Remove rest of DANE code.
We pulled in some of upstream's removal, but not the rest of it. Change-Id: I8ea6681848f3c59955b7d2ce935c077d024245be Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1099 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This commit is contained in:
David Benjamin
Adam Langley
parent
64f4c91b89
commit
5468b23797
@ -1529,11 +1529,6 @@ struct ssl_st
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/* fallback_scsv is non-zero iff we are sending the TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV
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* cipher suite value. Only applies to a client. */
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char fallback_scsv;
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DANE
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unsigned char *tlsa_record;
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int tlsa_witness;
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#endif
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};
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#endif
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137
ssl/ssl_cert.c
137
ssl/ssl_cert.c
@ -665,138 +665,6 @@ int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *sc,int type)
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return(1);
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}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DANE
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/*
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* return value:
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* -1: format or digest error
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* 0: match
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* 1: no match
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*/
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int tlsa_cmp(const X509 *cert, const unsigned char *tlsa_record, unsigned int reclen)
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{
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const EVP_MD *md;
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unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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unsigned int len, selector, matching_type;
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int ret;
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if (reclen<3) return -1;
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selector = tlsa_record[1];
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matching_type = tlsa_record[2];
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tlsa_record += 3;
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reclen -= 3;
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switch (matching_type) {
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case 0: /* exact match */
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if (selector==0) { /* full certificate */
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ret = EVP_Digest(tlsa_record,reclen,digest,&len,EVP_sha1(),NULL);
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return ret ? memcmp(cert->sha1_hash,digest,len)!=0 : -1;
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}
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else if (selector==1) { /* SubjectPublicKeyInfo */
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ASN1_BIT_STRING *key = X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(cert);
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if (key == NULL) return -1;
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if (key->length != reclen) return 1;
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return memcmp(key->data,tlsa_record,reclen)!=0;
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}
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return -1;
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case 1: /* SHA256 */
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case 2: /* SHA512 */
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md = matching_type==1 ? EVP_sha256() : EVP_sha512();
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if (reclen!=EVP_MD_size(md)) return -1;
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if (selector==0) { /* full certificate */
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ret = X509_digest(cert,md,digest,&len);
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}
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else if (selector==1) { /* SubjectPublicKeyInfo */
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ret = X509_pubkey_digest(cert,md,digest,&len);
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}
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else
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return -1;
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return ret ? memcmp(tlsa_record,digest,len)!=0 : -1;
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default:
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return -1;
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}
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}
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int dane_verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
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{
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SSL *s = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
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int depth=X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
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X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,depth);
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unsigned int reclen, certificate_usage;
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const unsigned char *tlsa_record = s->tlsa_record;
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int tlsa_ret = -1;
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if (s->verify_callback) ok = s->verify_callback(ok,ctx);
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if (tlsa_record == NULL) return ok;
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if (tlsa_record == (void*)-1) {
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ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; /* temporary code? */
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return 0;
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}
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while ((reclen = *(unsigned int *)tlsa_record)) {
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tlsa_record += sizeof(unsigned int);
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/*
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* tlsa_record[0] Certificate Usage field
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* tlsa_record[1] Selector field
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* tlsa_record[2] Matching Type Field
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* tlsa_record+3 Certificate Association data
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*/
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certificate_usage = tlsa_record[0];
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if (depth==0 || certificate_usage==0 || certificate_usage==2) {
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tlsa_ret = tlsa_cmp(cert,tlsa_record,reclen);
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if (tlsa_ret==0) {
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s->tlsa_witness = depth<<8|certificate_usage;
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break;
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}
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else if (tlsa_ret==-1)
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s->tlsa_witness = -1; /* something phishy? */
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}
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tlsa_record += reclen;
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}
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if (depth==0) {
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switch (s->tlsa_witness&0xff) { /* witnessed usage */
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case 0: /* CA constraint */
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if (s->tlsa_witness<0 && ctx->error==X509_V_OK)
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ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
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return 0;
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case 1: /* service certificate constraint */
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if (tlsa_ret!=0 && ctx->error==X509_V_OK)
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ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
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return 0;
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case 2: /* trust anchor assertion */
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if ((s->tlsa_witness>>8)>0 && ctx->error==X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY)
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ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
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break;
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case 3: /* domain-issued certificate */
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if (tlsa_ret==0)
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ctx->error = X509_V_OK; /* override all errors? */
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break;
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default:/* there were TLSA records, but something phishy happened */
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ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
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return ok;
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}
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}
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/*
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* returning 1 makes verify procedure traverse the whole chain,
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* not actually approve it...
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*/
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return 1;
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}
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#endif
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int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
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{
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X509 *x;
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@ -838,13 +706,8 @@ int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
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*/
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X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), s->param);
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DANE
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X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, dane_verify_callback);
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s->tlsa_witness = -1;
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#else
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if (s->verify_callback)
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X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, s->verify_callback);
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#endif
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if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL)
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#if 1 /* new with OpenSSL 0.9.7 */
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@ -712,11 +712,6 @@ void SSL_free(SSL *s)
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if (s->srtp_profiles)
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sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(s->srtp_profiles);
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DANE
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if (s->tlsa_record && s->tlsa_record!=(void *)-1)
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OPENSSL_free(s->tlsa_record);
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#endif
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OPENSSL_free(s);
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}
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