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Unwind DH_METHOD and DSA_METHOD.

Browse Source 
This will allow a static linker (with -ffunction-sections since things aren't
split into files) to drop unused parts of DH and DSA. Notably, the parameter
generation bits pull in primality-checking code.

Change-Id: I25087e4cb91bc9d0ab43bcb267c2e2c164e56b59
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6388
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This commit is contained in:
David Benjamin 2015-10-30 16:53:00 -04:00 committed by Adam Langley
parent 3fc138eccd
commit e8f783ac0d
12 changed files with 856 additions and 1247 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

1
crypto/dh/CMakeLists.txt
View File

@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ add_library(
OBJECT OBJECT
dh.c dh.c
dh_impl.c
params.c params.c
check.c check.c
dh_asn1.c dh_asn1.c

282
crypto/dh/dh.c
View File

@ -69,13 +69,11 @@
#include "../internal.h" #include "../internal.h"
extern const DH_METHOD DH_default_method; #define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT; static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT;
DH *DH_new(void) { return DH_new_method(NULL); } DH *DH_new(void) {
DH *DH_new_method(const ENGINE *engine) {
DH *dh = (DH *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DH)); DH *dh = (DH *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DH));
if (dh == NULL) { if (dh == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
@ -84,15 +82,6 @@ DH *DH_new_method(const ENGINE *engine) {
memset(dh, 0, sizeof(DH)); memset(dh, 0, sizeof(DH));
if (engine) {
dh->meth = ENGINE_get_DH_method(engine);
}
if (dh->meth == NULL) {
dh->meth = (DH_METHOD*) &DH_default_method;
}
METHOD_ref(dh->meth);
CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&dh->method_mont_p_lock); CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&dh->method_mont_p_lock);
dh->references = 1; dh->references = 1;
@ -102,14 +91,6 @@ DH *DH_new_method(const ENGINE *engine) {
return NULL; return NULL;
} }
if (dh->meth->init && !dh->meth->init(dh)) {
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, dh, &dh->ex_data);
CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&dh->method_mont_p_lock);
METHOD_unref(dh->meth);
OPENSSL_free(dh);
return NULL;
}
return dh; return dh;
} }
@ -122,11 +103,6 @@ void DH_free(DH *dh) {
return; return;
} }
if (dh->meth->finish) {
dh->meth->finish(dh);
}
METHOD_unref(dh->meth);
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, dh, &dh->ex_data); CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, dh, &dh->ex_data);
BN_MONT_CTX_free(dh->method_mont_p); BN_MONT_CTX_free(dh->method_mont_p);
@ -144,24 +120,256 @@ void DH_free(DH *dh) {
} }
int DH_generate_parameters_ex(DH *dh, int prime_bits, int generator, BN_GENCB *cb) { int DH_generate_parameters_ex(DH *dh, int prime_bits, int generator, BN_GENCB *cb) {
if (dh->meth->generate_parameters) { /* We generate DH parameters as follows
return dh->meth->generate_parameters(dh, prime_bits, generator, cb); * find a prime q which is prime_bits/2 bits long.
* p=(2*q)+1 or (p-1)/2 = q
* For this case, g is a generator if
* g^((p-1)/q) mod p != 1 for values of q which are the factors of p-1.
* Since the factors of p-1 are q and 2, we just need to check
* g^2 mod p != 1 and g^q mod p != 1.
*
* Having said all that,
* there is another special case method for the generators 2, 3 and 5.
* for 2, p mod 24 == 11
* for 3, p mod 12 == 5 <<<<< does not work for safe primes.
* for 5, p mod 10 == 3 or 7
*
* Thanks to Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com> for the pointers about the
* special generators and for answering some of my questions.
*
* I've implemented the second simple method :-).
* Since DH should be using a safe prime (both p and q are prime),
* this generator function can take a very very long time to run.
*/
/* Actually there is no reason to insist that 'generator' be a generator.
* It's just as OK (and in some sense better) to use a generator of the
* order-q subgroup.
*/
BIGNUM *t1, *t2;
int g, ok = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
} }
return DH_default_method.generate_parameters(dh, prime_bits, generator, cb); BN_CTX_start(ctx);
t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
t2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (t1 == NULL || t2 == NULL) {
goto err;
}
/* Make sure |dh| has the necessary elements */
if (dh->p == NULL) {
dh->p = BN_new();
if (dh->p == NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
if (dh->g == NULL) {
dh->g = BN_new();
if (dh->g == NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
if (generator <= 1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_BAD_GENERATOR);
goto err;
}
if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_2) {
if (!BN_set_word(t1, 24)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(t2, 11)) {
goto err;
}
g = 2;
} else if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_5) {
if (!BN_set_word(t1, 10)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(t2, 3)) {
goto err;
}
/* BN_set_word(t3,7); just have to miss
* out on these ones :-( */
g = 5;
} else {
/* in the general case, don't worry if 'generator' is a
* generator or not: since we are using safe primes,
* it will generate either an order-q or an order-2q group,
* which both is OK */
if (!BN_set_word(t1, 2)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(t2, 1)) {
goto err;
}
g = generator;
}
if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(dh->p, prime_bits, 1, t1, t2, cb)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(dh->g, g)) {
goto err;
}
ok = 1;
err:
if (!ok) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
}
if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
return ok;
} }
int DH_generate_key(DH *dh) { int DH_generate_key(DH *dh) {
if (dh->meth->generate_key) { int ok = 0;
return dh->meth->generate_key(dh); int generate_new_key = 0;
unsigned l;
BN_CTX *ctx;
BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
BIGNUM local_priv;
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
} }
return DH_default_method.generate_key(dh);
if (dh->priv_key == NULL) {
priv_key = BN_new();
if (priv_key == NULL) {
goto err;
}
generate_new_key = 1;
} else {
priv_key = dh->priv_key;
}
if (dh->pub_key == NULL) {
pub_key = BN_new();
if (pub_key == NULL) {
goto err;
}
} else {
pub_key = dh->pub_key;
}
mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dh->method_mont_p, &dh->method_mont_p_lock,
dh->p, ctx);
if (!mont) {
goto err;
}
if (generate_new_key) {
if (dh->q) {
do {
if (!BN_rand_range(priv_key, dh->q)) {
goto err;
}
} while (BN_is_zero(priv_key) || BN_is_one(priv_key));
} else {
/* secret exponent length */
DH_check_standard_parameters(dh);
l = dh->priv_length ? dh->priv_length : BN_num_bits(dh->p) - 1;
if (!BN_rand(priv_key, l, 0, 0)) {
goto err;
}
}
}
BN_with_flags(&local_priv, priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(pub_key, dh->g, &local_priv, dh->p, ctx, mont)) {
goto err;
}
dh->pub_key = pub_key;
dh->priv_key = priv_key;
ok = 1;
err:
if (ok != 1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
}
if (dh->pub_key == NULL) {
BN_free(pub_key);
}
if (dh->priv_key == NULL) {
BN_free(priv_key);
}
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return ok;
} }
int DH_compute_key(unsigned char *out, const BIGNUM *peers_key, DH *dh) { int DH_compute_key(unsigned char *out, const BIGNUM *peers_key, DH *dh) {
if (dh->meth->compute_key) { BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
return dh->meth->compute_key(dh, out, peers_key); BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
BIGNUM *shared_key;
int ret = -1;
int check_result;
BIGNUM local_priv;
if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
goto err;
} }
return DH_default_method.compute_key(dh, out, peers_key);
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
shared_key = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (shared_key == NULL) {
goto err;
}
if (dh->priv_key == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE);
goto err;
}
mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dh->method_mont_p, &dh->method_mont_p_lock,
dh->p, ctx);
if (!mont) {
goto err;
}
if (!DH_check_pub_key(dh, peers_key, &check_result) || check_result) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY);
goto err;
}
BN_with_flags(&local_priv, dh->priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(shared_key, peers_key, &local_priv, dh->p, ctx,
mont)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
ret = BN_bn2bin(shared_key, out);
err:
if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
return ret;
} }
int DH_size(const DH *dh) { return BN_num_bytes(dh->p); } int DH_size(const DH *dh) { return BN_num_bytes(dh->p); }
@ -246,9 +454,9 @@ int DH_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
} }
int DH_set_ex_data(DH *d, int idx, void *arg) { int DH_set_ex_data(DH *d, int idx, void *arg) {
return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx, arg)); return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx, arg);
} }
void *DH_get_ex_data(DH *d, int idx) { void *DH_get_ex_data(DH *d, int idx) {
return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx)); return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx);
} }

326
crypto/dh/dh_impl.c
View File

@ -1,326 +0,0 @@
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/thread.h>
#include "internal.h"
#define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
static int generate_parameters(DH *ret, int prime_bits, int generator, BN_GENCB *cb) {
/* We generate DH parameters as follows
* find a prime q which is prime_bits/2 bits long.
* p=(2*q)+1 or (p-1)/2 = q
* For this case, g is a generator if
* g^((p-1)/q) mod p != 1 for values of q which are the factors of p-1.
* Since the factors of p-1 are q and 2, we just need to check
* g^2 mod p != 1 and g^q mod p != 1.
*
* Having said all that,
* there is another special case method for the generators 2, 3 and 5.
* for 2, p mod 24 == 11
* for 3, p mod 12 == 5 <<<<< does not work for safe primes.
* for 5, p mod 10 == 3 or 7
*
* Thanks to Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com> for the pointers about the
* special generators and for answering some of my questions.
*
* I've implemented the second simple method :-).
* Since DH should be using a safe prime (both p and q are prime),
* this generator function can take a very very long time to run.
*/
/* Actually there is no reason to insist that 'generator' be a generator.
* It's just as OK (and in some sense better) to use a generator of the
* order-q subgroup.
*/
BIGNUM *t1, *t2;
int g, ok = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
t2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (t1 == NULL || t2 == NULL) {
goto err;
}
/* Make sure 'ret' has the necessary elements */
if (!ret->p && ((ret->p = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
goto err;
}
if (!ret->g && ((ret->g = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
goto err;
}
if (generator <= 1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_BAD_GENERATOR);
goto err;
}
if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_2) {
if (!BN_set_word(t1, 24)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(t2, 11)) {
goto err;
}
g = 2;
} else if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_5) {
if (!BN_set_word(t1, 10)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(t2, 3)) {
goto err;
}
/* BN_set_word(t3,7); just have to miss
* out on these ones :-( */
g = 5;
} else {
/* in the general case, don't worry if 'generator' is a
* generator or not: since we are using safe primes,
* it will generate either an order-q or an order-2q group,
* which both is OK */
if (!BN_set_word(t1, 2)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(t2, 1)) {
goto err;
}
g = generator;
}
if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(ret->p, prime_bits, 1, t1, t2, cb)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(ret->g, g)) {
goto err;
}
ok = 1;
err:
if (!ok) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
}
if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
return ok;
}
static int generate_key(DH *dh) {
int ok = 0;
int generate_new_key = 0;
unsigned l;
BN_CTX *ctx;
BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
BIGNUM local_priv;
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
if (dh->priv_key == NULL) {
priv_key = BN_new();
if (priv_key == NULL) {
goto err;
}
generate_new_key = 1;
} else {
priv_key = dh->priv_key;
}
if (dh->pub_key == NULL) {
pub_key = BN_new();
if (pub_key == NULL) {
goto err;
}
} else {
pub_key = dh->pub_key;
}
mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dh->method_mont_p, &dh->method_mont_p_lock,
dh->p, ctx);
if (!mont) {
goto err;
}
if (generate_new_key) {
if (dh->q) {
do {
if (!BN_rand_range(priv_key, dh->q)) {
goto err;
}
} while (BN_is_zero(priv_key) || BN_is_one(priv_key));
} else {
/* secret exponent length */
DH_check_standard_parameters(dh);
l = dh->priv_length ? dh->priv_length : BN_num_bits(dh->p) - 1;
if (!BN_rand(priv_key, l, 0, 0)) {
goto err;
}
}
}
BN_with_flags(&local_priv, priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(pub_key, dh->g, &local_priv, dh->p, ctx, mont)) {
goto err;
}
dh->pub_key = pub_key;
dh->priv_key = priv_key;
ok = 1;
err:
if (ok != 1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
}
if (dh->pub_key == NULL) {
BN_free(pub_key);
}
if (dh->priv_key == NULL) {
BN_free(priv_key);
}
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return ok;
}
static int compute_key(DH *dh, unsigned char *out, const BIGNUM *pub_key) {
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
BIGNUM *shared_key;
int ret = -1;
int check_result;
BIGNUM local_priv;
if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
goto err;
}
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
shared_key = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (shared_key == NULL) {
goto err;
}
if (dh->priv_key == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE);
goto err;
}
mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dh->method_mont_p, &dh->method_mont_p_lock,
dh->p, ctx);
if (!mont) {
goto err;
}
if (!DH_check_pub_key(dh, pub_key, &check_result) || check_result) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY);
goto err;
}
BN_with_flags(&local_priv, dh->priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(shared_key, pub_key, &local_priv, dh->p, ctx,
mont)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
ret = BN_bn2bin(shared_key, out);
err:
if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
return ret;
}
const struct dh_method DH_default_method = {
{
0 /* references */,
1 /* is_static */,
},
NULL /* app_data */,
NULL /* init */,
NULL /* finish */,
generate_parameters,
generate_key,
compute_key,
};

4
crypto/dh/params.c
View File

@ -264,9 +264,7 @@ BIGNUM bn_two = STATIC_BIGNUM(bn_two_data);
static DH *get_standard_parameters(const struct standard_parameters *params, static DH *get_standard_parameters(const struct standard_parameters *params,
const ENGINE *engine) { const ENGINE *engine) {
DH *dh; DH *dh = DH_new();
dh = DH_new_method(engine);
if (!dh) { if (!dh) {
return NULL; return NULL;
} }

1
crypto/dsa/CMakeLists.txt
View File

@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ add_library(
OBJECT OBJECT
dsa.c dsa.c
dsa_impl.c
dsa_asn1.c dsa_asn1.c
) )

653
crypto/dsa/dsa.c
View File

@ -62,24 +62,30 @@
#include <string.h> #include <string.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h> #include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h> #include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/digest.h>
#include <openssl/engine.h> #include <openssl/engine.h>
#include <openssl/err.h> #include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/ex_data.h> #include <openssl/ex_data.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h> #include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
#include <openssl/thread.h> #include <openssl/thread.h>
#include "internal.h" #include "internal.h"
#include "../internal.h" #include "../internal.h"
extern const DSA_METHOD DSA_default_method; #define OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
/* Primality test according to FIPS PUB 186[-1], Appendix 2.1: 50 rounds of
* Rabin-Miller */
#define DSS_prime_checks 50
static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT; static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT;
DSA *DSA_new(void) { return DSA_new_method(NULL); } DSA *DSA_new(void) {
DSA *DSA_new_method(const ENGINE *engine) {
DSA *dsa = (DSA *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DSA)); DSA *dsa = (DSA *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DSA));
if (dsa == NULL) { if (dsa == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
@ -88,15 +94,6 @@ DSA *DSA_new_method(const ENGINE *engine) {
memset(dsa, 0, sizeof(DSA)); memset(dsa, 0, sizeof(DSA));
if (engine) {
dsa->meth = ENGINE_get_DSA_method(engine);
}
if (dsa->meth == NULL) {
dsa->meth = (DSA_METHOD*) &DSA_default_method;
}
METHOD_ref(dsa->meth);
dsa->write_params = 1; dsa->write_params = 1;
dsa->references = 1; dsa->references = 1;
@ -104,15 +101,6 @@ DSA *DSA_new_method(const ENGINE *engine) {
if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, dsa, &dsa->ex_data)) { if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, dsa, &dsa->ex_data)) {
CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&dsa->method_mont_p_lock); CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&dsa->method_mont_p_lock);
METHOD_unref(dsa->meth);
OPENSSL_free(dsa);
return NULL;
}
if (dsa->meth->init && !dsa->meth->init(dsa)) {
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, dsa, &dsa->ex_data);
CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&dsa->method_mont_p_lock);
METHOD_unref(dsa->meth);
OPENSSL_free(dsa); OPENSSL_free(dsa);
return NULL; return NULL;
} }
@ -129,11 +117,6 @@ void DSA_free(DSA *dsa) {
return; return;
} }
if (dsa->meth->finish) {
dsa->meth->finish(dsa);
}
METHOD_unref(dsa->meth);
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, dsa, &dsa->ex_data); CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, dsa, &dsa->ex_data);
BN_clear_free(dsa->p); BN_clear_free(dsa->p);
@ -143,6 +126,7 @@ void DSA_free(DSA *dsa) {
BN_clear_free(dsa->priv_key); BN_clear_free(dsa->priv_key);
BN_clear_free(dsa->kinv); BN_clear_free(dsa->kinv);
BN_clear_free(dsa->r); BN_clear_free(dsa->r);
BN_MONT_CTX_free(dsa->method_mont_p);
CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&dsa->method_mont_p_lock); CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&dsa->method_mont_p_lock);
OPENSSL_free(dsa); OPENSSL_free(dsa);
} }
@ -155,19 +139,319 @@ int DSA_up_ref(DSA *dsa) {
int DSA_generate_parameters_ex(DSA *dsa, unsigned bits, const uint8_t *seed_in, int DSA_generate_parameters_ex(DSA *dsa, unsigned bits, const uint8_t *seed_in,
size_t seed_len, int *out_counter, size_t seed_len, int *out_counter,
unsigned long *out_h, BN_GENCB *cb) { unsigned long *out_h, BN_GENCB *cb) {
if (dsa->meth->generate_parameters) { int ok = 0;
return dsa->meth->generate_parameters(dsa, bits, seed_in, seed_len, unsigned char seed[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
out_counter, out_h, cb); unsigned char md[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned char buf[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], buf2[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
BIGNUM *r0, *W, *X, *c, *test;
BIGNUM *g = NULL, *q = NULL, *p = NULL;
BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
int k, n = 0, m = 0;
unsigned i;
int counter = 0;
int r = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
unsigned int h = 2;
unsigned qsize;
const EVP_MD *evpmd;
evpmd = (bits >= 2048) ? EVP_sha256() : EVP_sha1();
qsize = EVP_MD_size(evpmd);
if (bits < 512) {
bits = 512;
} }
return DSA_default_method.generate_parameters(dsa, bits, seed_in, seed_len,
out_counter, out_h, cb); bits = (bits + 63) / 64 * 64;
if (seed_in != NULL) {
if (seed_len < (size_t)qsize) {
return 0;
}
if (seed_len > (size_t)qsize) {
/* Only consume as much seed as is expected. */
seed_len = qsize;
}
memcpy(seed, seed_in, seed_len);
}
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
if (mont == NULL) {
goto err;
}
r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
g = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
W = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
q = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
X = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
c = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
p = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
test = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (test == NULL || !BN_lshift(test, BN_value_one(), bits - 1)) {
goto err;
}
for (;;) {
/* Find q. */
for (;;) {
/* step 1 */
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, m++)) {
goto err;
}
int use_random_seed = (seed_in == NULL);
if (use_random_seed) {
if (!RAND_bytes(seed, qsize)) {
goto err;
}
} else {
/* If we come back through, use random seed next time. */
seed_in = NULL;
}
memcpy(buf, seed, qsize);
memcpy(buf2, seed, qsize);
/* precompute "SEED + 1" for step 7: */
for (i = qsize - 1; i < qsize; i--) {
buf[i]++;
if (buf[i] != 0) {
break;
}
}
/* step 2 */
if (!EVP_Digest(seed, qsize, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL) ||
!EVP_Digest(buf, qsize, buf2, NULL, evpmd, NULL)) {
goto err;
}
for (i = 0; i < qsize; i++) {
md[i] ^= buf2[i];
}
/* step 3 */
md[0] |= 0x80;
md[qsize - 1] |= 0x01;
if (!BN_bin2bn(md, qsize, q)) {
goto err;
}
/* step 4 */
r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(q, DSS_prime_checks, ctx, use_random_seed, cb);
if (r > 0) {
break;
}
if (r != 0) {
goto err;
}
/* do a callback call */
/* step 5 */
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, 0) || !BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) {
goto err;
}
/* step 6 */
counter = 0;
/* "offset = 2" */
n = (bits - 1) / 160;
for (;;) {
if ((counter != 0) && !BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, counter)) {
goto err;
}
/* step 7 */
BN_zero(W);
/* now 'buf' contains "SEED + offset - 1" */
for (k = 0; k <= n; k++) {
/* obtain "SEED + offset + k" by incrementing: */
for (i = qsize - 1; i < qsize; i--) {
buf[i]++;
if (buf[i] != 0) {
break;
}
}
if (!EVP_Digest(buf, qsize, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL)) {
goto err;
}
/* step 8 */
if (!BN_bin2bn(md, qsize, r0) ||
!BN_lshift(r0, r0, (qsize << 3) * k) ||
!BN_add(W, W, r0)) {
goto err;
}
}
/* more of step 8 */
if (!BN_mask_bits(W, bits - 1) ||
!BN_copy(X, W) ||
!BN_add(X, X, test)) {
goto err;
}
/* step 9 */
if (!BN_lshift1(r0, q) ||
!BN_mod(c, X, r0, ctx) ||
!BN_sub(r0, c, BN_value_one()) ||
!BN_sub(p, X, r0)) {
goto err;
}
/* step 10 */
if (BN_cmp(p, test) >= 0) {
/* step 11 */
r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(p, DSS_prime_checks, ctx, 1, cb);
if (r > 0) {
goto end; /* found it */
}
if (r != 0) {
goto err;
}
}
/* step 13 */
counter++;
/* "offset = offset + n + 1" */
/* step 14 */
if (counter >= 4096) {
break;
}
}
}
end:
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, 1)) {
goto err;
}
/* We now need to generate g */
/* Set r0=(p-1)/q */
if (!BN_sub(test, p, BN_value_one()) ||
!BN_div(r0, NULL, test, q, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(test, h) ||
!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, p, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
for (;;) {
/* g=test^r0%p */
if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(g, test, r0, p, ctx, mont)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_is_one(g)) {
break;
}
if (!BN_add(test, test, BN_value_one())) {
goto err;
}
h++;
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1)) {
goto err;
}
ok = 1;
err:
if (ok) {
BN_free(dsa->p);
BN_free(dsa->q);
BN_free(dsa->g);
dsa->p = BN_dup(p);
dsa->q = BN_dup(q);
dsa->g = BN_dup(g);
if (dsa->p == NULL || dsa->q == NULL || dsa->g == NULL) {
ok = 0;
goto err;
}
if (out_counter != NULL) {
*out_counter = counter;
}
if (out_h != NULL) {
*out_h = h;
}
}
if (ctx) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
return ok;
} }
int DSA_generate_key(DSA *dsa) { int DSA_generate_key(DSA *dsa) {
if (dsa->meth->keygen) { int ok = 0;
return dsa->meth->keygen(dsa); BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
BIGNUM prk;
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
} }
return DSA_default_method.keygen(dsa);
priv_key = dsa->priv_key;
if (priv_key == NULL) {
priv_key = BN_new();
if (priv_key == NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
do {
if (!BN_rand_range(priv_key, dsa->q)) {
goto err;
}
} while (BN_is_zero(priv_key));
pub_key = dsa->pub_key;
if (pub_key == NULL) {
pub_key = BN_new();
if (pub_key == NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
BN_init(&prk);
BN_with_flags(&prk, priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!BN_mod_exp(pub_key, dsa->g, &prk, dsa->p, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
dsa->priv_key = priv_key;
dsa->pub_key = pub_key;
ok = 1;
err:
if (dsa->pub_key == NULL) {
BN_free(pub_key);
}
if (dsa->priv_key == NULL) {
BN_free(priv_key);
}
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return ok;
} }
DSA_SIG *DSA_SIG_new(void) { DSA_SIG *DSA_SIG_new(void) {
@ -192,10 +476,99 @@ void DSA_SIG_free(DSA_SIG *sig) {
} }
DSA_SIG *DSA_do_sign(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len, DSA *dsa) { DSA_SIG *DSA_do_sign(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len, DSA *dsa) {
if (dsa->meth->sign) { BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
return dsa->meth->sign(digest, digest_len, dsa); BIGNUM m;
BIGNUM xr;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
int reason = ERR_R_BN_LIB;
DSA_SIG *ret = NULL;
int noredo = 0;
BN_init(&m);
BN_init(&xr);
if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
reason = DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS;
goto err;
} }
return DSA_default_method.sign(digest, digest_len, dsa);
s = BN_new();
if (s == NULL) {
goto err;
}
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
redo:
if (dsa->kinv == NULL || dsa->r == NULL) {
if (!DSA_sign_setup(dsa, ctx, &kinv, &r)) {
goto err;
}
} else {
kinv = dsa->kinv;
dsa->kinv = NULL;
r = dsa->r;
dsa->r = NULL;
noredo = 1;
}
if (digest_len > BN_num_bytes(dsa->q)) {
/* if the digest length is greater than the size of q use the
* BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see
* fips 186-3, 4.2 */
digest_len = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q);
}
if (BN_bin2bn(digest, digest_len, &m) == NULL) {
goto err;
}
/* Compute s = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q */
if (!BN_mod_mul(&xr, dsa->priv_key, r, dsa->q, ctx)) {
goto err; /* s = xr */
}
if (!BN_add(s, &xr, &m)) {
goto err; /* s = m + xr */
}
if (BN_cmp(s, dsa->q) > 0) {
if (!BN_sub(s, s, dsa->q)) {
goto err;
}
}
if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, kinv, dsa->q, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
ret = DSA_SIG_new();
if (ret == NULL) {
goto err;
}
/* Redo if r or s is zero as required by FIPS 186-3: this is
* very unlikely. */
if (BN_is_zero(r) || BN_is_zero(s)) {
if (noredo) {
reason = DSA_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES;
goto err;
}
goto redo;
}
ret->r = r;
ret->s = s;
err:
if (!ret) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, reason);
BN_free(r);
BN_free(s);
}
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
BN_clear_free(&m);
BN_clear_free(&xr);
BN_clear_free(kinv);
return ret;
} }
int DSA_do_verify(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len, DSA_SIG *sig, int DSA_do_verify(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len, DSA_SIG *sig,
@ -209,11 +582,112 @@ int DSA_do_verify(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len, DSA_SIG *sig,
int DSA_do_check_signature(int *out_valid, const uint8_t *digest, int DSA_do_check_signature(int *out_valid, const uint8_t *digest,
size_t digest_len, DSA_SIG *sig, const DSA *dsa) { size_t digest_len, DSA_SIG *sig, const DSA *dsa) {
if (dsa->meth->verify) { BN_CTX *ctx;
return dsa->meth->verify(out_valid, digest, digest_len, sig, dsa); BIGNUM u1, u2, t1;
BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
int ret = 0;
unsigned i;
*out_valid = 0;
if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
} }
return DSA_default_method.verify(out_valid, digest, digest_len, sig, dsa); i = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
/* fips 186-3 allows only different sizes for q */
if (i != 160 && i != 224 && i != 256) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE);
return 0;
}
if (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
}
BN_init(&u1);
BN_init(&u2);
BN_init(&t1);
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || BN_is_negative(sig->r) ||
BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0) {
ret = 1;
goto err;
}
if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || BN_is_negative(sig->s) ||
BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0) {
ret = 1;
goto err;
}
/* Calculate W = inv(S) mod Q
* save W in u2 */
if (BN_mod_inverse(&u2, sig->s, dsa->q, ctx) == NULL) {
goto err;
}
/* save M in u1 */
if (digest_len > (i >> 3)) {
/* if the digest length is greater than the size of q use the
* BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see
* fips 186-3, 4.2 */
digest_len = (i >> 3);
}
if (BN_bin2bn(digest, digest_len, &u1) == NULL) {
goto err;
}
/* u1 = M * w mod q */
if (!BN_mod_mul(&u1, &u1, &u2, dsa->q, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
/* u2 = r * w mod q */
if (!BN_mod_mul(&u2, sig->r, &u2, dsa->q, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked((BN_MONT_CTX **)&dsa->method_mont_p,
(CRYPTO_MUTEX *)&dsa->method_mont_p_lock,
dsa->p, ctx);
if (!mont) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_mod_exp2_mont(&t1, dsa->g, &u1, dsa->pub_key, &u2, dsa->p, ctx,
mont)) {
goto err;
}
/* BN_copy(&u1,&t1); */
/* let u1 = u1 mod q */
if (!BN_mod(&u1, &t1, dsa->q, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
/* V is now in u1. If the signature is correct, it will be
* equal to R. */
*out_valid = BN_ucmp(&u1, sig->r) == 0;
ret = 1;
err:
if (ret != 1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
}
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
BN_free(&u1);
BN_free(&u2);
BN_free(&t1);
return ret;
} }
int DSA_sign(int type, const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len, int DSA_sign(int type, const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
@ -292,13 +766,102 @@ int DSA_size(const DSA *dsa) {
return ret; return ret;
} }
int DSA_sign_setup(const DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM **out_kinv, int DSA_sign_setup(const DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **out_kinv,
BIGNUM **out_r) { BIGNUM **out_r) {
if (dsa->meth->sign_setup) { BN_CTX *ctx;
return dsa->meth->sign_setup(dsa, ctx, out_kinv, out_r, NULL, 0); BIGNUM k, kq, *K, *kinv = NULL, *r = NULL;
int ret = 0;
if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
} }
return DSA_default_method.sign_setup(dsa, ctx, out_kinv, out_r, NULL, 0); BN_init(&k);
BN_init(&kq);
ctx = ctx_in;
if (ctx == NULL) {
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
r = BN_new();
if (r == NULL) {
goto err;
}
/* Get random k */
do {
if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q)) {
goto err;
}
} while (BN_is_zero(&k));
BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked((BN_MONT_CTX **)&dsa->method_mont_p,
(CRYPTO_MUTEX *)&dsa->method_mont_p_lock, dsa->p,
ctx) == NULL) {
goto err;
}
/* Compute r = (g^k mod p) mod q */
if (!BN_copy(&kq, &k)) {
goto err;
}
/* We do not want timing information to leak the length of k,
* so we compute g^k using an equivalent exponent of fixed length.
*
* (This is a kludge that we need because the BN_mod_exp_mont()
* does not let us specify the desired timing behaviour.) */
if (!BN_add(&kq, &kq, dsa->q)) {
goto err;
}
if (BN_num_bits(&kq) <= BN_num_bits(dsa->q) && !BN_add(&kq, &kq, dsa->q)) {
goto err;
}
K = &kq;
if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx, dsa->method_mont_p)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
/* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */
kinv = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, &k, dsa->q, ctx);
if (kinv == NULL) {
goto err;
}
BN_clear_free(*out_kinv);
*out_kinv = kinv;
kinv = NULL;
BN_clear_free(*out_r);
*out_r = r;
ret = 1;
err:
if (!ret) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
if (r != NULL) {
BN_clear_free(r);
}
}
if (ctx_in == NULL) {
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
BN_clear_free(&k);
BN_clear_free(&kq);
return ret;
} }
int DSA_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, int DSA_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,

734
crypto/dsa/dsa_impl.c
View File

@ -1,734 +0,0 @@
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*
* The DSS routines are based on patches supplied by
* Steven Schoch <schoch@sheba.arc.nasa.gov>. */
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/digest.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
#include <openssl/thread.h>
#include "internal.h"
#define OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
/* Primality test according to FIPS PUB 186[-1], Appendix 2.1: 50 rounds of
* Rabin-Miller */
#define DSS_prime_checks 50
static int sign_setup(const DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
BIGNUM **rp, const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len) {
BN_CTX *ctx;
BIGNUM k, kq, *K, *kinv = NULL, *r = NULL;
int ret = 0;
if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
BN_init(&k);
BN_init(&kq);
ctx = ctx_in;
if (ctx == NULL) {
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
r = BN_new();
if (r == NULL) {
goto err;
}
/* Get random k */
do {
/* If possible, we'll include the private key and message digest in the k
* generation. The |digest| argument is only empty if |DSA_sign_setup| is
* being used. */
int ok;
if (digest_len > 0) {
ok = BN_generate_dsa_nonce(&k, dsa->q, dsa->priv_key, digest, digest_len,
ctx);
} else {
ok = BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q);
}
if (!ok) {
goto err;
}
} while (BN_is_zero(&k));
BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked((BN_MONT_CTX **)&dsa->method_mont_p,
(CRYPTO_MUTEX *)&dsa->method_mont_p_lock, dsa->p,
ctx) == NULL) {
goto err;
}
/* Compute r = (g^k mod p) mod q */
if (!BN_copy(&kq, &k)) {
goto err;
}
/* We do not want timing information to leak the length of k,
* so we compute g^k using an equivalent exponent of fixed length.
*
* (This is a kludge that we need because the BN_mod_exp_mont()
* does not let us specify the desired timing behaviour.) */
if (!BN_add(&kq, &kq, dsa->q)) {
goto err;
}
if (BN_num_bits(&kq) <= BN_num_bits(dsa->q) && !BN_add(&kq, &kq, dsa->q)) {
goto err;
}
K = &kq;
if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx, dsa->method_mont_p)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
/* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */
kinv = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, &k, dsa->q, ctx);
if (kinv == NULL) {
goto err;
}
BN_clear_free(*kinvp);
*kinvp = kinv;
kinv = NULL;
BN_clear_free(*rp);
*rp = r;
ret = 1;
err:
if (!ret) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
if (r != NULL) {
BN_clear_free(r);
}
}
if (ctx_in == NULL) {
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
BN_clear_free(&k);
BN_clear_free(&kq);
return ret;
}
static DSA_SIG *sign(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len, DSA *dsa) {
BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
BIGNUM m;
BIGNUM xr;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
int reason = ERR_R_BN_LIB;
DSA_SIG *ret = NULL;
int noredo = 0;
BN_init(&m);
BN_init(&xr);
if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
reason = DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS;
goto err;
}
s = BN_new();
if (s == NULL) {
goto err;
}
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
redo:
if (dsa->kinv == NULL || dsa->r == NULL) {
if (!DSA_sign_setup(dsa, ctx, &kinv, &r)) {
goto err;
}
} else {
kinv = dsa->kinv;
dsa->kinv = NULL;
r = dsa->r;
dsa->r = NULL;
noredo = 1;
}
if (digest_len > BN_num_bytes(dsa->q)) {
/* if the digest length is greater than the size of q use the
* BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see
* fips 186-3, 4.2 */
digest_len = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q);
}
if (BN_bin2bn(digest, digest_len, &m) == NULL) {
goto err;
}
/* Compute s = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q */
if (!BN_mod_mul(&xr, dsa->priv_key, r, dsa->q, ctx)) {
goto err; /* s = xr */
}
if (!BN_add(s, &xr, &m)) {
goto err; /* s = m + xr */
}
if (BN_cmp(s, dsa->q) > 0) {
if (!BN_sub(s, s, dsa->q)) {
goto err;
}
}
if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, kinv, dsa->q, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
ret = DSA_SIG_new();
if (ret == NULL) {
goto err;
}
/* Redo if r or s is zero as required by FIPS 186-3: this is
* very unlikely. */
if (BN_is_zero(r) || BN_is_zero(s)) {
if (noredo) {
reason = DSA_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES;
goto err;
}
goto redo;
}
ret->r = r;
ret->s = s;
err:
if (!ret) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, reason);
BN_free(r);
BN_free(s);
}
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
BN_clear_free(&m);
BN_clear_free(&xr);
BN_clear_free(kinv);
return ret;
}
static int verify(int *out_valid, const uint8_t *dgst, size_t digest_len,
DSA_SIG *sig, const DSA *dsa) {
BN_CTX *ctx;
BIGNUM u1, u2, t1;
BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
int ret = 0;
unsigned i;
*out_valid = 0;
if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
i = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
/* fips 186-3 allows only different sizes for q */
if (i != 160 && i != 224 && i != 256) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE);
return 0;
}
if (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
}
BN_init(&u1);
BN_init(&u2);
BN_init(&t1);
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || BN_is_negative(sig->r) ||
BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0) {
ret = 1;
goto err;
}
if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || BN_is_negative(sig->s) ||
BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0) {
ret = 1;
goto err;
}
/* Calculate W = inv(S) mod Q
* save W in u2 */
if (BN_mod_inverse(&u2, sig->s, dsa->q, ctx) == NULL) {
goto err;
}
/* save M in u1 */
if (digest_len > (i >> 3)) {
/* if the digest length is greater than the size of q use the
* BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see
* fips 186-3, 4.2 */
digest_len = (i >> 3);
}
if (BN_bin2bn(dgst, digest_len, &u1) == NULL) {
goto err;
}
/* u1 = M * w mod q */
if (!BN_mod_mul(&u1, &u1, &u2, dsa->q, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
/* u2 = r * w mod q */
if (!BN_mod_mul(&u2, sig->r, &u2, dsa->q, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked((BN_MONT_CTX **)&dsa->method_mont_p,
(CRYPTO_MUTEX *)&dsa->method_mont_p_lock,
dsa->p, ctx);
if (!mont) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_mod_exp2_mont(&t1, dsa->g, &u1, dsa->pub_key, &u2, dsa->p, ctx,
mont)) {
goto err;
}
/* BN_copy(&u1,&t1); */
/* let u1 = u1 mod q */
if (!BN_mod(&u1, &t1, dsa->q, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
/* V is now in u1. If the signature is correct, it will be
* equal to R. */
*out_valid = BN_ucmp(&u1, sig->r) == 0;
ret = 1;
err:
if (ret != 1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
}
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
BN_free(&u1);
BN_free(&u2);
BN_free(&t1);
return ret;
}
static int keygen(DSA *dsa) {
int ok = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
BIGNUM prk;
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
priv_key = dsa->priv_key;
if (priv_key == NULL) {
priv_key = BN_new();
if (priv_key == NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
do {
if (!BN_rand_range(priv_key, dsa->q)) {
goto err;
}
} while (BN_is_zero(priv_key));
pub_key = dsa->pub_key;
if (pub_key == NULL) {
pub_key = BN_new();
if (pub_key == NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
BN_init(&prk);
BN_with_flags(&prk, priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!BN_mod_exp(pub_key, dsa->g, &prk, dsa->p, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
dsa->priv_key = priv_key;
dsa->pub_key = pub_key;
ok = 1;
err:
if (dsa->pub_key == NULL) {
BN_free(pub_key);
}
if (dsa->priv_key == NULL) {
BN_free(priv_key);
}
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return ok;
}
static int paramgen(DSA *ret, unsigned bits, const uint8_t *seed_in,
size_t seed_len, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret,
BN_GENCB *cb) {
int ok = 0;
unsigned char seed[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned char md[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned char buf[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], buf2[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
BIGNUM *r0, *W, *X, *c, *test;
BIGNUM *g = NULL, *q = NULL, *p = NULL;
BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
int k, n = 0, m = 0;
unsigned i;
int counter = 0;
int r = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
unsigned int h = 2;
unsigned qsize;
const EVP_MD *evpmd;
evpmd = (bits >= 2048) ? EVP_sha256() : EVP_sha1();
qsize = EVP_MD_size(evpmd);
if (bits < 512) {
bits = 512;
}
bits = (bits + 63) / 64 * 64;
if (seed_in != NULL) {
if (seed_len < (size_t)qsize) {
return 0;
}
if (seed_len > (size_t)qsize) {
/* Only consume as much seed as is expected. */
seed_len = qsize;
}
memcpy(seed, seed_in, seed_len);
}
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
if (mont == NULL) {
goto err;
}
r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
g = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
W = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
q = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
X = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
c = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
p = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
test = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (test == NULL || !BN_lshift(test, BN_value_one(), bits - 1)) {
goto err;
}
for (;;) {
/* Find q. */
for (;;) {
/* step 1 */
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, m++)) {
goto err;
}
int use_random_seed = (seed_in == NULL);
if (use_random_seed) {
if (!RAND_bytes(seed, qsize)) {
goto err;
}
} else {
/* If we come back through, use random seed next time. */
seed_in = NULL;
}
memcpy(buf, seed, qsize);
memcpy(buf2, seed, qsize);
/* precompute "SEED + 1" for step 7: */
for (i = qsize - 1; i < qsize; i--) {
buf[i]++;
if (buf[i] != 0) {
break;
}
}
/* step 2 */
if (!EVP_Digest(seed, qsize, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL) ||
!EVP_Digest(buf, qsize, buf2, NULL, evpmd, NULL)) {
goto err;
}
for (i = 0; i < qsize; i++) {
md[i] ^= buf2[i];
}
/* step 3 */
md[0] |= 0x80;
md[qsize - 1] |= 0x01;
if (!BN_bin2bn(md, qsize, q)) {
goto err;
}
/* step 4 */
r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(q, DSS_prime_checks, ctx, use_random_seed, cb);
if (r > 0) {
break;
}
if (r != 0) {
goto err;
}
/* do a callback call */
/* step 5 */
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, 0) || !BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) {
goto err;
}
/* step 6 */
counter = 0;
/* "offset = 2" */
n = (bits - 1) / 160;
for (;;) {
if ((counter != 0) && !BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, counter)) {
goto err;
}
/* step 7 */
BN_zero(W);
/* now 'buf' contains "SEED + offset - 1" */
for (k = 0; k <= n; k++) {
/* obtain "SEED + offset + k" by incrementing: */
for (i = qsize - 1; i < qsize; i--) {
buf[i]++;
if (buf[i] != 0) {
break;
}
}
if (!EVP_Digest(buf, qsize, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL)) {
goto err;
}
/* step 8 */
if (!BN_bin2bn(md, qsize, r0) ||
!BN_lshift(r0, r0, (qsize << 3) * k) ||
!BN_add(W, W, r0)) {
goto err;
}
}
/* more of step 8 */
if (!BN_mask_bits(W, bits - 1) ||
!BN_copy(X, W) ||
!BN_add(X, X, test)) {
goto err;
}
/* step 9 */
if (!BN_lshift1(r0, q) ||
!BN_mod(c, X, r0, ctx) ||
!BN_sub(r0, c, BN_value_one()) ||
!BN_sub(p, X, r0)) {
goto err;
}
/* step 10 */
if (BN_cmp(p, test) >= 0) {
/* step 11 */
r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(p, DSS_prime_checks, ctx, 1, cb);
if (r > 0) {
goto end; /* found it */
}
if (r != 0) {
goto err;
}
}
/* step 13 */
counter++;
/* "offset = offset + n + 1" */
/* step 14 */
if (counter >= 4096) {
break;
}
}
}
end:
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, 1)) {
goto err;
}
/* We now need to generate g */
/* Set r0=(p-1)/q */
if (!BN_sub(test, p, BN_value_one()) ||
!BN_div(r0, NULL, test, q, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(test, h) ||
!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, p, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
for (;;) {
/* g=test^r0%p */
if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(g, test, r0, p, ctx, mont)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_is_one(g)) {
break;
}
if (!BN_add(test, test, BN_value_one())) {
goto err;
}
h++;
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1)) {
goto err;
}
ok = 1;
err:
if (ok) {
BN_free(ret->p);
BN_free(ret->q);
BN_free(ret->g);
ret->p = BN_dup(p);
ret->q = BN_dup(q);
ret->g = BN_dup(g);
if (ret->p == NULL || ret->q == NULL || ret->g == NULL) {
ok = 0;
goto err;
}
if (counter_ret != NULL) {
*counter_ret = counter;
}
if (h_ret != NULL) {
*h_ret = h;
}
}
if (ctx) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
return ok;
}
static int finish(DSA *dsa) {
BN_MONT_CTX_free(dsa->method_mont_p);
dsa->method_mont_p = NULL;
return 1;
}
const struct dsa_method DSA_default_method = {
{
0 /* references */,
1 /* is_static */,
},
NULL /* app_data */,
NULL /* init */,
finish /* finish */,
sign,
sign_setup,
verify,
paramgen,
keygen,
};

24
crypto/engine/engine.c
View File

@ -17,8 +17,6 @@
#include <string.h> #include <string.h>
#include <assert.h> #include <assert.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
#include <openssl/ec_key.h> #include <openssl/ec_key.h>
#include <openssl/err.h> #include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h> #include <openssl/mem.h>
@ -27,8 +25,6 @@
struct engine_st { struct engine_st {
DH_METHOD *dh_method;
DSA_METHOD *dsa_method;
RSA_METHOD *rsa_method; RSA_METHOD *rsa_method;
ECDSA_METHOD *ecdsa_method; ECDSA_METHOD *ecdsa_method;
}; };
@ -64,26 +60,6 @@ static int set_method(void **out_member, const void *method, size_t method_size,
return 1; return 1;
} }
int ENGINE_set_DH_method(ENGINE *engine, const DH_METHOD *method,
size_t method_size) {
return set_method((void **)&engine->dh_method, method, method_size,
sizeof(DH_METHOD));
}
DH_METHOD *ENGINE_get_DH_method(const ENGINE *engine) {
return engine->dh_method;
}
int ENGINE_set_DSA_method(ENGINE *engine, const DSA_METHOD *method,
size_t method_size) {
return set_method((void **)&engine->dsa_method, method, method_size,
sizeof(DSA_METHOD));
}
DSA_METHOD *ENGINE_get_DSA_method(const ENGINE *engine) {
return engine->dsa_method;
}
int ENGINE_set_RSA_method(ENGINE *engine, const RSA_METHOD *method, int ENGINE_set_RSA_method(ENGINE *engine, const RSA_METHOD *method,
size_t method_size) { size_t method_size) {
return set_method((void **)&engine->rsa_method, method, method_size, return set_method((void **)&engine->rsa_method, method, method_size,

2
include/openssl/base.h
View File

@ -201,9 +201,7 @@ typedef struct cbs_st CBS;
typedef struct cmac_ctx_st CMAC_CTX; typedef struct cmac_ctx_st CMAC_CTX;
typedef struct conf_st CONF; typedef struct conf_st CONF;
typedef struct conf_value_st CONF_VALUE; typedef struct conf_value_st CONF_VALUE;
typedef struct dh_method DH_METHOD;
typedef struct dh_st DH; typedef struct dh_st DH;
typedef struct dsa_method DSA_METHOD;
typedef struct dsa_st DSA; typedef struct dsa_st DSA;
typedef struct ec_key_st EC_KEY; typedef struct ec_key_st EC_KEY;
typedef struct ecdsa_method_st ECDSA_METHOD; typedef struct ecdsa_method_st ECDSA_METHOD;

36
include/openssl/dh.h
View File

@ -77,9 +77,6 @@ extern "C" {
/* DH_new returns a new, empty DH object or NULL on error. */ /* DH_new returns a new, empty DH object or NULL on error. */
OPENSSL_EXPORT DH *DH_new(void); OPENSSL_EXPORT DH *DH_new(void);
/* DH_new_method acts the same as |DH_new| but takes an explicit |ENGINE|. */
OPENSSL_EXPORT DH *DH_new_method(const ENGINE *engine);
/* DH_free decrements the reference count of |dh| and frees it if the reference /* DH_free decrements the reference count of |dh| and frees it if the reference
* count drops to zero. */ * count drops to zero. */
OPENSSL_EXPORT void DH_free(DH *dh); OPENSSL_EXPORT void DH_free(DH *dh);
@ -90,9 +87,8 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int DH_up_ref(DH *dh);
/* Standard parameters. /* Standard parameters.
* *
* These functions return new DH objects with standard parameters configured * These functions return new DH objects with standard parameters. They return
* that use the given ENGINE, which may be NULL. They return NULL on allocation * NULL on allocation failure. The |engine| parameter is ignored. */
* failure. */
/* These parameters are taken from RFC 5114. */ /* These parameters are taken from RFC 5114. */
@ -204,35 +200,7 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int DH_set_ex_data(DH *d, int idx, void *arg);
OPENSSL_EXPORT void *DH_get_ex_data(DH *d, int idx); OPENSSL_EXPORT void *DH_get_ex_data(DH *d, int idx);
/* dh_method contains function pointers to override the implementation of DH.
* See |engine.h| for details. */
struct dh_method {
struct openssl_method_common_st common;
/* app_data is an opaque pointer for the method to use. */
void *app_data;
/* init is called just before the return of |DH_new_method|. It returns one
* on success or zero on error. */
int (*init)(DH *dh);
/* finish is called before |dh| is destructed. */
void (*finish)(DH *dh);
/* generate_parameters is called by |DH_generate_parameters_ex|. */
int (*generate_parameters)(DH *dh, int prime_bits, int generator,
BN_GENCB *cb);
/* generate_parameters is called by |DH_generate_key|. */
int (*generate_key)(DH *dh);
/* compute_key is called by |DH_compute_key|. */
int (*compute_key)(DH *dh, uint8_t *out, const BIGNUM *pub_key);
};
struct dh_st { struct dh_st {
DH_METHOD *meth;
BIGNUM *p; BIGNUM *p;
BIGNUM *g; BIGNUM *g;
BIGNUM *pub_key; /* g^x mod p */ BIGNUM *pub_key; /* g^x mod p */

31
include/openssl/dsa.h
View File

@ -80,9 +80,6 @@ extern "C" {
/* DSA_new returns a new, empty DSA object or NULL on error. */ /* DSA_new returns a new, empty DSA object or NULL on error. */
OPENSSL_EXPORT DSA *DSA_new(void); OPENSSL_EXPORT DSA *DSA_new(void);
/* DSA_new_method acts the same as |DH_new| but takes an explicit |ENGINE|. */
OPENSSL_EXPORT DSA *DSA_new_method(const ENGINE *engine);
/* DSA_free decrements the reference count of |dsa| and frees it if the /* DSA_free decrements the reference count of |dsa| and frees it if the
* reference count drops to zero. */ * reference count drops to zero. */
OPENSSL_EXPORT void DSA_free(DSA *dsa); OPENSSL_EXPORT void DSA_free(DSA *dsa);
@ -312,31 +309,6 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int DSA_set_ex_data(DSA *d, int idx, void *arg);
OPENSSL_EXPORT void *DSA_get_ex_data(const DSA *d, int idx); OPENSSL_EXPORT void *DSA_get_ex_data(const DSA *d, int idx);
struct dsa_method {
struct openssl_method_common_st common;
void *app_data;
int (*init)(DSA *dsa);
int (*finish)(DSA *dsa);
DSA_SIG *(*sign)(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len, DSA *dsa);
int (*sign_setup)(const DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp,
const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len);
int (*verify)(int *out_valid, const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
DSA_SIG *sig, const DSA *dsa);
/* generate_parameters, if non-NULL, is used to generate DSA parameters. */
int (*generate_parameters)(DSA *dsa, unsigned bits, const uint8_t *seed,
size_t seed_len, int *counter_ret,
unsigned long *h_ret, BN_GENCB *cb);
/* keygen, if non-NULL, is used to generate DSA keys. */
int (*keygen)(DSA *dsa);
};
struct dsa_st { struct dsa_st {
long version; long version;
int write_params; int write_params;
@ -356,9 +328,6 @@ struct dsa_st {
BN_MONT_CTX *method_mont_p; BN_MONT_CTX *method_mont_p;
CRYPTO_refcount_t references; CRYPTO_refcount_t references;
CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
DSA_METHOD *meth;
/* functional reference if 'meth' is ENGINE-provided */
ENGINE *engine;
}; };

9
include/openssl/engine.h
View File

@ -53,15 +53,6 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT void ENGINE_free(ENGINE *engine);
* *
* Set functions return one on success and zero on allocation failure. */ * Set functions return one on success and zero on allocation failure. */
OPENSSL_EXPORT int ENGINE_set_DH_method(ENGINE *engine, const DH_METHOD *method,
size_t method_size);
OPENSSL_EXPORT DH_METHOD *ENGINE_get_DH_method(const ENGINE *engine);
OPENSSL_EXPORT int ENGINE_set_DSA_method(ENGINE *engine,
const DSA_METHOD *method,
size_t method_size);
OPENSSL_EXPORT DSA_METHOD *ENGINE_get_DSA_method(const ENGINE *engine);
OPENSSL_EXPORT int ENGINE_set_RSA_method(ENGINE *engine, OPENSSL_EXPORT int ENGINE_set_RSA_method(ENGINE *engine,
const RSA_METHOD *method, const RSA_METHOD *method,
size_t method_size); size_t method_size);