Same fix as in dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message.
Applying same fix as in dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message. A truncated DTLS fragment would cause *ok to be clear, but the return value would still be the number of bytes read. Problem identified by Emilia Käsper, based on previous issue/patch by Adam Langley. Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> (Imported from upstream's 3d5dceac430d7b9b273331931d4d2303f5a2256f) Change-Id: Ibe30716266e2ee1489c98b922cf53edda096c23c Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1437 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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@ -670,7 +670,9 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
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/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
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i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
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frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off,frag_len,0);
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if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
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if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
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i=-1;
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if (i<=0)
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goto err;
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RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->frag_off,
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