Rather than store CA names and only find out that they're unparsable
when we're asked for a |STACK_OF(X509_NAME)|, check that we can parse
them all during the handshake. This avoids changing the semantics with
the previous change that kept CA names as |CRYPTO_BUFFER|s.
Change-Id: I0fc7a4e6ab01685347e7a5be0d0579f45b8a4818
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This change converts the CA names that are parsed from a server's
CertificateRequest, as well as the CA names that are configured for
sending to clients in the same, to use |CRYPTO_BUFFER|.
The |X509_NAME|-based interfaces are turned into compatibility wrappers.
Change-Id: I95304ecc988ee39320499739a0866c7f8ff5ed98
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Change-Id: I3bc1e46fb94104c4ae31c1c98fa0d5a931e5f954
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It has no more callers.
Change-Id: I587ccb3b63810ed167febf7a65ba85106d17a300
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The new APIs are SSL_CTX_set_strict_cipher_list() and
SSL_set_strict_cipher_list(). They have two motivations:
First, typos in cipher lists can go undetected for a long time, and
can have surprising consequences when silently ignored.
Second, there is a tendency to use superstition in the construction of
cipher lists, for example by "turning off" things that do not actually
exist. This leads to the corrosive belief that DEFAULT and ALL ought
not to be trusted. This belief is false.
Change-Id: I42909b69186e0b4cf45457e5c0bc968f6bbf231a
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The two non-trivial changes are:
1. The public API now queries it out of the session. There is a long
comment over the old field explaining why the state was separate, but
this predates EMS being forbidden from changing across resumption. It
is not possible for established_session and the socket to disagree on
EMS.
2. Since SSL_HANDSHAKE gets reset on each handshake, the check that EMS
does not change on renego looks different. I've reworked that function a
bit, but it should have the same effect.
Change-Id: If72e5291f79681381cf4d8ceab267f76618b7c3d
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This lets us trim another two pointers of per-connection state.
Change-Id: I2145d529bc25b7e24a921d01e82ee99f2c98867c
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This effectively reverts b9824e2417. This
error seems to have mostly just caused confusion in logs and the
occasional bug around failing to ERR_clear_error. Consumers tend to
blindly call SSL_shutdown when tearing down an SSL (to avoid
invalidating sessions). This means handshake failures trigger two
errors, which is screwy.
Go back to the old behavior where SSL_shutdown while SSL_in_init
silently succeeds.
Change-Id: I1fcfc92d481b97c840847dc39afe59679cd995f2
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This reduces us from seven different configuration patterns to six (see
comment #2 of linked bug). I do not believe there is any behavior change
here as SSL_set_SSL_CTX already manually copied the field. It now gives
us a nice invariant: SSL_set_SSL_CTX overrides all and only the
dual-SSL/SSL_CTX options hanging off of CERT.
BUG=123
Change-Id: I1ae06b791fb869917a6503cee41afb2d9be53d89
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I'm not sure why the SSL versions of these functions return int while
the SSL_CTX version returns void. It looks like this dates to
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/1491/, of which the initial
upload was an SSL_ctrl macro. I guess one of the ints got accidentally
preserved in conversion.
(No existing caller, aside from bssl_shim, checks the result.)
Change-Id: Id54309c1aa03462d520b9a45cdfdefdd2cdd1298
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0-RTT requires matching the selected ALPN parameters against those in
the session. Stash the ALPN value in the session in TLS 1.3, so we can
recover it.
BUG=76
Change-Id: I8668b287651ae4deb0bf540c0885a02d189adee0
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Recent changes added SSL-level setters to these APIs. Unfortunately,
this has the side effect of breaking SSL_set_SSL_CTX, which is how SNI
is typically handled. SSL_set_SSL_CTX is kind of a weird function in
that it's very sensitive to which of the hodge-podge of config styles is
in use. I previously listed out all the config styles here, but it was
long and unhelpful. (I counted up to 7.)
Of the various SSL_set_SSL_CTX-visible config styles, the sanest seems
to be to move it to CERT. In this case, it's actually quite reasonable
since they're very certificate-related.
Later we may wish to think about whether we can cut down all 7 kinds of
config styles because this is kinda nuts. I'm wondering we should do
CERT => SSL_CONFIG, move everything there, and make that be the same
structure that is dropped post-handshake (supposing the caller has
disavowed SSL_clear and renego). Fruit for later thought. (Note though
that comes with a behavior change for all the existing config.)
Change-Id: I9aa47d8bd37bf2847869e0b577739d4d579ee4ae
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All the business with rewinding hs->state back or skipping states based
on reuse_message or a skip parameter isn't really worth the trouble for
a debugging callback. With SSL_state no longer exposed, we don't have to
worry about breaking things.
BUG=177
Change-Id: I9a0421f01c8b2f24c80a6b3e44de9138ea023f58
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The split was there out of paranoia that some caller may notice the
change in initial state. Now that SSL_state is neutered, simplify.
BUG=177
Change-Id: I7e2138c2b56821b0c79eec98bb09a82fc28238e8
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I doubt this matters, but this seems a little odd. In particular, this
avoids info_callback seeing the SSL_ST_OK once we stop switching
hs->state back and forth.
BUG=177
Change-Id: Ied39c0e94c242af9d5d0f26795d6e0f2f0b12406
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Code which manages to constrain itself on this will limit our ability to
rework the handshake. I believe, at this point, we only need to expose
one bit of information (there's some code that compares SSL_state to
SSL_ST_OK), if even that.
BUG=177
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This makes sense to do if we are a client and initiate a renegotiation
at the same time as the server requesting one. Since we will never
initiate a renegotiation, this should not be necessary.
Change-Id: I5835944291fdb8dfcc4fed2ebf1064e91ccdbe6a
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We compare pointer/length pairs constantly. To avoid needing to type it
everywhere and get GTest's output, add a StringPiece-alike for byte
slices which supports ==, !=, and std::ostream.
BUG=129
Change-Id: I108342cbd2c6a58fec0b9cb87ebdf50364bda099
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|SSL_SESSION_from_bytes| now takes an |SSL_CTX*|, from which it uses the
|X509_METHOD| and buffer pool. This is our API so we can do this.
This also requires adding an |SSL_CTX*| argument to |SSL_SESSION_new|
for the same reason. However, |SSL_SESSION_new| already has very few
callers (and none in third-party code that I can see) so I think we can
get away with this.
Change-Id: I1337cd2bd8cff03d4b9405ea3146b3b59584aa72
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We sized the post-handshake message limit for the older zero-length
KeyUpdate and forgot to update it when it got larger.
Thanks to Matt Caswell for catching this.
Change-Id: I7d2189479e9516fbfb6c195dfa367794d383582c
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Change-Id: I98903df561bbf8c5739f892d2ad5e89ac0eb8e6f
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In honor of CVE-2016-9244. Although that particular bug BoGo was already
testing since it uses 16 bytes here.
The empty session ID case is particularly worth testing to make sure we
don't get confused somewhere. RFC 5077 allows clients to offer tickets
with no session ID. This is absurd since the client then has no way of
detecting resumption except by lookahead. We'll never do this as a
client, but should handle it correctly as a server.
Change-Id: I49695d19f03c4efdef43749c07372d590a010cda
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ssl_rsa.c now basically deals with private-key functions, so rename to
reflect that.
Change-Id: Ia87ed4c0f9b34af134844e2eeb270fc45ff3f23f
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I even made a note to update my change in light of this but still
managed to forget. With this, grep tells me that all |alert| values have
the correct default value now.
Change-Id: If37c4f2f6b36cf69e53303a3924a8eda4cfffed8
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We already have some cases where the default is DECODE_ERROR and, rather
than have two defaults, just harmonise on that. (INTERNAL_ERROR might
make more sense in some cases, but we don't want to have to remember
what the default is in each case and nobody really cares what the actual
value is anyway.)
Change-Id: I28007898e8d6e7415219145eb9f43ea875028ab2
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Change-Id: If97da565155292d5f0de5c6a8b0fd8508398768a
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This ABCD thing with multiple ways to enter the same function is
confusing. ClientHello processing is the most egregious of these, so
split it up ahead of time as an intermediate step.
States remain named as-is due to them being exposed as public API. We
should have a story for which subset of states we need to promise as
public API and to intentionally break all other cases (map to some
generic value) before we go too far there.
BUG=128
Change-Id: Id9d28c6de14bd53c3294552691cebe705748f489
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Previously, the alert was uninitialised.
(Thanks to Robert Swiecki and honggfuzz.)
Change-Id: I2d4eb96b0126f3eb502672b2600ad43ae140acec
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The Go side (thankfully not the C side) was not fully updated for the
exporter secret derivation being earlier at some point. Also TLS 1.2
upgrades the PRF hash for pre-1.2 ciphers to SHA-256, so make sure we
cover that.
Change-Id: Ibdf50ef500e7e48a52799ac75577822bc304a613
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Change-Id: I471880d785c38123e038279f67348bf02b47d091
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Replicate the logic in the AllTests targets to dump the error queue on
failure. GTest seems to print to stdout, so we do here too.
BUG=129
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The more complex ones will want a TEST_P, but here are a few easy ones
to start with.
BUG=129
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Right now the only way to set an SCT list is the per-context function
SSL_CTX_set_signed_cert_timestamp_list. However this assumes that all the
SSLs generated from a SSL_CTX share the same SCT list, which is wrong.
In order to avoid memory duplication in case SSL_CTX has its own list, a
CRYPTO_BUFFER is used for both SSL_CTX and SSL.
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As previously discussed, it turns out we don't actually need this, so
there's no point in keeping it.
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The SNI extension may be ACKed by the server. This is kind of pointless,
but make sure we cover these codepaths.
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Change-Id: I878dfb9f5d3736c3ec0d5fa39052cca58932dbb7
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Change-Id: I38cd04fa40edde4e4dd31fdc16bbf92985430198
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ssl_get_new_session would stash a copy of the configured hostname
into the SSL_SESSION on the server. Servers have no reason to
configuring that anyway, but, if one did, we'd leak when filling in
the client-supplied SNI later.
Remove this code and guard against this by remembering to OPENSSL_free
when overwriting that field (although it should always be NULL).
Reported-By: Robert Swiecki <swiecki@google.com>
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With the CRYPTO_BUFFER stuff, this API is now slightly more complex. Add
some tests as a sanity-check.
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This is purely to support curl, which now has HTTPS proxy support that,
sadly, uses the BIO SSL. Don't use the BIO SSL for anything else.
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The TLS 1.2 and 1.3 state machines do the exact same thing at the
beginning. Let them process the ClientHello extensions, etc., and
finalize the certificate in common code. Once we start picking
parameters, we begin to diverge. Everything before this point is
arguably part of setting up the configuration, which is
version-agnostic.
BUG=128
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The version negotiation logic was a little bizarrely wedged in the
middle of the state machine. (We don't support server renegotiation, so
have_version is always false here.)
BUG=128
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It has no other callers, now that the handshake is written elsewhere.
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In TLS 1.2, resumption's benefits are more-or-less subsumed by False
Start. TLS 1.2 resumption lifetime is bounded by how much traffic we are
willing to encrypt without fresh key material, so the lifetime is short.
Renewal uses the same key, so we do not allow it to increase lifetimes.
In TLS 1.3, resumption unlocks 0-RTT. We do not implement psk_ke, so
resumption incorporates fresh key material into both encrypted traffic
(except for early data) and renewed tickets. Thus we are both more
willing to and more interested in longer lifetimes for tickets. Renewal
is also not useless. Thus in TLS 1.3, lifetime is bound separately by
the lifetime of a given secret as a psk_dhe_ke authenticator and the
lifetime of the online signature which authenticated the initial
handshake.
This change maintains two lifetimes on an SSL_SESSION: timeout which is
the renewable lifetime of this ticket, and auth_timeout which is the
non-renewable cliff. It also separates the TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 timeouts.
The old session timeout defaults and configuration apply to TLS 1.3, and
we define new ones for TLS 1.3.
Finally, this makes us honor the NewSessionTicket timeout in TLS 1.3.
It's no longer a "hint" in 1.3 and there's probably value in avoiding
known-useless 0-RTT offers.
BUG=120
Change-Id: Iac46d56e5a6a377d8b88b8fa31f492d534cb1b85
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13503
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This special-case is almost unexposed (the timeout is initialized to the
default) except if the caller calls SSL_CTX_set_timeout(0). Preserve
that behavior by mapping 0 to SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT in
SSL_CTX_set_timeout but simplify the internal state.
Change-Id: Ice03a519c25284b925f1e0cf485f2d8c54dc5038
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13502
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It is impossible to have to call dispatch_alert when writing application
data. Now that we don't send warning alerts through ssl3_send_alert, all
alerts are closure alerts, which means attempts to write will fail.
This prunes a lot of dead code, avoiding the re-entrancy in the write
path. With that gone, tracking alert_dispatch is much more
straightforward.
BUG=146
Change-Id: Ie5fe677daee71e463d79562f3d2cea822a92581d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13500
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
