Add a deterministic PRNG for fuzzing.
If running the stack through a fuzzer, we would like execution to be completely deterministic. This is gated on a BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE #ifdef. For now, this just uses the zero ChaCha20 key and a global counter. As needed, we can extend this to a thread-local counter and a separate ChaCha20 stream and counter per input length. Change-Id: Ic6c9d8a25e70d68e5dc6804e2c234faf48e51395 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7286 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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@ -96,6 +96,8 @@ if(FUZZ)
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message("You need to build with Clang for fuzzing to work")
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endif()
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add_definitions(-DBORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
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set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -fsanitize=address -fsanitize-coverage=edge,indirect-calls")
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set(CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS "${CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS} -fsanitize=address -fsanitize-coverage=edge,indirect-calls")
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set(CMAKE_EXE_LINKER_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -fsanitize=address")
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@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ add_library(
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OBJECT
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deterministic.c
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rand.c
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urandom.c
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windows.c
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49
crypto/rand/deterministic.c
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49
crypto/rand/deterministic.c
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@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
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/* Copyright (c) 2016, Google Inc.
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*
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* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
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* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
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* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
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* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
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* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
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* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
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* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
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* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/chacha.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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/* g_num_calls is the number of calls to |CRYPTO_sysrand| that have occured.
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*
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* TODO(davidben): This is intentionally not thread-safe. If the fuzzer mode is
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* ever used in a multi-threaded program, replace this with a thread-local. (A
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* mutex would not be deterministic.) */
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static uint64_t g_num_calls = 0;
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void RAND_cleanup(void) {}
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void RAND_reset_for_fuzzing(void) { g_num_calls = 0; }
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void CRYPTO_sysrand(uint8_t *out, size_t requested) {
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static const uint8_t kZeroKey[32];
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uint8_t nonce[12];
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memset(nonce, 0, sizeof(nonce));
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memcpy(nonce, &g_num_calls, sizeof(g_num_calls));
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memset(out, 0, requested);
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CRYPTO_chacha_20(out, out, requested, kZeroKey, nonce, 0);
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g_num_calls++;
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}
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#endif /* BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE */
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@ -72,7 +72,8 @@ static void rand_thread_state_free(void *state) {
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OPENSSL_free(state);
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}
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#if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM)
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#if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && \
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!defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
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/* These functions are defined in asm/rdrand-x86_64.pl */
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extern int CRYPTO_rdrand(uint8_t out[8]);
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@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#if !defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS)
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#if !defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS) && !defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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@ -220,4 +220,4 @@ void CRYPTO_sysrand(uint8_t *out, size_t requested) {
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}
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}
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#endif /* !OPENSSL_WINDOWS */
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#endif /* !OPENSSL_WINDOWS && !BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE */
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@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#if defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS)
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#if defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS) && !defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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@ -53,4 +53,4 @@ void CRYPTO_sysrand(uint8_t *out, size_t requested) {
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return;
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}
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#endif /* OPENSSL_WINDOWS */
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#endif /* OPENSSL_WINDOWS && !BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE */
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@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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struct GlobalState {
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@ -15,6 +16,8 @@ struct GlobalState {
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static GlobalState g_state;
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extern "C" int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {
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RAND_reset_for_fuzzing();
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// This only fuzzes the initial flow from the server so far.
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SSL *client = SSL_new(g_state.ctx);
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BIO *in = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
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@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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static const uint8_t kCertificateDER[] = {
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@ -204,6 +205,8 @@ struct GlobalState {
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static GlobalState g_state;
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extern "C" int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {
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RAND_reset_for_fuzzing();
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// This only fuzzes the initial flow from the client so far.
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SSL *server = SSL_new(g_state.ctx);
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BIO *in = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
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@ -62,6 +62,12 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT void RAND_set_urandom_fd(int fd);
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OPENSSL_EXPORT void RAND_enable_fork_unsafe_buffering(int fd);
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#endif
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#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
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/* RAND_reset_for_fuzzing resets the fuzzer-only deterministic RNG. This
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* function is only defined in the fuzzer-only build configuration. */
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OPENSSL_EXPORT void RAND_reset_for_fuzzing(void);
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#endif
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/* Deprecated functions */
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