2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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2015-08-11 16:47:56 +01:00
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <limits.h>
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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#include "internal.h"
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2017-04-28 22:47:06 +01:00
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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BIGNUM *BN_bin2bn(const uint8_t *in, size_t len, BIGNUM *ret) {
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2015-08-11 17:05:02 +01:00
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size_t num_words;
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unsigned m;
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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BN_ULONG word = 0;
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BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
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if (ret == NULL) {
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ret = bn = BN_new();
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}
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if (ret == NULL) {
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return NULL;
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}
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if (len == 0) {
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ret->top = 0;
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return ret;
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}
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num_words = ((len - 1) / BN_BYTES) + 1;
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m = (len - 1) % BN_BYTES;
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2017-04-21 16:26:30 +01:00
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if (!bn_wexpand(ret, num_words)) {
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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if (bn) {
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BN_free(bn);
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// |bn_wexpand| must check bounds on |num_words| to write it into
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// |ret->dmax|.
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2015-08-11 17:05:02 +01:00
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assert(num_words <= INT_MAX);
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ret->top = (int)num_words;
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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ret->neg = 0;
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while (len--) {
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word = (word << 8) | *(in++);
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if (m-- == 0) {
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ret->d[--num_words] = word;
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word = 0;
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m = BN_BYTES - 1;
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}
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}
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// need to call this due to clear byte at top if avoiding having the top bit
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// set (-ve number)
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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bn_correct_top(ret);
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return ret;
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}
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2016-12-08 04:53:22 +00:00
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BIGNUM *BN_le2bn(const uint8_t *in, size_t len, BIGNUM *ret) {
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BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
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if (ret == NULL) {
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bn = BN_new();
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ret = bn;
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}
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if (ret == NULL) {
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return NULL;
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}
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if (len == 0) {
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ret->top = 0;
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ret->neg = 0;
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return ret;
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}
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// Reserve enough space in |ret|.
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2016-12-08 04:53:22 +00:00
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size_t num_words = ((len - 1) / BN_BYTES) + 1;
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if (!bn_wexpand(ret, num_words)) {
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BN_free(bn);
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return NULL;
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}
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ret->top = num_words;
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// Make sure the top bytes will be zeroed.
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2016-12-08 04:53:22 +00:00
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ret->d[num_words - 1] = 0;
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// We only support little-endian platforms, so we can simply memcpy the
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// internal representation.
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2016-12-08 04:53:22 +00:00
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OPENSSL_memcpy(ret->d, in, len);
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bn_correct_top(ret);
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return ret;
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}
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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size_t BN_bn2bin(const BIGNUM *in, uint8_t *out) {
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size_t n, i;
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BN_ULONG l;
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n = i = BN_num_bytes(in);
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while (i--) {
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l = in->d[i / BN_BYTES];
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*(out++) = (unsigned char)(l >> (8 * (i % BN_BYTES))) & 0xff;
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}
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return n;
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}
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2018-01-23 04:09:16 +00:00
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// TODO(davidben): This does not need to be quite so complex once the |BIGNUM|s
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// we care about are fixed-width. |read_word_padded| is a hack to paper over
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// parts of the |bn_correct_top| leak. Fix that, and this can be simpler.
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2016-12-08 04:53:22 +00:00
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// constant_time_select_ulong returns |x| if |v| is 1 and |y| if |v| is 0. Its
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// behavior is undefined if |v| takes any other value.
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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static BN_ULONG constant_time_select_ulong(int v, BN_ULONG x, BN_ULONG y) {
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BN_ULONG mask = v;
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mask--;
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return (~mask & x) | (mask & y);
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}
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// constant_time_le_size_t returns 1 if |x| <= |y| and 0 otherwise. |x| and |y|
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// must not have their MSBs set.
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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static int constant_time_le_size_t(size_t x, size_t y) {
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return ((x - y - 1) >> (sizeof(size_t) * 8 - 1)) & 1;
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}
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// read_word_padded returns the |i|'th word of |in|, if it is not out of
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// bounds. Otherwise, it returns 0. It does so without branches on the size of
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// |in|, however it necessarily does not have the same memory access pattern. If
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// the access would be out of bounds, it reads the last word of |in|. |in| must
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// not be zero.
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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static BN_ULONG read_word_padded(const BIGNUM *in, size_t i) {
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2018-01-23 04:09:16 +00:00
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if (in->dmax == 0) {
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return 0;
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}
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// Read |in->d[i]| if valid. Otherwise, read the last word.
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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BN_ULONG l = in->d[constant_time_select_ulong(
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constant_time_le_size_t(in->dmax, i), in->dmax - 1, i)];
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// Clamp to zero if above |d->top|.
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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return constant_time_select_ulong(constant_time_le_size_t(in->top, i), 0, l);
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}
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2018-01-23 04:09:16 +00:00
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static int fits_in_bytes(const BIGNUM *in, size_t len) {
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BN_ULONG mask = 0;
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for (size_t i = (len + (BN_BYTES - 1)) / BN_BYTES; i < (size_t)in->top; i++) {
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mask |= in->d[i];
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}
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if ((len % BN_BYTES) != 0) {
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BN_ULONG l = read_word_padded(in, len / BN_BYTES);
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mask |= l >> (8 * (len % BN_BYTES));
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}
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return mask == 0;
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}
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int BN_bn2le_padded(uint8_t *out, size_t len, const BIGNUM *in) {
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// If we don't have enough space, fail out.
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if (!fits_in_bytes(in, len)) {
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return 0;
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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}
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2018-01-23 04:09:16 +00:00
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size_t todo = in->top * BN_BYTES;
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if (todo > len) {
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todo = len;
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}
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// We only support little-endian platforms, so we can simply memcpy into the
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// internal representation.
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OPENSSL_memcpy(out, in->d, todo);
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// Pad out the rest of the buffer with zeroes.
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OPENSSL_memset(out + todo, 0, len - todo);
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return 1;
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}
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int BN_bn2bin_padded(uint8_t *out, size_t len, const BIGNUM *in) {
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// Check if the integer is too big. This case can exit early in non-constant
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// time.
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2018-01-23 04:09:16 +00:00
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if (!fits_in_bytes(in, len)) {
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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return 0;
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}
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// Write the bytes out one by one. Serialization is done without branching on
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// the bits of |in| or on |in->top|, but if the routine would otherwise read
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// out of bounds, the memory access pattern can't be fixed. However, for an
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// RSA key of size a multiple of the word size, the probability of BN_BYTES
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// leading zero octets is low.
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//
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// See Falko Stenzke, "Manger's Attack revisited", ICICS 2010.
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2016-09-05 17:47:25 +01:00
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size_t i = len;
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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while (i--) {
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2016-09-05 17:47:25 +01:00
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BN_ULONG l = read_word_padded(in, i / BN_BYTES);
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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*(out++) = (uint8_t)(l >> (8 * (i % BN_BYTES))) & 0xff;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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BN_ULONG BN_get_word(const BIGNUM *bn) {
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Add initial support for non-minimal BIGNUMs.
Thanks to Andres Erbsen for extremely helpful suggestions on how finally
plug this long-standing hole!
OpenSSL BIGNUMs are currently minimal-width, which means they cannot be
constant-time. We'll need to either excise BIGNUM from RSA and EC or
somehow fix BIGNUM. EC_SCALAR and later EC_FELEM work will excise it
from EC, but RSA's BIGNUMs are more transparent. Teaching BIGNUM to
handle non-minimal word widths is probably simpler.
The main constraint is BIGNUM's large "calculator" API surface. One
could, in theory, do arbitrary math on RSA components, which means all
public functions must tolerate non-minimal inputs. This is also useful
for EC; https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/24445 is
silly.
As a first step, fix comparison-type functions that were assuming
minimal BIGNUMs. I've also added bn_resize_words, but it is testing-only
until the rest of the library is fixed.
bn->top is now a loose upper bound we carry around. It does not affect
numerical results, only performance and secrecy. This is a departure
from the original meaning, and compiler help in auditing everything is
nice, so the final change in this series will rename bn->top to
bn->width. Thus these new functions are named per "width", not "top".
Looking further ahead, how are output BIGNUM widths determined? There's
three notions of correctness here:
1. Do I compute the right answer for all widths?
2. Do I handle secret data in constant time?
3. Does my memory usage not balloon absurdly?
For (1), a BIGNUM function must give the same answer for all input
widths. BN_mod_add_quick may assume |a| < |m|, but |a| may still be
wider than |m| by way of leading zeres. The simplest approach is to
write code in a width-agnostic way and rely on functions to accept all
widths. Where functions need to look at bn->d, we'll a few helper
functions to smooth over funny widths.
For (2), (1) is little cumbersome. Consider constant-time modular
addition. A sane type system would guarantee input widths match. But C
is weak here, and bifurcating the internals is a lot of work. Thus, at
least for now, I do not propose we move RSA's internal computation out
of BIGNUM. (EC_SCALAR/EC_FELEM are valuable for EC because we get to
stack-allocate, curves were already specialized, and EC only has two
types with many operations on those types. None of these apply to RSA.
We've got numbers mod n, mod p, mod q, and their corresponding
exponents, each of which is used for basically one operation.)
Instead, constant-time BIGNUM functions will output non-minimal widths.
This is trivial for BN_bin2bn or modular arithmetic. But for BN_mul,
constant-time[*] would dictate r->top = a->top + b->top. A calculator
repeatedly multiplying by one would then run out of memory. Those we'll
split into a private BN_mul_fixed for crypto, leaving BN_mul for
calculators. BN_mul is just BN_mul_fixed followed by bn_correct_top.
[*] BN_mul is not constant-time for other reasons, but that will be
fixed separately.
Bug: 232
Change-Id: Ide2258ae8c09a9a41bb71d6777908d1c27917069
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25244
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-01-20 20:56:53 +00:00
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switch (bn_minimal_width(bn)) {
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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case 0:
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return 0;
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case 1:
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return bn->d[0];
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default:
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return BN_MASK2;
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}
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}
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2015-08-12 01:17:28 +01:00
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2016-12-16 00:28:44 +00:00
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int BN_get_u64(const BIGNUM *bn, uint64_t *out) {
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Add initial support for non-minimal BIGNUMs.
Thanks to Andres Erbsen for extremely helpful suggestions on how finally
plug this long-standing hole!
OpenSSL BIGNUMs are currently minimal-width, which means they cannot be
constant-time. We'll need to either excise BIGNUM from RSA and EC or
somehow fix BIGNUM. EC_SCALAR and later EC_FELEM work will excise it
from EC, but RSA's BIGNUMs are more transparent. Teaching BIGNUM to
handle non-minimal word widths is probably simpler.
The main constraint is BIGNUM's large "calculator" API surface. One
could, in theory, do arbitrary math on RSA components, which means all
public functions must tolerate non-minimal inputs. This is also useful
for EC; https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/24445 is
silly.
As a first step, fix comparison-type functions that were assuming
minimal BIGNUMs. I've also added bn_resize_words, but it is testing-only
until the rest of the library is fixed.
bn->top is now a loose upper bound we carry around. It does not affect
numerical results, only performance and secrecy. This is a departure
from the original meaning, and compiler help in auditing everything is
nice, so the final change in this series will rename bn->top to
bn->width. Thus these new functions are named per "width", not "top".
Looking further ahead, how are output BIGNUM widths determined? There's
three notions of correctness here:
1. Do I compute the right answer for all widths?
2. Do I handle secret data in constant time?
3. Does my memory usage not balloon absurdly?
For (1), a BIGNUM function must give the same answer for all input
widths. BN_mod_add_quick may assume |a| < |m|, but |a| may still be
wider than |m| by way of leading zeres. The simplest approach is to
write code in a width-agnostic way and rely on functions to accept all
widths. Where functions need to look at bn->d, we'll a few helper
functions to smooth over funny widths.
For (2), (1) is little cumbersome. Consider constant-time modular
addition. A sane type system would guarantee input widths match. But C
is weak here, and bifurcating the internals is a lot of work. Thus, at
least for now, I do not propose we move RSA's internal computation out
of BIGNUM. (EC_SCALAR/EC_FELEM are valuable for EC because we get to
stack-allocate, curves were already specialized, and EC only has two
types with many operations on those types. None of these apply to RSA.
We've got numbers mod n, mod p, mod q, and their corresponding
exponents, each of which is used for basically one operation.)
Instead, constant-time BIGNUM functions will output non-minimal widths.
This is trivial for BN_bin2bn or modular arithmetic. But for BN_mul,
constant-time[*] would dictate r->top = a->top + b->top. A calculator
repeatedly multiplying by one would then run out of memory. Those we'll
split into a private BN_mul_fixed for crypto, leaving BN_mul for
calculators. BN_mul is just BN_mul_fixed followed by bn_correct_top.
[*] BN_mul is not constant-time for other reasons, but that will be
fixed separately.
Bug: 232
Change-Id: Ide2258ae8c09a9a41bb71d6777908d1c27917069
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25244
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-01-20 20:56:53 +00:00
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switch (bn_minimal_width(bn)) {
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2016-12-16 00:28:44 +00:00
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case 0:
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*out = 0;
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return 1;
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case 1:
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*out = bn->d[0];
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return 1;
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#if defined(OPENSSL_32_BIT)
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case 2:
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*out = (uint64_t) bn->d[0] | (((uint64_t) bn->d[1]) << 32);
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return 1;
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#endif
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default:
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return 0;
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}
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}
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