2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
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* project 1999.
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* licensing@OpenSSL.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
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#include <openssl/pkcs8.h>
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2014-09-19 18:49:56 +01:00
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <limits.h>
|
2015-01-31 01:08:37 +00:00
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|
#include <string.h>
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2014-09-19 18:49:56 +01:00
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|
|
2016-01-01 06:17:30 +00:00
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|
#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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|
#include <openssl/cipher.h>
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|
#include <openssl/digest.h>
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|
#include <openssl/err.h>
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|
|
#include <openssl/mem.h>
|
2017-03-14 06:00:46 +00:00
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|
#include <openssl/nid.h>
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
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|
#include <openssl/rand.h>
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-08-21 19:09:44 +01:00
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|
#include "internal.h"
|
2018-05-10 00:58:51 +01:00
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|
#include "../bytestring/internal.h"
|
2016-08-17 21:56:14 +01:00
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|
#include "../internal.h"
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-05-10 00:58:51 +01:00
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|
static int pkcs12_encode_password(const char *in, size_t in_len, uint8_t **out,
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|
|
size_t *out_len) {
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|
|
CBB cbb;
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|
|
|
if (!CBB_init(&cbb, in_len * 2)) {
|
Push password encoding back into pkcs12_key_gen.
With PKCS8_encrypt_pbe and PKCS8_decrypt_pbe gone in
3e8b782c0cc0d9621f622cf80ab1a9bcf442fa17, we can restore the old
arrangement where the password encoding was handled in pkcs12_key_gen.
This simplifies the interface for the follow-up crypto/asn1 split.
Note this change is *not* a no-op for PKCS#12 files which use PBES2.
Before, we would perform the PKCS#12 password encoding for all parts of
PKCS#12 processing. The new behavior is we only perform it for the parts
that go through the PKCS#12 KDF. For such a file, it would only be the
MAC.
I believe the specification supports our new behavior. Although RFC 7292
B.1 says something which implies that the transformation is about
converting passwords to byte strings and would thus be universal,
appendix B itself is prefaced with:
Note that this method for password privacy mode is not recommended
and is deprecated for new usage. The procedures and algorithms
defined in PKCS #5 v2.1 [13] [22] should be used instead.
Specifically, PBES2 should be used as encryption scheme, with PBKDF2
as the key derivation function.
"This method" refers to the key derivation and not the password
formatting, but it does give support to the theory that password
formatting is tied to PKCS#12 key derivation.
(Of course, if one believes PKCS#12's assertion that their inane
encoding (NUL-terminated UTF-16!) is because PKCS#5 failed to talk about
passwords as Unicode strings, one would think that PBES2 (also in
PKCS#5) would have the same issue and thus need PKCS#12 to valiantly
save the day with an encoding...)
This matches OpenSSL's behavior and that of recent versions of NSS. See
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1268141. I was unable to
figure out what variants, if any, macOS accepts.
BUG=54
Change-Id: I9a1bb4d5e168e6e76b82241e4634b1103e620b9b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14213
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
2017-03-14 05:43:23 +00:00
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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|
return 0;
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}
|
2018-05-10 00:58:51 +01:00
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// Convert the password to BMPString, or UCS-2. See
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7292#appendix-B.1.
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CBS cbs;
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CBS_init(&cbs, (const uint8_t *)in, in_len);
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|
|
while (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
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|
|
uint32_t c;
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|
|
if (!cbs_get_utf8(&cbs, &c) ||
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!cbb_add_ucs2_be(&cbb, c)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_INVALID_CHARACTERS);
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goto err;
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}
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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}
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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|
// Terminate the result with a UCS-2 NUL.
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2018-05-10 00:58:51 +01:00
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|
if (!cbb_add_ucs2_be(&cbb, 0) ||
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|
!CBB_finish(&cbb, out, out_len)) {
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|
goto err;
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}
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|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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|
return 1;
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2018-05-10 00:58:51 +01:00
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|
|
|
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|
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err:
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|
|
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
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|
return 0;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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|
|
}
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2017-03-14 06:00:46 +00:00
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|
|
int pkcs12_key_gen(const char *pass, size_t pass_len, const uint8_t *salt,
|
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|
|
size_t salt_len, uint8_t id, unsigned iterations,
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|
|
size_t out_len, uint8_t *out, const EVP_MD *md) {
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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|
|
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7292#appendix-B. Quoted parts of the
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|
// specification have errata applied and other typos fixed.
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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2016-04-16 22:10:01 +01:00
|
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|
if (iterations < 1) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_ITERATION_COUNT);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2015-02-11 06:17:41 +00:00
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|
}
|
2016-04-16 22:10:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
Push password encoding back into pkcs12_key_gen.
With PKCS8_encrypt_pbe and PKCS8_decrypt_pbe gone in
3e8b782c0cc0d9621f622cf80ab1a9bcf442fa17, we can restore the old
arrangement where the password encoding was handled in pkcs12_key_gen.
This simplifies the interface for the follow-up crypto/asn1 split.
Note this change is *not* a no-op for PKCS#12 files which use PBES2.
Before, we would perform the PKCS#12 password encoding for all parts of
PKCS#12 processing. The new behavior is we only perform it for the parts
that go through the PKCS#12 KDF. For such a file, it would only be the
MAC.
I believe the specification supports our new behavior. Although RFC 7292
B.1 says something which implies that the transformation is about
converting passwords to byte strings and would thus be universal,
appendix B itself is prefaced with:
Note that this method for password privacy mode is not recommended
and is deprecated for new usage. The procedures and algorithms
defined in PKCS #5 v2.1 [13] [22] should be used instead.
Specifically, PBES2 should be used as encryption scheme, with PBKDF2
as the key derivation function.
"This method" refers to the key derivation and not the password
formatting, but it does give support to the theory that password
formatting is tied to PKCS#12 key derivation.
(Of course, if one believes PKCS#12's assertion that their inane
encoding (NUL-terminated UTF-16!) is because PKCS#5 failed to talk about
passwords as Unicode strings, one would think that PBES2 (also in
PKCS#5) would have the same issue and thus need PKCS#12 to valiantly
save the day with an encoding...)
This matches OpenSSL's behavior and that of recent versions of NSS. See
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1268141. I was unable to
figure out what variants, if any, macOS accepts.
BUG=54
Change-Id: I9a1bb4d5e168e6e76b82241e4634b1103e620b9b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14213
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
2017-03-14 05:43:23 +00:00
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
|
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *pass_raw = NULL, *I = NULL;
|
|
|
|
size_t pass_raw_len = 0, I_len = 0;
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
// If |pass| is NULL, we use the empty string rather than {0, 0} as the raw
|
|
|
|
// password.
|
Push password encoding back into pkcs12_key_gen.
With PKCS8_encrypt_pbe and PKCS8_decrypt_pbe gone in
3e8b782c0cc0d9621f622cf80ab1a9bcf442fa17, we can restore the old
arrangement where the password encoding was handled in pkcs12_key_gen.
This simplifies the interface for the follow-up crypto/asn1 split.
Note this change is *not* a no-op for PKCS#12 files which use PBES2.
Before, we would perform the PKCS#12 password encoding for all parts of
PKCS#12 processing. The new behavior is we only perform it for the parts
that go through the PKCS#12 KDF. For such a file, it would only be the
MAC.
I believe the specification supports our new behavior. Although RFC 7292
B.1 says something which implies that the transformation is about
converting passwords to byte strings and would thus be universal,
appendix B itself is prefaced with:
Note that this method for password privacy mode is not recommended
and is deprecated for new usage. The procedures and algorithms
defined in PKCS #5 v2.1 [13] [22] should be used instead.
Specifically, PBES2 should be used as encryption scheme, with PBKDF2
as the key derivation function.
"This method" refers to the key derivation and not the password
formatting, but it does give support to the theory that password
formatting is tied to PKCS#12 key derivation.
(Of course, if one believes PKCS#12's assertion that their inane
encoding (NUL-terminated UTF-16!) is because PKCS#5 failed to talk about
passwords as Unicode strings, one would think that PBES2 (also in
PKCS#5) would have the same issue and thus need PKCS#12 to valiantly
save the day with an encoding...)
This matches OpenSSL's behavior and that of recent versions of NSS. See
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1268141. I was unable to
figure out what variants, if any, macOS accepts.
BUG=54
Change-Id: I9a1bb4d5e168e6e76b82241e4634b1103e620b9b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14213
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
2017-03-14 05:43:23 +00:00
|
|
|
if (pass != NULL &&
|
2018-05-10 00:58:51 +01:00
|
|
|
!pkcs12_encode_password(pass, pass_len, &pass_raw, &pass_raw_len)) {
|
Push password encoding back into pkcs12_key_gen.
With PKCS8_encrypt_pbe and PKCS8_decrypt_pbe gone in
3e8b782c0cc0d9621f622cf80ab1a9bcf442fa17, we can restore the old
arrangement where the password encoding was handled in pkcs12_key_gen.
This simplifies the interface for the follow-up crypto/asn1 split.
Note this change is *not* a no-op for PKCS#12 files which use PBES2.
Before, we would perform the PKCS#12 password encoding for all parts of
PKCS#12 processing. The new behavior is we only perform it for the parts
that go through the PKCS#12 KDF. For such a file, it would only be the
MAC.
I believe the specification supports our new behavior. Although RFC 7292
B.1 says something which implies that the transformation is about
converting passwords to byte strings and would thus be universal,
appendix B itself is prefaced with:
Note that this method for password privacy mode is not recommended
and is deprecated for new usage. The procedures and algorithms
defined in PKCS #5 v2.1 [13] [22] should be used instead.
Specifically, PBES2 should be used as encryption scheme, with PBKDF2
as the key derivation function.
"This method" refers to the key derivation and not the password
formatting, but it does give support to the theory that password
formatting is tied to PKCS#12 key derivation.
(Of course, if one believes PKCS#12's assertion that their inane
encoding (NUL-terminated UTF-16!) is because PKCS#5 failed to talk about
passwords as Unicode strings, one would think that PBES2 (also in
PKCS#5) would have the same issue and thus need PKCS#12 to valiantly
save the day with an encoding...)
This matches OpenSSL's behavior and that of recent versions of NSS. See
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1268141. I was unable to
figure out what variants, if any, macOS accepts.
BUG=54
Change-Id: I9a1bb4d5e168e6e76b82241e4634b1103e620b9b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14213
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
2017-03-14 05:43:23 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
// In the spec, |block_size| is called "v", but measured in bits.
|
2016-04-16 22:10:01 +01:00
|
|
|
size_t block_size = EVP_MD_block_size(md);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
// 1. Construct a string, D (the "diversifier"), by concatenating v/8 copies
|
|
|
|
// of ID.
|
2016-04-16 22:10:01 +01:00
|
|
|
uint8_t D[EVP_MAX_MD_BLOCK_SIZE];
|
2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memset(D, id, block_size);
|
2016-04-16 22:10:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
// 2. Concatenate copies of the salt together to create a string S of length
|
|
|
|
// v(ceiling(s/v)) bits (the final copy of the salt may be truncated to
|
|
|
|
// create S). Note that if the salt is the empty string, then so is S.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// 3. Concatenate copies of the password together to create a string P of
|
|
|
|
// length v(ceiling(p/v)) bits (the final copy of the password may be
|
|
|
|
// truncated to create P). Note that if the password is the empty string,
|
|
|
|
// then so is P.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// 4. Set I=S||P to be the concatenation of S and P.
|
2016-04-16 22:10:01 +01:00
|
|
|
if (salt_len + block_size - 1 < salt_len ||
|
|
|
|
pass_raw_len + block_size - 1 < pass_raw_len) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
|
Push password encoding back into pkcs12_key_gen.
With PKCS8_encrypt_pbe and PKCS8_decrypt_pbe gone in
3e8b782c0cc0d9621f622cf80ab1a9bcf442fa17, we can restore the old
arrangement where the password encoding was handled in pkcs12_key_gen.
This simplifies the interface for the follow-up crypto/asn1 split.
Note this change is *not* a no-op for PKCS#12 files which use PBES2.
Before, we would perform the PKCS#12 password encoding for all parts of
PKCS#12 processing. The new behavior is we only perform it for the parts
that go through the PKCS#12 KDF. For such a file, it would only be the
MAC.
I believe the specification supports our new behavior. Although RFC 7292
B.1 says something which implies that the transformation is about
converting passwords to byte strings and would thus be universal,
appendix B itself is prefaced with:
Note that this method for password privacy mode is not recommended
and is deprecated for new usage. The procedures and algorithms
defined in PKCS #5 v2.1 [13] [22] should be used instead.
Specifically, PBES2 should be used as encryption scheme, with PBKDF2
as the key derivation function.
"This method" refers to the key derivation and not the password
formatting, but it does give support to the theory that password
formatting is tied to PKCS#12 key derivation.
(Of course, if one believes PKCS#12's assertion that their inane
encoding (NUL-terminated UTF-16!) is because PKCS#5 failed to talk about
passwords as Unicode strings, one would think that PBES2 (also in
PKCS#5) would have the same issue and thus need PKCS#12 to valiantly
save the day with an encoding...)
This matches OpenSSL's behavior and that of recent versions of NSS. See
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1268141. I was unable to
figure out what variants, if any, macOS accepts.
BUG=54
Change-Id: I9a1bb4d5e168e6e76b82241e4634b1103e620b9b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14213
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
2017-03-14 05:43:23 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
2015-02-11 06:17:41 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-04-16 22:10:01 +01:00
|
|
|
size_t S_len = block_size * ((salt_len + block_size - 1) / block_size);
|
|
|
|
size_t P_len = block_size * ((pass_raw_len + block_size - 1) / block_size);
|
Push password encoding back into pkcs12_key_gen.
With PKCS8_encrypt_pbe and PKCS8_decrypt_pbe gone in
3e8b782c0cc0d9621f622cf80ab1a9bcf442fa17, we can restore the old
arrangement where the password encoding was handled in pkcs12_key_gen.
This simplifies the interface for the follow-up crypto/asn1 split.
Note this change is *not* a no-op for PKCS#12 files which use PBES2.
Before, we would perform the PKCS#12 password encoding for all parts of
PKCS#12 processing. The new behavior is we only perform it for the parts
that go through the PKCS#12 KDF. For such a file, it would only be the
MAC.
I believe the specification supports our new behavior. Although RFC 7292
B.1 says something which implies that the transformation is about
converting passwords to byte strings and would thus be universal,
appendix B itself is prefaced with:
Note that this method for password privacy mode is not recommended
and is deprecated for new usage. The procedures and algorithms
defined in PKCS #5 v2.1 [13] [22] should be used instead.
Specifically, PBES2 should be used as encryption scheme, with PBKDF2
as the key derivation function.
"This method" refers to the key derivation and not the password
formatting, but it does give support to the theory that password
formatting is tied to PKCS#12 key derivation.
(Of course, if one believes PKCS#12's assertion that their inane
encoding (NUL-terminated UTF-16!) is because PKCS#5 failed to talk about
passwords as Unicode strings, one would think that PBES2 (also in
PKCS#5) would have the same issue and thus need PKCS#12 to valiantly
save the day with an encoding...)
This matches OpenSSL's behavior and that of recent versions of NSS. See
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1268141. I was unable to
figure out what variants, if any, macOS accepts.
BUG=54
Change-Id: I9a1bb4d5e168e6e76b82241e4634b1103e620b9b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14213
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
2017-03-14 05:43:23 +00:00
|
|
|
I_len = S_len + P_len;
|
2016-04-16 22:10:01 +01:00
|
|
|
if (I_len < S_len) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
|
Push password encoding back into pkcs12_key_gen.
With PKCS8_encrypt_pbe and PKCS8_decrypt_pbe gone in
3e8b782c0cc0d9621f622cf80ab1a9bcf442fa17, we can restore the old
arrangement where the password encoding was handled in pkcs12_key_gen.
This simplifies the interface for the follow-up crypto/asn1 split.
Note this change is *not* a no-op for PKCS#12 files which use PBES2.
Before, we would perform the PKCS#12 password encoding for all parts of
PKCS#12 processing. The new behavior is we only perform it for the parts
that go through the PKCS#12 KDF. For such a file, it would only be the
MAC.
I believe the specification supports our new behavior. Although RFC 7292
B.1 says something which implies that the transformation is about
converting passwords to byte strings and would thus be universal,
appendix B itself is prefaced with:
Note that this method for password privacy mode is not recommended
and is deprecated for new usage. The procedures and algorithms
defined in PKCS #5 v2.1 [13] [22] should be used instead.
Specifically, PBES2 should be used as encryption scheme, with PBKDF2
as the key derivation function.
"This method" refers to the key derivation and not the password
formatting, but it does give support to the theory that password
formatting is tied to PKCS#12 key derivation.
(Of course, if one believes PKCS#12's assertion that their inane
encoding (NUL-terminated UTF-16!) is because PKCS#5 failed to talk about
passwords as Unicode strings, one would think that PBES2 (also in
PKCS#5) would have the same issue and thus need PKCS#12 to valiantly
save the day with an encoding...)
This matches OpenSSL's behavior and that of recent versions of NSS. See
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1268141. I was unable to
figure out what variants, if any, macOS accepts.
BUG=54
Change-Id: I9a1bb4d5e168e6e76b82241e4634b1103e620b9b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14213
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
2017-03-14 05:43:23 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
2015-02-11 06:17:41 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-04-16 22:10:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
Push password encoding back into pkcs12_key_gen.
With PKCS8_encrypt_pbe and PKCS8_decrypt_pbe gone in
3e8b782c0cc0d9621f622cf80ab1a9bcf442fa17, we can restore the old
arrangement where the password encoding was handled in pkcs12_key_gen.
This simplifies the interface for the follow-up crypto/asn1 split.
Note this change is *not* a no-op for PKCS#12 files which use PBES2.
Before, we would perform the PKCS#12 password encoding for all parts of
PKCS#12 processing. The new behavior is we only perform it for the parts
that go through the PKCS#12 KDF. For such a file, it would only be the
MAC.
I believe the specification supports our new behavior. Although RFC 7292
B.1 says something which implies that the transformation is about
converting passwords to byte strings and would thus be universal,
appendix B itself is prefaced with:
Note that this method for password privacy mode is not recommended
and is deprecated for new usage. The procedures and algorithms
defined in PKCS #5 v2.1 [13] [22] should be used instead.
Specifically, PBES2 should be used as encryption scheme, with PBKDF2
as the key derivation function.
"This method" refers to the key derivation and not the password
formatting, but it does give support to the theory that password
formatting is tied to PKCS#12 key derivation.
(Of course, if one believes PKCS#12's assertion that their inane
encoding (NUL-terminated UTF-16!) is because PKCS#5 failed to talk about
passwords as Unicode strings, one would think that PBES2 (also in
PKCS#5) would have the same issue and thus need PKCS#12 to valiantly
save the day with an encoding...)
This matches OpenSSL's behavior and that of recent versions of NSS. See
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1268141. I was unable to
figure out what variants, if any, macOS accepts.
BUG=54
Change-Id: I9a1bb4d5e168e6e76b82241e4634b1103e620b9b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14213
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
2017-03-14 05:43:23 +00:00
|
|
|
I = OPENSSL_malloc(I_len);
|
2016-04-16 22:10:01 +01:00
|
|
|
if (I_len != 0 && I == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
Push password encoding back into pkcs12_key_gen.
With PKCS8_encrypt_pbe and PKCS8_decrypt_pbe gone in
3e8b782c0cc0d9621f622cf80ab1a9bcf442fa17, we can restore the old
arrangement where the password encoding was handled in pkcs12_key_gen.
This simplifies the interface for the follow-up crypto/asn1 split.
Note this change is *not* a no-op for PKCS#12 files which use PBES2.
Before, we would perform the PKCS#12 password encoding for all parts of
PKCS#12 processing. The new behavior is we only perform it for the parts
that go through the PKCS#12 KDF. For such a file, it would only be the
MAC.
I believe the specification supports our new behavior. Although RFC 7292
B.1 says something which implies that the transformation is about
converting passwords to byte strings and would thus be universal,
appendix B itself is prefaced with:
Note that this method for password privacy mode is not recommended
and is deprecated for new usage. The procedures and algorithms
defined in PKCS #5 v2.1 [13] [22] should be used instead.
Specifically, PBES2 should be used as encryption scheme, with PBKDF2
as the key derivation function.
"This method" refers to the key derivation and not the password
formatting, but it does give support to the theory that password
formatting is tied to PKCS#12 key derivation.
(Of course, if one believes PKCS#12's assertion that their inane
encoding (NUL-terminated UTF-16!) is because PKCS#5 failed to talk about
passwords as Unicode strings, one would think that PBES2 (also in
PKCS#5) would have the same issue and thus need PKCS#12 to valiantly
save the day with an encoding...)
This matches OpenSSL's behavior and that of recent versions of NSS. See
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1268141. I was unable to
figure out what variants, if any, macOS accepts.
BUG=54
Change-Id: I9a1bb4d5e168e6e76b82241e4634b1103e620b9b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14213
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
2017-03-14 05:43:23 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
2015-02-11 06:17:41 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-04-16 22:10:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2016-09-05 17:47:25 +01:00
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < S_len; i++) {
|
2016-04-16 22:10:01 +01:00
|
|
|
I[i] = salt[i % salt_len];
|
2015-02-11 06:17:41 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-09-05 17:47:25 +01:00
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < P_len; i++) {
|
2016-04-16 22:10:01 +01:00
|
|
|
I[i + S_len] = pass_raw[i % pass_raw_len];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (out_len != 0) {
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
// A. Set A_i=H^r(D||I). (i.e., the r-th hash of D||I,
|
|
|
|
// H(H(H(... H(D||I))))
|
2016-04-16 22:10:01 +01:00
|
|
|
uint8_t A[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
unsigned A_len;
|
|
|
|
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, md, NULL) ||
|
|
|
|
!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, D, block_size) ||
|
|
|
|
!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, I, I_len) ||
|
|
|
|
!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, A, &A_len)) {
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
for (unsigned iter = 1; iter < iterations; iter++) {
|
2016-04-16 22:10:01 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, md, NULL) ||
|
|
|
|
!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, A, A_len) ||
|
|
|
|
!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, A, &A_len)) {
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-04-16 22:10:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
size_t todo = out_len < A_len ? out_len : A_len;
|
2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(out, A, todo);
|
2016-04-16 22:10:01 +01:00
|
|
|
out += todo;
|
|
|
|
out_len -= todo;
|
|
|
|
if (out_len == 0) {
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2015-02-11 06:17:41 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-04-16 22:10:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
// B. Concatenate copies of A_i to create a string B of length v bits (the
|
|
|
|
// final copy of A_i may be truncated to create B).
|
2016-04-16 22:10:01 +01:00
|
|
|
uint8_t B[EVP_MAX_MD_BLOCK_SIZE];
|
2016-09-05 17:47:25 +01:00
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < block_size; i++) {
|
2016-04-16 22:10:01 +01:00
|
|
|
B[i] = A[i % A_len];
|
2015-02-11 06:17:41 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-04-16 22:10:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
// C. Treating I as a concatenation I_0, I_1, ..., I_(k-1) of v-bit blocks,
|
|
|
|
// where k=ceiling(s/v)+ceiling(p/v), modify I by setting I_j=(I_j+B+1) mod
|
|
|
|
// 2^v for each j.
|
2016-04-16 22:10:01 +01:00
|
|
|
assert(I_len % block_size == 0);
|
2016-09-05 17:47:25 +01:00
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < I_len; i += block_size) {
|
2016-04-16 22:10:01 +01:00
|
|
|
unsigned carry = 1;
|
2016-09-05 17:47:25 +01:00
|
|
|
for (size_t j = block_size - 1; j < block_size; j--) {
|
2016-04-16 22:10:01 +01:00
|
|
|
carry += I[i + j] + B[j];
|
|
|
|
I[i + j] = (uint8_t)carry;
|
|
|
|
carry >>= 8;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-04-16 22:10:01 +01:00
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2016-04-16 22:10:01 +01:00
|
|
|
err:
|
2017-08-30 18:49:05 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(I);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(pass_raw);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
static int pkcs12_pbe_cipher_init(const struct pbe_suite *suite,
|
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned iterations,
|
Push password encoding back into pkcs12_key_gen.
With PKCS8_encrypt_pbe and PKCS8_decrypt_pbe gone in
3e8b782c0cc0d9621f622cf80ab1a9bcf442fa17, we can restore the old
arrangement where the password encoding was handled in pkcs12_key_gen.
This simplifies the interface for the follow-up crypto/asn1 split.
Note this change is *not* a no-op for PKCS#12 files which use PBES2.
Before, we would perform the PKCS#12 password encoding for all parts of
PKCS#12 processing. The new behavior is we only perform it for the parts
that go through the PKCS#12 KDF. For such a file, it would only be the
MAC.
I believe the specification supports our new behavior. Although RFC 7292
B.1 says something which implies that the transformation is about
converting passwords to byte strings and would thus be universal,
appendix B itself is prefaced with:
Note that this method for password privacy mode is not recommended
and is deprecated for new usage. The procedures and algorithms
defined in PKCS #5 v2.1 [13] [22] should be used instead.
Specifically, PBES2 should be used as encryption scheme, with PBKDF2
as the key derivation function.
"This method" refers to the key derivation and not the password
formatting, but it does give support to the theory that password
formatting is tied to PKCS#12 key derivation.
(Of course, if one believes PKCS#12's assertion that their inane
encoding (NUL-terminated UTF-16!) is because PKCS#5 failed to talk about
passwords as Unicode strings, one would think that PBES2 (also in
PKCS#5) would have the same issue and thus need PKCS#12 to valiantly
save the day with an encoding...)
This matches OpenSSL's behavior and that of recent versions of NSS. See
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1268141. I was unable to
figure out what variants, if any, macOS accepts.
BUG=54
Change-Id: I9a1bb4d5e168e6e76b82241e4634b1103e620b9b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14213
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
2017-03-14 05:43:23 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *pass, size_t pass_len,
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_len,
|
|
|
|
int is_encrypt) {
|
|
|
|
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = suite->cipher_func();
|
|
|
|
const EVP_MD *md = suite->md_func();
|
2016-12-29 03:39:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
uint8_t key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
|
|
|
|
uint8_t iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
|
Push password encoding back into pkcs12_key_gen.
With PKCS8_encrypt_pbe and PKCS8_decrypt_pbe gone in
3e8b782c0cc0d9621f622cf80ab1a9bcf442fa17, we can restore the old
arrangement where the password encoding was handled in pkcs12_key_gen.
This simplifies the interface for the follow-up crypto/asn1 split.
Note this change is *not* a no-op for PKCS#12 files which use PBES2.
Before, we would perform the PKCS#12 password encoding for all parts of
PKCS#12 processing. The new behavior is we only perform it for the parts
that go through the PKCS#12 KDF. For such a file, it would only be the
MAC.
I believe the specification supports our new behavior. Although RFC 7292
B.1 says something which implies that the transformation is about
converting passwords to byte strings and would thus be universal,
appendix B itself is prefaced with:
Note that this method for password privacy mode is not recommended
and is deprecated for new usage. The procedures and algorithms
defined in PKCS #5 v2.1 [13] [22] should be used instead.
Specifically, PBES2 should be used as encryption scheme, with PBKDF2
as the key derivation function.
"This method" refers to the key derivation and not the password
formatting, but it does give support to the theory that password
formatting is tied to PKCS#12 key derivation.
(Of course, if one believes PKCS#12's assertion that their inane
encoding (NUL-terminated UTF-16!) is because PKCS#5 failed to talk about
passwords as Unicode strings, one would think that PBES2 (also in
PKCS#5) would have the same issue and thus need PKCS#12 to valiantly
save the day with an encoding...)
This matches OpenSSL's behavior and that of recent versions of NSS. See
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1268141. I was unable to
figure out what variants, if any, macOS accepts.
BUG=54
Change-Id: I9a1bb4d5e168e6e76b82241e4634b1103e620b9b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14213
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
2017-03-14 05:43:23 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!pkcs12_key_gen(pass, pass_len, salt, salt_len, PKCS12_KEY_ID, iterations,
|
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher), key, md) ||
|
|
|
|
!pkcs12_key_gen(pass, pass_len, salt, salt_len, PKCS12_IV_ID, iterations,
|
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher), iv, md)) {
|
2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_KEY_GEN_ERROR);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-12-29 03:39:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int ret = EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, key, iv, is_encrypt);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(key, EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(iv, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
static int pkcs12_pbe_decrypt_init(const struct pbe_suite *suite,
|
Push password encoding back into pkcs12_key_gen.
With PKCS8_encrypt_pbe and PKCS8_decrypt_pbe gone in
3e8b782c0cc0d9621f622cf80ab1a9bcf442fa17, we can restore the old
arrangement where the password encoding was handled in pkcs12_key_gen.
This simplifies the interface for the follow-up crypto/asn1 split.
Note this change is *not* a no-op for PKCS#12 files which use PBES2.
Before, we would perform the PKCS#12 password encoding for all parts of
PKCS#12 processing. The new behavior is we only perform it for the parts
that go through the PKCS#12 KDF. For such a file, it would only be the
MAC.
I believe the specification supports our new behavior. Although RFC 7292
B.1 says something which implies that the transformation is about
converting passwords to byte strings and would thus be universal,
appendix B itself is prefaced with:
Note that this method for password privacy mode is not recommended
and is deprecated for new usage. The procedures and algorithms
defined in PKCS #5 v2.1 [13] [22] should be used instead.
Specifically, PBES2 should be used as encryption scheme, with PBKDF2
as the key derivation function.
"This method" refers to the key derivation and not the password
formatting, but it does give support to the theory that password
formatting is tied to PKCS#12 key derivation.
(Of course, if one believes PKCS#12's assertion that their inane
encoding (NUL-terminated UTF-16!) is because PKCS#5 failed to talk about
passwords as Unicode strings, one would think that PBES2 (also in
PKCS#5) would have the same issue and thus need PKCS#12 to valiantly
save the day with an encoding...)
This matches OpenSSL's behavior and that of recent versions of NSS. See
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1268141. I was unable to
figure out what variants, if any, macOS accepts.
BUG=54
Change-Id: I9a1bb4d5e168e6e76b82241e4634b1103e620b9b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14213
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
2017-03-14 05:43:23 +00:00
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass,
|
|
|
|
size_t pass_len, CBS *param) {
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
CBS pbe_param, salt;
|
|
|
|
uint64_t iterations;
|
|
|
|
if (!CBS_get_asn1(param, &pbe_param, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
|
|
|
|
!CBS_get_asn1(&pbe_param, &salt, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
|
|
|
|
!CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&pbe_param, &iterations) ||
|
|
|
|
CBS_len(&pbe_param) != 0 ||
|
|
|
|
CBS_len(param) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_DECODE_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (iterations == 0 || iterations > UINT_MAX) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_ITERATION_COUNT);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
Push password encoding back into pkcs12_key_gen.
With PKCS8_encrypt_pbe and PKCS8_decrypt_pbe gone in
3e8b782c0cc0d9621f622cf80ab1a9bcf442fa17, we can restore the old
arrangement where the password encoding was handled in pkcs12_key_gen.
This simplifies the interface for the follow-up crypto/asn1 split.
Note this change is *not* a no-op for PKCS#12 files which use PBES2.
Before, we would perform the PKCS#12 password encoding for all parts of
PKCS#12 processing. The new behavior is we only perform it for the parts
that go through the PKCS#12 KDF. For such a file, it would only be the
MAC.
I believe the specification supports our new behavior. Although RFC 7292
B.1 says something which implies that the transformation is about
converting passwords to byte strings and would thus be universal,
appendix B itself is prefaced with:
Note that this method for password privacy mode is not recommended
and is deprecated for new usage. The procedures and algorithms
defined in PKCS #5 v2.1 [13] [22] should be used instead.
Specifically, PBES2 should be used as encryption scheme, with PBKDF2
as the key derivation function.
"This method" refers to the key derivation and not the password
formatting, but it does give support to the theory that password
formatting is tied to PKCS#12 key derivation.
(Of course, if one believes PKCS#12's assertion that their inane
encoding (NUL-terminated UTF-16!) is because PKCS#5 failed to talk about
passwords as Unicode strings, one would think that PBES2 (also in
PKCS#5) would have the same issue and thus need PKCS#12 to valiantly
save the day with an encoding...)
This matches OpenSSL's behavior and that of recent versions of NSS. See
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1268141. I was unable to
figure out what variants, if any, macOS accepts.
BUG=54
Change-Id: I9a1bb4d5e168e6e76b82241e4634b1103e620b9b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14213
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
2017-03-14 05:43:23 +00:00
|
|
|
return pkcs12_pbe_cipher_init(suite, ctx, (unsigned)iterations, pass,
|
|
|
|
pass_len, CBS_data(&salt), CBS_len(&salt),
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
0 /* decrypt */);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-08-21 19:09:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
static const struct pbe_suite kBuiltinPBE[] = {
|
|
|
|
{
|
2017-03-14 04:34:49 +00:00
|
|
|
NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC,
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
// 1.2.840.113549.1.12.1.6
|
2017-03-14 04:34:49 +00:00
|
|
|
{0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x06},
|
|
|
|
10,
|
|
|
|
EVP_rc2_40_cbc,
|
|
|
|
EVP_sha1,
|
|
|
|
pkcs12_pbe_decrypt_init,
|
2014-08-21 22:11:39 +01:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
2017-03-14 04:34:49 +00:00
|
|
|
NID_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4,
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
// 1.2.840.113549.1.12.1.1
|
2017-03-14 04:34:49 +00:00
|
|
|
{0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x01},
|
|
|
|
10,
|
|
|
|
EVP_rc4,
|
|
|
|
EVP_sha1,
|
|
|
|
pkcs12_pbe_decrypt_init,
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
2017-03-14 04:34:49 +00:00
|
|
|
NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC,
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
// 1.2.840.113549.1.12.1.3
|
2017-03-14 04:34:49 +00:00
|
|
|
{0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x03},
|
|
|
|
10,
|
|
|
|
EVP_des_ede3_cbc,
|
|
|
|
EVP_sha1,
|
|
|
|
pkcs12_pbe_decrypt_init,
|
2015-08-21 19:09:44 +01:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
2017-03-14 04:34:49 +00:00
|
|
|
NID_pbes2,
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
// 1.2.840.113549.1.5.13
|
2017-03-14 04:34:49 +00:00
|
|
|
{0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x05, 0x0d},
|
|
|
|
9,
|
|
|
|
NULL,
|
|
|
|
NULL,
|
|
|
|
PKCS5_pbe2_decrypt_init,
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2018-05-10 23:58:21 +01:00
|
|
|
static const struct pbe_suite *get_pkcs12_pbe_suite(int pbe_nid) {
|
2017-03-14 04:34:49 +00:00
|
|
|
for (unsigned i = 0; i < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kBuiltinPBE); i++) {
|
2018-05-10 23:58:21 +01:00
|
|
|
if (kBuiltinPBE[i].pbe_nid == pbe_nid &&
|
|
|
|
// If |cipher_func| or |md_func| are missing, this is a PBES2 scheme.
|
|
|
|
kBuiltinPBE[i].cipher_func != NULL &&
|
|
|
|
kBuiltinPBE[i].md_func != NULL) {
|
2015-08-21 19:09:44 +01:00
|
|
|
return &kBuiltinPBE[i];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-05-09 22:28:09 +01:00
|
|
|
int pkcs12_pbe_encrypt_init(CBB *out, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int alg,
|
|
|
|
unsigned iterations, const char *pass,
|
|
|
|
size_t pass_len, const uint8_t *salt,
|
|
|
|
size_t salt_len) {
|
2018-05-10 23:58:21 +01:00
|
|
|
const struct pbe_suite *suite = get_pkcs12_pbe_suite(alg);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
if (suite == NULL) {
|
2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
// See RFC 2898, appendix A.3.
|
2017-03-14 04:34:49 +00:00
|
|
|
CBB algorithm, oid, param, salt_cbb;
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!CBB_add_asn1(out, &algorithm, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
|
2017-03-14 04:34:49 +00:00
|
|
|
!CBB_add_asn1(&algorithm, &oid, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
|
|
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&oid, suite->oid, suite->oid_len) ||
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
!CBB_add_asn1(&algorithm, ¶m, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
|
|
|
|
!CBB_add_asn1(¶m, &salt_cbb, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
|
|
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&salt_cbb, salt, salt_len) ||
|
|
|
|
!CBB_add_asn1_uint64(¶m, iterations) ||
|
|
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Push password encoding back into pkcs12_key_gen.
With PKCS8_encrypt_pbe and PKCS8_decrypt_pbe gone in
3e8b782c0cc0d9621f622cf80ab1a9bcf442fa17, we can restore the old
arrangement where the password encoding was handled in pkcs12_key_gen.
This simplifies the interface for the follow-up crypto/asn1 split.
Note this change is *not* a no-op for PKCS#12 files which use PBES2.
Before, we would perform the PKCS#12 password encoding for all parts of
PKCS#12 processing. The new behavior is we only perform it for the parts
that go through the PKCS#12 KDF. For such a file, it would only be the
MAC.
I believe the specification supports our new behavior. Although RFC 7292
B.1 says something which implies that the transformation is about
converting passwords to byte strings and would thus be universal,
appendix B itself is prefaced with:
Note that this method for password privacy mode is not recommended
and is deprecated for new usage. The procedures and algorithms
defined in PKCS #5 v2.1 [13] [22] should be used instead.
Specifically, PBES2 should be used as encryption scheme, with PBKDF2
as the key derivation function.
"This method" refers to the key derivation and not the password
formatting, but it does give support to the theory that password
formatting is tied to PKCS#12 key derivation.
(Of course, if one believes PKCS#12's assertion that their inane
encoding (NUL-terminated UTF-16!) is because PKCS#5 failed to talk about
passwords as Unicode strings, one would think that PBES2 (also in
PKCS#5) would have the same issue and thus need PKCS#12 to valiantly
save the day with an encoding...)
This matches OpenSSL's behavior and that of recent versions of NSS. See
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1268141. I was unable to
figure out what variants, if any, macOS accepts.
BUG=54
Change-Id: I9a1bb4d5e168e6e76b82241e4634b1103e620b9b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14213
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
2017-03-14 05:43:23 +00:00
|
|
|
return pkcs12_pbe_cipher_init(suite, ctx, iterations, pass, pass_len, salt,
|
|
|
|
salt_len, 1 /* encrypt */);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-14 06:00:46 +00:00
|
|
|
int pkcs8_pbe_decrypt(uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len, CBS *algorithm,
|
|
|
|
const char *pass, size_t pass_len, const uint8_t *in,
|
|
|
|
size_t in_len) {
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *buf = NULL;;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
|
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
CBS obj;
|
|
|
|
if (!CBS_get_asn1(algorithm, &obj, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT)) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_DECODE_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-14 04:34:49 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct pbe_suite *suite = NULL;
|
|
|
|
for (unsigned i = 0; i < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kBuiltinPBE); i++) {
|
|
|
|
if (CBS_mem_equal(&obj, kBuiltinPBE[i].oid, kBuiltinPBE[i].oid_len)) {
|
|
|
|
suite = &kBuiltinPBE[i];
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
if (suite == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Push password encoding back into pkcs12_key_gen.
With PKCS8_encrypt_pbe and PKCS8_decrypt_pbe gone in
3e8b782c0cc0d9621f622cf80ab1a9bcf442fa17, we can restore the old
arrangement where the password encoding was handled in pkcs12_key_gen.
This simplifies the interface for the follow-up crypto/asn1 split.
Note this change is *not* a no-op for PKCS#12 files which use PBES2.
Before, we would perform the PKCS#12 password encoding for all parts of
PKCS#12 processing. The new behavior is we only perform it for the parts
that go through the PKCS#12 KDF. For such a file, it would only be the
MAC.
I believe the specification supports our new behavior. Although RFC 7292
B.1 says something which implies that the transformation is about
converting passwords to byte strings and would thus be universal,
appendix B itself is prefaced with:
Note that this method for password privacy mode is not recommended
and is deprecated for new usage. The procedures and algorithms
defined in PKCS #5 v2.1 [13] [22] should be used instead.
Specifically, PBES2 should be used as encryption scheme, with PBKDF2
as the key derivation function.
"This method" refers to the key derivation and not the password
formatting, but it does give support to the theory that password
formatting is tied to PKCS#12 key derivation.
(Of course, if one believes PKCS#12's assertion that their inane
encoding (NUL-terminated UTF-16!) is because PKCS#5 failed to talk about
passwords as Unicode strings, one would think that PBES2 (also in
PKCS#5) would have the same issue and thus need PKCS#12 to valiantly
save the day with an encoding...)
This matches OpenSSL's behavior and that of recent versions of NSS. See
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1268141. I was unable to
figure out what variants, if any, macOS accepts.
BUG=54
Change-Id: I9a1bb4d5e168e6e76b82241e4634b1103e620b9b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14213
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
2017-03-14 05:43:23 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!suite->decrypt_init(suite, &ctx, pass, pass_len, algorithm)) {
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_KEYGEN_FAILURE);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(in_len);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
if (buf == NULL) {
|
2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
if (in_len > INT_MAX) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
int n1, n2;
|
|
|
|
if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, buf, &n1, in, (int)in_len) ||
|
|
|
|
!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, buf + n1, &n2)) {
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
*out = buf;
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
*out_len = n1 + n2;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
buf = NULL;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(buf);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-14 06:26:10 +00:00
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *PKCS8_parse_encrypted_private_key(CBS *cbs, const char *pass,
|
|
|
|
size_t pass_len) {
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
// See RFC 5208, section 6.
|
2017-03-14 06:26:10 +00:00
|
|
|
CBS epki, algorithm, ciphertext;
|
|
|
|
if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &epki, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
!CBS_get_asn1(&epki, &algorithm, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
|
|
|
|
!CBS_get_asn1(&epki, &ciphertext, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
|
2017-03-14 06:26:10 +00:00
|
|
|
CBS_len(&epki) != 0) {
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_DECODE_ERROR);
|
2017-03-14 06:26:10 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-03-14 06:26:10 +00:00
|
|
|
uint8_t *out;
|
|
|
|
size_t out_len;
|
2017-03-14 06:00:46 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!pkcs8_pbe_decrypt(&out, &out_len, &algorithm, pass, pass_len,
|
|
|
|
CBS_data(&ciphertext), CBS_len(&ciphertext))) {
|
2017-03-14 06:26:10 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-03-14 06:26:10 +00:00
|
|
|
CBS pki;
|
|
|
|
CBS_init(&pki, out, out_len);
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *ret = EVP_parse_private_key(&pki);
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(out);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-14 06:26:10 +00:00
|
|
|
int PKCS8_marshal_encrypted_private_key(CBB *out, int pbe_nid,
|
|
|
|
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
|
|
|
|
const char *pass, size_t pass_len,
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_len,
|
|
|
|
int iterations, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
|
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *plaintext = NULL, *salt_buf = NULL;
|
|
|
|
size_t plaintext_len = 0;
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
|
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
|
2014-07-31 18:59:47 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
// Generate a random salt if necessary.
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
if (salt == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
if (salt_len == 0) {
|
|
|
|
salt_len = PKCS5_SALT_LEN;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
salt_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(salt_len);
|
|
|
|
if (salt_buf == NULL ||
|
|
|
|
!RAND_bytes(salt_buf, salt_len)) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
salt = salt_buf;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (iterations <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
iterations = PKCS5_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
// Serialize the input key.
|
2017-03-14 06:26:10 +00:00
|
|
|
CBB plaintext_cbb;
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_init(&plaintext_cbb, 128) ||
|
|
|
|
!EVP_marshal_private_key(&plaintext_cbb, pkey) ||
|
|
|
|
!CBB_finish(&plaintext_cbb, &plaintext, &plaintext_len)) {
|
|
|
|
CBB_cleanup(&plaintext_cbb);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
CBB epki;
|
2017-03-14 06:26:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!CBB_add_asn1(out, &epki, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int alg_ok;
|
2015-08-21 19:09:44 +01:00
|
|
|
if (pbe_nid == -1) {
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
alg_ok = PKCS5_pbe2_encrypt_init(&epki, &ctx, cipher, (unsigned)iterations,
|
Push password encoding back into pkcs12_key_gen.
With PKCS8_encrypt_pbe and PKCS8_decrypt_pbe gone in
3e8b782c0cc0d9621f622cf80ab1a9bcf442fa17, we can restore the old
arrangement where the password encoding was handled in pkcs12_key_gen.
This simplifies the interface for the follow-up crypto/asn1 split.
Note this change is *not* a no-op for PKCS#12 files which use PBES2.
Before, we would perform the PKCS#12 password encoding for all parts of
PKCS#12 processing. The new behavior is we only perform it for the parts
that go through the PKCS#12 KDF. For such a file, it would only be the
MAC.
I believe the specification supports our new behavior. Although RFC 7292
B.1 says something which implies that the transformation is about
converting passwords to byte strings and would thus be universal,
appendix B itself is prefaced with:
Note that this method for password privacy mode is not recommended
and is deprecated for new usage. The procedures and algorithms
defined in PKCS #5 v2.1 [13] [22] should be used instead.
Specifically, PBES2 should be used as encryption scheme, with PBKDF2
as the key derivation function.
"This method" refers to the key derivation and not the password
formatting, but it does give support to the theory that password
formatting is tied to PKCS#12 key derivation.
(Of course, if one believes PKCS#12's assertion that their inane
encoding (NUL-terminated UTF-16!) is because PKCS#5 failed to talk about
passwords as Unicode strings, one would think that PBES2 (also in
PKCS#5) would have the same issue and thus need PKCS#12 to valiantly
save the day with an encoding...)
This matches OpenSSL's behavior and that of recent versions of NSS. See
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1268141. I was unable to
figure out what variants, if any, macOS accepts.
BUG=54
Change-Id: I9a1bb4d5e168e6e76b82241e4634b1103e620b9b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14213
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
2017-03-14 05:43:23 +00:00
|
|
|
pass, pass_len, salt, salt_len);
|
2015-08-21 19:09:44 +01:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
alg_ok = pkcs12_pbe_encrypt_init(&epki, &ctx, pbe_nid, (unsigned)iterations,
|
Push password encoding back into pkcs12_key_gen.
With PKCS8_encrypt_pbe and PKCS8_decrypt_pbe gone in
3e8b782c0cc0d9621f622cf80ab1a9bcf442fa17, we can restore the old
arrangement where the password encoding was handled in pkcs12_key_gen.
This simplifies the interface for the follow-up crypto/asn1 split.
Note this change is *not* a no-op for PKCS#12 files which use PBES2.
Before, we would perform the PKCS#12 password encoding for all parts of
PKCS#12 processing. The new behavior is we only perform it for the parts
that go through the PKCS#12 KDF. For such a file, it would only be the
MAC.
I believe the specification supports our new behavior. Although RFC 7292
B.1 says something which implies that the transformation is about
converting passwords to byte strings and would thus be universal,
appendix B itself is prefaced with:
Note that this method for password privacy mode is not recommended
and is deprecated for new usage. The procedures and algorithms
defined in PKCS #5 v2.1 [13] [22] should be used instead.
Specifically, PBES2 should be used as encryption scheme, with PBKDF2
as the key derivation function.
"This method" refers to the key derivation and not the password
formatting, but it does give support to the theory that password
formatting is tied to PKCS#12 key derivation.
(Of course, if one believes PKCS#12's assertion that their inane
encoding (NUL-terminated UTF-16!) is because PKCS#5 failed to talk about
passwords as Unicode strings, one would think that PBES2 (also in
PKCS#5) would have the same issue and thus need PKCS#12 to valiantly
save the day with an encoding...)
This matches OpenSSL's behavior and that of recent versions of NSS. See
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1268141. I was unable to
figure out what variants, if any, macOS accepts.
BUG=54
Change-Id: I9a1bb4d5e168e6e76b82241e4634b1103e620b9b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14213
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
2017-03-14 05:43:23 +00:00
|
|
|
pass, pass_len, salt, salt_len);
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!alg_ok) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
2015-08-21 19:09:44 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-03-14 06:26:10 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t max_out = plaintext_len + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(&ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (max_out < plaintext_len) {
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_TOO_LONG);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
CBB ciphertext;
|
2017-03-14 06:26:10 +00:00
|
|
|
uint8_t *ptr;
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
int n1, n2;
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_add_asn1(&epki, &ciphertext, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
|
2017-03-14 06:26:10 +00:00
|
|
|
!CBB_reserve(&ciphertext, &ptr, max_out) ||
|
|
|
|
!EVP_CipherUpdate(&ctx, ptr, &n1, plaintext, plaintext_len) ||
|
|
|
|
!EVP_CipherFinal_ex(&ctx, ptr + n1, &n2) ||
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
!CBB_did_write(&ciphertext, n1 + n2) ||
|
2017-03-14 06:26:10 +00:00
|
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-14 06:26:10 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
2017-08-30 18:49:05 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(plaintext);
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(salt_buf);
|
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|