Clarify the scope & initialization of |data_len| in |aead_tls_open|.
Neither branch of the |if| statement is expected to touch |data_len|. Clarify this by moving |data_len| after the |if| statement. Change-Id: Ibbc81e5b0c006882672df18442a6e7987064ca6d Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11880 CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ static int aead_tls_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
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/* Remove CBC padding. Code from here on is timing-sensitive with respect to
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* |padding_ok| and |data_plus_mac_len| for CBC ciphers. */
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unsigned padding_ok, data_plus_mac_len, data_len;
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unsigned padding_ok, data_plus_mac_len;
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if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
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if (!EVP_tls_cbc_remove_padding(
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&padding_ok, &data_plus_mac_len, out, total,
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@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ static int aead_tls_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
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* already been checked against the MAC size at the top of the function. */
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assert(data_plus_mac_len >= HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx));
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}
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data_len = data_plus_mac_len - HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx);
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unsigned data_len = data_plus_mac_len - HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx);
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/* At this point, if the padding is valid, the first |data_plus_mac_len| bytes
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* after |out| are the plaintext and MAC. Otherwise, |data_plus_mac_len| is
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