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boringssl/crypto/ecdh_extra/ecdh_extra.c

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Inital import. Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta). (This change contains substantial changes from the original and effectively starts a new history.)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
*
* The Elliptic Curve Public-Key Crypto Library (ECC Code) included
* herein is developed by SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and is contributed
* to the OpenSSL project.
*
* The ECC Code is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license provided below.
*
* The ECDH software is originally written by Douglas Stebila of
* Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2000-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* licensing@OpenSSL.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
Resolve a small handful of size_t truncation warnings. This is very far from all of it, but I did some easy ones before I got bored. Snapshot the progress until someone else wants to continue this. BUG=22 Change-Id: I2609e9766d883a273e53e01a75a4b1d4700e2436 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9132 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
2016-08-04 22:38:40 +01:00
#include <limits.h>
Remove string.h from base.h. Including string.h in base.h causes any file that includes a BoringSSL header to include string.h. Generally this wouldn't be a problem, although string.h might slow down the compile if it wasn't otherwise needed. However, it also causes problems for ipsec-tools in Android because OpenSSL didn't have this behaviour. This change removes string.h from base.h and, instead, adds it to each .c file that requires it. Change-Id: I5968e50b0e230fd3adf9b72dd2836e6f52d6fb37 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3200 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-01-31 01:08:37 +00:00
#include <string.h>
Inital import. Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta). (This change contains substantial changes from the original and effectively starts a new history.)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/digest.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
Store EC_KEY's private key as an EC_SCALAR. This isn't strictly necessary now that BIGNUMs are safe, but we get to rely on type-system annotations from EC_SCALAR. Additionally, EC_POINT_mul depends on BN_div, while the EC_SCALAR version does not. Change-Id: I75e6967f3d35aef17278b94862f4e506baff5c23 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/26424 Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
2018-03-07 01:21:28 +00:00
#include "../fipsmodule/ec/internal.h"
Work around language and compiler bug in memcpy, etc. Most C standard library functions are undefined if passed NULL, even when the corresponding length is zero. This gives them (and, in turn, all functions which call them) surprising behavior on empty arrays. Some compilers will miscompile code due to this rule. See also https://www.imperialviolet.org/2016/06/26/nonnull.html Add OPENSSL_memcpy, etc., wrappers which avoid this problem. BUG=23 Change-Id: I95f42b23e92945af0e681264fffaf578e7f8465e Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12928 Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
#include "../internal.h"
Inital import. Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta). (This change contains substantial changes from the original and effectively starts a new history.)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
int ECDH_compute_key(void *out, size_t outlen, const EC_POINT *pub_key,
Const-correct ECDH_compute_key. Change-Id: Id8099cc3a250e36e62b8a48e74706b75e5fa127c Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11566 Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2016-10-08 07:06:48 +01:00
const EC_KEY *priv_key,
Clean up |ECDH_compute_key|. 1. Check for the presence of the private key before allocating or computing anything. 2. Check the return value of |BN_CTX_get|. 3. Don't bother computing the Y coordinate since it is not used. 4. Remove conditional logic in cleanup section. Change-Id: I4d8611603363c7e5d16a8e9f1d6c3a56809f27ae Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6171 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-08 22:52:56 +01:00
void *(*kdf)(const void *in, size_t inlen, void *out,
size_t *outlen)) {
Store EC_KEY's private key as an EC_SCALAR. This isn't strictly necessary now that BIGNUMs are safe, but we get to rely on type-system annotations from EC_SCALAR. Additionally, EC_POINT_mul depends on BN_div, while the EC_SCALAR version does not. Change-Id: I75e6967f3d35aef17278b94862f4e506baff5c23 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/26424 Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
2018-03-07 01:21:28 +00:00
if (priv_key->priv_key == NULL) {
Remove the func parameter to OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR. Much of this was done automatically with find . -name '*.c' | xargs sed -E -i '' -e 's/(OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR\([a-zA-Z_0-9]+, )[a-zA-Z_0-9]+, ([a-zA-Z_0-9]+\);)/\1\2/' find . -name '*.c' | xargs sed -E -i '' -e 's/(OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR\([a-zA-Z_0-9]+, )[a-zA-Z_0-9]+, ([a-zA-Z_0-9]+\);)/\1\2/' BUG=468039 Change-Id: I4c75fd95dff85ab1d4a546b05e6aed1aeeb499d8 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5276 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDH, ECDH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE);
Clean up |ECDH_compute_key|. 1. Check for the presence of the private key before allocating or computing anything. 2. Check the return value of |BN_CTX_get|. 3. Don't bother computing the Y coordinate since it is not used. 4. Remove conditional logic in cleanup section. Change-Id: I4d8611603363c7e5d16a8e9f1d6c3a56809f27ae Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6171 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-08 22:52:56 +01:00
return -1;
Inital import. Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta). (This change contains substantial changes from the original and effectively starts a new history.)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
}
Store EC_KEY's private key as an EC_SCALAR. This isn't strictly necessary now that BIGNUMs are safe, but we get to rely on type-system annotations from EC_SCALAR. Additionally, EC_POINT_mul depends on BN_div, while the EC_SCALAR version does not. Change-Id: I75e6967f3d35aef17278b94862f4e506baff5c23 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/26424 Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
2018-03-07 01:21:28 +00:00
const EC_SCALAR *const priv = &priv_key->priv_key->scalar;
Use EC_RAW_POINT in ECDSA. Now the only allocations in ECDSA are the ECDSA_SIG input and output. Change-Id: If1fcde6dc2ee2c53f5adc16a7f692e22e9c238de Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/33069 Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-11-09 23:06:51 +00:00
const EC_GROUP *const group = EC_KEY_get0_group(priv_key);
if (EC_GROUP_cmp(group, pub_key->group, NULL) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return -1;
}
Inital import. Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta). (This change contains substantial changes from the original and effectively starts a new history.)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
Clean up |ECDH_compute_key|. 1. Check for the presence of the private key before allocating or computing anything. 2. Check the return value of |BN_CTX_get|. 3. Don't bother computing the Y coordinate since it is not used. 4. Remove conditional logic in cleanup section. Change-Id: I4d8611603363c7e5d16a8e9f1d6c3a56809f27ae Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6171 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-08 22:52:56 +01:00
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
return -1;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
int ret = -1;
size_t buflen = 0;
uint8_t *buf = NULL;
Inital import. Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta). (This change contains substantial changes from the original and effectively starts a new history.)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
Clean up |ECDH_compute_key|. 1. Check for the presence of the private key before allocating or computing anything. 2. Check the return value of |BN_CTX_get|. 3. Don't bother computing the Y coordinate since it is not used. 4. Remove conditional logic in cleanup section. Change-Id: I4d8611603363c7e5d16a8e9f1d6c3a56809f27ae Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6171 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-08 22:52:56 +01:00
EC_POINT *tmp = EC_POINT_new(group);
Inital import. Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta). (This change contains substantial changes from the original and effectively starts a new history.)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
if (tmp == NULL) {
Remove the func parameter to OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR. Much of this was done automatically with find . -name '*.c' | xargs sed -E -i '' -e 's/(OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR\([a-zA-Z_0-9]+, )[a-zA-Z_0-9]+, ([a-zA-Z_0-9]+\);)/\1\2/' find . -name '*.c' | xargs sed -E -i '' -e 's/(OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR\([a-zA-Z_0-9]+, )[a-zA-Z_0-9]+, ([a-zA-Z_0-9]+\);)/\1\2/' BUG=468039 Change-Id: I4c75fd95dff85ab1d4a546b05e6aed1aeeb499d8 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5276 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDH, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
Inital import. Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta). (This change contains substantial changes from the original and effectively starts a new history.)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
goto err;
}
Use EC_RAW_POINT in ECDSA. Now the only allocations in ECDSA are the ECDSA_SIG input and output. Change-Id: If1fcde6dc2ee2c53f5adc16a7f692e22e9c238de Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/33069 Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-11-09 23:06:51 +00:00
if (!ec_point_mul_scalar(group, &tmp->raw, NULL, &pub_key->raw, priv)) {
Remove the func parameter to OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR. Much of this was done automatically with find . -name '*.c' | xargs sed -E -i '' -e 's/(OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR\([a-zA-Z_0-9]+, )[a-zA-Z_0-9]+, ([a-zA-Z_0-9]+\);)/\1\2/' find . -name '*.c' | xargs sed -E -i '' -e 's/(OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR\([a-zA-Z_0-9]+, )[a-zA-Z_0-9]+, ([a-zA-Z_0-9]+\);)/\1\2/' BUG=468039 Change-Id: I4c75fd95dff85ab1d4a546b05e6aed1aeeb499d8 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5276 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDH, ECDH_R_POINT_ARITHMETIC_FAILURE);
Inital import. Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta). (This change contains substantial changes from the original and effectively starts a new history.)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
goto err;
}
Clean up |ECDH_compute_key|. 1. Check for the presence of the private key before allocating or computing anything. 2. Check the return value of |BN_CTX_get|. 3. Don't bother computing the Y coordinate since it is not used. 4. Remove conditional logic in cleanup section. Change-Id: I4d8611603363c7e5d16a8e9f1d6c3a56809f27ae Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6171 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-08 22:52:56 +01:00
BIGNUM *x = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (!x) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDH, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, tmp, x, NULL, ctx)) {
Remove the func parameter to OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR. Much of this was done automatically with find . -name '*.c' | xargs sed -E -i '' -e 's/(OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR\([a-zA-Z_0-9]+, )[a-zA-Z_0-9]+, ([a-zA-Z_0-9]+\);)/\1\2/' find . -name '*.c' | xargs sed -E -i '' -e 's/(OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR\([a-zA-Z_0-9]+, )[a-zA-Z_0-9]+, ([a-zA-Z_0-9]+\);)/\1\2/' BUG=468039 Change-Id: I4c75fd95dff85ab1d4a546b05e6aed1aeeb499d8 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5276 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDH, ECDH_R_POINT_ARITHMETIC_FAILURE);
Inital import. Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta). (This change contains substantial changes from the original and effectively starts a new history.)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
goto err;
}
buflen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(buflen);
if (buf == NULL) {
Remove the func parameter to OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR. Much of this was done automatically with find . -name '*.c' | xargs sed -E -i '' -e 's/(OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR\([a-zA-Z_0-9]+, )[a-zA-Z_0-9]+, ([a-zA-Z_0-9]+\);)/\1\2/' find . -name '*.c' | xargs sed -E -i '' -e 's/(OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR\([a-zA-Z_0-9]+, )[a-zA-Z_0-9]+, ([a-zA-Z_0-9]+\);)/\1\2/' BUG=468039 Change-Id: I4c75fd95dff85ab1d4a546b05e6aed1aeeb499d8 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5276 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDH, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
Inital import. Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta). (This change contains substantial changes from the original and effectively starts a new history.)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
goto err;
}
Use BN_bn2bin_padded rather than doing math to figure out leading zeros. Saves doing it ad-hoc all the time. Change-Id: Ic1a1180f56eec37c19799649bb8f18237bd617f8 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2241 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2014-11-10 22:28:53 +00:00
if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(buf, buflen, x)) {
Remove the func parameter to OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR. Much of this was done automatically with find . -name '*.c' | xargs sed -E -i '' -e 's/(OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR\([a-zA-Z_0-9]+, )[a-zA-Z_0-9]+, ([a-zA-Z_0-9]+\);)/\1\2/' find . -name '*.c' | xargs sed -E -i '' -e 's/(OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR\([a-zA-Z_0-9]+, )[a-zA-Z_0-9]+, ([a-zA-Z_0-9]+\);)/\1\2/' BUG=468039 Change-Id: I4c75fd95dff85ab1d4a546b05e6aed1aeeb499d8 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5276 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
Inital import. Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta). (This change contains substantial changes from the original and effectively starts a new history.)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
goto err;
}
Clean up |ECDH_compute_key|. 1. Check for the presence of the private key before allocating or computing anything. 2. Check the return value of |BN_CTX_get|. 3. Don't bother computing the Y coordinate since it is not used. 4. Remove conditional logic in cleanup section. Change-Id: I4d8611603363c7e5d16a8e9f1d6c3a56809f27ae Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6171 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-08 22:52:56 +01:00
if (kdf != NULL) {
if (kdf(buf, buflen, out, &outlen) == NULL) {
Remove the func parameter to OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR. Much of this was done automatically with find . -name '*.c' | xargs sed -E -i '' -e 's/(OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR\([a-zA-Z_0-9]+, )[a-zA-Z_0-9]+, ([a-zA-Z_0-9]+\);)/\1\2/' find . -name '*.c' | xargs sed -E -i '' -e 's/(OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR\([a-zA-Z_0-9]+, )[a-zA-Z_0-9]+, ([a-zA-Z_0-9]+\);)/\1\2/' BUG=468039 Change-Id: I4c75fd95dff85ab1d4a546b05e6aed1aeeb499d8 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5276 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDH, ECDH_R_KDF_FAILED);
Inital import. Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta). (This change contains substantial changes from the original and effectively starts a new history.)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
goto err;
}
} else {
Run the comment converter on libcrypto. crypto/{asn1,x509,x509v3,pem} were skipped as they are still OpenSSL style. Change-Id: I3cd9a60e1cb483a981aca325041f3fbce294247c Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19504 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
// no KDF, just copy as much as we can
Clean up |ECDH_compute_key|. 1. Check for the presence of the private key before allocating or computing anything. 2. Check the return value of |BN_CTX_get|. 3. Don't bother computing the Y coordinate since it is not used. 4. Remove conditional logic in cleanup section. Change-Id: I4d8611603363c7e5d16a8e9f1d6c3a56809f27ae Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6171 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-08 22:52:56 +01:00
if (buflen < outlen) {
Inital import. Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta). (This change contains substantial changes from the original and effectively starts a new history.)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
outlen = buflen;
}
Work around language and compiler bug in memcpy, etc. Most C standard library functions are undefined if passed NULL, even when the corresponding length is zero. This gives them (and, in turn, all functions which call them) surprising behavior on empty arrays. Some compilers will miscompile code due to this rule. See also https://www.imperialviolet.org/2016/06/26/nonnull.html Add OPENSSL_memcpy, etc., wrappers which avoid this problem. BUG=23 Change-Id: I95f42b23e92945af0e681264fffaf578e7f8465e Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12928 Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
OPENSSL_memcpy(out, buf, outlen);
Inital import. Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta). (This change contains substantial changes from the original and effectively starts a new history.)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
}
Resolve a small handful of size_t truncation warnings. This is very far from all of it, but I did some easy ones before I got bored. Snapshot the progress until someone else wants to continue this. BUG=22 Change-Id: I2609e9766d883a273e53e01a75a4b1d4700e2436 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9132 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
2016-08-04 22:38:40 +01:00
if (outlen > INT_MAX) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDH, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
goto err;
}
ret = (int)outlen;
Clean up |ECDH_compute_key|. 1. Check for the presence of the private key before allocating or computing anything. 2. Check the return value of |BN_CTX_get|. 3. Don't bother computing the Y coordinate since it is not used. 4. Remove conditional logic in cleanup section. Change-Id: I4d8611603363c7e5d16a8e9f1d6c3a56809f27ae Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6171 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-08 22:52:56 +01:00
Inital import. Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta). (This change contains substantial changes from the original and effectively starts a new history.)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
err:
Clean up |ECDH_compute_key|. 1. Check for the presence of the private key before allocating or computing anything. 2. Check the return value of |BN_CTX_get|. 3. Don't bother computing the Y coordinate since it is not used. 4. Remove conditional logic in cleanup section. Change-Id: I4d8611603363c7e5d16a8e9f1d6c3a56809f27ae Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6171 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-08 22:52:56 +01:00
OPENSSL_free(buf);
EC_POINT_free(tmp);
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
Inital import. Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta). (This change contains substantial changes from the original and effectively starts a new history.)
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
return ret;
}
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