Fix memory leak from zero-length DTLS fragments.
The |pqueue_insert| function can fail if one attempts to insert a duplicate sequence number. When handling a fragment of an out of sequence message, |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would not call |dtls1_reassemble_fragment| if the fragment's length was zero. It would then allocate a fresh fragment and attempt to insert it, but ignore the return value, leaking the fragment. This allows an attacker to exhaust the memory of a DTLS peer. Fixes CVE-2014-3507 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> (Imported from upstream's 8ca4c4b25e050b881f3aad7017052842b888722d.) Change-Id: I387e3f6467a0041f6367965ed3c1ad4377b9ac08 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1435 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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@ -619,6 +619,9 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
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msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
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goto err;
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if (frag_len == 0)
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return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
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/* Try to find item in queue */
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memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
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seq64be[6] = (unsigned char) (msg_hdr->seq>>8);
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@ -695,7 +698,12 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
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goto err;
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}
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pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
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item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
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/* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
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* However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
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* |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it and control
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* would never have reached this branch. */
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assert(item != NULL);
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}
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return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
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@ -753,7 +761,7 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
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}
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else
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{
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if (frag_len && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
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if (frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
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return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok);
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if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
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@ -782,7 +790,15 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
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if ( item == NULL)
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goto err;
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pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
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item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
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/* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
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* However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
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* |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it. Then, either
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* |frag_len| != |msg_hdr->msg_len| in which case |item| is set
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* to NULL and it will have been processed with
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* |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, above, or the record will have
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* been discarded. */
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assert(item != NULL);
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}
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return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
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