2018-02-01 21:49:18 +00:00
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/*
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* Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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* Copyright (c) 2014, Intel Corporation. All Rights Reserved.
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2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
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*
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2018-02-01 21:49:18 +00:00
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* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
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*
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2018-02-01 21:49:18 +00:00
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* Originally written by Shay Gueron (1, 2), and Vlad Krasnov (1)
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* (1) Intel Corporation, Israel Development Center, Haifa, Israel
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* (2) University of Haifa, Israel
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*
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* Reference:
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* S.Gueron and V.Krasnov, "Fast Prime Field Elliptic Curve Cryptography with
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* 256 Bit Primes"
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*/
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2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
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#include <openssl/ec.h>
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2015-11-13 01:05:22 +00:00
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#include <assert.h>
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2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
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#include <stdint.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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2018-11-13 17:01:05 +00:00
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#include <openssl/cpu.h>
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2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
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#include <openssl/crypto.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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2017-05-02 22:25:39 +01:00
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#include "../bn/internal.h"
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#include "../delocate.h"
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#include "../../internal.h"
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2016-10-25 01:02:26 +01:00
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#include "internal.h"
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#include "p256-x86_64.h"
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2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
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#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && \
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!defined(OPENSSL_SMALL)
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typedef P256_POINT_AFFINE PRECOMP256_ROW[64];
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// One converted into the Montgomery domain
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2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
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static const BN_ULONG ONE[P256_LIMBS] = {
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TOBN(0x00000000, 0x00000001), TOBN(0xffffffff, 0x00000000),
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TOBN(0xffffffff, 0xffffffff), TOBN(0x00000000, 0xfffffffe),
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};
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// Precomputed tables for the default generator
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2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
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#include "p256-x86_64-table.h"
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// Recode window to a signed digit, see util-64.c for details
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2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
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static unsigned booth_recode_w5(unsigned in) {
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unsigned s, d;
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s = ~((in >> 5) - 1);
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d = (1 << 6) - in - 1;
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d = (d & s) | (in & ~s);
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d = (d >> 1) + (d & 1);
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return (d << 1) + (s & 1);
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}
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static unsigned booth_recode_w7(unsigned in) {
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unsigned s, d;
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s = ~((in >> 7) - 1);
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d = (1 << 8) - in - 1;
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d = (d & s) | (in & ~s);
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d = (d >> 1) + (d & 1);
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return (d << 1) + (s & 1);
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}
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// copy_conditional copies |src| to |dst| if |move| is one and leaves it as-is
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// if |move| is zero.
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//
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// WARNING: this breaks the usual convention of constant-time functions
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// returning masks.
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2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
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static void copy_conditional(BN_ULONG dst[P256_LIMBS],
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const BN_ULONG src[P256_LIMBS], BN_ULONG move) {
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2015-11-03 22:29:01 +00:00
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BN_ULONG mask1 = ((BN_ULONG)0) - move;
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2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
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BN_ULONG mask2 = ~mask1;
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dst[0] = (src[0] & mask1) ^ (dst[0] & mask2);
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dst[1] = (src[1] & mask1) ^ (dst[1] & mask2);
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dst[2] = (src[2] & mask1) ^ (dst[2] & mask2);
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dst[3] = (src[3] & mask1) ^ (dst[3] & mask2);
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if (P256_LIMBS == 8) {
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dst[4] = (src[4] & mask1) ^ (dst[4] & mask2);
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dst[5] = (src[5] & mask1) ^ (dst[5] & mask2);
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dst[6] = (src[6] & mask1) ^ (dst[6] & mask2);
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dst[7] = (src[7] & mask1) ^ (dst[7] & mask2);
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}
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}
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// is_not_zero returns one iff in != 0 and zero otherwise.
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//
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// WARNING: this breaks the usual convention of constant-time functions
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// returning masks.
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//
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// (define-fun is_not_zero ((in (_ BitVec 64))) (_ BitVec 64)
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// (bvlshr (bvor in (bvsub #x0000000000000000 in)) #x000000000000003f)
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// )
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//
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// (declare-fun x () (_ BitVec 64))
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//
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// (assert (and (= x #x0000000000000000) (= (is_not_zero x) #x0000000000000001)))
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// (check-sat)
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//
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// (assert (and (not (= x #x0000000000000000)) (= (is_not_zero x) #x0000000000000000)))
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// (check-sat)
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//
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2016-11-11 13:38:49 +00:00
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static BN_ULONG is_not_zero(BN_ULONG in) {
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in |= (0 - in);
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in >>= BN_BITS2 - 1;
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return in;
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}
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// ecp_nistz256_mod_inverse_mont sets |r| to (|in| * 2^-256)^-1 * 2^256 mod p.
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// That is, |r| is the modular inverse of |in| for input and output in the
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// Montgomery domain.
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2016-11-11 03:58:36 +00:00
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static void ecp_nistz256_mod_inverse_mont(BN_ULONG r[P256_LIMBS],
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const BN_ULONG in[P256_LIMBS]) {
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2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
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/* The poly is ffffffff 00000001 00000000 00000000 00000000 ffffffff ffffffff
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ffffffff
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We use FLT and used poly-2 as exponent */
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BN_ULONG p2[P256_LIMBS];
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BN_ULONG p4[P256_LIMBS];
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BN_ULONG p8[P256_LIMBS];
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BN_ULONG p16[P256_LIMBS];
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BN_ULONG p32[P256_LIMBS];
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BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS];
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int i;
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ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, in);
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(p2, res, in); // 3*p
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2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
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ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, p2);
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ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(p4, res, p2); // f*p
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2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
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ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, p4);
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ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
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ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
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ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(p8, res, p4); // ff*p
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2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
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ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, p8);
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for (i = 0; i < 7; i++) {
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ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
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}
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(p16, res, p8); // ffff*p
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2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
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ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, p16);
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for (i = 0; i < 15; i++) {
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ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
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}
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(p32, res, p16); // ffffffff*p
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2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
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ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, p32);
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for (i = 0; i < 31; i++) {
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ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
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}
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ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res, res, in);
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for (i = 0; i < 32 * 4; i++) {
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ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
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}
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ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res, res, p32);
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for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
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ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
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}
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ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res, res, p32);
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for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
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ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
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}
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ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res, res, p16);
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for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
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ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
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}
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ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res, res, p8);
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ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
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ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
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ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
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ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
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ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res, res, p4);
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ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
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ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
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ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res, res, p2);
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ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
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ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res);
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2016-03-26 09:09:26 +00:00
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ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(r, res, in);
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2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
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}
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// r = p * p_scalar
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Add EC_FELEM for EC_POINTs and related temporaries.
This introduces EC_FELEM, which is analogous to EC_SCALAR. It is used
for EC_POINT's representation in the generic EC_METHOD, as well as
random operations on tuned EC_METHODs that still are implemented
genericly.
Unlike EC_SCALAR, EC_FELEM's exact representation is awkwardly specific
to the EC_METHOD, analogous to how the old values were BIGNUMs but may
or may not have been in Montgomery form. This is kind of a nuisance, but
no more than before. (If p224-64.c were easily convertable to Montgomery
form, we could say |EC_FELEM| is always in Montgomery form. If we
exposed the internal add and double implementations in each of the
curves, we could give |EC_POINT| an |EC_METHOD|-specific representation
and |EC_FELEM| is purely a |EC_GFp_mont_method| type. I'll leave this
for later.)
The generic add and doubling formulas are aligned with the formulas
proved in fiat-crypto. Those only applied to a = -3, so I've proved a
generic one in https://github.com/mit-plv/fiat-crypto/pull/356, in case
someone uses a custom curve. The new formulas are verified,
constant-time, and swap a multiply for a square. As expressed in
fiat-crypto they do use more temporaries, but this seems to be fine with
stack-allocated EC_FELEMs. (We can try to help the compiler later,
but benchamrks below suggest this isn't necessary.)
Unlike BIGNUM, EC_FELEM can be stack-allocated. It also captures the
bounds in the type system and, in particular, that the width is correct,
which will make it easier to select a point in constant-time in the
future. (Indeed the old code did not always have the correct width. Its
point formula involved halving and implemented this in variable time and
variable width.)
Before:
Did 77274 ECDH P-256 operations in 10046087us (7692.0 ops/sec)
Did 5959 ECDH P-384 operations in 10031701us (594.0 ops/sec)
Did 10815 ECDSA P-384 signing operations in 10087892us (1072.1 ops/sec)
Did 8976 ECDSA P-384 verify operations in 10071038us (891.3 ops/sec)
Did 2600 ECDH P-521 operations in 10091688us (257.6 ops/sec)
Did 4590 ECDSA P-521 signing operations in 10055195us (456.5 ops/sec)
Did 3811 ECDSA P-521 verify operations in 10003574us (381.0 ops/sec)
After:
Did 77736 ECDH P-256 operations in 10029858us (7750.5 ops/sec) [+0.8%]
Did 7519 ECDH P-384 operations in 10068076us (746.8 ops/sec) [+25.7%]
Did 13335 ECDSA P-384 signing operations in 10029962us (1329.5 ops/sec) [+24.0%]
Did 11021 ECDSA P-384 verify operations in 10088600us (1092.4 ops/sec) [+22.6%]
Did 2912 ECDH P-521 operations in 10001325us (291.2 ops/sec) [+13.0%]
Did 5150 ECDSA P-521 signing operations in 10027462us (513.6 ops/sec) [+12.5%]
Did 4264 ECDSA P-521 verify operations in 10069694us (423.4 ops/sec) [+11.1%]
This more than pays for removing points_make_affine previously and even
speeds up ECDH P-256 slightly. (The point-on-curve check uses the
generic code.)
Next is to push the stack-allocating up to ec_wNAF_mul, followed by a
constant-time single-point multiplication.
Bug: 239
Change-Id: I44a2dff7c52522e491d0f8cffff64c4ab5cd353c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27668
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-04-23 02:39:34 +01:00
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static void ecp_nistz256_windowed_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, P256_POINT *r,
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2018-04-25 03:53:07 +01:00
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const EC_RAW_POINT *p,
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Add EC_FELEM for EC_POINTs and related temporaries.
This introduces EC_FELEM, which is analogous to EC_SCALAR. It is used
for EC_POINT's representation in the generic EC_METHOD, as well as
random operations on tuned EC_METHODs that still are implemented
genericly.
Unlike EC_SCALAR, EC_FELEM's exact representation is awkwardly specific
to the EC_METHOD, analogous to how the old values were BIGNUMs but may
or may not have been in Montgomery form. This is kind of a nuisance, but
no more than before. (If p224-64.c were easily convertable to Montgomery
form, we could say |EC_FELEM| is always in Montgomery form. If we
exposed the internal add and double implementations in each of the
curves, we could give |EC_POINT| an |EC_METHOD|-specific representation
and |EC_FELEM| is purely a |EC_GFp_mont_method| type. I'll leave this
for later.)
The generic add and doubling formulas are aligned with the formulas
proved in fiat-crypto. Those only applied to a = -3, so I've proved a
generic one in https://github.com/mit-plv/fiat-crypto/pull/356, in case
someone uses a custom curve. The new formulas are verified,
constant-time, and swap a multiply for a square. As expressed in
fiat-crypto they do use more temporaries, but this seems to be fine with
stack-allocated EC_FELEMs. (We can try to help the compiler later,
but benchamrks below suggest this isn't necessary.)
Unlike BIGNUM, EC_FELEM can be stack-allocated. It also captures the
bounds in the type system and, in particular, that the width is correct,
which will make it easier to select a point in constant-time in the
future. (Indeed the old code did not always have the correct width. Its
point formula involved halving and implemented this in variable time and
variable width.)
Before:
Did 77274 ECDH P-256 operations in 10046087us (7692.0 ops/sec)
Did 5959 ECDH P-384 operations in 10031701us (594.0 ops/sec)
Did 10815 ECDSA P-384 signing operations in 10087892us (1072.1 ops/sec)
Did 8976 ECDSA P-384 verify operations in 10071038us (891.3 ops/sec)
Did 2600 ECDH P-521 operations in 10091688us (257.6 ops/sec)
Did 4590 ECDSA P-521 signing operations in 10055195us (456.5 ops/sec)
Did 3811 ECDSA P-521 verify operations in 10003574us (381.0 ops/sec)
After:
Did 77736 ECDH P-256 operations in 10029858us (7750.5 ops/sec) [+0.8%]
Did 7519 ECDH P-384 operations in 10068076us (746.8 ops/sec) [+25.7%]
Did 13335 ECDSA P-384 signing operations in 10029962us (1329.5 ops/sec) [+24.0%]
Did 11021 ECDSA P-384 verify operations in 10088600us (1092.4 ops/sec) [+22.6%]
Did 2912 ECDH P-521 operations in 10001325us (291.2 ops/sec) [+13.0%]
Did 5150 ECDSA P-521 signing operations in 10027462us (513.6 ops/sec) [+12.5%]
Did 4264 ECDSA P-521 verify operations in 10069694us (423.4 ops/sec) [+11.1%]
This more than pays for removing points_make_affine previously and even
speeds up ECDH P-256 slightly. (The point-on-curve check uses the
generic code.)
Next is to push the stack-allocating up to ec_wNAF_mul, followed by a
constant-time single-point multiplication.
Bug: 239
Change-Id: I44a2dff7c52522e491d0f8cffff64c4ab5cd353c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27668
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-04-23 02:39:34 +01:00
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const EC_SCALAR *p_scalar) {
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2015-11-13 01:05:22 +00:00
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assert(p != NULL);
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assert(p_scalar != NULL);
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Add EC_FELEM for EC_POINTs and related temporaries.
This introduces EC_FELEM, which is analogous to EC_SCALAR. It is used
for EC_POINT's representation in the generic EC_METHOD, as well as
random operations on tuned EC_METHODs that still are implemented
genericly.
Unlike EC_SCALAR, EC_FELEM's exact representation is awkwardly specific
to the EC_METHOD, analogous to how the old values were BIGNUMs but may
or may not have been in Montgomery form. This is kind of a nuisance, but
no more than before. (If p224-64.c were easily convertable to Montgomery
form, we could say |EC_FELEM| is always in Montgomery form. If we
exposed the internal add and double implementations in each of the
curves, we could give |EC_POINT| an |EC_METHOD|-specific representation
and |EC_FELEM| is purely a |EC_GFp_mont_method| type. I'll leave this
for later.)
The generic add and doubling formulas are aligned with the formulas
proved in fiat-crypto. Those only applied to a = -3, so I've proved a
generic one in https://github.com/mit-plv/fiat-crypto/pull/356, in case
someone uses a custom curve. The new formulas are verified,
constant-time, and swap a multiply for a square. As expressed in
fiat-crypto they do use more temporaries, but this seems to be fine with
stack-allocated EC_FELEMs. (We can try to help the compiler later,
but benchamrks below suggest this isn't necessary.)
Unlike BIGNUM, EC_FELEM can be stack-allocated. It also captures the
bounds in the type system and, in particular, that the width is correct,
which will make it easier to select a point in constant-time in the
future. (Indeed the old code did not always have the correct width. Its
point formula involved halving and implemented this in variable time and
variable width.)
Before:
Did 77274 ECDH P-256 operations in 10046087us (7692.0 ops/sec)
Did 5959 ECDH P-384 operations in 10031701us (594.0 ops/sec)
Did 10815 ECDSA P-384 signing operations in 10087892us (1072.1 ops/sec)
Did 8976 ECDSA P-384 verify operations in 10071038us (891.3 ops/sec)
Did 2600 ECDH P-521 operations in 10091688us (257.6 ops/sec)
Did 4590 ECDSA P-521 signing operations in 10055195us (456.5 ops/sec)
Did 3811 ECDSA P-521 verify operations in 10003574us (381.0 ops/sec)
After:
Did 77736 ECDH P-256 operations in 10029858us (7750.5 ops/sec) [+0.8%]
Did 7519 ECDH P-384 operations in 10068076us (746.8 ops/sec) [+25.7%]
Did 13335 ECDSA P-384 signing operations in 10029962us (1329.5 ops/sec) [+24.0%]
Did 11021 ECDSA P-384 verify operations in 10088600us (1092.4 ops/sec) [+22.6%]
Did 2912 ECDH P-521 operations in 10001325us (291.2 ops/sec) [+13.0%]
Did 5150 ECDSA P-521 signing operations in 10027462us (513.6 ops/sec) [+12.5%]
Did 4264 ECDSA P-521 verify operations in 10069694us (423.4 ops/sec) [+11.1%]
This more than pays for removing points_make_affine previously and even
speeds up ECDH P-256 slightly. (The point-on-curve check uses the
generic code.)
Next is to push the stack-allocating up to ec_wNAF_mul, followed by a
constant-time single-point multiplication.
Bug: 239
Change-Id: I44a2dff7c52522e491d0f8cffff64c4ab5cd353c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27668
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-04-23 02:39:34 +01:00
|
|
|
assert(group->field.width == P256_LIMBS);
|
2015-11-13 01:05:22 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
static const unsigned kWindowSize = 5;
|
|
|
|
static const unsigned kMask = (1 << (5 /* kWindowSize */ + 1)) - 1;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
// A |P256_POINT| is (3 * 32) = 96 bytes, and the 64-byte alignment should
|
|
|
|
// add no more than 63 bytes of overhead. Thus, |table| should require
|
|
|
|
// ~1599 ((96 * 16) + 63) bytes of stack space.
|
2016-01-18 06:12:57 +00:00
|
|
|
alignas(64) P256_POINT table[16];
|
2015-11-13 01:05:22 +00:00
|
|
|
uint8_t p_str[33];
|
Make ECDSA signing 10% faster and plug some timing leaks.
None of the asymmetric crypto we inherented from OpenSSL is
constant-time because of BIGNUM. BIGNUM chops leading zeros off the
front of everything, so we end up leaking information about the first
word, in theory. BIGNUM functions additionally tend to take the full
range of inputs and then call into BN_nnmod at various points.
All our secret values should be acted on in constant-time, but k in
ECDSA is a particularly sensitive value. So, ecdsa_sign_setup, in an
attempt to mitigate the BIGNUM leaks, would add a couple copies of the
order.
This does not work at all. k is used to compute two values: k^-1 and kG.
The first operation when computing k^-1 is to call BN_nnmod if k is out
of range. The entry point to our tuned constant-time curve
implementations is to call BN_nnmod if the scalar has too many bits,
which this causes. The result is both corrections are immediately undone
but cause us to do more variable-time work in the meantime.
Replace all these computations around k with the word-based functions
added in the various preceding CLs. In doing so, replace the BN_mod_mul
calls (which internally call BN_nnmod) with Montgomery reduction. We can
avoid taking k^-1 out of Montgomery form, which combines nicely with
Brian Smith's trick in 3426d1011946b26ff1bb2fd98a081ba4753c9cc8. Along
the way, we avoid some unnecessary mallocs.
BIGNUM still affects the private key itself, as well as the EC_POINTs.
But this should hopefully be much better now. Also it's 10% faster:
Before:
Did 15000 ECDSA P-224 signing operations in 1069117us (14030.3 ops/sec)
Did 18000 ECDSA P-256 signing operations in 1053908us (17079.3 ops/sec)
Did 1078 ECDSA P-384 signing operations in 1087853us (990.9 ops/sec)
Did 473 ECDSA P-521 signing operations in 1069835us (442.1 ops/sec)
After:
Did 16000 ECDSA P-224 signing operations in 1064799us (15026.3 ops/sec)
Did 19000 ECDSA P-256 signing operations in 1007839us (18852.2 ops/sec)
Did 1078 ECDSA P-384 signing operations in 1079413us (998.7 ops/sec)
Did 484 ECDSA P-521 signing operations in 1083616us (446.7 ops/sec)
Change-Id: I2a25e90fc99dac13c0616d0ea45e125a4bd8cca1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/23075
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2017-11-13 03:58:00 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(p_str, p_scalar->bytes, 32);
|
|
|
|
p_str[32] = 0;
|
2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
// table[0] is implicitly (0,0,0) (the point at infinity), therefore it is
|
|
|
|
// not stored. All other values are actually stored with an offset of -1 in
|
|
|
|
// table.
|
2015-11-13 01:05:22 +00:00
|
|
|
P256_POINT *row = table;
|
Add EC_FELEM for EC_POINTs and related temporaries.
This introduces EC_FELEM, which is analogous to EC_SCALAR. It is used
for EC_POINT's representation in the generic EC_METHOD, as well as
random operations on tuned EC_METHODs that still are implemented
genericly.
Unlike EC_SCALAR, EC_FELEM's exact representation is awkwardly specific
to the EC_METHOD, analogous to how the old values were BIGNUMs but may
or may not have been in Montgomery form. This is kind of a nuisance, but
no more than before. (If p224-64.c were easily convertable to Montgomery
form, we could say |EC_FELEM| is always in Montgomery form. If we
exposed the internal add and double implementations in each of the
curves, we could give |EC_POINT| an |EC_METHOD|-specific representation
and |EC_FELEM| is purely a |EC_GFp_mont_method| type. I'll leave this
for later.)
The generic add and doubling formulas are aligned with the formulas
proved in fiat-crypto. Those only applied to a = -3, so I've proved a
generic one in https://github.com/mit-plv/fiat-crypto/pull/356, in case
someone uses a custom curve. The new formulas are verified,
constant-time, and swap a multiply for a square. As expressed in
fiat-crypto they do use more temporaries, but this seems to be fine with
stack-allocated EC_FELEMs. (We can try to help the compiler later,
but benchamrks below suggest this isn't necessary.)
Unlike BIGNUM, EC_FELEM can be stack-allocated. It also captures the
bounds in the type system and, in particular, that the width is correct,
which will make it easier to select a point in constant-time in the
future. (Indeed the old code did not always have the correct width. Its
point formula involved halving and implemented this in variable time and
variable width.)
Before:
Did 77274 ECDH P-256 operations in 10046087us (7692.0 ops/sec)
Did 5959 ECDH P-384 operations in 10031701us (594.0 ops/sec)
Did 10815 ECDSA P-384 signing operations in 10087892us (1072.1 ops/sec)
Did 8976 ECDSA P-384 verify operations in 10071038us (891.3 ops/sec)
Did 2600 ECDH P-521 operations in 10091688us (257.6 ops/sec)
Did 4590 ECDSA P-521 signing operations in 10055195us (456.5 ops/sec)
Did 3811 ECDSA P-521 verify operations in 10003574us (381.0 ops/sec)
After:
Did 77736 ECDH P-256 operations in 10029858us (7750.5 ops/sec) [+0.8%]
Did 7519 ECDH P-384 operations in 10068076us (746.8 ops/sec) [+25.7%]
Did 13335 ECDSA P-384 signing operations in 10029962us (1329.5 ops/sec) [+24.0%]
Did 11021 ECDSA P-384 verify operations in 10088600us (1092.4 ops/sec) [+22.6%]
Did 2912 ECDH P-521 operations in 10001325us (291.2 ops/sec) [+13.0%]
Did 5150 ECDSA P-521 signing operations in 10027462us (513.6 ops/sec) [+12.5%]
Did 4264 ECDSA P-521 verify operations in 10069694us (423.4 ops/sec) [+11.1%]
This more than pays for removing points_make_affine previously and even
speeds up ECDH P-256 slightly. (The point-on-curve check uses the
generic code.)
Next is to push the stack-allocating up to ec_wNAF_mul, followed by a
constant-time single-point multiplication.
Bug: 239
Change-Id: I44a2dff7c52522e491d0f8cffff64c4ab5cd353c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27668
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-04-23 02:39:34 +01:00
|
|
|
assert(group->field.width == P256_LIMBS);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(row[1 - 1].X, p->X.words, P256_LIMBS * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(row[1 - 1].Y, p->Y.words, P256_LIMBS * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(row[1 - 1].Z, p->Z.words, P256_LIMBS * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-11-13 01:05:22 +00:00
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_point_double(&row[2 - 1], &row[1 - 1]);
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_point_add(&row[3 - 1], &row[2 - 1], &row[1 - 1]);
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_point_double(&row[4 - 1], &row[2 - 1]);
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_point_double(&row[6 - 1], &row[3 - 1]);
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_point_double(&row[8 - 1], &row[4 - 1]);
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_point_double(&row[12 - 1], &row[6 - 1]);
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_point_add(&row[5 - 1], &row[4 - 1], &row[1 - 1]);
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_point_add(&row[7 - 1], &row[6 - 1], &row[1 - 1]);
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_point_add(&row[9 - 1], &row[8 - 1], &row[1 - 1]);
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_point_add(&row[13 - 1], &row[12 - 1], &row[1 - 1]);
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_point_double(&row[14 - 1], &row[7 - 1]);
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_point_double(&row[10 - 1], &row[5 - 1]);
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_point_add(&row[15 - 1], &row[14 - 1], &row[1 - 1]);
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_point_add(&row[11 - 1], &row[10 - 1], &row[1 - 1]);
|
2016-07-17 22:22:39 +01:00
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_point_double(&row[16 - 1], &row[8 - 1]);
|
2015-11-13 01:05:22 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
BN_ULONG tmp[P256_LIMBS];
|
2016-01-18 06:12:57 +00:00
|
|
|
alignas(32) P256_POINT h;
|
2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned index = 255;
|
2015-11-13 01:05:22 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned wvalue = p_str[(index - 1) / 8];
|
2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
wvalue = (wvalue >> ((index - 1) % 8)) & kMask;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-11-13 01:05:22 +00:00
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_select_w5(r, table, booth_recode_w5(wvalue) >> 1);
|
2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (index >= 5) {
|
2015-11-13 01:05:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (index != 255) {
|
2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned off = (index - 1) / 8;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-11-13 01:05:22 +00:00
|
|
|
wvalue = p_str[off] | p_str[off + 1] << 8;
|
2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
wvalue = (wvalue >> ((index - 1) % 8)) & kMask;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wvalue = booth_recode_w5(wvalue);
|
|
|
|
|
2015-11-13 01:05:22 +00:00
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_select_w5(&h, table, wvalue >> 1);
|
2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, h.Y);
|
|
|
|
copy_conditional(h.Y, tmp, (wvalue & 1));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_point_add(r, r, &h);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
index -= kWindowSize;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_point_double(r, r);
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_point_double(r, r);
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_point_double(r, r);
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_point_double(r, r);
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_point_double(r, r);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
// Final window
|
2015-11-13 01:05:22 +00:00
|
|
|
wvalue = p_str[0];
|
|
|
|
wvalue = (wvalue << 1) & kMask;
|
2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-11-13 01:05:22 +00:00
|
|
|
wvalue = booth_recode_w5(wvalue);
|
2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-11-13 01:05:22 +00:00
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_select_w5(&h, table, wvalue >> 1);
|
2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-11-13 01:05:22 +00:00
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, h.Y);
|
|
|
|
copy_conditional(h.Y, tmp, wvalue & 1);
|
2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-11-13 01:05:22 +00:00
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_point_add(r, r, &h);
|
2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-11-06 23:18:56 +00:00
|
|
|
typedef union {
|
|
|
|
P256_POINT p;
|
|
|
|
P256_POINT_AFFINE a;
|
|
|
|
} p256_point_union_t;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static unsigned calc_first_wvalue(unsigned *index, const uint8_t p_str[33]) {
|
|
|
|
static const unsigned kWindowSize = 7;
|
|
|
|
static const unsigned kMask = (1 << (7 /* kWindowSize */ + 1)) - 1;
|
|
|
|
*index = kWindowSize;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned wvalue = (p_str[0] << 1) & kMask;
|
|
|
|
return booth_recode_w7(wvalue);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static unsigned calc_wvalue(unsigned *index, const uint8_t p_str[33]) {
|
|
|
|
static const unsigned kWindowSize = 7;
|
|
|
|
static const unsigned kMask = (1 << (7 /* kWindowSize */ + 1)) - 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
const unsigned off = (*index - 1) / 8;
|
|
|
|
unsigned wvalue = p_str[off] | p_str[off + 1] << 8;
|
|
|
|
wvalue = (wvalue >> ((*index - 1) % 8)) & kMask;
|
|
|
|
*index += kWindowSize;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return booth_recode_w7(wvalue);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void mul_p_add_and_store(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r,
|
|
|
|
const EC_SCALAR *g_scalar,
|
|
|
|
const EC_RAW_POINT *p_,
|
|
|
|
const EC_SCALAR *p_scalar,
|
|
|
|
p256_point_union_t *t, p256_point_union_t *p) {
|
|
|
|
const int p_is_infinity = g_scalar == NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (p_scalar != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
P256_POINT *out = &t->p;
|
|
|
|
if (p_is_infinity) {
|
|
|
|
out = &p->p;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_windowed_mul(group, out, p_, p_scalar);
|
|
|
|
if (!p_is_infinity) {
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_point_add(&p->p, &p->p, out);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert(group->field.width == P256_LIMBS);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(r->X.words, p->p.X, P256_LIMBS * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(r->Y.words, p->p.Y, P256_LIMBS * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(r->Z.words, p->p.Z, P256_LIMBS * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-04-25 03:53:07 +01:00
|
|
|
static void ecp_nistz256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r,
|
|
|
|
const EC_SCALAR *g_scalar,
|
|
|
|
const EC_RAW_POINT *p_,
|
|
|
|
const EC_SCALAR *p_scalar) {
|
2015-11-13 01:05:22 +00:00
|
|
|
assert((p_ != NULL) == (p_scalar != NULL));
|
|
|
|
|
2018-11-06 23:18:56 +00:00
|
|
|
alignas(32) p256_point_union_t t, p;
|
2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-11-13 01:05:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (g_scalar != NULL) {
|
Make ECDSA signing 10% faster and plug some timing leaks.
None of the asymmetric crypto we inherented from OpenSSL is
constant-time because of BIGNUM. BIGNUM chops leading zeros off the
front of everything, so we end up leaking information about the first
word, in theory. BIGNUM functions additionally tend to take the full
range of inputs and then call into BN_nnmod at various points.
All our secret values should be acted on in constant-time, but k in
ECDSA is a particularly sensitive value. So, ecdsa_sign_setup, in an
attempt to mitigate the BIGNUM leaks, would add a couple copies of the
order.
This does not work at all. k is used to compute two values: k^-1 and kG.
The first operation when computing k^-1 is to call BN_nnmod if k is out
of range. The entry point to our tuned constant-time curve
implementations is to call BN_nnmod if the scalar has too many bits,
which this causes. The result is both corrections are immediately undone
but cause us to do more variable-time work in the meantime.
Replace all these computations around k with the word-based functions
added in the various preceding CLs. In doing so, replace the BN_mod_mul
calls (which internally call BN_nnmod) with Montgomery reduction. We can
avoid taking k^-1 out of Montgomery form, which combines nicely with
Brian Smith's trick in 3426d1011946b26ff1bb2fd98a081ba4753c9cc8. Along
the way, we avoid some unnecessary mallocs.
BIGNUM still affects the private key itself, as well as the EC_POINTs.
But this should hopefully be much better now. Also it's 10% faster:
Before:
Did 15000 ECDSA P-224 signing operations in 1069117us (14030.3 ops/sec)
Did 18000 ECDSA P-256 signing operations in 1053908us (17079.3 ops/sec)
Did 1078 ECDSA P-384 signing operations in 1087853us (990.9 ops/sec)
Did 473 ECDSA P-521 signing operations in 1069835us (442.1 ops/sec)
After:
Did 16000 ECDSA P-224 signing operations in 1064799us (15026.3 ops/sec)
Did 19000 ECDSA P-256 signing operations in 1007839us (18852.2 ops/sec)
Did 1078 ECDSA P-384 signing operations in 1079413us (998.7 ops/sec)
Did 484 ECDSA P-521 signing operations in 1083616us (446.7 ops/sec)
Change-Id: I2a25e90fc99dac13c0616d0ea45e125a4bd8cca1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/23075
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2017-11-13 03:58:00 +00:00
|
|
|
uint8_t p_str[33];
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(p_str, g_scalar->bytes, 32);
|
|
|
|
p_str[32] = 0;
|
2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
// First window
|
2018-11-06 23:18:56 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned index = 0;
|
|
|
|
unsigned wvalue = calc_first_wvalue(&index, p_str);
|
2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-01-12 07:52:34 +00:00
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_select_w7(&p.a, ecp_nistz256_precomputed[0], wvalue >> 1);
|
2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-11-08 08:15:32 +00:00
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_neg(p.p.Z, p.p.Y);
|
|
|
|
copy_conditional(p.p.Y, p.p.Z, wvalue & 1);
|
2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
// Convert |p| from affine to Jacobian coordinates. We set Z to zero if |p|
|
|
|
|
// is infinity and |ONE| otherwise. |p| was computed from the table, so it
|
|
|
|
// is infinity iff |wvalue >> 1| is zero.
|
2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memset(p.p.Z, 0, sizeof(p.p.Z));
|
2016-11-11 13:38:49 +00:00
|
|
|
copy_conditional(p.p.Z, ONE, is_not_zero(wvalue >> 1));
|
2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Make ECDSA signing 10% faster and plug some timing leaks.
None of the asymmetric crypto we inherented from OpenSSL is
constant-time because of BIGNUM. BIGNUM chops leading zeros off the
front of everything, so we end up leaking information about the first
word, in theory. BIGNUM functions additionally tend to take the full
range of inputs and then call into BN_nnmod at various points.
All our secret values should be acted on in constant-time, but k in
ECDSA is a particularly sensitive value. So, ecdsa_sign_setup, in an
attempt to mitigate the BIGNUM leaks, would add a couple copies of the
order.
This does not work at all. k is used to compute two values: k^-1 and kG.
The first operation when computing k^-1 is to call BN_nnmod if k is out
of range. The entry point to our tuned constant-time curve
implementations is to call BN_nnmod if the scalar has too many bits,
which this causes. The result is both corrections are immediately undone
but cause us to do more variable-time work in the meantime.
Replace all these computations around k with the word-based functions
added in the various preceding CLs. In doing so, replace the BN_mod_mul
calls (which internally call BN_nnmod) with Montgomery reduction. We can
avoid taking k^-1 out of Montgomery form, which combines nicely with
Brian Smith's trick in 3426d1011946b26ff1bb2fd98a081ba4753c9cc8. Along
the way, we avoid some unnecessary mallocs.
BIGNUM still affects the private key itself, as well as the EC_POINTs.
But this should hopefully be much better now. Also it's 10% faster:
Before:
Did 15000 ECDSA P-224 signing operations in 1069117us (14030.3 ops/sec)
Did 18000 ECDSA P-256 signing operations in 1053908us (17079.3 ops/sec)
Did 1078 ECDSA P-384 signing operations in 1087853us (990.9 ops/sec)
Did 473 ECDSA P-521 signing operations in 1069835us (442.1 ops/sec)
After:
Did 16000 ECDSA P-224 signing operations in 1064799us (15026.3 ops/sec)
Did 19000 ECDSA P-256 signing operations in 1007839us (18852.2 ops/sec)
Did 1078 ECDSA P-384 signing operations in 1079413us (998.7 ops/sec)
Did 484 ECDSA P-521 signing operations in 1083616us (446.7 ops/sec)
Change-Id: I2a25e90fc99dac13c0616d0ea45e125a4bd8cca1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/23075
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2017-11-13 03:58:00 +00:00
|
|
|
for (int i = 1; i < 37; i++) {
|
2018-11-06 23:18:56 +00:00
|
|
|
wvalue = calc_wvalue(&index, p_str);
|
2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-01-12 07:52:34 +00:00
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_select_w7(&t.a, ecp_nistz256_precomputed[i], wvalue >> 1);
|
2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-11-08 08:15:32 +00:00
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_neg(t.p.Z, t.a.Y);
|
|
|
|
copy_conditional(t.a.Y, t.p.Z, wvalue & 1);
|
2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-30 19:27:46 +00:00
|
|
|
// Note |ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine| does not work if |p.p| and |t.a|
|
|
|
|
// are the same non-infinity point, so it is important that we compute the
|
|
|
|
// |g_scalar| term before the |p_scalar| term.
|
2015-11-08 08:15:32 +00:00
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine(&p.p, &p.p, &t.a);
|
2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-11-06 23:18:56 +00:00
|
|
|
mul_p_add_and_store(group, r, g_scalar, p_, p_scalar, &t, &p);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void ecp_nistz256_points_mul_public(const EC_GROUP *group,
|
|
|
|
EC_RAW_POINT *r,
|
|
|
|
const EC_SCALAR *g_scalar,
|
|
|
|
const EC_RAW_POINT *p_,
|
|
|
|
const EC_SCALAR *p_scalar) {
|
|
|
|
assert(p_ != NULL && p_scalar != NULL && g_scalar != NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
alignas(32) p256_point_union_t t, p;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t p_str[33];
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(p_str, g_scalar->bytes, 32);
|
|
|
|
p_str[32] = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// First window
|
|
|
|
unsigned index = 0;
|
|
|
|
unsigned wvalue = calc_first_wvalue(&index, p_str);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Convert |p| from affine to Jacobian coordinates. We set Z to zero if |p|
|
|
|
|
// is infinity and |ONE| otherwise. |p| was computed from the table, so it
|
|
|
|
// is infinity iff |wvalue >> 1| is zero.
|
|
|
|
if ((wvalue >> 1) != 0) {
|
2019-01-12 07:52:34 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(&p.a, &ecp_nistz256_precomputed[0][(wvalue >> 1) - 1],
|
|
|
|
sizeof(p.a));
|
2018-11-06 23:18:56 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(&p.p.Z, ONE, sizeof(p.p.Z));
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memset(&p.a, 0, sizeof(p.a));
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memset(p.p.Z, 0, sizeof(p.p.Z));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((wvalue & 1) == 1) {
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_neg(p.p.Y, p.p.Y);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (int i = 1; i < 37; i++) {
|
|
|
|
wvalue = calc_wvalue(&index, p_str);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((wvalue >> 1) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-01-12 07:52:34 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(&t.a, &ecp_nistz256_precomputed[i][(wvalue >> 1) - 1],
|
|
|
|
sizeof(p.a));
|
2018-11-06 23:18:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((wvalue & 1) == 1) {
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_neg(t.a.Y, t.a.Y);
|
2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-11-06 23:18:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-30 19:27:46 +00:00
|
|
|
// Note |ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine| does not work if |p.p| and |t.a|
|
|
|
|
// are the same non-infinity point, so it is important that we compute the
|
|
|
|
// |g_scalar| term before the |p_scalar| term.
|
2018-11-06 23:18:56 +00:00
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine(&p.p, &p.p, &t.a);
|
2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-11-06 23:18:56 +00:00
|
|
|
mul_p_add_and_store(group, r, g_scalar, p_, p_scalar, &t, &p);
|
2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-04-25 03:53:07 +01:00
|
|
|
static int ecp_nistz256_get_affine(const EC_GROUP *group,
|
2018-11-09 00:31:58 +00:00
|
|
|
const EC_RAW_POINT *point, EC_FELEM *x,
|
|
|
|
EC_FELEM *y) {
|
2018-04-25 03:53:07 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity(group, point)) {
|
2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Add EC_FELEM for EC_POINTs and related temporaries.
This introduces EC_FELEM, which is analogous to EC_SCALAR. It is used
for EC_POINT's representation in the generic EC_METHOD, as well as
random operations on tuned EC_METHODs that still are implemented
genericly.
Unlike EC_SCALAR, EC_FELEM's exact representation is awkwardly specific
to the EC_METHOD, analogous to how the old values were BIGNUMs but may
or may not have been in Montgomery form. This is kind of a nuisance, but
no more than before. (If p224-64.c were easily convertable to Montgomery
form, we could say |EC_FELEM| is always in Montgomery form. If we
exposed the internal add and double implementations in each of the
curves, we could give |EC_POINT| an |EC_METHOD|-specific representation
and |EC_FELEM| is purely a |EC_GFp_mont_method| type. I'll leave this
for later.)
The generic add and doubling formulas are aligned with the formulas
proved in fiat-crypto. Those only applied to a = -3, so I've proved a
generic one in https://github.com/mit-plv/fiat-crypto/pull/356, in case
someone uses a custom curve. The new formulas are verified,
constant-time, and swap a multiply for a square. As expressed in
fiat-crypto they do use more temporaries, but this seems to be fine with
stack-allocated EC_FELEMs. (We can try to help the compiler later,
but benchamrks below suggest this isn't necessary.)
Unlike BIGNUM, EC_FELEM can be stack-allocated. It also captures the
bounds in the type system and, in particular, that the width is correct,
which will make it easier to select a point in constant-time in the
future. (Indeed the old code did not always have the correct width. Its
point formula involved halving and implemented this in variable time and
variable width.)
Before:
Did 77274 ECDH P-256 operations in 10046087us (7692.0 ops/sec)
Did 5959 ECDH P-384 operations in 10031701us (594.0 ops/sec)
Did 10815 ECDSA P-384 signing operations in 10087892us (1072.1 ops/sec)
Did 8976 ECDSA P-384 verify operations in 10071038us (891.3 ops/sec)
Did 2600 ECDH P-521 operations in 10091688us (257.6 ops/sec)
Did 4590 ECDSA P-521 signing operations in 10055195us (456.5 ops/sec)
Did 3811 ECDSA P-521 verify operations in 10003574us (381.0 ops/sec)
After:
Did 77736 ECDH P-256 operations in 10029858us (7750.5 ops/sec) [+0.8%]
Did 7519 ECDH P-384 operations in 10068076us (746.8 ops/sec) [+25.7%]
Did 13335 ECDSA P-384 signing operations in 10029962us (1329.5 ops/sec) [+24.0%]
Did 11021 ECDSA P-384 verify operations in 10088600us (1092.4 ops/sec) [+22.6%]
Did 2912 ECDH P-521 operations in 10001325us (291.2 ops/sec) [+13.0%]
Did 5150 ECDSA P-521 signing operations in 10027462us (513.6 ops/sec) [+12.5%]
Did 4264 ECDSA P-521 verify operations in 10069694us (423.4 ops/sec) [+11.1%]
This more than pays for removing points_make_affine previously and even
speeds up ECDH P-256 slightly. (The point-on-curve check uses the
generic code.)
Next is to push the stack-allocating up to ec_wNAF_mul, followed by a
constant-time single-point multiplication.
Bug: 239
Change-Id: I44a2dff7c52522e491d0f8cffff64c4ab5cd353c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27668
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-04-23 02:39:34 +01:00
|
|
|
BN_ULONG z_inv2[P256_LIMBS];
|
|
|
|
BN_ULONG z_inv3[P256_LIMBS];
|
|
|
|
assert(group->field.width == P256_LIMBS);
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_mod_inverse_mont(z_inv3, point->Z.words);
|
2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(z_inv2, z_inv3);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
// Instead of using |ecp_nistz256_from_mont| to convert the |x| coordinate
|
|
|
|
// and then calling |ecp_nistz256_from_mont| again to convert the |y|
|
|
|
|
// coordinate below, convert the common factor |z_inv2| once now, saving one
|
|
|
|
// reduction.
|
2016-11-11 23:52:39 +00:00
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_from_mont(z_inv2, z_inv2);
|
2016-03-26 00:22:40 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-26 00:29:52 +00:00
|
|
|
if (x != NULL) {
|
2018-11-09 00:31:58 +00:00
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(x->words, z_inv2, point->X.words);
|
2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (y != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(z_inv3, z_inv3, z_inv2);
|
2018-11-09 00:31:58 +00:00
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(y->words, z_inv3, point->Y.words);
|
2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-11-05 23:30:28 +00:00
|
|
|
static void ecp_nistz256_add(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r,
|
|
|
|
const EC_RAW_POINT *a_, const EC_RAW_POINT *b_) {
|
|
|
|
P256_POINT a, b;
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(a.X, a_->X.words, P256_LIMBS * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(a.Y, a_->Y.words, P256_LIMBS * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(a.Z, a_->Z.words, P256_LIMBS * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(b.X, b_->X.words, P256_LIMBS * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(b.Y, b_->Y.words, P256_LIMBS * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(b.Z, b_->Z.words, P256_LIMBS * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_point_add(&a, &a, &b);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(r->X.words, a.X, P256_LIMBS * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(r->Y.words, a.Y, P256_LIMBS * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(r->Z.words, a.Z, P256_LIMBS * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void ecp_nistz256_dbl(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r,
|
|
|
|
const EC_RAW_POINT *a_) {
|
|
|
|
P256_POINT a;
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(a.X, a_->X.words, P256_LIMBS * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(a.Y, a_->Y.words, P256_LIMBS * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(a.Z, a_->Z.words, P256_LIMBS * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_point_double(&a, &a);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(r->X.words, a.X, P256_LIMBS * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(r->Y.words, a.Y, P256_LIMBS * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(r->Z.words, a.Z, P256_LIMBS * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-04-07 00:58:46 +01:00
|
|
|
static void ecp_nistz256_inv_mod_ord(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *out,
|
|
|
|
const EC_SCALAR *in) {
|
|
|
|
// table[i] stores a power of |in| corresponding to the matching enum value.
|
|
|
|
enum {
|
|
|
|
// The following indices specify the power in binary.
|
|
|
|
i_1 = 0,
|
|
|
|
i_10,
|
|
|
|
i_11,
|
|
|
|
i_101,
|
|
|
|
i_111,
|
|
|
|
i_1010,
|
|
|
|
i_1111,
|
|
|
|
i_10101,
|
|
|
|
i_101010,
|
|
|
|
i_101111,
|
|
|
|
// The following indices specify 2^N-1, or N ones in a row.
|
|
|
|
i_x6,
|
|
|
|
i_x8,
|
|
|
|
i_x16,
|
|
|
|
i_x32
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
BN_ULONG table[15][P256_LIMBS];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// https://briansmith.org/ecc-inversion-addition-chains-01#p256_scalar_inversion
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Even though this code path spares 12 squarings, 4.5%, and 13
|
|
|
|
// multiplications, 25%, the overall sign operation is not that much faster,
|
|
|
|
// not more that 2%. Most of the performance of this function comes from the
|
|
|
|
// scalar operations.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Pre-calculate powers.
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(table[i_1], in->words, P256_LIMBS * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_ord_sqr_mont(table[i_10], table[i_1], 1);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_ord_mul_mont(table[i_11], table[i_1], table[i_10]);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_ord_mul_mont(table[i_101], table[i_11], table[i_10]);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_ord_mul_mont(table[i_111], table[i_101], table[i_10]);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_ord_sqr_mont(table[i_1010], table[i_101], 1);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_ord_mul_mont(table[i_1111], table[i_1010], table[i_101]);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_ord_sqr_mont(table[i_10101], table[i_1010], 1);
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_ord_mul_mont(table[i_10101], table[i_10101], table[i_1]);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_ord_sqr_mont(table[i_101010], table[i_10101], 1);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_ord_mul_mont(table[i_101111], table[i_101010], table[i_101]);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_ord_mul_mont(table[i_x6], table[i_101010], table[i_10101]);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_ord_sqr_mont(table[i_x8], table[i_x6], 2);
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_ord_mul_mont(table[i_x8], table[i_x8], table[i_11]);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_ord_sqr_mont(table[i_x16], table[i_x8], 8);
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_ord_mul_mont(table[i_x16], table[i_x16], table[i_x8]);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_ord_sqr_mont(table[i_x32], table[i_x16], 16);
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_ord_mul_mont(table[i_x32], table[i_x32], table[i_x16]);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Compute |in| raised to the order-2.
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_ord_sqr_mont(out->words, table[i_x32], 64);
|
|
|
|
ecp_nistz256_ord_mul_mont(out->words, out->words, table[i_x32]);
|
|
|
|
static const struct {
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uint8_t p, i;
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} kChain[27] = {{32, i_x32}, {6, i_101111}, {5, i_111}, {4, i_11},
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{5, i_1111}, {5, i_10101}, {4, i_101}, {3, i_101},
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{3, i_101}, {5, i_111}, {9, i_101111}, {6, i_1111},
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{2, i_1}, {5, i_1}, {6, i_1111}, {5, i_111},
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{4, i_111}, {5, i_111}, {5, i_101}, {3, i_11},
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{10, i_101111}, {2, i_11}, {5, i_11}, {5, i_11},
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{3, i_1}, {7, i_10101}, {6, i_1111}};
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for (size_t i = 0; i < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kChain); i++) {
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ecp_nistz256_ord_sqr_mont(out->words, out->words, kChain[i].p);
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ecp_nistz256_ord_mul_mont(out->words, out->words, table[kChain[i].i]);
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}
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}
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2018-11-06 23:18:56 +00:00
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static int ecp_nistz256_mont_inv_mod_ord_vartime(const EC_GROUP *group,
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EC_SCALAR *out,
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const EC_SCALAR *in) {
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2018-12-06 00:44:03 +00:00
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if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_get()[1] & (1 << 28)) == 0) {
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2018-11-06 23:18:56 +00:00
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// No AVX support; fallback to generic code.
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return ec_GFp_simple_mont_inv_mod_ord_vartime(group, out, in);
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}
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2018-11-09 22:46:55 +00:00
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assert(group->order.width == P256_LIMBS);
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if (!beeu_mod_inverse_vartime(out->words, in->words, group->order.d)) {
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2018-11-06 23:18:56 +00:00
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return 0;
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}
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// The result should be returned in the Montgomery domain.
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ec_scalar_to_montgomery(group, out, out);
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return 1;
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}
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2018-11-09 01:07:42 +00:00
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static int ecp_nistz256_cmp_x_coordinate(const EC_GROUP *group,
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const EC_RAW_POINT *p,
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const EC_SCALAR *r) {
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if (ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity(group, p)) {
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2018-11-06 23:18:56 +00:00
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return 0;
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}
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2018-11-09 22:46:55 +00:00
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assert(group->order.width == P256_LIMBS);
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assert(group->field.width == P256_LIMBS);
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2018-11-06 23:18:56 +00:00
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// We wish to compare X/Z^2 with r. This is equivalent to comparing X with
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// r*Z^2. Note that X and Z are represented in Montgomery form, while r is
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// not.
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BN_ULONG r_Z2[P256_LIMBS], Z2_mont[P256_LIMBS], X[P256_LIMBS];
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2018-11-09 01:07:42 +00:00
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ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(Z2_mont, p->Z.words, p->Z.words);
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ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(r_Z2, r->words, Z2_mont);
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ecp_nistz256_from_mont(X, p->X.words);
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2018-11-06 23:18:56 +00:00
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if (OPENSSL_memcmp(r_Z2, X, sizeof(r_Z2)) == 0) {
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return 1;
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}
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// During signing the x coefficient is reduced modulo the group order.
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// Therefore there is a small possibility, less than 1/2^128, that group_order
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// < p.x < P. in that case we need not only to compare against |r| but also to
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// compare against r+group_order.
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2018-11-09 22:46:55 +00:00
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if (bn_less_than_words(r->words, group->field_minus_order.words,
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P256_LIMBS)) {
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2018-11-09 01:07:42 +00:00
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// We can ignore the carry because: r + group_order < p < 2^256.
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2018-11-09 22:46:55 +00:00
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bn_add_words(r_Z2, r->words, group->order.d, P256_LIMBS);
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2018-11-09 01:07:42 +00:00
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ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(r_Z2, r_Z2, Z2_mont);
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2018-11-06 23:18:56 +00:00
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if (OPENSSL_memcmp(r_Z2, X, sizeof(r_Z2)) == 0) {
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return 1;
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}
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}
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|
2018-11-09 01:07:42 +00:00
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return 0;
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2018-11-06 23:18:56 +00:00
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}
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2017-05-02 22:25:39 +01:00
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DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EC_METHOD, EC_GFp_nistz256_method) {
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out->group_init = ec_GFp_mont_group_init;
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out->group_finish = ec_GFp_mont_group_finish;
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out->group_set_curve = ec_GFp_mont_group_set_curve;
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out->point_get_affine_coordinates = ecp_nistz256_get_affine;
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2018-11-05 23:30:28 +00:00
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|
|
out->add = ecp_nistz256_add;
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|
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out->dbl = ecp_nistz256_dbl;
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2017-05-02 22:25:39 +01:00
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|
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out->mul = ecp_nistz256_points_mul;
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2018-11-06 23:18:56 +00:00
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|
|
out->mul_public = ecp_nistz256_points_mul_public;
|
Add EC_FELEM for EC_POINTs and related temporaries.
This introduces EC_FELEM, which is analogous to EC_SCALAR. It is used
for EC_POINT's representation in the generic EC_METHOD, as well as
random operations on tuned EC_METHODs that still are implemented
genericly.
Unlike EC_SCALAR, EC_FELEM's exact representation is awkwardly specific
to the EC_METHOD, analogous to how the old values were BIGNUMs but may
or may not have been in Montgomery form. This is kind of a nuisance, but
no more than before. (If p224-64.c were easily convertable to Montgomery
form, we could say |EC_FELEM| is always in Montgomery form. If we
exposed the internal add and double implementations in each of the
curves, we could give |EC_POINT| an |EC_METHOD|-specific representation
and |EC_FELEM| is purely a |EC_GFp_mont_method| type. I'll leave this
for later.)
The generic add and doubling formulas are aligned with the formulas
proved in fiat-crypto. Those only applied to a = -3, so I've proved a
generic one in https://github.com/mit-plv/fiat-crypto/pull/356, in case
someone uses a custom curve. The new formulas are verified,
constant-time, and swap a multiply for a square. As expressed in
fiat-crypto they do use more temporaries, but this seems to be fine with
stack-allocated EC_FELEMs. (We can try to help the compiler later,
but benchamrks below suggest this isn't necessary.)
Unlike BIGNUM, EC_FELEM can be stack-allocated. It also captures the
bounds in the type system and, in particular, that the width is correct,
which will make it easier to select a point in constant-time in the
future. (Indeed the old code did not always have the correct width. Its
point formula involved halving and implemented this in variable time and
variable width.)
Before:
Did 77274 ECDH P-256 operations in 10046087us (7692.0 ops/sec)
Did 5959 ECDH P-384 operations in 10031701us (594.0 ops/sec)
Did 10815 ECDSA P-384 signing operations in 10087892us (1072.1 ops/sec)
Did 8976 ECDSA P-384 verify operations in 10071038us (891.3 ops/sec)
Did 2600 ECDH P-521 operations in 10091688us (257.6 ops/sec)
Did 4590 ECDSA P-521 signing operations in 10055195us (456.5 ops/sec)
Did 3811 ECDSA P-521 verify operations in 10003574us (381.0 ops/sec)
After:
Did 77736 ECDH P-256 operations in 10029858us (7750.5 ops/sec) [+0.8%]
Did 7519 ECDH P-384 operations in 10068076us (746.8 ops/sec) [+25.7%]
Did 13335 ECDSA P-384 signing operations in 10029962us (1329.5 ops/sec) [+24.0%]
Did 11021 ECDSA P-384 verify operations in 10088600us (1092.4 ops/sec) [+22.6%]
Did 2912 ECDH P-521 operations in 10001325us (291.2 ops/sec) [+13.0%]
Did 5150 ECDSA P-521 signing operations in 10027462us (513.6 ops/sec) [+12.5%]
Did 4264 ECDSA P-521 verify operations in 10069694us (423.4 ops/sec) [+11.1%]
This more than pays for removing points_make_affine previously and even
speeds up ECDH P-256 slightly. (The point-on-curve check uses the
generic code.)
Next is to push the stack-allocating up to ec_wNAF_mul, followed by a
constant-time single-point multiplication.
Bug: 239
Change-Id: I44a2dff7c52522e491d0f8cffff64c4ab5cd353c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27668
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-04-23 02:39:34 +01:00
|
|
|
out->felem_mul = ec_GFp_mont_felem_mul;
|
|
|
|
out->felem_sqr = ec_GFp_mont_felem_sqr;
|
|
|
|
out->bignum_to_felem = ec_GFp_mont_bignum_to_felem;
|
|
|
|
out->felem_to_bignum = ec_GFp_mont_felem_to_bignum;
|
2018-04-07 00:58:46 +01:00
|
|
|
out->scalar_inv_montgomery = ecp_nistz256_inv_mod_ord;
|
2018-11-06 23:18:56 +00:00
|
|
|
out->scalar_inv_montgomery_vartime = ecp_nistz256_mont_inv_mod_ord_vartime;
|
|
|
|
out->cmp_x_coordinate = ecp_nistz256_cmp_x_coordinate;
|
2019-02-21 16:49:57 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-11-03 22:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && \
|
|
|
|
!defined(OPENSSL_SMALL) */
|