Remove logic for non-signing client certificates.
Now that only RSA and ECDSA certificates are supported, the server should just reject non-signing ones outright, rather than allowing them to skip CertificateVerify. Change-Id: I7fe5ed3adde14481016ee841ed241faba18c26f0 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1609 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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@ -2306,15 +2306,10 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
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EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
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/* Determine if a CertificateVerify message is expected at all. It is
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* important that this be determined before ssl_get_message is called,
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* so as not to process the ChangeCipherSpec message early. */
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if (peer != NULL)
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{
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pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
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type = X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
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}
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if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
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/* Only RSA and ECDSA client certificates are supported, so a
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* CertificateVerify is required if and only if there's a
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* client certificate. */
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if (peer == NULL)
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{
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ret = 1;
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goto done_with_buffer;
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@ -2333,6 +2328,16 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
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goto done;
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}
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pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
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type = X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
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if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
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{
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/* If it's not a signing certificate, it's unsupported. */
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al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_verify, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
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goto f_err;
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}
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CBS_init(&certificate_verify, s->init_msg, n);
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/* We now have a signature that we need to verify. */
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