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- /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
- /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
-
- #include <assert.h>
- #include <errno.h>
- #include <limits.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
-
- #include <openssl/buf.h>
- #include <openssl/err.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/mem.h>
- #include <openssl/rand.h>
-
- #include "ssl_locl.h"
-
-
- static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const uint8_t *buf, unsigned int len,
- char fragment, char is_fragment);
- static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
-
- int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend) {
- /* If |extend| is 0, obtain new n-byte packet;
- * if |extend| is 1, increase packet by another n bytes.
- *
- * The packet will be in the sub-array of |s->s3->rbuf.buf| specified by
- * |s->packet| and |s->packet_length|. (If |s->read_ahead| is set, |max|
- * bytes may be stored in |rbuf| (plus |s->packet_length| bytes if |extend|
- * is one.) */
- int i, len, left;
- long align = 0;
- uint8_t *pkt;
- SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
-
- if (n <= 0) {
- return n;
- }
-
- rb = &s->s3->rbuf;
- if (rb->buf == NULL && !ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- left = rb->left;
-
- align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
- align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
-
- if (!extend) {
- /* start with empty packet ... */
- if (left == 0) {
- rb->offset = align;
- } else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
- /* check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
- * alignment... */
- pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
- if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
- /* Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field is
- * insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about whether memmove
- * will occur or not. Header values has no effect on memmove arguments
- * and therefore no buffer overrun can be triggered. */
- memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
- rb->offset = align;
- }
- }
- s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
- s->packet_length = 0;
- /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
- }
-
- /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
- * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into the
- * buffer). */
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && left > 0 && n > left) {
- n = left;
- }
-
- /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
- if (left >= n) {
- s->packet_length += n;
- rb->left = left - n;
- rb->offset += n;
- return n;
- }
-
- /* else we need to read more data */
-
- len = s->packet_length;
- pkt = rb->buf + align;
- /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer: |len| bytes already pointed
- * to by |packet|, |left| extra ones at the end. */
- if (s->packet != pkt) {
- /* len > 0 */
- memmove(pkt, s->packet, len + left);
- s->packet = pkt;
- rb->offset = len + align;
- }
-
- assert(n <= (int)(rb->len - rb->offset));
-
- if (!s->read_ahead) {
- /* ignore max parameter */
- max = n;
- } else {
- if (max < n) {
- max = n;
- }
- if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) {
- max = rb->len - rb->offset;
- }
- }
-
- while (left < n) {
- /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and need to
- * read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if possible). */
- ERR_clear_system_error();
- if (s->rbio != NULL) {
- s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
- } else {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_n, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
- i = -1;
- }
-
- if (i <= 0) {
- rb->left = left;
- if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) &&
- len + left == 0) {
- ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
- }
- return i;
- }
- left += i;
- /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
- * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to byte
- * oriented as in the TLS case. */
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && n > left) {
- n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
- }
- }
-
- /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
- rb->offset += n;
- rb->left = left - n;
- s->packet_length += n;
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
-
- return n;
- }
-
- /* MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that will
- * be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an attacker
- * could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and cause
- * ssl3_get_record to loop forever. */
- #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
-
- /* Call this to get a new input record. It will return <= 0 if more data is
- * needed, normally due to an error or non-blocking IO. When it finishes, one
- * packet has been decoded and can be found in
- * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
- * ssl->s3->rrec.data - data
- * ssl->s3->rrec.length - number of bytes */
- /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
- static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) {
- int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al;
- int n, i, ret = -1;
- SSL3_RECORD *rr;
- uint8_t *p;
- short version;
- size_t extra;
- unsigned empty_record_count = 0;
-
- rr = &s->s3->rrec;
-
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) {
- extra = SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
- } else {
- extra = 0;
- }
-
- if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra) {
- /* An application error: SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER set after
- * ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_record, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
-
- again:
- /* check if we have the header */
- if (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY ||
- s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
- n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
- if (n <= 0) {
- return n; /* error or non-blocking */
- }
- s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
-
- p = s->packet;
- if (s->msg_callback) {
- s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
- }
-
- /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
- rr->type = *(p++);
- ssl_major = *(p++);
- ssl_minor = *(p++);
- version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;
- n2s(p, rr->length);
-
- if (s->s3->have_version && version != s->version) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_record, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
- if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)) {
- /* Send back error using their minor version number. */
- s->version = (unsigned short)version;
- }
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_record, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
- al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_record, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
- }
-
- /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
-
- if (rr->length > s->packet_length - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
- /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
- i = rr->length;
- n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1);
- if (n <= 0) {
- /* Error or non-blocking IO. Now |n| == |rr->length|, and
- * |s->packet_length| == |SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH| + |rr->length|. */
- return n;
- }
- }
-
- s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
-
- /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, and
- * we have that many bytes in s->packet. */
- rr->input = &s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH];
-
- /* ok, we can now read from |s->packet| data into |rr|. |rr->input| points at
- * |rr->length| bytes, which need to be copied into |rr->data| by decryption.
- * When the data is 'copied' into the |rr->data| buffer, |rr->input| will be
- * pointed at the new buffer. */
-
- /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
- * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
-
- /* check is not needed I believe */
- if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH + extra) {
- al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_record, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
- rr->data = rr->input;
-
- if (!s->enc_method->enc(s, 0)) {
- al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_record,
- SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + extra) {
- al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_record, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- rr->off = 0;
- /* So at this point the following is true:
- * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record;
- * ssl->s3->rrec.length is the number of bytes in the record;
- * ssl->s3->rrec.off is the offset to first valid byte;
- * ssl->s3->rrec.data is where to take bytes from (increment after use). */
-
- /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
- s->packet_length = 0;
-
- /* just read a 0 length packet */
- if (rr->length == 0) {
- empty_record_count++;
- if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_record, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS);
- goto f_err;
- }
- goto again;
- }
-
- return 1;
-
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- err:
- return ret;
- }
-
- /* Call this to write data in records of type |type|. It will return <= 0 if
- * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. */
- int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) {
- const uint8_t *buf = buf_;
- unsigned int tot, n, nw;
- int i;
-
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX);
- tot = s->s3->wnum;
- s->s3->wnum = 0;
-
- if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) {
- i = s->handshake_func(s);
- if (i < 0) {
- return i;
- }
- if (i == 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_write_bytes, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- /* Ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out than
- * the the original len from a write which didn't complete for non-blocking
- * I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for this in
- * ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be possible to
- * end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then promptly send
- * beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and report the error in
- * a way the user will notice. */
- if (len < 0 || (size_t)len < tot) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_write_bytes, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
- return -1;
- }
-
- n = (len - tot);
- for (;;) {
- /* max contains the maximum number of bytes that we can put into a
- * record. */
- unsigned max = s->max_send_fragment;
- /* fragment is true if do_ssl3_write should send the first byte in its own
- * record in order to randomise a CBC IV. */
- int fragment = 0;
-
- if (n > 1 && s->s3->need_record_splitting &&
- type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && !s->s3->record_split_done) {
- fragment = 1;
- /* record_split_done records that the splitting has been done in case we
- * hit an SSL_WANT_WRITE condition. In that case, we don't need to do the
- * split again. */
- s->s3->record_split_done = 1;
- }
-
- if (n > max) {
- nw = max;
- } else {
- nw = n;
- }
-
- i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, fragment, 0);
- if (i <= 0) {
- s->s3->wnum = tot;
- s->s3->record_split_done = 0;
- return i;
- }
-
- if (i == (int)n || (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
- (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
- /* next chunk of data should get another prepended, one-byte fragment in
- * ciphersuites with known-IV weakness. */
- s->s3->record_split_done = 0;
- return tot + i;
- }
-
- n -= i;
- tot += i;
- }
- }
-
- /* do_ssl3_write writes an SSL record of the given type. If |fragment| is 1
- * then it splits the record into a one byte record and a record with the rest
- * of the data in order to randomise a CBC IV. If |is_fragment| is true then
- * this call resulted from do_ssl3_write calling itself in order to create that
- * one byte fragment. */
- static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const uint8_t *buf, unsigned int len,
- char fragment, char is_fragment) {
- uint8_t *p, *plen;
- int i;
- int prefix_len = 0;
- int eivlen = 0;
- long align = 0;
- SSL3_RECORD *wr;
- SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
-
- /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This will
- * happen with non blocking IO */
- if (wb->left != 0) {
- return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
- }
-
- /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
- if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
- i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
- if (i <= 0) {
- return i;
- }
- /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
- }
-
- if (wb->buf == NULL && !ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s)) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (len == 0) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- wr = &s->s3->wrec;
-
- if (fragment) {
- /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
- * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
- prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 1 /* length */, 0 /* fragment */,
- 1 /* is_fragment */);
- if (prefix_len <= 0) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (prefix_len >
- (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) {
- /* insufficient space */
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, do_ssl3_write, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (is_fragment) {
- /* The extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, and that will be a
- * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD. So, if we want to align the real
- * payload, we can just pretend that we have two headers and a byte. */
- align = (long)wb->buf + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + 1;
- align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
- p = wb->buf + align;
- wb->offset = align;
- } else if (prefix_len) {
- p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
- } else {
- align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
- align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
- p = wb->buf + align;
- wb->offset = align;
- }
-
- /* write the header */
-
- *(p++) = type & 0xff;
- wr->type = type;
-
- /* Some servers hang if initial ClientHello is larger than 256 bytes and
- * record version number > TLS 1.0. */
- if (!s->s3->have_version && s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
- *(p++) = TLS1_VERSION >> 8;
- *(p++) = TLS1_VERSION & 0xff;
- } else {
- *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
- *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
- }
-
- /* field where we are to write out packet length */
- plen = p;
- p += 2;
-
- /* Leave room for the variable nonce for AEADs which specify it explicitly. */
- if (s->aead_write_ctx != NULL &&
- s->aead_write_ctx->variable_nonce_included_in_record) {
- eivlen = s->aead_write_ctx->variable_nonce_len;
- }
-
- /* lets setup the record stuff. */
- wr->data = p + eivlen;
- wr->length = (int)(len - (fragment != 0));
- wr->input = (uint8_t *)buf + (fragment != 0);
-
- /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data */
-
- memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length);
- wr->input = wr->data;
-
- /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from wr->input.
- * Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
-
- wr->input = p;
- wr->data = p;
- wr->length += eivlen;
-
- if (!s->enc_method->enc(s, 1)) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* record length after mac and block padding */
- s2n(wr->length, plen);
-
- if (s->msg_callback) {
- s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen - 5, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
- }
-
- /* we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
- * wr->length long. */
- wr->type = type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
- wr->length += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
-
- if (is_fragment) {
- /* we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write out
- * anything. */
- return wr->length;
- }
-
- /* now let's set up wb */
- wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
-
- /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries
- * later */
- s->s3->wpend_tot = len;
- s->s3->wpend_buf = buf;
- s->s3->wpend_type = type;
- s->s3->wpend_ret = len;
-
- /* we now just need to write the buffer */
- return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
-
- err:
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
- int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const uint8_t *buf, unsigned int len) {
- int i;
- SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
-
- if (s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len ||
- (s->s3->wpend_buf != buf &&
- !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) ||
- s->s3->wpend_type != type) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_write_pending, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
- return -1;
- }
-
- for (;;) {
- ERR_clear_system_error();
- if (s->wbio != NULL) {
- s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
- i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
- (unsigned int)wb->left);
- } else {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_write_pending, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
- i = -1;
- }
- if (i == wb->left) {
- wb->left = 0;
- wb->offset += i;
- if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
- }
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- return s->s3->wpend_ret;
- } else if (i <= 0) {
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
- point in using a datagram service */
- wb->left = 0;
- }
- return i;
- }
- wb->offset += i;
- wb->left -= i;
- }
- }
-
- /* ssl3_expect_change_cipher_spec informs the record layer that a
- * ChangeCipherSpec record is required at this point. If a Handshake record is
- * received before ChangeCipherSpec, the connection will fail. Moreover, if
- * there are unprocessed handshake bytes, the handshake will also fail and the
- * function returns zero. Otherwise, the function returns one. */
- int ssl3_expect_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) {
- if (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0 || s->s3->tmp.reuse_message) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_expect_change_cipher_spec,
- SSL_R_UNPROCESSED_HANDSHAKE_DATA);
- return 0;
- }
-
- s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS;
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
- * 'type' is one of the following:
- *
- * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
- * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
- * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
- *
- * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
- * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
- *
- * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
- * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
- * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
- * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
- * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
- * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
- * Change cipher spec protocol
- * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
- * Alert protocol
- * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
- * Handshake protocol
- * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
- * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
- * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
- * Application data protocol
- * none of our business
- */
- int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, uint8_t *buf, int len, int peek) {
- int al, i, j, ret;
- unsigned int n;
- SSL3_RECORD *rr;
- void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
- uint8_t alert_buffer[2];
-
- if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL && !ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- if ((type && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) ||
- (peek && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
- /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
- uint8_t *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
- uint8_t *dst = buf;
- unsigned int k;
-
- /* peek == 0 */
- n = 0;
- while (len > 0 && s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
- *dst++ = *src++;
- len--;
- s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
- n++;
- }
- /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
- for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++) {
- s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
- }
- return n;
- }
-
- /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
-
- if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) {
- /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
- i = s->handshake_func(s);
- if (i < 0) {
- return i;
- }
- if (i == 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- start:
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
-
- /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
- * s->s3->rrec.data - data
- * s->s3->rrec.off - offset into 'data' for next read
- * s->s3->rrec.length - number of bytes. */
- rr = &s->s3->rrec;
-
- /* get new packet if necessary */
- if (rr->length == 0 || s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY) {
- ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- return ret;
- }
- }
-
- /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
-
- if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
- * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
- && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes,
- SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* If we are expecting a ChangeCipherSpec, it is illegal to receive a
- * Handshake record. */
- if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS)) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_HANDSHAKE_RECORD_BEFORE_CCS);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
- * 'peek' mode) */
- if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
- rr->length = 0;
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (type == rr->type) {
- /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
- /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we are doing a
- * handshake for the first time */
- if (SSL_in_init(s) && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
- s->aead_read_ctx == NULL) {
- /* TODO(davidben): Is this check redundant with the handshake_func
- * check? */
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (len <= 0) {
- return len;
- }
-
- if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) {
- n = rr->length;
- } else {
- n = (unsigned int)len;
- }
-
- memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
- if (!peek) {
- rr->length -= n;
- rr->off += n;
- if (rr->length == 0) {
- s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
- rr->off = 0;
- if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) {
- ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
- }
- }
- }
-
- return n;
- }
-
-
- /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
- * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
-
- /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill that so
- * that we can process the data at a fixed place. */
-
- if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
- const size_t size = sizeof(s->s3->handshake_fragment);
- const size_t avail = size - s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
- const size_t todo = (rr->length < avail) ? rr->length : avail;
- memcpy(s->s3->handshake_fragment + s->s3->handshake_fragment_len,
- &rr->data[rr->off], todo);
- rr->off += todo;
- rr->length -= todo;
- s->s3->handshake_fragment_len += todo;
- if (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len < size) {
- goto start; /* fragment was too small */
- }
- } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
- /* Note that this will still allow multiple alerts to be processed in the
- * same record */
- if (rr->length < sizeof(alert_buffer)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_BAD_ALERT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- memcpy(alert_buffer, &rr->data[rr->off], sizeof(alert_buffer));
- rr->off += sizeof(alert_buffer);
- rr->length -= sizeof(alert_buffer);
- }
-
- /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
- * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
-
- /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
- if (!s->server && s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4 &&
- s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST &&
- s->session != NULL && s->session->cipher != NULL) {
- s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
-
- if (s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0 ||
- s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0 ||
- s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (s->msg_callback) {
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
- s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
- }
-
- if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && !s->s3->renegotiate) {
- ssl3_renegotiate(s);
- if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
- i = s->handshake_func(s);
- if (i < 0) {
- return i;
- }
- if (i == 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return -1;
- }
- }
- }
- /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try again to
- * obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
- goto start;
- }
-
- if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
- const uint8_t alert_level = alert_buffer[0];
- const uint8_t alert_descr = alert_buffer[1];
-
- if (s->msg_callback) {
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_buffer, 2, s,
- s->msg_callback_arg);
- }
-
- if (s->info_callback != NULL) {
- cb = s->info_callback;
- } else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) {
- cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
- }
-
- if (cb != NULL) {
- j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
- cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
- }
-
- if (alert_level == 1) {
- /* warning */
- s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
- if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
- s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested renegotiation and
- * the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal alert because if
- * application tried to renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
- * expects it to succeed.
- *
- * In future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if the
- * peer refused it where we carry on. */
- else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
- goto f_err;
- }
- } else if (alert_level == 2) {
- /* fatal */
- char tmp[16];
-
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes,
- SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
- BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%d", alert_descr);
- ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
- s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
- SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
- return 0;
- } else {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- goto start;
- }
-
- if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) {
- /* but we have not received a shutdown */
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- rr->length = 0;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
- /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly what the
- * record payload has to look like */
- if (rr->length != 1 || rr->off != 0 || rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS)) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS;
-
- rr->length = 0;
-
- if (s->msg_callback) {
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s,
- s->msg_callback_arg);
- }
-
- s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
- if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
- goto err;
- } else {
- goto start;
- }
- }
-
- /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
- if (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4 && !s->in_handshake) {
- if ((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) {
- s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
- s->renegotiate = 1;
- s->new_session = 1;
- }
- i = s->handshake_func(s);
- if (i < 0) {
- return i;
- }
- if (i == 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- goto start;
- }
-
- switch (rr->type) {
- default:
- /* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types. TLS v1.2 gives an
- * unexpected message alert. */
- if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
- rr->length = 0;
- goto start;
- }
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
- goto f_err;
-
- case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
- case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
- case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
- /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
- * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not
- * happen when type != rr->type */
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
-
- case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
- /* At this point we were expecting handshake data but have application
- * data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read() (i.e.
- * |in_read_app_data| is set) and it makes sense to read application data
- * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started), we will indulge
- * it. */
- if (s->s3->in_read_app_data && s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0 &&
- (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
- s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A &&
- s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A) ||
- ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
- s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A &&
- s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A))) {
- s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
- return -1;
- } else {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- /* not reached */
-
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- err:
- return -1;
- }
-
- int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) {
- int i;
-
- if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) {
- i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
- } else {
- i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) {
- if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) {
- /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec,
- SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
- return 0;
- }
-
- s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
- if (!s->enc_method->setup_key_block(s)) {
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- if (!s->enc_method->change_cipher_state(s, i)) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc) {
- /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
- desc = s->enc_method->alert_value(desc);
- if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION) {
- /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
- desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- }
- if (desc < 0) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
- if (level == 2 && s->session != NULL) {
- SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
- }
-
- s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
- s->s3->send_alert[0] = level;
- s->s3->send_alert[1] = desc;
- if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) {
- /* data is still being written out. */
- return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
- }
-
- /* else data is still being written out, we will get written some time in the
- * future */
- return -1;
- }
-
- int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) {
- int i, j;
- void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
-
- s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
- i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0, 0);
- if (i <= 0) {
- s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
- } else {
- /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. If the message
- * does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, we will not worry too much. */
- if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
- BIO_flush(s->wbio);
- }
-
- if (s->msg_callback) {
- s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s,
- s->msg_callback_arg);
- }
-
- if (s->info_callback != NULL) {
- cb = s->info_callback;
- } else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) {
- cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
- }
-
- if (cb != NULL) {
- j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1];
- cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j);
- }
- }
-
- return i;
- }
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