Remove is_probably_safari logic.

We handle it externally now.

Change-Id: Ib561f64078809645195fd1a859b3256499038847
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1098
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This commit is contained in:
David Benjamin 2014-07-03 16:15:44 -04:00 committed by Adam Langley
parent 5468b23797
commit b9621b9c1a
3 changed files with 0 additions and 92 deletions

View File

@ -2747,10 +2747,6 @@ void ssl3_clear(SSL *s)
s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
s->s3->is_probably_safari = 0;
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
rp = s->s3->rbuf.buf;
wp = s->s3->wbuf.buf;
rlen = s->s3->rbuf.len;

View File

@ -533,13 +533,6 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
int next_proto_neg_seen;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
/* This is set to true if we believe that this is a version of Safari
* running on OS X 10.6 or newer. We wish to know this because Safari
* on 10.8 .. 10.8.3 has broken ECDHE-ECDSA support. */
char is_probably_safari;
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
/* ALPN information
* (we are in the process of transitioning from NPN to ALPN.) */

View File

@ -1734,82 +1734,6 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned c
return ret;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
/* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
* SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |cbs|.
* Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
* SNI,
* elliptic_curves
* ec_point_formats
*
* We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
* but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
* Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
* 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
*/
static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CBS *extensions)
{
static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
0x01, /* 1 point format */
0x00, /* uncompressed */
};
/* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
};
CBS extensions_copy = *extensions, extension;
uint16_t type;
/* First extension is server_name. */
if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions_copy, &type) ||
!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions_copy, &extension) ||
type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
return;
/* Compare the remainder of the extensions block. */
if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
{
const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
if (len1 + len2 != CBS_len(&extensions_copy))
return;
if (memcmp(CBS_data(&extensions_copy), kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
return;
if (memcmp(CBS_data(&extensions_copy) + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
return;
}
else
{
const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
if (len != CBS_len(&extensions_copy))
return;
if (memcmp(CBS_data(&extensions_copy), kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
return;
}
s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
/* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
* ClientHello.
* cbs: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
@ -1913,11 +1837,6 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert)
return 0;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
ssl_check_for_safari(s, &extensions);
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0)
{
uint16_t type;