boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/cipher/cipher.c

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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
#include <openssl/cipher.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/nid.h>
#include "internal.h"
#include "../../internal.h"
void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) {
OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX));
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(void) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX));
if (ctx) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
}
return ctx;
}
int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c) {
if (c->cipher != NULL && c->cipher->cleanup) {
c->cipher->cleanup(c);
}
OPENSSL_free(c->cipher_data);
OPENSSL_memset(c, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX));
return 1;
}
void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) {
if (ctx) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}
}
int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out, const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *in) {
if (in == NULL || in->cipher == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INPUT_NOT_INITIALIZED);
return 0;
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(out);
OPENSSL_memcpy(out, in, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX));
if (in->cipher_data && in->cipher->ctx_size) {
out->cipher_data = OPENSSL_malloc(in->cipher->ctx_size);
if (!out->cipher_data) {
out->cipher = NULL;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_memcpy(out->cipher_data, in->cipher_data, in->cipher->ctx_size);
}
if (in->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY) {
if (!in->cipher->ctrl((EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)in, EVP_CTRL_COPY, 0, out)) {
out->cipher = NULL;
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
Switch OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER to 1.1.0. Although we are derived from 1.0.2, we mimic 1.1.0 in some ways around our FOO_up_ref functions and opaque libssl types. This causes some difficulties when porting third-party code as any OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER checks for 1.1.0 APIs we have will be wrong. Moreover, adding accessors without changing OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER can break external projects. It is common to implement a compatibility version of an accessor under #ifdef as a static function. This then conflicts with our headers if we, unlike OpenSSL 1.0.2, have this function. This change switches OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER to 1.1.0 and atomically adds enough accessors for software with 1.1.0 support already. The hope is this will unblock hiding SSL_CTX and SSL_SESSION, which will be especially useful with C++-ficiation. The cost is we will hit some growing pains as more 1.1.0 consumers enter the ecosystem and we converge on the right set of APIs to import from upstream. It does not remove any 1.0.2 APIs, so we will not require that all projects support 1.1.0. The exception is APIs which changed in 1.1.0 but did not change the function signature. Those are breaking changes. Specifically: - SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb is now const-correct. - X509_get0_signature is now const-correct. For C++ consumers only, this change temporarily includes an overload hack for SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb that keeps the old callback working. This is a workaround for Node not yet supporting OpenSSL 1.1.0. The version number is set at (the as yet unreleased) 1.1.0g to denote that this change includes https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4384. Bug: 91 Change-Id: I5eeb27448a6db4c25c244afac37f9604d9608a76 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10340 Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2016-08-12 19:48:19 +01:00
void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
}
int EVP_CipherInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
ENGINE *engine, const uint8_t *key, const uint8_t *iv,
int enc) {
if (enc == -1) {
enc = ctx->encrypt;
} else {
if (enc) {
enc = 1;
}
ctx->encrypt = enc;
}
if (cipher) {
// Ensure a context left from last time is cleared (the previous check
// attempted to avoid this if the same ENGINE and EVP_CIPHER could be
// used).
if (ctx->cipher) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
// Restore encrypt and flags
ctx->encrypt = enc;
}
ctx->cipher = cipher;
if (ctx->cipher->ctx_size) {
ctx->cipher_data = OPENSSL_malloc(ctx->cipher->ctx_size);
if (!ctx->cipher_data) {
ctx->cipher = NULL;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
} else {
ctx->cipher_data = NULL;
}
ctx->key_len = cipher->key_len;
ctx->flags = 0;
if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT) {
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_INIT, 0, NULL)) {
ctx->cipher = NULL;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
} else if (!ctx->cipher) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_NO_CIPHER_SET);
return 0;
}
// we assume block size is a power of 2 in *cryptUpdate
assert(ctx->cipher->block_size == 1 || ctx->cipher->block_size == 8 ||
ctx->cipher->block_size == 16);
if (!(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_flags(ctx) & EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV)) {
switch (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx)) {
case EVP_CIPH_STREAM_CIPHER:
case EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE:
break;
case EVP_CIPH_CFB_MODE:
ctx->num = 0;
// fall-through
case EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE:
assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) <= sizeof(ctx->iv));
if (iv) {
OPENSSL_memcpy(ctx->oiv, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
}
OPENSSL_memcpy(ctx->iv, ctx->oiv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
break;
case EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE:
case EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE:
ctx->num = 0;
// Don't reuse IV for CTR mode
if (iv) {
OPENSSL_memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
}
break;
default:
return 0;
}
}
if (key || (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT)) {
if (!ctx->cipher->init(ctx, key, iv, enc)) {
return 0;
}
}
ctx->buf_len = 0;
ctx->final_used = 0;
ctx->block_mask = ctx->cipher->block_size - 1;
return 1;
}
int EVP_EncryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
ENGINE *impl, const uint8_t *key, const uint8_t *iv) {
return EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, impl, key, iv, 1);
}
int EVP_DecryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
ENGINE *impl, const uint8_t *key, const uint8_t *iv) {
return EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, impl, key, iv, 0);
}
int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, int *out_len,
const uint8_t *in, int in_len) {
int i, j, bl;
if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) {
i = ctx->cipher->cipher(ctx, out, in, in_len);
if (i < 0) {
return 0;
} else {
*out_len = i;
}
return 1;
}
if (in_len <= 0) {
*out_len = 0;
return in_len == 0;
}
if (ctx->buf_len == 0 && (in_len & ctx->block_mask) == 0) {
if (ctx->cipher->cipher(ctx, out, in, in_len)) {
*out_len = in_len;
return 1;
} else {
*out_len = 0;
return 0;
}
}
i = ctx->buf_len;
bl = ctx->cipher->block_size;
assert(bl <= (int)sizeof(ctx->buf));
if (i != 0) {
Fix encrypt overflow An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncryptUpdate function. If an attacker is able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to EVP_EncryptUpdate with a partial block then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap corruption. Following an analysis of all OpenSSL internal usage of the EVP_EncryptUpdate function all usage is one of two forms. The first form is like this: EVP_EncryptInit() EVP_EncryptUpdate() i.e. where the EVP_EncryptUpdate() call is known to be the first called function after an EVP_EncryptInit(), and therefore that specific call must be safe. The second form is where the length passed to EVP_EncryptUpdate() can be seen from the code to be some small value and therefore there is no possibility of an overflow. [BoringSSL: We also have code that calls EVP_CIPHER functions by way of the TLS/SSL3 "AEADs". However, there we know the inputs are bounded by 2^16.] Since all instances are one of these two forms, I believe that there can be no overflows in internal code due to this problem. It should be noted that EVP_DecryptUpdate() can call EVP_EncryptUpdate() in certain code paths. Also EVP_CipherUpdate() is a synonym for EVP_EncryptUpdate(). Therefore I have checked all instances of these calls too, and came to the same conclusion, i.e. there are no instances in internal usage where an overflow could occur. This could still represent a security issue for end user code that calls this function directly. CVE-2016-2106 Issue reported by Guido Vranken. (Imported from upstream's 3ab937bc440371fbbe74318ce494ba95021f850a.) Change-Id: Iabde896555c39899c7f0f6baf7a163a7b3c2f3d6 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7845 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2016-05-03 12:42:19 +01:00
if (bl - i > in_len) {
OPENSSL_memcpy(&ctx->buf[i], in, in_len);
ctx->buf_len += in_len;
*out_len = 0;
return 1;
} else {
j = bl - i;
OPENSSL_memcpy(&ctx->buf[i], in, j);
if (!ctx->cipher->cipher(ctx, out, ctx->buf, bl)) {
return 0;
}
in_len -= j;
in += j;
out += bl;
*out_len = bl;
}
} else {
*out_len = 0;
}
i = in_len & ctx->block_mask;
in_len -= i;
if (in_len > 0) {
if (!ctx->cipher->cipher(ctx, out, in, in_len)) {
return 0;
}
*out_len += in_len;
}
if (i != 0) {
OPENSSL_memcpy(ctx->buf, &in[in_len], i);
}
ctx->buf_len = i;
return 1;
}
int EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, int *out_len) {
int n, ret;
unsigned int i, b, bl;
if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) {
ret = ctx->cipher->cipher(ctx, out, NULL, 0);
if (ret < 0) {
return 0;
} else {
*out_len = ret;
}
return 1;
}
b = ctx->cipher->block_size;
assert(b <= sizeof(ctx->buf));
if (b == 1) {
*out_len = 0;
return 1;
}
bl = ctx->buf_len;
if (ctx->flags & EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING) {
if (bl) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_DATA_NOT_MULTIPLE_OF_BLOCK_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
*out_len = 0;
return 1;
}
n = b - bl;
for (i = bl; i < b; i++) {
ctx->buf[i] = n;
}
ret = ctx->cipher->cipher(ctx, out, ctx->buf, b);
if (ret) {
*out_len = b;
}
return ret;
}
int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, int *out_len,
const uint8_t *in, int in_len) {
int fix_len;
unsigned int b;
if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) {
int r = ctx->cipher->cipher(ctx, out, in, in_len);
if (r < 0) {
*out_len = 0;
return 0;
} else {
*out_len = r;
}
return 1;
}
if (in_len <= 0) {
*out_len = 0;
return in_len == 0;
}
if (ctx->flags & EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING) {
return EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, out_len, in, in_len);
}
b = ctx->cipher->block_size;
assert(b <= sizeof(ctx->final));
if (ctx->final_used) {
OPENSSL_memcpy(out, ctx->final, b);
out += b;
fix_len = 1;
} else {
fix_len = 0;
}
if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, out_len, in, in_len)) {
return 0;
}
// if we have 'decrypted' a multiple of block size, make sure
// we have a copy of this last block
if (b > 1 && !ctx->buf_len) {
*out_len -= b;
ctx->final_used = 1;
OPENSSL_memcpy(ctx->final, &out[*out_len], b);
} else {
ctx->final_used = 0;
}
if (fix_len) {
*out_len += b;
}
return 1;
}
int EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *out_len) {
int i, n;
unsigned int b;
*out_len = 0;
if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) {
i = ctx->cipher->cipher(ctx, out, NULL, 0);
if (i < 0) {
return 0;
} else {
*out_len = i;
}
return 1;
}
b = ctx->cipher->block_size;
if (ctx->flags & EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING) {
if (ctx->buf_len) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_DATA_NOT_MULTIPLE_OF_BLOCK_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
*out_len = 0;
return 1;
}
if (b > 1) {
if (ctx->buf_len || !ctx->final_used) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_WRONG_FINAL_BLOCK_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
assert(b <= sizeof(ctx->final));
// The following assumes that the ciphertext has been authenticated.
// Otherwise it provides a padding oracle.
n = ctx->final[b - 1];
if (n == 0 || n > (int)b) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
if (ctx->final[--b] != n) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
return 0;
}
}
n = ctx->cipher->block_size - n;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
out[i] = ctx->final[i];
}
*out_len = n;
} else {
*out_len = 0;
}
return 1;
}
int EVP_Cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
size_t in_len) {
return ctx->cipher->cipher(ctx, out, in, in_len);
}
int EVP_CipherUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, int *out_len,
const uint8_t *in, int in_len) {
if (ctx->encrypt) {
return EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, out_len, in, in_len);
} else {
return EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, out, out_len, in, in_len);
}
}
int EVP_CipherFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, int *out_len) {
if (ctx->encrypt) {
return EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, out, out_len);
} else {
return EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, out, out_len);
}
}
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) {
return ctx->cipher;
}
int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) {
return ctx->cipher->nid;
}
unsigned EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) {
return ctx->cipher->block_size;
}
unsigned EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) {
return ctx->key_len;
}
unsigned EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) {
return ctx->cipher->iv_len;
}
void *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) {
return ctx->app_data;
}
void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, void *data) {
ctx->app_data = data;
}
uint32_t EVP_CIPHER_CTX_flags(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) {
return ctx->cipher->flags & ~EVP_CIPH_MODE_MASK;
}
uint32_t EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) {
return ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_MODE_MASK;
}
int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int command, int arg, void *ptr) {
int ret;
if (!ctx->cipher) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_NO_CIPHER_SET);
return 0;
}
if (!ctx->cipher->ctrl) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_CTRL_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
return 0;
}
ret = ctx->cipher->ctrl(ctx, command, arg, ptr);
if (ret == -1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_CTRL_OPERATION_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
return 0;
}
return ret;
}
int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int pad) {
if (pad) {
ctx->flags &= ~EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING;
} else {
ctx->flags |= EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING;
}
return 1;
}
int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, unsigned key_len) {
if (c->key_len == key_len) {
return 1;
}
if (key_len == 0 || !(c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
c->key_len = key_len;
return 1;
}
int EVP_CIPHER_nid(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher) { return cipher->nid; }
unsigned EVP_CIPHER_block_size(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher) {
return cipher->block_size;
}
unsigned EVP_CIPHER_key_length(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher) {
return cipher->key_len;
}
unsigned EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher) {
return cipher->iv_len;
}
uint32_t EVP_CIPHER_flags(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher) {
return cipher->flags & ~EVP_CIPH_MODE_MASK;
}
uint32_t EVP_CIPHER_mode(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher) {
return cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_MODE_MASK;
}
int EVP_CipherInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
const uint8_t *key, const uint8_t *iv, int enc) {
if (cipher) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
}
return EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, key, iv, enc);
}
int EVP_EncryptInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
const uint8_t *key, const uint8_t *iv) {
return EVP_CipherInit(ctx, cipher, key, iv, 1);
}
int EVP_DecryptInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
const uint8_t *key, const uint8_t *iv) {
return EVP_CipherInit(ctx, cipher, key, iv, 0);
}
int EVP_add_cipher_alias(const char *a, const char *b) {
return 1;
}