preference list of all TLS and DTLS versions. The legacy version negotiation is converted to the new scheme. The version lists and negotiation are driven by the preference lists and a ssl_supports_version API. To simplify the mess around SSL_SESSION and versions, version_from_wire is now DTLS/TLS-agnostic, with any filtering being done by ssl_supports_version. This is screwy but allows parsing SSL_SESSIONs to sanity-check it and reject all bogus versions in SSL_SESSION. This reduces a mess of error cases. As part of this, the weird logic where ssl->version is set early when sending the ClientHello is removed. The one place where we were relying on this behavior is tweaked to query hs->max_version instead. Change-Id: Ic91b348481ceba94d9ae06d6781187c11adc15b0 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17524 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2017-06-20 15:55:02 +01:00
return TLS1_3_VERSION;
}
return ret;
Revise version negotiation logic on the C side. This is in preparation for upcoming experiments which will require supporting multiple experimental versions of TLS 1.3 with, on the server, the ability to enable multiple variants at once. This means the version <-> wire bijection no longer exists, even when limiting to a single SSL*. Thus version_to_wire is removed and instead we treat the wire version as the canonical version value. There is a mapping from valid wire versions to protocol versions which describe the high-level handshake protocol in use. This mapping is not injective, so uses of version_from_wire are rewritten differently. All the version-munging logic is moved to ssl_versions.c with a master preference list of all TLS and DTLS versions. The legacy version negotiation is converted to the new scheme. The version lists and negotiation are driven by the preference lists and a ssl_supports_version API. To simplify the mess around SSL_SESSION and versions, version_from_wire is now DTLS/TLS-agnostic, with any filtering being done by ssl_supports_version. This is screwy but allows parsing SSL_SESSIONs to sanity-check it and reject all bogus versions in SSL_SESSION. This reduces a mess of error cases. As part of this, the weird logic where ssl->version is set early when sending the ClientHello is removed. The one place where we were relying on this behavior is tweaked to query hs->max_version instead. Change-Id: Ic91b348481ceba94d9ae06d6781187c11adc15b0 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17524 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2017-06-20 15:55:02 +01:00
}
static const char *ssl_get_version(int version) {
switch (version) {
/* Report TLS 1.3 draft version as TLS 1.3 in the public API. */
case TLS1_3_DRAFT_VERSION:
case TLS1_3_EXPERIMENT_VERSION:
case TLS1_3_RECORD_TYPE_EXPERIMENT_VERSION:
Revise version negotiation logic on the C side. This is in preparation for upcoming experiments which will require supporting multiple experimental versions of TLS 1.3 with, on the server, the ability to enable multiple variants at once. This means the version <-> wire bijection no longer exists, even when limiting to a single SSL*. Thus version_to_wire is removed and instead we treat the wire version as the canonical version value. There is a mapping from valid wire versions to protocol versions which describe the high-level handshake protocol in use. This mapping is not injective, so uses of version_from_wire are rewritten differently. All the version-munging logic is moved to ssl_versions.c with a master preference list of all TLS and DTLS versions. The legacy version negotiation is converted to the new scheme. The version lists and negotiation are driven by the preference lists and a ssl_supports_version API. To simplify the mess around SSL_SESSION and versions, version_from_wire is now DTLS/TLS-agnostic, with any filtering being done by ssl_supports_version. This is screwy but allows parsing SSL_SESSIONs to sanity-check it and reject all bogus versions in SSL_SESSION. This reduces a mess of error cases. As part of this, the weird logic where ssl->version is set early when sending the ClientHello is removed. The one place where we were relying on this behavior is tweaked to query hs->max_version instead. Change-Id: Ic91b348481ceba94d9ae06d6781187c11adc15b0 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17524 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2017-06-20 15:55:02 +01:00
return "TLSv1.3";
case TLS1_2_VERSION:
return "TLSv1.2";
case TLS1_1_VERSION:
return "TLSv1.1";
case TLS1_VERSION:
return "TLSv1";
case SSL3_VERSION:
return "SSLv3";
case DTLS1_VERSION:
return "DTLSv1";
case DTLS1_2_VERSION:
return "DTLSv1.2";
default:
return "unknown";
}
}
const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *ssl) {
return ssl_get_version(ssl_version(ssl));
Revise version negotiation logic on the C side. This is in preparation for upcoming experiments which will require supporting multiple experimental versions of TLS 1.3 with, on the server, the ability to enable multiple variants at once. This means the version <-> wire bijection no longer exists, even when limiting to a single SSL*. Thus version_to_wire is removed and instead we treat the wire version as the canonical version value. There is a mapping from valid wire versions to protocol versions which describe the high-level handshake protocol in use. This mapping is not injective, so uses of version_from_wire are rewritten differently. All the version-munging logic is moved to ssl_versions.c with a master preference list of all TLS and DTLS versions. The legacy version negotiation is converted to the new scheme. The version lists and negotiation are driven by the preference lists and a ssl_supports_version API. To simplify the mess around SSL_SESSION and versions, version_from_wire is now DTLS/TLS-agnostic, with any filtering being done by ssl_supports_version. This is screwy but allows parsing SSL_SESSIONs to sanity-check it and reject all bogus versions in SSL_SESSION. This reduces a mess of error cases. As part of this, the weird logic where ssl->version is set early when sending the ClientHello is removed. The one place where we were relying on this behavior is tweaked to query hs->max_version instead. Change-Id: Ic91b348481ceba94d9ae06d6781187c11adc15b0 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17524 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2017-06-20 15:55:02 +01:00
}
const char *SSL_SESSION_get_version(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
return ssl_get_version(session->ssl_version);
}
uint16_t ssl3_protocol_version(const SSL *ssl) {
assert(ssl->s3->have_version);
uint16_t version;
if (!ssl_protocol_version_from_wire(&version, ssl->version)) {
/* |ssl->version| will always be set to a valid version. */
assert(0);
return 0;
}
return version;
}
int ssl_supports_version(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t version) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
/* As a client, only allow the configured TLS 1.3 variant. As a server,
* support all TLS 1.3 variants as long as tls13_variant is set to a
* non-default value. */
if (ssl->server) {
if (ssl->tls13_variant == tls13_default &&
(version == TLS1_3_EXPERIMENT_VERSION ||
version == TLS1_3_RECORD_TYPE_EXPERIMENT_VERSION)) {
return 0;
}
} else {
if ((ssl->tls13_variant != tls13_experiment &&
version == TLS1_3_EXPERIMENT_VERSION) ||
(ssl->tls13_variant != tls13_record_type_experiment &&
version == TLS1_3_RECORD_TYPE_EXPERIMENT_VERSION) ||
(ssl->tls13_variant != tls13_default &&
version == TLS1_3_DRAFT_VERSION)) {
return 0;
}
}
Revise version negotiation logic on the C side. This is in preparation for upcoming experiments which will require supporting multiple experimental versions of TLS 1.3 with, on the server, the ability to enable multiple variants at once. This means the version <-> wire bijection no longer exists, even when limiting to a single SSL*. Thus version_to_wire is removed and instead we treat the wire version as the canonical version value. There is a mapping from valid wire versions to protocol versions which describe the high-level handshake protocol in use. This mapping is not injective, so uses of version_from_wire are rewritten differently. All the version-munging logic is moved to ssl_versions.c with a master preference list of all TLS and DTLS versions. The legacy version negotiation is converted to the new scheme. The version lists and negotiation are driven by the preference lists and a ssl_supports_version API. To simplify the mess around SSL_SESSION and versions, version_from_wire is now DTLS/TLS-agnostic, with any filtering being done by ssl_supports_version. This is screwy but allows parsing SSL_SESSIONs to sanity-check it and reject all bogus versions in SSL_SESSION. This reduces a mess of error cases. As part of this, the weird logic where ssl->version is set early when sending the ClientHello is removed. The one place where we were relying on this behavior is tweaked to query hs->max_version instead. Change-Id: Ic91b348481ceba94d9ae06d6781187c11adc15b0 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17524 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2017-06-20 15:55:02 +01:00
uint16_t protocol_version;
return method_supports_version(ssl->method, version) &&
Revise version negotiation logic on the C side. This is in preparation for upcoming experiments which will require supporting multiple experimental versions of TLS 1.3 with, on the server, the ability to enable multiple variants at once. This means the version <-> wire bijection no longer exists, even when limiting to a single SSL*. Thus version_to_wire is removed and instead we treat the wire version as the canonical version value. There is a mapping from valid wire versions to protocol versions which describe the high-level handshake protocol in use. This mapping is not injective, so uses of version_from_wire are rewritten differently. All the version-munging logic is moved to ssl_versions.c with a master preference list of all TLS and DTLS versions. The legacy version negotiation is converted to the new scheme. The version lists and negotiation are driven by the preference lists and a ssl_supports_version API. To simplify the mess around SSL_SESSION and versions, version_from_wire is now DTLS/TLS-agnostic, with any filtering being done by ssl_supports_version. This is screwy but allows parsing SSL_SESSIONs to sanity-check it and reject all bogus versions in SSL_SESSION. This reduces a mess of error cases. As part of this, the weird logic where ssl->version is set early when sending the ClientHello is removed. The one place where we were relying on this behavior is tweaked to query hs->max_version instead. Change-Id: Ic91b348481ceba94d9ae06d6781187c11adc15b0 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17524 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2017-06-20 15:55:02 +01:00
ssl_protocol_version_from_wire(&protocol_version, version) &&
hs->min_version <= protocol_version &&
protocol_version <= hs->max_version;
}
int ssl_add_supported_versions(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *cbb) {
const uint16_t *versions;
size_t num_versions;
get_method_versions(hs->ssl->method, &versions, &num_versions);
for (size_t i = 0; i < num_versions; i++) {
if (ssl_supports_version(hs, versions[i]) &&
!CBB_add_u16(cbb, versions[i])) {
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
int ssl_negotiate_version(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
uint16_t *out_version, const CBS *peer_versions) {
const uint16_t *versions;
size_t num_versions;
get_method_versions(hs->ssl->method, &versions, &num_versions);
for (size_t i = 0; i < num_versions; i++) {
if (!ssl_supports_version(hs, versions[i])) {
continue;
}
CBS copy = *peer_versions;
while (CBS_len(&copy) != 0) {
uint16_t version;
if (!CBS_get_u16(&copy, &version)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (version == versions[i]) {
*out_version = version;
return 1;
}
}
}
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
*out_alert = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
return 0;
}