boringssl/crypto/dh/dh.c

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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/buf.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/ex_data.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/thread.h>
#include "../internal.h"
#define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT;
DH *DH_new(void) {
DH *dh = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DH));
if (dh == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
OPENSSL_memset(dh, 0, sizeof(DH));
CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&dh->method_mont_p_lock);
dh->references = 1;
CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&dh->ex_data);
return dh;
}
void DH_free(DH *dh) {
if (dh == NULL) {
return;
}
if (!CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&dh->references)) {
return;
}
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, dh, &dh->ex_data);
BN_MONT_CTX_free(dh->method_mont_p);
BN_clear_free(dh->p);
BN_clear_free(dh->g);
BN_clear_free(dh->q);
BN_clear_free(dh->j);
OPENSSL_free(dh->seed);
BN_clear_free(dh->counter);
BN_clear_free(dh->pub_key);
BN_clear_free(dh->priv_key);
CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&dh->method_mont_p_lock);
OPENSSL_free(dh);
}
void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **out_pub_key,
const BIGNUM **out_priv_key) {
if (out_pub_key != NULL) {
*out_pub_key = dh->pub_key;
}
if (out_priv_key != NULL) {
*out_priv_key = dh->priv_key;
}
}
Switch OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER to 1.1.0. Although we are derived from 1.0.2, we mimic 1.1.0 in some ways around our FOO_up_ref functions and opaque libssl types. This causes some difficulties when porting third-party code as any OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER checks for 1.1.0 APIs we have will be wrong. Moreover, adding accessors without changing OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER can break external projects. It is common to implement a compatibility version of an accessor under #ifdef as a static function. This then conflicts with our headers if we, unlike OpenSSL 1.0.2, have this function. This change switches OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER to 1.1.0 and atomically adds enough accessors for software with 1.1.0 support already. The hope is this will unblock hiding SSL_CTX and SSL_SESSION, which will be especially useful with C++-ficiation. The cost is we will hit some growing pains as more 1.1.0 consumers enter the ecosystem and we converge on the right set of APIs to import from upstream. It does not remove any 1.0.2 APIs, so we will not require that all projects support 1.1.0. The exception is APIs which changed in 1.1.0 but did not change the function signature. Those are breaking changes. Specifically: - SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb is now const-correct. - X509_get0_signature is now const-correct. For C++ consumers only, this change temporarily includes an overload hack for SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb that keeps the old callback working. This is a workaround for Node not yet supporting OpenSSL 1.1.0. The version number is set at (the as yet unreleased) 1.1.0g to denote that this change includes https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4384. Bug: 91 Change-Id: I5eeb27448a6db4c25c244afac37f9604d9608a76 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10340 Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2016-08-12 19:48:19 +01:00
int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key) {
if (pub_key != NULL) {
BN_free(dh->pub_key);
dh->pub_key = pub_key;
}
if (priv_key != NULL) {
BN_free(dh->priv_key);
dh->priv_key = priv_key;
}
return 1;
}
void DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **out_p, const BIGNUM **out_q,
const BIGNUM **out_g) {
if (out_p != NULL) {
*out_p = dh->p;
}
if (out_q != NULL) {
*out_q = dh->q;
}
if (out_g != NULL) {
*out_g = dh->g;
}
}
Switch OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER to 1.1.0. Although we are derived from 1.0.2, we mimic 1.1.0 in some ways around our FOO_up_ref functions and opaque libssl types. This causes some difficulties when porting third-party code as any OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER checks for 1.1.0 APIs we have will be wrong. Moreover, adding accessors without changing OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER can break external projects. It is common to implement a compatibility version of an accessor under #ifdef as a static function. This then conflicts with our headers if we, unlike OpenSSL 1.0.2, have this function. This change switches OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER to 1.1.0 and atomically adds enough accessors for software with 1.1.0 support already. The hope is this will unblock hiding SSL_CTX and SSL_SESSION, which will be especially useful with C++-ficiation. The cost is we will hit some growing pains as more 1.1.0 consumers enter the ecosystem and we converge on the right set of APIs to import from upstream. It does not remove any 1.0.2 APIs, so we will not require that all projects support 1.1.0. The exception is APIs which changed in 1.1.0 but did not change the function signature. Those are breaking changes. Specifically: - SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb is now const-correct. - X509_get0_signature is now const-correct. For C++ consumers only, this change temporarily includes an overload hack for SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb that keeps the old callback working. This is a workaround for Node not yet supporting OpenSSL 1.1.0. The version number is set at (the as yet unreleased) 1.1.0g to denote that this change includes https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4384. Bug: 91 Change-Id: I5eeb27448a6db4c25c244afac37f9604d9608a76 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10340 Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2016-08-12 19:48:19 +01:00
int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g) {
if ((dh->p == NULL && p == NULL) ||
(dh->g == NULL && g == NULL)) {
return 0;
}
if (p != NULL) {
BN_free(dh->p);
dh->p = p;
}
if (q != NULL) {
BN_free(dh->q);
dh->q = q;
}
if (g != NULL) {
Switch OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER to 1.1.0. Although we are derived from 1.0.2, we mimic 1.1.0 in some ways around our FOO_up_ref functions and opaque libssl types. This causes some difficulties when porting third-party code as any OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER checks for 1.1.0 APIs we have will be wrong. Moreover, adding accessors without changing OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER can break external projects. It is common to implement a compatibility version of an accessor under #ifdef as a static function. This then conflicts with our headers if we, unlike OpenSSL 1.0.2, have this function. This change switches OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER to 1.1.0 and atomically adds enough accessors for software with 1.1.0 support already. The hope is this will unblock hiding SSL_CTX and SSL_SESSION, which will be especially useful with C++-ficiation. The cost is we will hit some growing pains as more 1.1.0 consumers enter the ecosystem and we converge on the right set of APIs to import from upstream. It does not remove any 1.0.2 APIs, so we will not require that all projects support 1.1.0. The exception is APIs which changed in 1.1.0 but did not change the function signature. Those are breaking changes. Specifically: - SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb is now const-correct. - X509_get0_signature is now const-correct. For C++ consumers only, this change temporarily includes an overload hack for SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb that keeps the old callback working. This is a workaround for Node not yet supporting OpenSSL 1.1.0. The version number is set at (the as yet unreleased) 1.1.0g to denote that this change includes https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4384. Bug: 91 Change-Id: I5eeb27448a6db4c25c244afac37f9604d9608a76 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10340 Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2016-08-12 19:48:19 +01:00
BN_free(dh->g);
dh->g = g;
}
return 1;
}
int DH_generate_parameters_ex(DH *dh, int prime_bits, int generator, BN_GENCB *cb) {
// We generate DH parameters as follows
// find a prime q which is prime_bits/2 bits long.
// p=(2*q)+1 or (p-1)/2 = q
// For this case, g is a generator if
// g^((p-1)/q) mod p != 1 for values of q which are the factors of p-1.
// Since the factors of p-1 are q and 2, we just need to check
// g^2 mod p != 1 and g^q mod p != 1.
//
// Having said all that,
// there is another special case method for the generators 2, 3 and 5.
// for 2, p mod 24 == 11
// for 3, p mod 12 == 5 <<<<< does not work for safe primes.
// for 5, p mod 10 == 3 or 7
//
// Thanks to Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com> for the pointers about the
// special generators and for answering some of my questions.
//
// I've implemented the second simple method :-).
// Since DH should be using a safe prime (both p and q are prime),
// this generator function can take a very very long time to run.
// Actually there is no reason to insist that 'generator' be a generator.
// It's just as OK (and in some sense better) to use a generator of the
// order-q subgroup.
BIGNUM *t1, *t2;
int g, ok = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
t2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (t1 == NULL || t2 == NULL) {
goto err;
}
// Make sure |dh| has the necessary elements
if (dh->p == NULL) {
dh->p = BN_new();
if (dh->p == NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
if (dh->g == NULL) {
dh->g = BN_new();
if (dh->g == NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
if (generator <= 1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_BAD_GENERATOR);
goto err;
}
if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_2) {
if (!BN_set_word(t1, 24)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(t2, 11)) {
goto err;
}
g = 2;
} else if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_5) {
if (!BN_set_word(t1, 10)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(t2, 3)) {
goto err;
}
// BN_set_word(t3,7); just have to miss
// out on these ones :-(
g = 5;
} else {
// in the general case, don't worry if 'generator' is a
// generator or not: since we are using safe primes,
// it will generate either an order-q or an order-2q group,
// which both is OK
if (!BN_set_word(t1, 2)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(t2, 1)) {
goto err;
}
g = generator;
}
if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(dh->p, prime_bits, 1, t1, t2, cb)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(dh->g, g)) {
goto err;
}
ok = 1;
err:
if (!ok) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
}
if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
return ok;
}
int DH_generate_key(DH *dh) {
int ok = 0;
int generate_new_key = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
goto err;
}
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
if (dh->priv_key == NULL) {
priv_key = BN_new();
if (priv_key == NULL) {
goto err;
}
generate_new_key = 1;
} else {
priv_key = dh->priv_key;
}
if (dh->pub_key == NULL) {
pub_key = BN_new();
if (pub_key == NULL) {
goto err;
}
} else {
pub_key = dh->pub_key;
}
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dh->method_mont_p, &dh->method_mont_p_lock,
dh->p, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
if (generate_new_key) {
if (dh->q) {
if (!BN_rand_range_ex(priv_key, 2, dh->q)) {
goto err;
}
} else {
// secret exponent length
unsigned priv_bits = dh->priv_length;
if (priv_bits == 0) {
const unsigned p_bits = BN_num_bits(dh->p);
if (p_bits == 0) {
goto err;
}
priv_bits = p_bits - 1;
}
if (!BN_rand(priv_key, priv_bits, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY)) {
goto err;
}
}
}
if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(pub_key, dh->g, priv_key, dh->p, ctx,
dh->method_mont_p)) {
goto err;
}
dh->pub_key = pub_key;
dh->priv_key = priv_key;
ok = 1;
err:
if (ok != 1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
}
if (dh->pub_key == NULL) {
BN_free(pub_key);
}
if (dh->priv_key == NULL) {
BN_free(priv_key);
}
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return ok;
}
int DH_compute_key(unsigned char *out, const BIGNUM *peers_key, DH *dh) {
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *shared_key;
int ret = -1;
int check_result;
if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
goto err;
}
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
shared_key = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (shared_key == NULL) {
goto err;
}
if (dh->priv_key == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE);
goto err;
}
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dh->method_mont_p, &dh->method_mont_p_lock,
dh->p, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
if (!DH_check_pub_key(dh, peers_key, &check_result) || check_result) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY);
goto err;
}
if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(shared_key, peers_key, dh->priv_key, dh->p,
ctx, dh->method_mont_p)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
ret = BN_bn2bin(shared_key, out);
err:
if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
return ret;
}
int DH_size(const DH *dh) { return BN_num_bytes(dh->p); }
unsigned DH_num_bits(const DH *dh) { return BN_num_bits(dh->p); }
int DH_up_ref(DH *dh) {
CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&dh->references);
return 1;
}
static int int_dh_bn_cpy(BIGNUM **dst, const BIGNUM *src) {
BIGNUM *a = NULL;
if (src) {
a = BN_dup(src);
if (!a) {
return 0;
}
}
BN_free(*dst);
*dst = a;
return 1;
}
static int int_dh_param_copy(DH *to, const DH *from, int is_x942) {
if (is_x942 == -1) {
is_x942 = !!from->q;
}
if (!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->p, from->p) ||
!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->g, from->g)) {
return 0;
}
if (!is_x942) {
return 1;
}
if (!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->q, from->q) ||
!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->j, from->j)) {
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_free(to->seed);
to->seed = NULL;
to->seedlen = 0;
if (from->seed) {
to->seed = BUF_memdup(from->seed, from->seedlen);
if (!to->seed) {
return 0;
}
to->seedlen = from->seedlen;
}
return 1;
}
DH *DHparams_dup(const DH *dh) {
DH *ret = DH_new();
if (!ret) {
return NULL;
}
if (!int_dh_param_copy(ret, dh, -1)) {
DH_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
return ret;
}
int DH_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
int index;
if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp,
free_func)) {
return -1;
}
return index;
}
int DH_set_ex_data(DH *d, int idx, void *arg) {
return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx, arg);
}
void *DH_get_ex_data(DH *d, int idx) {
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx);
}