kris/boringssl
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Releases Wiki Activity

Don't be lenient if the client attempts unsafe renego.

Browse Source 
This was added in upstream's 82e610e2cfbbb5fd29c09785b6909a91e606f347. The
commit message cites draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation which was on
draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-01 at the time. The text in question (6.2 Server
Considerations) is no longer in RFC 5746. The RFC now recommends terminating
the connection which is much simpler.

It also was wrong anyway as it checked s->ctx->options instead of s->options
for SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION.

Removing that block will result in the connection being terminated in
ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext.

Change-Id: Ie222c78babd3654c5023ad07ac0d8e0adde68698
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2235
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This commit is contained in:
David Benjamin 2014-11-01 03:43:48 -04:00 committed by Adam Langley
parent 6867f4854e
commit b4188f0c9d
1 changed files with 1 additions and 19 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

20
ssl/s3_pkt.c
View File

@ -1157,25 +1157,7 @@ start:
* now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
goto start;
}
/* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
* allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
* WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
*/
if (s->server &&
SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
(s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
(s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
(s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
(s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
!(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
{
/*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
rr->length = 0;
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
goto start;
}
if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
{
int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];