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Limit the number of PBKDF2 iterations when fuzzing.

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(Otherwise the fuzzer will discover that it can trigger extremely large
amounts of computation and start timing out.)

BUG=oss-fuzz:9767

Change-Id: Ibc1da5a90da169c7caf522f792530d1020f8cb54
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30404
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This commit is contained in:
Adam Langley 2018-08-08 08:16:29 -07:00 committed by CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org
parent 6410e18e91
commit 2bcb315138
1 changed files with 7 additions and 1 deletions
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8
crypto/pkcs8/pkcs8_x509.c
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@ -669,11 +669,17 @@ int PKCS12_get_key_and_certs(EVP_PKEY **out_key, STACK_OF(X509) *out_certs,
goto err;
}
#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
static const uint64_t kIterationsLimit = 1024;
#else
static const uint64_t kIterationsLimit = UINT_MAX;
#endif
// The iteration count is optional and the default is one.
uint64_t iterations = 1;
if (CBS_len(&mac_data) > 0) {
if (!CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&mac_data, &iterations) ||
iterations > UINT_MAX) {
iterations > kIterationsLimit) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
goto err;
}