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Resolve a small handful of size_t truncation warnings.

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This is very far from all of it, but I did some easy ones before I got
bored. Snapshot the progress until someone else wants to continue this.

BUG=22

Change-Id: I2609e9766d883a273e53e01a75a4b1d4700e2436
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9132
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This commit is contained in:
David Benjamin 2016-08-04 21:38:40 +00:00 committed by CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org
parent b9195402b4
commit 22edd87755
8 changed files with 34 additions and 20 deletions
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16
crypto/base64/base64.c
View File

@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ void EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, int *out_len,
if (sizeof(ctx->data) - ctx->data_used > in_len) {
memcpy(&ctx->data[ctx->data_used], in, in_len);
ctx->data_used += in_len;
ctx->data_used += (unsigned)in_len;
return;
}
@ -152,14 +152,14 @@ void EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, int *out_len,
memcpy(ctx->data, in, in_len);
}
ctx->data_used = in_len;
ctx->data_used = (unsigned)in_len;
if (total > INT_MAX) {
/* We cannot signal an error, but we can at least avoid making *out_len
* negative. */
total = 0;
}
*out_len = total;
*out_len = (int)total;
}
void EVP_EncodeFinal(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, int *out_len) {
@ -172,7 +172,11 @@ void EVP_EncodeFinal(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, int *out_len) {
out[encoded++] = '\n';
out[encoded] = '\0';
ctx->data_used = 0;
*out_len = encoded;
/* ctx->data_used is bounded by sizeof(ctx->data), so this does not
* overflow. */
assert(encoded <= INT_MAX);
*out_len = (int)encoded;
}
size_t EVP_EncodeBlock(uint8_t *dst, const uint8_t *src, size_t src_len) {
@ -344,7 +348,7 @@ int EVP_DecodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, int *out_len,
*out_len = 0;
return -1;
}
*out_len = bytes_out;
*out_len = (int)bytes_out;
if (ctx->eof_seen) {
return 0;
@ -434,5 +438,5 @@ int EVP_DecodeBlock(uint8_t *dst, const uint8_t *src, size_t src_len) {
}
assert(dst_len <= INT_MAX);
return dst_len;
return (int)dst_len;
}

8
crypto/bytestring/cbb.c
View File

@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ int CBB_flush(CBB *cbb) {
/* For ASN.1 we assume that we'll only need a single byte for the length.
* If that turned out to be incorrect, we have to move the contents along
* in order to make space. */
size_t len_len;
uint8_t len_len;
uint8_t initial_length_byte;
assert (cbb->child->pending_len_len == 1);
@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ int CBB_flush(CBB *cbb) {
initial_length_byte = 0x80 | 1;
} else {
len_len = 1;
initial_length_byte = len;
initial_length_byte = (uint8_t)len;
len = 0;
}
@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ int CBB_flush(CBB *cbb) {
for (i = cbb->child->pending_len_len - 1; i < cbb->child->pending_len_len;
i--) {
cbb->base->buf[cbb->child->offset + i] = len;
cbb->base->buf[cbb->child->offset + i] = (uint8_t)len;
len >>= 8;
}
if (len != 0) {
@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ size_t CBB_len(const CBB *cbb) {
}
static int cbb_add_length_prefixed(CBB *cbb, CBB *out_contents,
size_t len_len) {
uint8_t len_len) {
uint8_t *prefix_bytes;
if (!CBB_flush(cbb)) {

6
crypto/cipher/e_ssl3.c
View File

@ -263,10 +263,10 @@ static int aead_ssl3_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
total += len;
assert(total == in_len);
/* Remove CBC padding and MAC. This would normally be timing-sensitive, but SSLv3 CBC
* ciphers are already broken. Support will be removed eventually.
/* Remove CBC padding and MAC. This would normally be timing-sensitive, but
* SSLv3 CBC ciphers are already broken. Support will be removed eventually.
* https://www.openssl.org/~bodo/ssl-poodle.pdf */
unsigned data_len;
size_t data_len;
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&ssl3_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
unsigned padding_length = out[total - 1];
if (total < padding_length + 1 + mac_len) {

8
crypto/ecdh/ecdh.c
View File

@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
@ -142,7 +143,12 @@ int ECDH_compute_key(void *out, size_t outlen, const EC_POINT *pub_key,
memcpy(out, buf, outlen);
}
ret = outlen;
if (outlen > INT_MAX) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDH, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
goto err;
}
ret = (int)outlen;
err:
OPENSSL_free(buf);

6
crypto/obj/obj.c
View File

@ -215,10 +215,14 @@ int OBJ_obj2nid(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj) {
}
int OBJ_cbs2nid(const CBS *cbs) {
if (CBS_len(cbs) > INT_MAX) {
return NID_undef;
}
ASN1_OBJECT obj;
memset(&obj, 0, sizeof(obj));
obj.data = CBS_data(cbs);
obj.length = CBS_len(cbs);
obj.length = (int)CBS_len(cbs);
return OBJ_obj2nid(&obj);
}

6
crypto/poly1305/poly1305.c
View File

@ -217,9 +217,9 @@ void CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305_state *statep, const uint8_t *in,
#endif
if (state->buf_used) {
unsigned int todo = 16 - state->buf_used;
unsigned todo = 16 - state->buf_used;
if (todo > in_len) {
todo = in_len;
todo = (unsigned)in_len;
}
for (i = 0; i < todo; i++) {
state->buf[state->buf_used + i] = in[i];
@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ void CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305_state *statep, const uint8_t *in,
for (i = 0; i < in_len; i++) {
state->buf[i] = in[i];
}
state->buf_used = in_len;
state->buf_used = (unsigned)in_len;
}
}

2
crypto/rand/windows.c
View File

@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ void CRYPTO_sysrand(uint8_t *out, size_t requested) {
while (requested > 0) {
ULONG output_bytes_this_pass = ULONG_MAX;
if (requested < output_bytes_this_pass) {
output_bytes_this_pass = requested;
output_bytes_this_pass = (ULONG)requested;
}
if (RtlGenRandom(out, output_bytes_this_pass) == FALSE) {
abort();

2
include/openssl/stack.h
View File

@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ typedef struct stack_st {
void **data;
/* sorted is non-zero if the values pointed to by |data| are in ascending
* order, based on |comp|. */
size_t sorted;
int sorted;
/* num_alloc contains the number of pointers allocated in the buffer pointed
* to by |data|, which may be larger than |num|. */
size_t num_alloc;