I'm not sure why the SSL versions of these functions return int while
the SSL_CTX version returns void. It looks like this dates to
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/1491/, of which the initial
upload was an SSL_ctrl macro. I guess one of the ints got accidentally
preserved in conversion.
(No existing caller, aside from bssl_shim, checks the result.)
Change-Id: Id54309c1aa03462d520b9a45cdfdefdd2cdd1298
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13866
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Recent changes added SSL-level setters to these APIs. Unfortunately,
this has the side effect of breaking SSL_set_SSL_CTX, which is how SNI
is typically handled. SSL_set_SSL_CTX is kind of a weird function in
that it's very sensitive to which of the hodge-podge of config styles is
in use. I previously listed out all the config styles here, but it was
long and unhelpful. (I counted up to 7.)
Of the various SSL_set_SSL_CTX-visible config styles, the sanest seems
to be to move it to CERT. In this case, it's actually quite reasonable
since they're very certificate-related.
Later we may wish to think about whether we can cut down all 7 kinds of
config styles because this is kinda nuts. I'm wondering we should do
CERT => SSL_CONFIG, move everything there, and make that be the same
structure that is dropped post-handshake (supposing the caller has
disavowed SSL_clear and renego). Fruit for later thought. (Note though
that comes with a behavior change for all the existing config.)
Change-Id: I9aa47d8bd37bf2847869e0b577739d4d579ee4ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13864
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Code which manages to constrain itself on this will limit our ability to
rework the handshake. I believe, at this point, we only need to expose
one bit of information (there's some code that compares SSL_state to
SSL_ST_OK), if even that.
BUG=177
Change-Id: Ie1c43006737db0b974811f1819755c629ae68e7b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13826
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Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: I98903df561bbf8c5739f892d2ad5e89ac0eb8e6f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13369
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Right now the only way to set an SCT list is the per-context function
SSL_CTX_set_signed_cert_timestamp_list. However this assumes that all the
SSLs generated from a SSL_CTX share the same SCT list, which is wrong.
In order to avoid memory duplication in case SSL_CTX has its own list, a
CRYPTO_BUFFER is used for both SSL_CTX and SSL.
Change-Id: Id20e6f128c33cf3e5bff1be390645441be6518c6
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As previously discussed, it turns out we don't actually need this, so
there's no point in keeping it.
Change-Id: If549c917b6bd818cd36948e37cb7839c8d122b1a
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In TLS 1.2, resumption's benefits are more-or-less subsumed by False
Start. TLS 1.2 resumption lifetime is bounded by how much traffic we are
willing to encrypt without fresh key material, so the lifetime is short.
Renewal uses the same key, so we do not allow it to increase lifetimes.
In TLS 1.3, resumption unlocks 0-RTT. We do not implement psk_ke, so
resumption incorporates fresh key material into both encrypted traffic
(except for early data) and renewed tickets. Thus we are both more
willing to and more interested in longer lifetimes for tickets. Renewal
is also not useless. Thus in TLS 1.3, lifetime is bound separately by
the lifetime of a given secret as a psk_dhe_ke authenticator and the
lifetime of the online signature which authenticated the initial
handshake.
This change maintains two lifetimes on an SSL_SESSION: timeout which is
the renewable lifetime of this ticket, and auth_timeout which is the
non-renewable cliff. It also separates the TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 timeouts.
The old session timeout defaults and configuration apply to TLS 1.3, and
we define new ones for TLS 1.3.
Finally, this makes us honor the NewSessionTicket timeout in TLS 1.3.
It's no longer a "hint" in 1.3 and there's probably value in avoiding
known-useless 0-RTT offers.
BUG=120
Change-Id: Iac46d56e5a6a377d8b88b8fa31f492d534cb1b85
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13503
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This special-case is almost unexposed (the timeout is initialized to the
default) except if the caller calls SSL_CTX_set_timeout(0). Preserve
that behavior by mapping 0 to SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT in
SSL_CTX_set_timeout but simplify the internal state.
Change-Id: Ice03a519c25284b925f1e0cf485f2d8c54dc5038
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13502
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change converts the |CERT| struct to holding certificates as binary
blobs, rather than in parsed form. The members for holding the parsed
form are still there, however, but are only used as a cache for the
event that someone asks us for a non-owning pointer to the parsed leaf
or chain.
Next steps:
* Move more functions in to ssl_x509.c
* Create an X509_OPS struct of function pointers that will hang off
the |SSL_METHOD| to abstract out the current calls to crypto/x509
operations.
BUG=chromium:671420
Change-Id: Ifa05d88c49a987fd561b349705c9c48f106ec868
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13280
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
On the TLS side, we introduce a running buffer of ciphertext. Queuing up
pending data consists of encrypting the record into the buffer. This
effectively reimplements what the buffer BIO was doing previously, but
this resizes to fit the whole flight.
As part of this, rename all the functions to add to the pending flight
to be more uniform. This CL proposes "add_foo" to add to the pending
flight and "flush_flight" to drain it.
We add an add_alert hook for alerts but, for now, only the SSL 3.0
warning alert (sent mid-handshake) uses this mechanism. Later work will
push this down to the rest of the write path so closure alerts use it
too, as in DTLS. The intended end state is that all the ssl_buffer.c and
wpend_ret logic will only be used for application data and eventually
optionally replaced by the in-place API, while all "incidental" data
will be handled internally.
For now, the two buffers are mutually exclusive. Moving closure alerts
to "incidentals" will change this, but flushing application data early
is tricky due to wpend_ret. (If we call ssl_write_buffer_flush,
do_ssl3_write doesn't realize it still has a wpend_ret to replay.) That
too is all left alone in this change.
To keep the diff down, write_message is retained for now and will be
removed from the state machines in a follow-up change.
BUG=72
Change-Id: Ibce882f5f7196880648f25d5005322ca4055c71d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13224
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Instead, "writing" a message merely adds it to the outgoing_messages
structure. The code to write the flight then loops over it all and now
shares code with retransmission. The verbs here are all a little odd,
but they'll be fixed in later commits.
In doing so, this fixes a slight miscalculation of the record-layer
overhead when retransmitting a flight that spans two epochs. (We'd use
the encrypted epoch's overhead for the unencrypted epoch.)
BUG=72
Change-Id: I8ac897c955cc74799f8b5ca6923906e97d6dad17
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13223
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This was replaced by the more general CLIENT_RANDOM scheme that records
the master secret. Support was added in Wireshark 1.8.0, released in
June 2012. At this point, ECDHE is sufficiently widely deployed that
anyone that cares about this feature must have upgraded their Wireshark
by now.
Change-Id: I9b708f245ec8728c1999daf91aca663be7d25661
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13263
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Eventually, all uses of crypto/x509 will be from ssl_x509.c, but this is
just a start.
Change-Id: I2f38cdcbf18b1f26add0aac10a70af10a79dee0e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13242
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We have a test somewhere which tries to read off of it. Align the getter
roughly with upstream's SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context (which we don't
currently expose).
BUG=6
Change-Id: Iab240868838ba56c1f08d112888d9536574347b4
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TLS 1.3 doesn't support renegotiation in the first place, but so callers
don't report TLS 1.3 servers as missing it, always report it as
(vacuously) protected against this bug.
BUG=chromium:680281
Change-Id: Ibfec03102b2aec7eaa773c331d6844292e7bb685
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This adds support for setting 0-RTT mode on tickets minted by
BoringSSL, allowing for testing of the initial handshake knowledge.
BUG=76
Change-Id: Ic199842c03b5401ef122a537fdb7ed9e9a5c635a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12740
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We repeat this in a bunch of places.
Change-Id: Iee2c95a13e1645453f101d8be4be9ac78d520387
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13051
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We have this function now. Probably good to use it.
Change-Id: I00fe1f4cf5c8cb6f61a8f6600cac4667e95ad7f3
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This extension will be used to test whether
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/762 is deployable against
middleboxes. For simplicity, it is mutually exclusive with 0-RTT. If
client and server agree on the extension, TLS 1.3 records will use the
format in the PR rather than what is in draft 18.
BUG=119
Change-Id: I1372ddf7b328ddf73d496df54ac03a95ede961e1
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Most C standard library functions are undefined if passed NULL, even
when the corresponding length is zero. This gives them (and, in turn,
all functions which call them) surprising behavior on empty arrays.
Some compilers will miscompile code due to this rule. See also
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2016/06/26/nonnull.html
Add OPENSSL_memcpy, etc., wrappers which avoid this problem.
BUG=23
Change-Id: I95f42b23e92945af0e681264fffaf578e7f8465e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12928
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There are no longer any consumers of these APIs.
These were useful back when the CBC vs. RC4 tradeoff varied by version
and it was worth carefully tuning this cutoff. Nowadays RC4 is
completely gone and there's no use in configuring these anymore.
To avoid invalidating the existing ssl_ctx_api corpus and requiring it
regenerated, I've left the entries in there. It's probably reasonable
for new API fuzzers to reuse those slots.
Change-Id: I02bf950e3828062341e4e45c8871a44597ae93d5
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This function always returns the full chain and will hopefully eliminate
the need for some code in Conscrypt.
Change-Id: Ib662005322c40824edf09d100a784ff00492896a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12780
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
So we can report it cleanly out of DevTools, it should behave like
SSL_get_curve_id and be reported on resumption too.
BUG=chromium:658905
Change-Id: I0402e540a1e722e09eaebadf7fb4785d8880c389
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The only accessor for this field is the group/curve ID. Switch to only
storing that so no cipher checks are needed to interpret it. Instead,
ignore older values at parse time.
Change-Id: Id0946d4ac9e7482c69e64cc368a9d0cddf328bd3
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Nothing calls this anymore. DHE is nearly gone. This unblocks us from
making key_exchange_info only apply to the curve.
Change-Id: I3099e7222a62441df6e01411767d48166a0729b1
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This currently only works for certificates parsed from the network, but
if making several connections that share certificates, some KB of memory
might be saved.
BUG=chromium:671420
Change-Id: I1c7a71d84e1976138641f71830aafff87f795f9d
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OpenSSL includes a leaf certificate in a certificate chain when it's a
client, but doesn't when it's a server. This is also reflected in the
serialisation of sessions.
This change makes the internal semantics consistent: the leaf is always
included in the chain in memory, and never duplicated when serialised.
To maintain the same API, SSL_get_peer_cert_chain will construct a copy
of the chain without the leaf if needed.
Since the serialised format of a client session has changed, an
|is_server| boolean is added to the ASN.1 that defaults to true. Thus
any old client sessions will be parsed as server sessions and (silently)
discarded by a client.
Change-Id: Ibcf72bc8a130cedb423bc0fd3417868e0af3ca3e
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state is now initialized to SSL_ST_INIT in SSL_HANDSHAKE. If there is no
handshake present, we report SSL_ST_OK. This saves 8 bytes of
per-connection post-handshake memory.
Change-Id: Idb3f7031045caed005bd7712bc8c4b42c81a1d04
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This is to free up moving ssl->state into SSL_HANDSHAKE. ssl->state
serves two purposes right now. First, it is the state tracking for
SSL_HANDSHAKE. Second, it lets the system know there is a handshake
waiting to complete.
Instead, arrange things so that, if there is a handshake waiting to
complete, hs is not NULL. That means we need to initialize it when
creating a new connection and when discovering a renego.
Note this means we cannot make initializing an SSL_HANDSHAKE depend on
client vs. server.
Change-Id: I585a8d7e700c4ffe4d372248d34c44106ad7e7a0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12696
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Reduce the amount of boilerplate needed to add more of these. Also tidy
things up a little.
Change-Id: I90ea7f70dba5a2b38a1fb716faff97eb4f6afafc
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This reverts commits 5a6e616961 and
e8509090cf. I'm going to unify how the
chains are kept in memory between client and server first otherwise the
mess just keeps growing.
Change-Id: I76df0d94c9053b2454821d22a3c97951b6419831
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Change-Id: Ie947ab176d10feb709c6e135d5241c6cf605b8e8
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This currently only works for certificates parsed from the network, but
if making several connections that share certificates, some KB of memory
might be saved.
Change-Id: I0ea4589d7a8b5c41df225ad7f282b6d1376a8db4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12164
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Right now the only way to set an OCSP response is SSL_CTX_set_ocsp_response
however this assumes that all the SSLs generated from a SSL_CTX share the
same OCSP response, which is wrong.
This is similar to the OpenSSL "function" SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp,
the main difference being that this doesn't take ownership of the OCSP buffer.
In order to avoid memory duplication in case SSL_CTX has its own response,
a CRYPTO_BUFFER is used for both SSL_CTX and SSL.
Change-Id: I3a0697f82b805ac42a22be9b6bb596aa0b530025
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All callers were long since updated.
Change-Id: Ibdc9b186076dfbcbc3bd7dcc72610c8d5a522cfc
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Prior to 87eab4902d, due to some
confusions between configuration and connection state, SSL_clear had the
side effect of offering the previously established session on the new
connection.
wpa_supplicant relies on this behavior, so restore it for TLS 1.2 and
below and add a test. (This behavior is largely incompatible with TLS
1.3's post-handshake tickets, so it won't work in 1.3. It'll act as if
we configured an unresumable session instead.)
Change-Id: Iaee8c0afc1cb65c0ab7397435602732b901b1c2d
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size_t at the public API, uint8_t on the SSL structs since everything
fits in there comfortably.
Change-Id: I837c3b21e04e03dfb957c1a3e6770300d0b49c0b
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It is impossible to have an SSL* without a corresponding method.
Change-Id: Icaf826a06aaaa2c7caf98b1e4a950f9c1d48e6bd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12621
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There is no need to retain it beyond this point.
Change-Id: Ib5722ab30fc013380198b1582d1240f0fe0aa770
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12620
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These too have no reason to be called across files.
Change-Id: Iee477e71f956c2fa0d8817bf2777cb3a81e1c853
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This allows a consumer to disable Channel ID (for instance, it may be
enabled on the SSL_CTX and later disabled on the SSL) without reaching
into the SSL struct directly.
Deprecate the old APIs in favor of these.
BUG=6
Change-Id: I193bf94bc1f537e1a81602a39fc2b9a73f44c73b
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Each of these functions is called only once, but they're interspersed
between s3_lib.c and ssl_lib.c.
Change-Id: Ic496e364b091fc8e01fc0653fe73c83c47f690d9
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It's our ClientHello representation. May as well name it accordingly.
Also switch away from calling the variable name ctx as that conflicts
with SSL_CTX.
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The remaining direct accesses are in functions which expect to be called
in and out of the handshake. Accordingly, they are NULL-checked.
Change-Id: I07a7de6bdca7b6f8d09e22da11b8863ebf41389a
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We currently look up SSL_HANDSHAKE off of ssl->s3->hs everywhere, but
this is a little dangerous. Unlike ssl->s3->tmp, ssl->s3->hs may not be
present. Right now we just know not to call some functions outside the
handshake.
Instead, code which expects to only be called during a handshake should
take an explicit SSL_HANDSHAKE * parameter and can assume it non-NULL.
This replaces the SSL * parameter. Instead, that is looked up from
hs->ssl.
Code which is called in both cases, reads from ssl->s3->hs. Ultimately,
we should get to the point that all direct access of ssl->s3->hs needs
to be NULL-checked.
As a start, manage the lifetime of the ssl->s3->hs in SSL_do_handshake.
This allows the top-level handshake_func hooks to be passed in the
SSL_HANDSHAKE *. Later work will route it through the stack. False Start
is a little wonky, but I think this is cleaner overall.
Change-Id: I26dfeb95f1bc5a0a630b5c442c90c26a6b9e2efe
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12236
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Due to recent changes, changing the SSL session timeout from cert_cb is
not possible anymore since the new |SSL_SESSION| is initialized *after*
cert_cb is run. The alternative would be using |SSL_CTX_set_timeout| but
the specific |SSL_CTX| could be shared by multiple |SSL|s.
Setting a value on a per-connection basis is useful in case timeouts
need to be calculated dynamically based on specific certificate/domain
information that would be retrieved from inside cert_cb (or other
callbacks).
It would also be possible to set the value to 0 to prevent session
resumption, which is not otherwise doable in the handshake callbacks.
Change-Id: I730a528c647f83f7f77f59b5b21d7e060e4c9843
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12440
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This change causes SSL_CTX_set_signed_cert_timestamp_list to check the
SCT list for shallow validity before allowing it to be set.
Change-Id: Ib8a1fe185224ff02ed4ce53a0109e60d934e96b3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12401
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Previously the option to retain only the SHA-256 hash of client
certificates could only be set at the |SSL_CTX| level. This change makes
|SSL| objects inherit the setting from the |SSL_CTX|, but allows it to
be overridden on a per-|SSL| basis.
Change-Id: Id435934af3d425d5f008d2f3b9751d1d0884ee55
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12182
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This simplifies a little code around EMS and PSK KE modes, but requires
tweaking the SNI code.
The extensions that are more tightly integrated with the handshake are
still processed inline for now. It does, however, require an extra state
in 1.2 so the asynchronous session callback does not cause extensions to
be processed twice. Tweak a test enforce this.
This and a follow-up to move cert_cb before resumption are done in
preparation for resolving the cipher suite before resumption and only
resuming on match.
Note this has caller-visible effects:
- The legacy SNI callback happens before resumption.
- The ALPN callback happens before resumption.
- Custom extension ClientHello parsing callbacks also cannot depend on
resumption state.
- The DoS protection callback now runs after all the extension callbacks
as it is documented to be called after the resumption decision.
BUG=116
Change-Id: I1281a3b61789b95c370314aaed4f04c1babbc65f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11845
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
