boringssl/ssl/s3_both.c

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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/buf.h>
#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#include <openssl/nid.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include "internal.h"
/* ssl3_do_write sends |ssl->init_buf| in records of type 'type'
* (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC). It returns 1 on success
* and <= 0 on error. */
static int ssl3_do_write(SSL *ssl, int type, const uint8_t *data, size_t len) {
int ret = ssl3_write_bytes(ssl, type, data, len);
if (ret <= 0) {
return ret;
}
/* ssl3_write_bytes writes the data in its entirety. */
assert((size_t)ret == len);
ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, ssl->version, type, data, len);
return 1;
}
int ssl3_init_message(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb, CBB *body, uint8_t type) {
CBB_zero(cbb);
if (ssl->s3->pending_message != NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/* Pick a modest size hint to save most of the |realloc| calls. */
if (!CBB_init(cbb, 64) ||
!CBB_add_u8(cbb, type) ||
!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, body)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int ssl3_finish_message(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) {
if (ssl->s3->pending_message != NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
uint8_t *msg = NULL;
size_t len;
if (!CBB_finish(cbb, &msg, &len) ||
len > 0xffffffffu) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
OPENSSL_free(msg);
return 0;
}
ssl3_update_handshake_hash(ssl, msg, len);
ssl->s3->pending_message = msg;
ssl->s3->pending_message_len = (uint32_t)len;
return 1;
}
int ssl3_write_message(SSL *ssl) {
if (ssl->s3->pending_message == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
int ret = ssl3_do_write(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, ssl->s3->pending_message,
ssl->s3->pending_message_len);
if (ret <= 0) {
return ret;
}
OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->pending_message);
ssl->s3->pending_message = NULL;
ssl->s3->pending_message_len = 0;
return 1;
}
int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *ssl, int a, int b) {
if (ssl->state == b) {
return ssl->method->write_message(ssl);
}
int n = ssl->s3->enc_method->final_finish_mac(ssl, ssl->server,
ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md);
if (n == 0) {
return 0;
}
ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = n;
/* Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. */
if (!ssl_log_master_secret(ssl, ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
ssl->session->master_key,
ssl->session->master_key_length)) {
return 0;
}
/* Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */
if (ssl->server) {
assert(n <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md, n);
ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len = n;
} else {
assert(n <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md, n);
ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len = n;
}
CBB cbb, body;
if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_FINISHED) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&body, ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md,
ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) ||
!ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, &cbb)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return -1;
}
ssl->state = b;
return ssl->method->write_message(ssl);
}
/* ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
* so far. */
static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *ssl) {
/* If no new cipher setup then return immediately: other functions will set
* the appropriate error. */
if (ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
return;
}
ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = ssl->s3->enc_method->final_finish_mac(
ssl, !ssl->server, ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
}
int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *ssl) {
int al, finished_len, ok;
long message_len;
uint8_t *p;
message_len = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_FINISHED,
Simplify handshake message size limits. A handshake message can go up to 2^24 bytes = 16MB which is a little large for the peer to force us to buffer. Accordingly, we bound the size of a handshake message. Rather than have a global limit, the existing logic uses a different limit at each state in the handshake state machine and, for certificates, allows configuring the maximum certificate size. This is nice in that we engage larger limits iff the relevant state is reachable from the handshake. Servers without client auth get a tighter limit "for free". However, this doesn't work for DTLS due to out-of-order messages and we use a simpler scheme for DTLS. This scheme also is tricky on optional messages and makes the handshake <-> message layer communication complex. Apart from an ignored 20,000 byte limit on ServerHello, the largest non-certificate limit is the common 16k limit on ClientHello. So this complexity wasn't buying us anything. Unify everything on the DTLS scheme except, so as not to regress bounds on client-auth-less servers, also correctly check for whether client auth is configured. The value of 16k was chosen based on this value. (The 20,000 byte ServerHello limit makes no sense. We can easily bound the ServerHello because servers may not send extensions we don't implement. But it gets overshadowed by the certificate anyway.) Change-Id: I00309b16d809a3c2a1543f99fd29c4163e3add81 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7941 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2016-05-12 05:43:05 +01:00
ssl_dont_hash_message, &ok);
if (!ok) {
return message_len;
}
/* Snapshot the finished hash before incorporating the new message. */
ssl3_take_mac(ssl);
if (!ssl3_hash_current_message(ssl)) {
goto err;
}
p = ssl->init_msg;
finished_len = ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
if (finished_len != message_len) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
int finished_ret =
CRYPTO_memcmp(p, ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, finished_len);
#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
finished_ret = 0;
#endif
if (finished_ret != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
goto f_err;
}
/* Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */
if (ssl->server) {
assert(finished_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
finished_len);
ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finished_len;
} else {
assert(finished_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
finished_len);
ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finished_len;
}
return 1;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
return 0;
}
int ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl) {
static const uint8_t kChangeCipherSpec[1] = {SSL3_MT_CCS};
return ssl3_do_write(ssl, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, kChangeCipherSpec,
sizeof(kChangeCipherSpec));
}
int ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *ssl) {
CBB cbb, body;
if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) ||
!ssl_add_cert_chain(ssl, &body) ||
!ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, &cbb)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Simplify handshake message size limits. A handshake message can go up to 2^24 bytes = 16MB which is a little large for the peer to force us to buffer. Accordingly, we bound the size of a handshake message. Rather than have a global limit, the existing logic uses a different limit at each state in the handshake state machine and, for certificates, allows configuring the maximum certificate size. This is nice in that we engage larger limits iff the relevant state is reachable from the handshake. Servers without client auth get a tighter limit "for free". However, this doesn't work for DTLS due to out-of-order messages and we use a simpler scheme for DTLS. This scheme also is tricky on optional messages and makes the handshake <-> message layer communication complex. Apart from an ignored 20,000 byte limit on ServerHello, the largest non-certificate limit is the common 16k limit on ClientHello. So this complexity wasn't buying us anything. Unify everything on the DTLS scheme except, so as not to regress bounds on client-auth-less servers, also correctly check for whether client auth is configured. The value of 16k was chosen based on this value. (The 20,000 byte ServerHello limit makes no sense. We can easily bound the ServerHello because servers may not send extensions we don't implement. But it gets overshadowed by the certificate anyway.) Change-Id: I00309b16d809a3c2a1543f99fd29c4163e3add81 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7941 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2016-05-12 05:43:05 +01:00
size_t ssl_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *ssl) {
/* kMaxMessageLen is the default maximum message size for handshakes which do
* not accept peer certificate chains. */
static const size_t kMaxMessageLen = 16384;
if ((!ssl->server || (ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) &&
kMaxMessageLen < ssl->max_cert_list) {
return ssl->max_cert_list;
}
return kMaxMessageLen;
}
static int extend_handshake_buffer(SSL *ssl, size_t length) {
if (!BUF_MEM_reserve(ssl->init_buf, length)) {
return -1;
}
while (ssl->init_buf->length < length) {
int ret =
ssl3_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
(uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data + ssl->init_buf->length,
length - ssl->init_buf->length, 0);
if (ret <= 0) {
return ret;
}
ssl->init_buf->length += (size_t)ret;
}
return 1;
}
Simplify handshake message size limits. A handshake message can go up to 2^24 bytes = 16MB which is a little large for the peer to force us to buffer. Accordingly, we bound the size of a handshake message. Rather than have a global limit, the existing logic uses a different limit at each state in the handshake state machine and, for certificates, allows configuring the maximum certificate size. This is nice in that we engage larger limits iff the relevant state is reachable from the handshake. Servers without client auth get a tighter limit "for free". However, this doesn't work for DTLS due to out-of-order messages and we use a simpler scheme for DTLS. This scheme also is tricky on optional messages and makes the handshake <-> message layer communication complex. Apart from an ignored 20,000 byte limit on ServerHello, the largest non-certificate limit is the common 16k limit on ClientHello. So this complexity wasn't buying us anything. Unify everything on the DTLS scheme except, so as not to regress bounds on client-auth-less servers, also correctly check for whether client auth is configured. The value of 16k was chosen based on this value. (The 20,000 byte ServerHello limit makes no sense. We can easily bound the ServerHello because servers may not send extensions we don't implement. But it gets overshadowed by the certificate anyway.) Change-Id: I00309b16d809a3c2a1543f99fd29c4163e3add81 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7941 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2016-05-12 05:43:05 +01:00
/* Obtain handshake message of message type |msg_type| (any if |msg_type| ==
* -1). */
long ssl3_get_message(SSL *ssl, int msg_type,
Simplify handshake message size limits. A handshake message can go up to 2^24 bytes = 16MB which is a little large for the peer to force us to buffer. Accordingly, we bound the size of a handshake message. Rather than have a global limit, the existing logic uses a different limit at each state in the handshake state machine and, for certificates, allows configuring the maximum certificate size. This is nice in that we engage larger limits iff the relevant state is reachable from the handshake. Servers without client auth get a tighter limit "for free". However, this doesn't work for DTLS due to out-of-order messages and we use a simpler scheme for DTLS. This scheme also is tricky on optional messages and makes the handshake <-> message layer communication complex. Apart from an ignored 20,000 byte limit on ServerHello, the largest non-certificate limit is the common 16k limit on ClientHello. So this complexity wasn't buying us anything. Unify everything on the DTLS scheme except, so as not to regress bounds on client-auth-less servers, also correctly check for whether client auth is configured. The value of 16k was chosen based on this value. (The 20,000 byte ServerHello limit makes no sense. We can easily bound the ServerHello because servers may not send extensions we don't implement. But it gets overshadowed by the certificate anyway.) Change-Id: I00309b16d809a3c2a1543f99fd29c4163e3add81 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7941 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2016-05-12 05:43:05 +01:00
enum ssl_hash_message_t hash_message, int *ok) {
*ok = 0;
again:
if (ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message) {
/* A ssl_dont_hash_message call cannot be combined with reuse_message; the
* ssl_dont_hash_message would have to have been applied to the previous
* call. */
assert(hash_message == ssl_hash_message);
assert(ssl->s3->tmp.message_complete);
ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 0;
hash_message = ssl_dont_hash_message;
} else if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_complete) {
ssl->s3->tmp.message_complete = 0;
ssl->init_buf->length = 0;
}
/* Read the message header, if we haven't yet. */
int ret = extend_handshake_buffer(ssl, 4);
if (ret <= 0) {
return ret;
}
/* Parse out the length. Cap it so the peer cannot force us to buffer up to
* 2^24 bytes. */
const uint8_t *p = (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data;
size_t msg_len = (((uint32_t)p[1]) << 16) | (((uint32_t)p[2]) << 8) | p[3];
if (msg_len > ssl_max_handshake_message_len(ssl)) {
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
return -1;
}
/* Read the message body, if we haven't yet. */
ret = extend_handshake_buffer(ssl, 4 + msg_len);
if (ret <= 0) {
return ret;
}
/* We have now received a complete message. */
ssl->s3->tmp.message_complete = 1;
ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, ssl->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
ssl->init_buf->data, ssl->init_buf->length);
static const uint8_t kHelloRequest[4] = {SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0, 0, 0};
if (!ssl->server && ssl->init_buf->length == sizeof(kHelloRequest) &&
memcmp(kHelloRequest, ssl->init_buf->data, sizeof(kHelloRequest)) == 0) {
/* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- we are doing a
* handshake anyway now, so ignore them if their format is correct. Does
* not count for 'Finished' MAC. */
goto again;
}
uint8_t actual_type = ((const uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data)[0];
if (msg_type >= 0 && actual_type != msg_type) {
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
return -1;
}
ssl->s3->tmp.message_type = actual_type;
ssl->init_msg = (uint8_t*)ssl->init_buf->data + 4;
ssl->init_num = ssl->init_buf->length - 4;
/* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
if (hash_message == ssl_hash_message && !ssl3_hash_current_message(ssl)) {
return -1;
}
*ok = 1;
return ssl->init_num;
}
int ssl3_hash_current_message(SSL *ssl) {
/* The handshake header (different size between DTLS and TLS) is included in
* the hash. */
size_t header_len = ssl->init_msg - (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data;
return ssl3_update_handshake_hash(ssl, (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data,
ssl->init_num + header_len);
}
int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) {
int al;
switch (type) {
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH:
case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH:
case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH:
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED:
case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL:
case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP:
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
break;
default:
al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
break;
}
return al;
}
int ssl_fill_hello_random(uint8_t *out, size_t len, int is_server) {
if (is_server) {
const uint32_t current_time = time(NULL);
uint8_t *p = out;
if (len < 4) {
return 0;
}
p[0] = current_time >> 24;
p[1] = current_time >> 16;
p[2] = current_time >> 8;
p[3] = current_time;
return RAND_bytes(p + 4, len - 4);
} else {
return RAND_bytes(out, len);
}
}