If the ASN.1 BIO is presented with a large length field read it in
chunks of increasing size checking for EOF on each read. This prevents
small files allocating excessive amounts of data.
CVE-2016-2109
Thanks to Brian Carpenter for reporting this issue.
(Imported from upstream's f32774087f7b3db1f789688368d16d917757421e)
Change-Id: Id1b0d4436c4879d0ba7d3b7482b937cafffa28f7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7741
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Many of the compatibility issues are described at
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/mt612856.aspx. The macros
that suppressed warnings on a per-function basis no longer work in
Update 1, so replace them with #pragmas. Update 1 warns when |size_t|
arguments to |printf| are casted, so stop doing that casting.
Unfortunately, this requires an ugly hack to continue working in
MSVC 2013 as MSVC 2013 doesn't support "%zu". Finally, Update 1 has new
warnings, some of which need to be suppressed.
---
Updated by davidben to give up on suppressing warnings in crypto/x509 and
crypto/x509v3 as those directories aren't changed much from upstream. In each
of these cases, upstream opted just blindly initialize the variable, so do the
same. Also switch C4265 to level 4, per Microsoft's recommendation and work
around a bug in limits.h that happens to get fixed by Google include order
style.
(limits.h is sensitive to whether corecrt.h, pulled in by stddef.h and some
other headers, is included before it. The reason it affected just one file is
we often put the file's header first, which means base.h is pulling in
stddef.h. Relying on this is ugly, but it's no worse than what everything else
is doing and this doesn't seem worth making something as tame as limits.h so
messy to use.)
Change-Id: I02d1f935356899f424d3525d03eca401bfa3e6cd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7480
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Partially fixes build with -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations.
Change-Id: I51209c30f532899f57cfdd9a50cff0a8ee3da5b5
Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotrsikora@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7512
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Partially fixes build with -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations.
Change-Id: I6048f5b7ef31560399b25ed9880156bc7d8abac2
Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotrsikora@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7511
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
I messed up a few of these.
ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM doesn't exist. X509_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM does
exist as part of X509_PUBKEY_set, but the SPKI parser doesn't emit this. (I
don't mind the legacy code having really weird errors, but since EVP is now
limited to things we like, let's try to keep that clean.) To avoid churn in
Conscrypt, we'll keep defining X509_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM, but not actually
do anything with it anymore. Conscrypt was already aware of
EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM, so this should be fine. (I don't expect
EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM to go away. The SPKI parsers we like live in EVP
now.)
A few other ASN1_R_* values didn't quite match upstream, so make those match
again. Finally, I got some of the rsa_pss.c values wrong. Each of those
corresponds to an (overly specific) RSA_R_* value in upstream. However, those
were gone in BoringSSL since even the initial commit. We placed the RSA <-> EVP
glue in crypto/evp (so crypto/rsa wouldn't depend on crypto/evp) while upstream
placed them in crypto/rsa.
Since no one seemed to notice the loss of RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH, let's undo
all the cross-module errors inserted in crypto/rsa. Instead, since that kind of
specificity is not useful, funnel it all into X509_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS
(formerly EVP_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS, formerly RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS).
Reset the error codes for all affected modules.
(That our error code story means error codes are not stable across this kind of
refactoring is kind of a problem. Hopefully this will be the last of it.)
Change-Id: Ibfb3a0ac340bfc777bc7de6980ef3ddf0a8c84bc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7458
Reviewed-by: Emily Stark (Dunn) <estark@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
People seem to condition on these a lot. Since this code has now been moved
twice, just make them all cross-module errors rather than leave a trail of
renamed error codes in our wake.
Change-Id: Iea18ab3d320f03cf29a64a27acca119768c4115c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7431
Reviewed-by: Emily Stark (Dunn) <estark@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
While we're here, may as well test others.
Change-Id: I711528641a3f7dd035c696c3c1d6b035437c91cc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7239
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The high bits of the type get used for the V_ASN1_NEG bit, so when used with
ASN1_ANY/ASN1_TYPE, universal tags become ambiguous. This allows one to create
a negative zero, which should be impossible. Impose an upper bound on universal
tags accepted by crypto/asn1 and add a test.
BUG=590615
Change-Id: I363e01ebfde621c8865101f5bcbd5f323fb59e79
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7238
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
(Imported from upstream's e9cf5f03666bb82f0184e4f013702d0b164afdca and
29305f4edc886db349f2beedb345f9dd93311c09)
Change-Id: I0fa019e9d337676a84a7a6c103d2c4e14e18aede
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7240
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
(Imported from upstream's 3661bb4e7934668bd99ca777ea8b30eedfafa871.)
Fix bug where i2c_ASN1_INTEGER mishandles zero if it is marked as
negative.
Thanks to Huzaifa Sidhpurwala <huzaifas@redhat.com> and Hanno Böck
<hanno@hboeck.de> for reporting this issue.
BUG=590615
Change-Id: I8959e8ae01510a5924862a3f353be23130eee554
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7199
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
It's not used anywhere else, in the library or consumers (Google ones or
ones I could find on Debian codesearch). This is a sufficiently
specialized function that the risk of a third-party library newly
depending on it is low. This removes the last include of asn1.h or
x509.h in crypto/evp.
(This is almost entirely cosmetic because it wasn't keeping the static linker
from doing the right thing anyway. But if we were want to separate the legacy
ASN.1 stack into its own decrepit-like target, we'll need to be pickier about
separation.)
Change-Id: I9be97c9321572e3a2ed093e1d50036b7654cff41
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7080
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
OpenSSL upstream did a bulk reformat. We still have some files that have
the old OpenSSL style and this makes applying patches to them more
manual, and thus more error-prone, than it should be.
This change is the result of running
util/openssl-format-source -v -c .
in the enumerated directories. A few files were in BoringSSL style and
have not been touched.
This change should be formatting only; no semantic difference.
Change-Id: I75ced2970ae22b9facb930a79798350a09c5111e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6904
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There was a TODO to remove it once asn1_mac.h was trimmed. This has now
happened. Remove it and reset error codes for crypto/asn1.
Change-Id: Iaf2f3e75741914415372939471b135618910f95d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6761
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
(Imported from upstream's d88ef40a1e5c81d0d32b4a431e55f5456e678dd2 and
943c4ca62b3f5a160340d57aecb9413407a06e15.)
Change-Id: Idd52aebae6839695be0f3a8a7659adeec6650b98
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6556
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
When parsing a combined structure pass a flag to the decode routine
so on error a pointer to the parent structure is not zeroed as
this will leak any additional components in the parent.
This can leak memory in any application parsing PKCS#7 or CMS structures.
CVE-2015-3195.
Thanks to Adam Langley (Google/BoringSSL) for discovering this bug using
libFuzzer.
PR#4131
(Imported from upstream's cc598f321fbac9c04da5766243ed55d55948637d, with test
from our original report. Verified ASan trips up on the test without the fix.)
Change-Id: I007d93f172b2f16bf6845d685d72717ed840276c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6615
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There's a few things that will be kind of a nuisance and possibly not worth it
(crypto/asn1 dumps a lot of undeclared things, etc.). But it caught some
mistakes. Even without the warning, making sure to include the externs before
defining a function helps catch type mismatches.
Change-Id: I3dab282aaba6023e7cebc94ed7a767a5d7446b08
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6484
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Android is now using Ninja so it doesn't spew so much to the terminal
and thus any warnings in BoringSSL (which builds really early in the
process) and much more obvious.
Thus this change fixes a few warnings that appear in the Android build.
Change-Id: Id255ace90fece772a1c3a718c877559ce920b960
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6400
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
(Imported from upstream's 728bcd59d3d41e152aead0d15acc51a8958536d3.)
Actually this one was reported by us, but the commit message doesn't
mention this.
This is slightly modified from upstream's version to fix some problems
noticed in import. Specifically one of d2i_X509_AUX's success paths is
bust and d2i_PrivateKey still updates on one error path. Resolve the
latter by changing both it and d2i_AutoPrivateKey to explicitly hit the
error path on ret == NULL. This lets us remove the NULL check in
d2i_AutoPrivateKey.
We'll want to report the problems back upstream.
Change-Id: Ifcfc965ca6d5ec0a08ac154854bd351cafbaba25
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5948
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's supposed to be void*. The only reason this was working was that it was
only called in C which happily casts from void* to T*. (But if called in C++ in
a macro, it breaks.)
Change-Id: I7f765c3572b9b4815ae58da852be1e742de1bd96
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5760
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
arm_arch.h is included from ARM asm files, but lives in crypto/, not
openssl/include/. Since the asm files are often built from a different
location than their position in the source tree, relative include paths
are unlikely to work so, rather than having crypto/ be a de-facto,
second global include path, this change moves arm_arch.h to
include/openssl/.
It also removes entries from many include paths because they should be
needed as relative includes are always based on the locations of the
source file.
Change-Id: I638ff43d641ca043a4fc06c0d901b11c6ff73542
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5746
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Running make_errors.go every time a function is renamed is incredibly
tedious. Plus we keep getting them wrong.
Instead, sample __func__ (__FUNCTION__ in MSVC) in the OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR macro
and store it alongside file and line number. This doesn't change the format of
ERR_print_errors, however ERR_error_string_n now uses the placeholder
"OPENSSL_internal" rather than an actual function name since that only takes
the uint32_t packed error code as input.
This updates err scripts to not emit the function string table. The
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR invocations, for now, still include the extra
parameter. That will be removed in a follow-up.
BUG=468039
Change-Id: Iaa2ef56991fb58892fa8a1283b3b8b995fbb308d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5275
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change converts the reference counts in crypto/ to use
|CRYPTO_refcount_t|. The reference counts in |X509_PKEY| and |X509_INFO|
were never actually used and so were dropped.
Change-Id: I75d572cdac1f8c1083c482e29c9519282d7fd16c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4772
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
While *pval is usually a pointer in rare circumstances it can be a long
value. One some platforms (e.g. WIN64) where
sizeof(long) < sizeof(ASN1_VALUE *) this will write past the field.
*pval is initialised correctly in the rest of ASN1_item_ex_new so setting it
to NULL is unecessary anyway.
Thanks to Julien Kauffmann for reporting this issue.
(Imported from upstream's f617b4969a9261b9d7d381670aefbe2cf766a2cb.)
Change-Id: I8cc777f7ab126dcef3a0278a82d3fc91faf4c231
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4510
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
See upstream's a0eed48d37a4b7beea0c966caf09ad46f4a92a44. Rather than import
that, we should just ensure neg + zero isn't a possible state.
Add some tests for asc2bn and dec2bn while we're here. Also fix a bug with
dec2bn where it doesn't actually ignore trailing data as it's supposed to.
Change-Id: I2385b67b740e57020c75a247bee254085ab7ce15
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4484
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Beyond generally eliminating unnecessary includes, eliminate as many
includes of headers that declare/define particularly error-prone
functionality like strlen, malloc, and free. crypto/err/internal.h was
added to remove the dependency on openssl/thread.h from the public
openssl/err.h header. The include of <stdlib.h> in openssl/mem.h was
retained since it defines OPENSSL_malloc and friends as macros around
the stdlib.h functions. The public x509.h, x509v3.h, and ssl.h headers
were not changed in order to minimize breakage of source compatibility
with external code.
Change-Id: I0d264b73ad0a720587774430b2ab8f8275960329
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4220
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
C4701 is "potentially uninitialized local variable 'buf' used". It
sometimes results in false positives, which can now be suppressed
using the macro OPENSSL_SUPPRESS_POTENTIALLY_UNINITIALIZED_WARNINGS.
Change-Id: I15068b5a48e1c704702e7752982b9ead855e7633
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3160
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Amazingly, asn1_GetSequence isn't completely unused? Keep that around for now
and ditch everything else. This lets us enable C4311 in MSVC which is actually
a pretty reasonable warning.
Change-Id: I43bb9206b1745e8a68224f3a435713d2a74e04ea
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4256
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Quite a few functions reported wrong function names when pushing
to the error stack.
Change-Id: I84d89dbefd2ecdc89ffb09799e673bae17be0e0f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4080
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Fix segmentation violation when ASN1_TYPE_cmp is passed a boolean type. This
can be triggered during certificate verification so could be a DoS attack
against a client or a server enabling client authentication.
CVE-2015-0286
(Imported from upstream's e677e8d13595f7b3287f8feef7676feb301b0e8a.)
Change-Id: I5faefc190568504bb5895ed9816a6d80432cfa45
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4048
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Allocate and free ASN.1 string types directly instead of going through
the ASN.1 item code.
(Imported from upstream's 3d6aa6d441fe8124d247dffee5c68c2e5efd8258.)
Change-Id: I617283e67071a792f219ed08f19078afc223e2f5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4041
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Previously, ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t would return 1 if s > t, -1 if
s < t, and 0 if s == t.
This behavior was broken in upstream's
904348a4922333106b613754136305db229475ea, resulting in the opposite time
comparison behavior.
PR#3706
(Imported from upstream's da27006df06853a33b132133699a7aa9d4277920.)
Change-Id: I9c1c28ba21d82ff4b587e33b262f46be4e846ff9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4043
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
When printing out an ASN.1 structure, if the type is an item template don't
fall through and attempt to interpret as a primitive type.
(Imported from upstream's 5dc1247a7494f50c88ce7492518bbe0ce6f124fa.)
Change-Id: Ica39757792cbf3f83879953b67838927ddbdb809
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4009
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The call to asn1_do_adb can return NULL on error, so we should check the
return value before attempting to use it.
(Imported from upstream's 34a7ed0c39aa3ab67eea1e106577525eaf0d7a00.)
Change-Id: Ia43cdc73b5f1d16e6fc907b5aaf13c9df5a9958c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4007
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
ASN1_primitive_new takes an ASN1_ITEM * param |it|. There are a couple
of conditional code paths that check whether |it| is NULL or not - but
later |it| is deref'd unconditionally. If |it| was ever really NULL then
this would seg fault. In practice ASN1_primitive_new is marked as an
internal function in the public header file. The only places it is ever
used internally always pass a non NULL parameter for |it|. Therefore, change
the code to sanity check that |it| is not NULL, and remove the conditional
checking.
(Imported from upstream's 9e488fd6ab2c295941e91a47ab7bcd346b7540c7)
Change-Id: Icbb13cd00d0ec5529871b678b0bcc465956a7572
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4006
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
(Imported from upstream's 0b142f022e2c5072295e00ebc11c5b707a726d74.)
Modified further because these ought to just be BIO_puts.
Change-Id: I8b70d70d0f626bb19b455adb4f0e08bacf453c1d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4002
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Fix a few remnants of them being unsigned long. Also rename extremely unhelpful
variable names in SSL_get_error. i is now ret_code to match the header.
Change-Id: Ic31d6626bfe09c9e21c03691dfc716c5573833ea
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3881
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Imported from upstream's 918bb8652969fd53f0c390c1cd909265ed502c7e. (The
remainder is in code we've since deleted.)
Change-Id: Ie878272114086ba60a0fd5eae059b641b00ec0c4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3831
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Caught by malloc valgrind tests on Basic-Client-Sync. Also one by inspection
and verified with valgrind. Those should pass now with the exception of
CRYPTO_free_ex_data being internally implemented with malloc.
(Clearly we next should make our malloc tests assert that the containing
function fails to catch when we fail to check for some error and things
silently move one.)
Change-Id: I56c51dc8a32a7d3c7ac907d54015dc241728c761
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3440
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Some files in crypto/x509 were moved from crypto/asn1, so they emit errors from
another module. Fix make_errors.go to account for this: cross module errors
must use the foreign module as the first argument to OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR. Both
the function code and the error code should be declared in the foreign module.
Update make_errors.go to ignore cross-module error lines when deciding which
function tokens to emit.
Change-Id: Ic38377ddd56e22d033ef91318c30510762f6445d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3383
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Previously, error strings were kept in arrays for each subdirectory and
err.c would iterate over them all and insert them at init time to a hash
table.
This means that, even if you have a shared library and lots of processes
using that, each process has ~30KB of private memory from building that
hash table.
This this change, all the error strings are built into a sorted list and
are thus static data. This means that processes can share the error
information and it actually saves binary space because of all the
pointer overhead in the old scheme. Also it saves the time taken
building the hash table at startup.
This removes support for externally-supplied error string data.
Change-Id: Ifca04f335c673a048e1a3e76ff2b69c7264635be
Including string.h in base.h causes any file that includes a BoringSSL
header to include string.h. Generally this wouldn't be a problem,
although string.h might slow down the compile if it wasn't otherwise
needed. However, it also causes problems for ipsec-tools in Android
because OpenSSL didn't have this behaviour.
This change removes string.h from base.h and, instead, adds it to each
.c file that requires it.
Change-Id: I5968e50b0e230fd3adf9b72dd2836e6f52d6fb37
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3200
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
According to X6.90 null, object identifier, boolean, integer and enumerated
types can only have primitive encodings: return an error if any of
these are received with a constructed encoding.
(Imported from upstream's 89f40f369f414b52e00f7230b0e3ce99e430a508.)
Change-Id: Ia5d15eef72e379119f50fdbac4e92c4761bf5eaf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2835
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject the
signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the certificate
signature. NB: this will result in signature failure errors for some broken
certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received signature.
Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature (thanks to
Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS program for
discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs (negative or
with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
(Imported from upstream's 85cfc188c06bd046420ae70dd6e302f9efe022a9 and
4c52816d35681c0533c25fdd3abb4b7c6962302d)
Change-Id: Ic901aea8ea6457df27dc542a11c30464561e322b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2783
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This commit fixes a number of crashes caused by malloc failures. They
were found using the -malloc-test=0 option to runner.go which runs tests
many times, causing a different allocation call to fail in each case.
(This test only works on Linux and only looks for crashes caused by
allocation failures, not memory leaks or other errors.)
This is not the complete set of crashes! More can be found by collecting
core dumps from running with -malloc-test=0.
Change-Id: Ia61d19f51e373bccb7bc604642c51e043a74bd83
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2320
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Appease clang scan-build a bit. I'm not sure it's actually worth silencing all
of them because some of them look like preserving invariants between local
variables, but some are clearly pointless or can be restructured slightly.
Change-Id: I0bc81e2589bb402ff3ef0182d7a8921e31b85052
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2205
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
