Explicitly check for empty ASN.1 strings in d2i_ECPrivateKey.
The old code implicitly relies on the ASN.1 code returning a \0-prefixed buffer when the buffer length is 0. Change this to verify explicitly that the ASN.1 string has positive length. (Imported from upstream's 7f7c05ca638c3cc6d261961fae439cd91e3c1d27) Change-Id: Icc6c44b874bdcb02374016a36d209830d6162a8a
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@ -352,11 +352,16 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const uint8_t **in, long len) {
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if (priv_key->publicKey) {
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const uint8_t *pub_oct;
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size_t pub_oct_len;
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int pub_oct_len;
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pub_oct = M_ASN1_STRING_data(priv_key->publicKey);
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pub_oct_len = M_ASN1_STRING_length(priv_key->publicKey);
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/* save the point conversion form */
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/* The first byte (the point conversion form) must be present. */
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if (pub_oct_len <= 0) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, d2i_ECPrivateKey, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
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goto err;
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}
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/* Save the point conversion form. */
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ret->conv_form = (point_conversion_form_t)(pub_oct[0] & ~0x01);
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if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(ret->group, ret->pub_key, pub_oct, pub_oct_len,
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NULL)) {
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