It's weird and makes things more confusing. Only use it for local
preferences as there is a default. Peer preferences can be read
directly. Also simplify the logic for requiring a non-empty peer group
list for ECDHE. The normal logic will give us this for free.

Change-Id: I1916155fe246be988f20cbf0b1728380ec90ff3d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11527
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

This function is now only ever called as a client, so there are no peer
preferences to check against. It is also now only called on peer curves,
so it only needs to be compared against local preferences.

Change-Id: I87f5b10cf4fe5fef9a9d60aff36010634192e90c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11526
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

These functions are only called once. It ends up being not much code if
just done inline.

Change-Id: Ic432b313a6f7994ff9f51436cffbe0c3686a6c7c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11525
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

This is in preparation for simplifying tls1_check_group_id, called by
tls1_check_ec_cert, which, in turn, is in preparation for moving the
peer group list to SSL_HANDSHAKE.

It also helps with bug #55. Move the key usage check to the certificate
configuration sanity check. There's no sense in doing it late. Also
remove the ECDSA peer curve check as we configure certificates
externally. With only one certificate, there's no sense in trying to
remove it.

BUG=55

Change-Id: I8c116337770d96cc9cfd4b4f0ca7939a4f05a1a9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11524
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>

Change-Id: I7f1d546f735ca854ac58c65b529218afda164ec0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11523
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

Change-Id: I3ab30a44b7f90ef1159e022cd17b7f50ffe27a93
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11522
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

This releases memory associated with them after the handshake. Note this
changes the behavior of |SSL_get0_certificate_types| and
|SSL_get_client_CA_list| slightly. Both functions now return NULL
outside of the handshake. But they were already documented to return
something undefined when not called at the CertificateRequest.

A survey of callers finds none that would care. (Note
SSL_get_client_CA_list is used both as a getter for the corresponding
server config setter and to report client handshake properties. Only the
latter is affected.) It's also pretty difficult to imagine why a caller
would wish to query this stuff at any other time, and there are clear
benefits to dropping the CA list after the handshake (some servers send
ABSURDLY large lists).

Change-Id: I3ac3b601ff0cfa601881ce77ae33d99bb5327004
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11521
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

Change-Id: Ifcdbeab9291d1141605a09a1960702c792cffa86
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11561
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>

Change-Id: I5d4fc0d3204744e93d71a36923469035c19a5b10
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11560
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>

Fixing error:

fuzz/ssl_ctx_api.cc:232:6: error: implicit instantiation of undefined
template 'std::__1::basic_string....

BUG=

Change-Id: I6d623dcca3e4edc52702d713fc948a0242bd4db8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11540
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

Change-Id: Ib499b3393962a4d41cf9694e055ed3eb869d91a2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11504
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>

Change-Id: Iedf30f2711649e55fccfb77031c8617fca055ce7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11503
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>

Our implementation now expects draft 15.

Change-Id: I261a090763951110a6c9f03acfda4ae23cc14cfc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11502
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>

The server acknowledging a non-existent session is a particularly
interesting case since getting it wrong means a NULL crash.

Change-Id: Iabde4955de883595239cfd8e9d84a7711e60a886
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11500
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>

BUG=77

Change-Id: If568412655aae240b072c29d763a5b17bb5ca3f7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10840
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>

BUG=77

Change-Id: Id8c45e98c4c22cdd437cbba1e9375239e123b261
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10763
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>

EnableAllCiphers is problematic since some (version, cipher)
combinations aren't even defined and crash. Instead, use the
SendCipherSuite bug to mask the true cipher (which is becomes arbitrary)
for failure tests. The shim should fail long before we get further.

This lets us remove a number of weird checks in the TLS 1.3 code.

This also fixes the UnknownCipher tests which weren't actually testing
anything. EnableAllCiphers is now AdvertiseAllConfiguredCiphers and
does not filter out garbage values.

Change-Id: I7102fa893146bb0d096739e768c5a7aa339e51a8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11481
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>

This is not a complete fuzzer, even for SSL_CTX, but it's a start.

Written in memory of c-ares[1].

[1] https://twitter.com/hanno/status/781506296906444800

Change-Id: I64b02c60f35b9057201df2cc325ebb7a84a0229d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11423
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>

Now android-standalone is the same as android.

Change-Id: If4cda2f43bea66309c4e5bbd6a62298de72b0e24
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11411
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

This is another case where the specification failed to hammer things
down and OpenSSL messed it up as a result. Also fix the SCT test in TLS
1.3.

Change-Id: I47541670447d1929869e1a39b2d9671a127bfba0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11480
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>

The client/server split didn't actually make sense. We're interested in
whether the client will notice the bad version before anything else, so
ignore peer cipher preferences so all combinations work.

Change-Id: I52f84b932509136a9b39d93e46c46729c3864bfd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11413
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>

This finally removes the last Android hack. Both Chromium and Android
end up needing this thing (Chromium needs it for WebCrypto but currently
uses the EVP_AEAD version and Android needs it by way of
wpa_supplicant).

On the Android side, the alternative is we finish upstream's
NEED_INTERNAL_AES_WRAP patch, but then it just uses its own key-wrap
implementation. This seems a little silly, considering we have a version
of key-wrap under a different API anyway.

It also doesn't make much sense to leave the EVP_AEAD API around if we
don't want people to use it and Chromium's the only consumer. Remove it
and I'll switch Chromium to the new---er, old--- APIs next roll.

Change-Id: I23a89cda25bddb6ac1033e4cd408165f393d1e6c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11410
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

cURL calls this function if |OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER| is in [0x10002003,
0x10002fff], which it now is for BoringSSL after 0aecbcf6.

Change-Id: I3f224f73f46791bd2232a1a96ed926c32740a6f6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11461
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>

We have CBS_get_asn1 / CBS_get_asn1_element, but not the "any" variants
of them. Without this, a consumer walking a DER structure must manually
CBS_skip the header, which is a little annoying.

Change-Id: I7735c37eb9e5aaad2bde8407669bce5492e1ccf6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11404
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>

This is just to reduce the diff with upstream's files so it's easier to
tell what's going on. Upstream's files have lots and lots of trailing
whitespace. We were also missing a comment.

Change-Id: Icfc3b52939823a046a3744fd8e619b5bd6160715
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11408
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

ConflictingVersionNegotiation really should be about, say 1.1 and 1.2
since those may be negotiated via either mechanism. (Those two cases are
actually kinda weird and we may wish to change the spec. But, in the
meantime, test that we have the expected semantics.)

Also test that we ignore true TLS 1.3's number for now, until we use it,
and that TLS 1.3 suitably ignores ClientHello.version.

Change-Id: I76c660ddd179313fa68b15a6fda7a698bef4d9c9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11407
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

They weren't updated for the new version negotiation. (Though right now
they're just testing that we *don't* implement the downgrade detection
because it's a draft version.)

Change-Id: I4c983ebcdf3180d682833caf1e0063467ea41544
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11406
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

Otherwise we panic. Thanks to EKR for reporting.

Change-Id: Ie4b6c2e18e1c77c7b660ca5d4c3bafb38a82cb6a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11405
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

Rather than clear variables and break out of a loop that just ends up
returning anyway, just return. This makes all the abort points
consistent in this function.

Change-Id: I51d862e7c60a9e967773f15a17480b783af8c456
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11422
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>

Breaking from inside the inner loop doesn't do what the code wants.
Instead the outer loop will continue running and it's possible for it to
read off the end of the buffer. (Found with libFuzzer.)

Next change will update the other abort points in this code to match.

Change-Id: I006dca0cd4c31db1c4b5e84b996fe24b2f1e6c13
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11421
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>

Some projects (NGINX, OpenResty, ...) check for the, uhm, "alphabetic"
part of OpenSSL versions as well.

Change-Id: Iaa0809437756bc805235a1f53f4d62c900d22ca5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11440
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>

If asn1_item_ex_combine_new fails in one of the ASN1_template_new calls
just before the ASN1_OP_NEW_POST call, ASN1_item_ex_free will free the
temporary object which ultimately calls ASN1_OP_FREE_POST. This means
that ASN1_OP_FREE_POST needs to account for zero-initialized objects.

Change-Id: I56fb63bd5c015d9dfe3961606449bc6f5b1259e3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11403
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

I always forget this.

Change-Id: I9fa15cebb6586985ddc48cdbf9d184a49a8bfb02
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11402
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

Change-Id: Ia020ea08431859bf268d828b5d72715295de26e6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11401
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

They just need a different name for the real malloc implementations.

Change-Id: Iee1aac1133113d628fd3f9f1ed0335d66c6def24
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11400
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

Change-Id: I3e3eb16d58c94926c68991c3a5a4abe67d5bb6f2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11360
Commit-Queue: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>

This function is used by NGINX to enable specific curves for ECDH from a
configuration file. However when building with BoringSSL, since it's not
implmeneted, it falls back to using EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name() wich doesn't
support X25519.

Change-Id: I533df4ef302592c1a9f9fc8880bd85f796ce0ef3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11382
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>

OpenSSL recently had a regression here (CVE-2016-6309). We're fine,
but so that we stay that way, add some tests.

Change-Id: I244d7ff327b7aad550f86408c5e5e65e6d1babe5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11321
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>

Not sure if version-dependant, but with CMake 3.6 "!" doesn't work.

Change-Id: I5f91234b27e340142b479b602d4102134ad55ccb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11381
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

We've switched to the version extension, so refresh the corpus.

Change-Id: Ic50f58bd83d62dccae26063c9ea2d4a2c799da1f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11326
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

BUG=106

Change-Id: Iaa12aeb67627f3c22fe4a917c89c646cb3dc1843
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11325
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>

Change-Id: Ia535741caa914072f31beeb02ad1d26f7ad692b9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11324
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

Change-Id: I73f9fd64b46f26978b897409d817b34ec9d93afd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11080
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>

In order to align ppc64le with the existing code, 4467e59b changed the
prefix for both the ARM and ppc64le AES assembly code to be “aes_hw_”.
However, it didn't update aes.c as well.

Change-Id: I8e3c7dea1c49ddad8a613369af274e25d572a8fd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11342
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>

This change adds AES and GHASH assembly from upstream, with the aim of
speeding up AES-GCM.

The PPC64LE assembly matches the interface of the ARMv8 assembly so I've
changed the prefix of both sets of asm functions to be the same
("aes_hw_").

Otherwise, the new assmebly files and Perlasm match exactly those from
upstream's c536b6be1a (from their master branch).

Before:
Did 1879000 AES-128-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000428us (1878196.1 ops/sec): 30.1 MB/s
Did 61000 AES-128-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1006660us (60596.4 ops/sec): 81.8 MB/s
Did 11000 AES-128-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1072649us (10255.0 ops/sec): 84.0 MB/s
Did 1665000 AES-256-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000591us (1664016.6 ops/sec): 26.6 MB/s
Did 52000 AES-256-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1006971us (51640.0 ops/sec): 69.7 MB/s
Did 8840 AES-256-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1013294us (8724.0 ops/sec): 71.5 MB/s

After:
Did 4994000 AES-128-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000017us (4993915.1 ops/sec): 79.9 MB/s
Did 1389000 AES-128-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1000073us (1388898.6 ops/sec): 1875.0 MB/s
Did 319000 AES-128-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1000101us (318967.8 ops/sec): 2613.0 MB/s
Did 4668000 AES-256-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000149us (4667304.6 ops/sec): 74.7 MB/s
Did 1202000 AES-256-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1000646us (1201224.0 ops/sec): 1621.7 MB/s
Did 269000 AES-256-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1002804us (268247.8 ops/sec): 2197.5 MB/s

Change-Id: Id848562bd4e1aa79a4683012501dfa5e6c08cfcc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11262
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>

We were never really testing this.

Change-Id: Ia953870053d16d3994ae48172017d384c7bc3601
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11341
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>

One of Chromium's toolchains can't handle this for some reason. See also
empty_crls and empty in TestVerify.

Change-Id: I5e6a849f3042288da2e406882ae5cfec249a86ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11340
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>

This mirror's 2dc0204603 on the C side.

BUG=90

Change-Id: Iebb72df5a5ae98cb2fd8db519d973cd734ff05ea
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11320
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>

This is in preparation for implementing the version extension and is
probably what we should have done from the beginning as it makes
intolerance bugs simpler.

This means knobs like SendClientVersion and SendServerVersion deal with
the wire values while knobs like NegotiateVersion and MaxVersion deal
with logical versions. (This matches how the bugs have always worked.
SendFoo is just a weird post-processing bit on the handshake messages
while NegotiateVersion actually changes how BoGo behaves.)

BUG=90

Change-Id: I7f359d798d0899fa2742107fb3d854be19e731a4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11300
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>

It didn't clean up |profiles| on error or check for
sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_push failures.

Change-Id: I44d7f64896ad73347fbb0fc79752be4de70d3ab7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11323
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>