Revise signing preferences.
We currently preferentially sign the largest hash available and advertise such a preference for signatures we accept. We're just as happy with SHA-256 and, all else equal, a smaller hash would be epsilon more performant. We also currently claim, in TLS 1.3, we prefer P-384 over P-256 which is off. Instead order SHA-256 first, next the larger SHA-2 hashes, and leave SHA-1 at the bottom. Within a hash, order ECDSA > RSA-PSS > RSA-PKCS1. This has the added consequence that we will preferentially pair P-256 with SHA-256 in signatures we generate instead of larger hashes that get truncated anyway. Change-Id: If4aee068ba6829e8c0ef7948f56e67a5213e4c50 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11821 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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@ -1900,8 +1900,8 @@ static bool TestClientHello() {
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0xc0, 0x28, 0x00, 0x39, 0x00, 0x6b, 0x00, 0x9c, 0x00, 0x9d, 0x00, 0x2f,
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0x00, 0x3c, 0x00, 0x35, 0x00, 0x3d, 0x00, 0x0a, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x37,
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0xff, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x17, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x23, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x14, 0x00, 0x12, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x01, 0x08,
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0x05, 0x05, 0x01, 0x05, 0x03, 0x08, 0x04, 0x04, 0x01, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x14, 0x00, 0x12, 0x04, 0x03, 0x08, 0x04, 0x04,
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0x01, 0x05, 0x03, 0x08, 0x05, 0x05, 0x01, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x01, 0x02,
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0x01, 0x00, 0x0b, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0a, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00,
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0x06, 0x00, 0x1d, 0x00, 0x17, 0x00, 0x18,
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};
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83
ssl/t1_lib.c
83
ssl/t1_lib.c
@ -442,62 +442,73 @@ int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *ssl, uint16_t group_id) {
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}
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/* kVerifySignatureAlgorithms is the default list of accepted signature
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* algorithms for verifying. */
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static const uint16_t kVerifySignatureAlgorithms[] = {
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/* For now, do not enable RSA-PSS signature algorithms on Android's system
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* BoringSSL. Once TLS 1.3 is finalized and the change in Chrome has stuck,
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* algorithms for verifying.
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*
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* For now, RSA-PSS signature algorithms are not enabled on Android's system
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* BoringSSL. Once the change in Chrome has stuck and the values are finalized,
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* restore them. */
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static const uint16_t kVerifySignatureAlgorithms[] = {
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/* Prefer SHA-256 algorithms. */
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SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256,
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#if !defined(BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM)
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA512,
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA256,
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#endif
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512,
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256,
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/* Larger hashes are acceptable. */
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SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384,
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#if !defined(BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM)
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA384,
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#endif
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384,
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/* TODO(davidben): Remove this entry and SSL_CURVE_SECP521R1 from
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* kDefaultGroups. */
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#if defined(BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM)
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SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512,
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#endif
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#if !defined(BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM)
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA384,
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#endif
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384,
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SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384,
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#if !defined(BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM)
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA256,
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#endif
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256,
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SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256,
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1,
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};
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/* kSignSignatureAlgorithms is the default list of supported signature
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* algorithms for signing. */
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static const uint16_t kSignSignatureAlgorithms[] = {
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/* For now, do not enable RSA-PSS signature algorithms on Android's system
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* BoringSSL. Once TLS 1.3 is finalized and the change in Chrome has stuck,
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* restore them. */
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#if !defined(BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM)
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA512,
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#endif
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512,
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SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512,
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#if !defined(BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM)
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA384,
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#endif
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384,
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SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384,
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/* For now, SHA-1 is still accepted but least preferable. */
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1,
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};
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/* kSignSignatureAlgorithms is the default list of supported signature
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* algorithms for signing.
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*
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* For now, RSA-PSS signature algorithms are not enabled on Android's system
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* BoringSSL. Once the change in Chrome has stuck and the values are finalized,
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* restore them. */
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static const uint16_t kSignSignatureAlgorithms[] = {
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/* Prefer SHA-256 algorithms. */
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SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256,
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#if !defined(BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM)
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA256,
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#endif
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256,
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SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256,
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1,
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/* If needed, sign larger hashes.
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*
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* TODO(davidben): Determine which of these may be pruned. */
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SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384,
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#if !defined(BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM)
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA384,
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#endif
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384,
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SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512,
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#if !defined(BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM)
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA512,
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#endif
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512,
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/* If the peer supports nothing else, sign with SHA-1. */
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SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1,
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1,
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};
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size_t tls12_get_verify_sigalgs(const SSL *ssl, const uint16_t **out) {
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