This is another thing that MSVC can't cope with:
..\tool\speed.cc(537) : error C2536: 'SpeedNewHope::<⋯>::SpeedNewHope::<⋯>::clientmsg' : cannot specify explicit initializer for arrays
Change-Id: I6b4cb430895f7794e9cef1b1c12b57ba5d537c64
Rather than use an internal function in a test (which would need an
OPENSSL_EXPORT to work in a shared-library build), this change corrupts
the secret key directly.
Change-Id: Iee501910b23a0affaa0639dcc773d6ea2d0c5a82
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7780
Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
C and C++ disagree on the sizes of empty structs, which can be rather bad for
structs embedded in public headers. Stick a char in them to avoid issues. (It
doesn't really matter for CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX, but it's easier to add a char in
there too.)
Thanks to Andrew Chi for reporting this issue.
Change-Id: Ic54fff710b688decaa94848e9c7e1e73f0c58fd3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7760
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
(Imported from upstream's 2442382e11c022aaab4fdc6975bd15d5a75c4db2 and
0ca67644ddedfd656d43a6639d89a6236ff64652)
Change-Id: I601ef07e39f936e8f3e30412fd90cd339d712dc4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7742
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The i2d_X509() function can return a negative value on error. Therefore
we should make sure we check it.
Issue reported by Yuan Jochen Kang.
(Imported from upstream's 8f43c80bfac15544820739bf035df946eeb603e8)
Change-Id: If247d5bf1d792eb7c6dc179b606ed21ea0ccdbb8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7743
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
If the ASN.1 BIO is presented with a large length field read it in
chunks of increasing size checking for EOF on each read. This prevents
small files allocating excessive amounts of data.
CVE-2016-2109
Thanks to Brian Carpenter for reporting this issue.
(Imported from upstream's f32774087f7b3db1f789688368d16d917757421e)
Change-Id: Id1b0d4436c4879d0ba7d3b7482b937cafffa28f7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7741
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Forgot to mark something static.
Change-Id: I497075d0ad27e2062f84528fb568b333e72a7d3b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7753
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
It's not possible to encode an OID with only one component, so some of
the NIDs do not have encodings. The logic to actually encode OIDs checks
for this (before calling der_it), but not the logic to compute the
sorted OID list.
Without this, OBJ_obj2nid, when given an empty OID, returns something
arbitrary based on the binary search implementation instead of
NID_undef.
Change-Id: Ib68bae349f66eff3d193616eb26491b6668d4b0a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7752
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
C gets grumpy when you shift into a sign bit. Replace it with a different bit
trick.
BUG=chromium:603502
Change-Id: Ia4cc2e2d68675528b7c0155882ff4d6230df482b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7740
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We already had coverage for our new EVP_PKEY parsers, but it's good to have
some that cover them directly. The initial corpus was generated manually with
der-ascii and should cover most of the insanity around EC key serialization.
BUG=15
Change-Id: I7aaf56876680bfd5a89f5e365c5052eee03ba862
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7728
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
aosp-master has been updated past the point that this is necessary. Sadly, all
the other hacks still are. I'll try to get things rolling so we can ditch the
others in time.
Change-Id: If7b3aad271141fb26108a53972d2d3273f956e8d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7751
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Due to Android's complex branching scheme, we have to keep building against a
snapshotted version of wpa_supplicant. wpa_supplicant, in preparation for
OpenSSL 1.1.0, added compatibility versions of some accessors that we, in
working towards opaquification, have imported. This causes a conflict (C does
not like having static and non-static functions share a name).
Add a hack in the headers to suppress the conflicting accessors when
BORINGSSL_SUPPRESS_ACCESSORS is defined. Android releases which include an
updated BoringSSL will also locally carry this #define in wpa_supplicant build
files. Once we can be sure releases of BoringSSL will only see a new enough
wpa_supplicant (one which includes a to-be-submitted patch), we can ditch this.
Change-Id: I3e27fde86bac1e59077498ee5cbd916cd880821e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7750
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These source files previously didn't have the ISC license on them.
Change-Id: Ic0a2047d23b28d9d7f0a85b2fedb67574bdcab25
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7735
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The x86-64 version of this assembly doesn't include this function. It's
in decrepit/rc4 as a compatibility backfill but that means that 32-bit
builds end up with two definitions of this symbol.
Change-Id: Ib6da6b91aded8efc679ebbae6d60c96a78f3dc4e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7734
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Split gn and gyp generators apart. Since we're pre-generating files, there's no
need to make BoringSSL's build depend on the gypi_to_gn.py script. Also emit
the tests and a list of fuzzers so we don't need to manually update BUILD.gn
each time.
The new gn generator is based on the bazel one since they're fairly similar.
BUG=chromium:429246
Change-Id: I5a819a964d6ac6e56e9251bb3fd3de1db08214a4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7726
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Opaquifying SSL_SESSION is less important than the other structs, but this will
cause less turbulence in wpa_supplicant if we add this API too. Semantics and
name taken from OpenSSL 1.1.0 to match.
BUG=6
Change-Id: Ic39f58d74640fa19a60aafb434dd2c4cb43cdea9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7725
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Probably better to keep it out of the way for someone just trying to figure out
how to use the library. Notably, we don't really want people to think they need
to use the directioned init function.
Change-Id: Icacc2061071581abf46e38eb1d7a52e7b1f8361b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7724
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It has all of one function in there.
Change-Id: I86f0fbb76d267389c62b63ac01df685acb70535e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7723
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Avoid calculating the affine Y coordinate when the caller didn't ask
for it, as occurs, for example, in ECDH.
For symmetry and clarity, avoid calculating the affine X coordinate in
the hypothetical case where the caller only asked for the Y coordinate.
Change-Id: I69f5993fa0dfac8b010c38e695b136cefc277fed
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7590
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is purely hypothetical, as in real life nobody cares about the
|y| component without also caring about the |x| component, but it
clarifies the code and makes a future change clearer.
Change-Id: Icaa4de83c87b82a8e68cd2942779a06e5db300c3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7588
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The result would not be correct if, on input, |x->neg != 0| or
|y->neg != 0|.
Change-Id: I645566a78c2e18e42492fbfca1df17baa05240f7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7587
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Use only Montgomery math in |ec_GFp_mont_point_get_affine_coordinates|.
In particular, avoid |BN_mod_sqr| and |BN_mod_mul|.
Change-Id: I05c8f831d2865d1b105cda3871e9ae67083f8399
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7586
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
usleep is guarded by feature macro insanity. Use nanosleep which looks to be
less unfriendly.
Change-Id: I75cb2284f26cdedabb19871610761ec7440b6ad3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7710
Reviewed-by: Emily Stark (Dunn) <estark@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Now that we no longer support Windows XP, this function is available. In doing
so, remove the odd run_once_arg_t union and pass in a pointer to a function
pointer which is cleaner and still avoids C's silly rule where function
pointers can't be placed in a void*.
BUG=37
Change-Id: I44888bb3779dacdb660706debd33888ca389ebd5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7613
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The existing tests never actually tested this case.
Change-Id: Idb9cf0cbbe32fdf5cd353656a95fbedbaac09376
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7612
Reviewed-by: Emily Stark (Dunn) <estark@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is avoids pulling in BIGNUM for doing a straight-forward addition on a
block-sized value, and avoids a ton of mallocs. It's also -Wconversion-clean,
unlike the old one.
In doing so, this replaces the HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK with EVP_MAX_MD_BLOCK_SIZE.
By having the maximum block size available, most of the temporary values in the
key derivation don't need to be malloc'd.
BUG=22
Change-Id: I940a62bba4ea32bf82b1190098f3bf185d4cc7fe
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7688
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Also switch the EVP_CIPHER copy to cut down on how frequently we need to cast
back and forth.
BUG=22
Change-Id: I9af1e586ca27793a4ee6193bbb348cf2b28a126e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7689
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The EVP_MD versions do, so the types should bubble up.
BUG=22
Change-Id: Ibccbc9ff35bbfd3d164fc28bcdd53ed97c0ab338
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7687
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Require the public exponent to be available unless
|RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING| is set on the key. Also, document this.
If the public exponent |e| is not available, then we could compute it
from |p|, |q|, and |d|. However, there's no reasonable situation in
which we'd have |p| or |q| but not |e|; either we have all the CRT
parameters, or we have (e, d, n), or we have only (d, n). The
calculation to compute |e| exposes the private key to risk of side
channel attacks.
Also, it was particularly wasteful to compute |e| for each
|BN_BLINDING| created, instead of just once before the first
|BN_BLINDING| was created.
|BN_BLINDING| now no longer needs to contain a duplicate copy of |e|,
so it is now more space-efficient.
Note that the condition |b->e != NULL| in |bn_blinding_update| was
always true since commit cbf56a5683.
Change-Id: Ic2fd6980e0d359dcd53772a7c31bdd0267e316b4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7594
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This reduces the chance of double-frees.
BUG=10
Change-Id: I11a240e2ea5572effeddc05acb94db08c54a2e0b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7583
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
When |rsa->e == NULL| we cannot verify the result, so using the CRT
would leave the key too vulnerable to fault attacks.
Change-Id: I154622cf6205ba4d5fb219143db6072a787c2d1f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7581
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
|CRYPTO_memcmp| isn't necessary because there is no secret data being
acted on here.
Change-Id: Ib678d5d4fc16958aca409a93df139bdff8cb73fb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7465
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Use the common pattern of returning early instead of |goto err;| when
there's no cleanup to do yet. Also, move the error checking of
|BN_CTX_get| failure closer to the the calls to |BN_CTX_get|. Avoid
calling |OPENSSL_cleanse| on public data. Clarify when/why |buf| is not
freed.
Change-Id: I9df833db7eb7041c5af9349c461297372b988f98
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7464
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The same check is already done in |RSA_verify_raw|, so |RSA_verify|
doesn't need to do it.
Also, move the |RSA_verify_raw| check earlier.
Change-Id: I15f7db0aad386c0f764bba53e77dfc46574f7635
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7463
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We do not need to support engine-provided verification methods.
Change-Id: Iaad8369d403082b728c831167cc386fdcabfb067
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7311
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Although the server_name extension was intended to be extensible to new name
types, OpenSSL 1.0.x had a bug which meant different name types will cause an
error. Further, RFC 4366 originally defined syntax inextensibly. RFC 6066
corrected this mistake, but adding new name types is no longer feasible.
Act as if the extensibility does not exist to simplify parsing. This also
aligns with OpenSSL 1.1.x's behavior. See upstream's
062178678f5374b09f00d70796f6e692e8775aca and
https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg19425.html
Change-Id: I5af26516e8f777ddc1dab5581ff552daf2ea59b5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7294
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We reset it to SSL_NOTHING at the start of ever SSL_get_error-using operation.
Then we only set it to a non-NOTHING value in the rest of the stack on error
paths.
Currently, ssl->rwstate is set all over the place. Sometimes the pattern is:
ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
if (BIO_write(...) <= 0) {
goto err;
}
ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
Sometimes we only set it to the non-NOTHING value on error.
if (BIO_write(...) <= 0) {
ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
}
ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
Sometimes we just set it to SSL_NOTHING far from any callback in random places.
The third case is arbitrary and clearly should be removed.
But, in the second case, we sometimes forget to undo it afterwards. This is
largely harmless since an error in the error queue overrides rwstate, but we
don't always put something in the error queue (falling back to
SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL for "I'm not sure why it failed. Perhaps it was one of your
callbacks? Check your errno equivalent."), but in that case a stray rwstate
value will cause it to be wrong.
We could fix the cases where we fail to set SSL_NOTHING on success cases, but
this doesn't account for there being multiple SSL_get_error operations. The
consumer may have an SSL_read and an SSL_write running concurrently. Instead,
it seems the best option is to lift the SSL_NOTHING reset to the operations and
set SSL_WRITING and friends as in the second case.
(Someday hopefully we can fix this to just be an enum that is internally
returned. It can convert to something stateful at the API layer.)
Change-Id: I54665ec066a64eb0e48a06e2fcd0d2681a42df7f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7453
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The concern is if the peer denies our renegotiation attempt, but we will never
initiate renegotiation. We only support server-initiated renegotiation when we
are acting as the client.
(Strictly speaking, only the client ever initiates renegotiation. The server
sends a HelloRequest to ask the client to initiate it. But we forbid
application data interleave as soon as we see the HelloRequest, so we treat it
as part of the handshake.)
Change-Id: I1a625130de32a7227e4471f2f889255aba962ce4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7452
Reviewed-by: Emily Stark (Dunn) <estark@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is just kind of a silly thing to do. NSS doesn't allow them either. Fatal
alerts would kill the connection regardless and warning alerts are useless. We
previously stopped accepting fragmented alerts but still allowed them doubled
up.
This is in preparation for pulling the shared alert processing code between TLS
and DTLS out of read_bytes into some common place.
Change-Id: Idbef04e39ad135f9601f5686d41f54531981e0cf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7451
Reviewed-by: Emily Stark (Dunn) <estark@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
I don't think I ever look at that output. This way our builds are nice and
silent.
Change-Id: Idb215e3702f530a8b8661622c726093530885c91
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7700
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
In OpenSSL, socket BIOs only used recv/send on Windows and read/write on POSIX.
Align our socket BIOs with that behavior. This should be a no-op, but avoids
frustrating consumers overly sensitive to the syscalls used now that SSL_set_fd
has switched to socket BIOs to align with OpenSSL. b/28138582.
Change-Id: Id4870ef8e668e587d6ef51c5b5f21e03af66a288
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7686
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
One of the codepaths didn't free the group. Found by libFuzzer.
BUG=chromium:603893
Change-Id: Icb81f2f89a8c1a52e29069321498986b193a0e56
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7685
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
With SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD, decryption can happen outside of BoringSSL. Rather than crash the process, it would be nicer if BoringSSL handled the error gracefully.
Change-Id: I3f24d066f7a329d41420b208a7e13c82ec966710
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7683
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
(Imported from b9077d85b0042d3d5d877d5cf7f06a8a8c035673.)
Change-Id: I6df3b3d0913b001712a78671c69b9468e059047f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7682
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This currently doesn't prefix assembly symbols since they don't pull in
openssl/base.h
BUG=5
Change-Id: Ie0fdc79ae73099f84ecbf3f17604a1e615569b3b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7681
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
