(Imported from upstream's 728bcd59d3d41e152aead0d15acc51a8958536d3.)
Actually this one was reported by us, but the commit message doesn't
mention this.
This is slightly modified from upstream's version to fix some problems
noticed in import. Specifically one of d2i_X509_AUX's success paths is
bust and d2i_PrivateKey still updates on one error path. Resolve the
latter by changing both it and d2i_AutoPrivateKey to explicitly hit the
error path on ret == NULL. This lets us remove the NULL check in
d2i_AutoPrivateKey.
We'll want to report the problems back upstream.
Change-Id: Ifcfc965ca6d5ec0a08ac154854bd351cafbaba25
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5948
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This fixes an issue with Clang, which doesn't like static functions that
aren't used (to its eyes).
Change-Id: I7cb055aa9f0ab3934352c105abe45f9c30990250
This change causes ARM and Aarch64 to use the ARMv8 AES instructions, if
provided by the current CPU.
Change-Id: I50cb36270139fcf4ce42e5ebb8afe24ffcab22e3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6002
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
By doing this the compiler can notice that much of the code is unused in
the case that we know that we can't have a hardware RNG (i.e. ARM).
Change-Id: I72d364a30080364d700f855640e0164c2c62f0de
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6001
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
∙ Some comments had the wrong function name at the beginning.
∙ Some ARM asm ended up with two #if defined(__arm__) lines – one from
the .pl file and one inserted by the translation script.
Change-Id: Ia8032cd09f06a899bf205feebc2d535a5078b521
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6000
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Avoid using cnid = 0, use NID_undef instead, and return early instead of
trying to find an instance of that in the subject DN.
(Imported from upstrea's 40d5689458593aeca0d1a7f3591f7ccb48e459ac.)
Change-Id: I1bdf6bf7a4b1f4774a8dbec7e5df421b3a27c7e4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5947
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
- Pass in the right ciphertext length to ensure we're indeed testing
ciphertext corruption (and not truncation).
- Only test one mutation per byte to not make the test too slow.
- Add a separate test for truncated ciphertexts.
(Imported from upstream's 5f623eb61655688501cb1817a7ad0592299d894a.)
Change-Id: I425a77668beac9d391387e3afad8d15ae387468f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5945
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Not content with signing negative RSA moduli, still other Estonian IDs have too
many leading zeros. Work around those too.
This workaround will be removed in six months.
BUG=534766
Change-Id: Ica23b1b1499f9dbe39e94cf7b540900860e8e135
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5980
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex was implemented with a memcpy, which doesn't work well when
some of the pointers need to be copied, and ssl_verify_cert_chain didn't
account for set_ex_data failing.
Change-Id: Ieb556aeda6ab2e4c810f27012fefb1e65f860023
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5911
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Target date for removal of the workaround is 6 months.
BUG=532048
Change-Id: I402f75e46736936725575559cd8eb194115ab0df
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5910
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The documentation for |ECDSA_sign| and |ECDSA_verify| says that the
|type| parameter should be zero.
Change-Id: I875d3405455c5443f5a5a5c2960a9a9f486ca5bb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5832
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Estonian IDs issued between September 2014 to September 2015 are broken and use
negative moduli. They last five years and are common enough that we need to
work around this bug.
Add parallel "buggy" versions of BN_cbs2unsigned and RSA_parse_public_key which
tolerate this mistake, to align with OpenSSL's previous behavior. This code is
currently hooked up to rsa_pub_decode in RSA_ASN1_METHOD so that d2i_X509 is
tolerant. (This isn't a huge deal as the rest of that stack still uses the
legacy ASN.1 code which is overly lenient in many other ways.)
In future, when Chromium isn't using crypto/x509 and has more unified
certificate handling code, we can put client certificates under a slightly
different codepath, so this needn't hold for all certificates forever. Then in
September 2019, when the broken Estonian certificates all expire, we can purge
this codepath altogether.
BUG=532048
Change-Id: Iadb245048c71dba2eec45dd066c4a6e077140751
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5894
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We were getting this because of C's defaults, but it's fragile to leave
it like this because someone may add another field at the end in the
future.
Change-Id: I8b2dcbbc7cee8062915d15101f99f5a1aae6ad87
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5860
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It didn't do too much and I didn't notice that CRYPTO_sysrand wasn't
OPENSSL_EXPORTed, which makes the test impossible on shared-library
builds.
Change-Id: I38986572aa34fa9c0f30075d562b8ee4e1a0c8b8
Callers that lack hardware random may obtain a speed improvement by
calling |RAND_enable_fork_unsafe_buffering|, which enables a
thread-local buffer around reads from /dev/urandom.
Change-Id: I46e675d1679b20434dd520c58ece0f888f38a241
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5792
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
History has shown there are bugs in not setting the error code
appropriately, which makes any decision making based on
|ERR_peek_last_error|, etc. suspect. Also, this call was interfering
with the link-time optimizer's ability to discard the implementations of
many functions in crypto/err during dead code elimination.
Change-Id: Iba9e553bf0a72a1370ceb17ff275f5a20fca31ec
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5748
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is useful to skip an optional element, and mirrors the behaviour of
CBS_get_optional_asn1_octet_string.
Change-Id: Icb538c5e99a1d4e46412cae3c438184a94fab339
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5800
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
If the two extensions select different next protocols (quite possible since one
is server-selected and the other is client-selected), things will break. This
matches the behavior of NSS (Firefox) and Go.
Change-Id: Ie1da97bf062b91a370c85c12bc61423220a22f36
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5780
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Don't dereference |d| when |top| is zero. Also test that various BIGNUM
methods behave correctly on zero/even inputs.
(Imported from upstream's cf633fa00244e39eea2f2c0b623f7d5bbefa904e.)
We already had the BN_div and BN_MONT_CTX_set tests, but align them with
upstream's for consistency.
Change-Id: Ice5d04f559b4d5672e23c400637c07d8ee401727
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5783
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
BN_rand generates a single-word zero BIGNUM with quite a large
probability.
A zero BIGNUM in turn will end up having a NULL |d|-buffer, which we
shouldn't dereference without checking.
(Imported from upstream's 9c989aaa749d88b63bef5d5beeb3046eae62d836.)
Change-Id: Ic4d113e4fcf4ea4c0a4e905a1c4ba3fb758d9fc6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5782
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
If the seed value for dsa key generation is too short (< qsize),
return an error.
(Imported from upstream's 1d7df236dcb4f7c95707110753e5e77b19b9a0aa and
df1565ed9cebb6933ee7c6e762abcfefd1cd3846.)
This switches the trigger for random seed from seed_len = 0 to seed_in =
NULL.
Change-Id: I2e07abed754c57ef9d96b02a52ba6d260c3f5fb9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5781
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
See also upstream's c8491de393639dbc4508306b7dbedb3872b74293.
Change-Id: I017fb137d6d93b6abb82fdb03f02be8292963d0d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5767
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's supposed to be void*. The only reason this was working was that it was
only called in C which happily casts from void* to T*. (But if called in C++ in
a macro, it breaks.)
Change-Id: I7f765c3572b9b4815ae58da852be1e742de1bd96
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5760
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This begins decoupling the transport from the SSL state machine. The buffering
logic is hidden behind an opaque API. Fields like ssl->packet and
ssl->packet_length are gone.
ssl3_get_record and dtls1_get_record now call low-level tls_open_record and
dtls_open_record functions that unpack a single record independent of who owns
the buffer. Both may be called in-place. This removes ssl->rstate which was
redundant with the buffer length.
Future work will push the buffer up the stack until it is above the handshake.
Then we can expose SSL_open and SSL_seal APIs which act like *_open_record but
return a slightly larger enum due to other events being possible. Likewise the
handshake state machine will be detached from its buffer. The existing
SSL_read, SSL_write, etc., APIs will be implemented on top of SSL_open, etc.,
combined with ssl_read_buffer_* and ssl_write_buffer_*. (Which is why
ssl_read_buffer_extend still tries to abstract between TLS's and DTLS's fairly
different needs.)
The new buffering logic does not support read-ahead (removed previously) since
it lacks a memmove on ssl_read_buffer_discard for TLS, but this could be added
if desired. The old buffering logic wasn't quite right anyway; it tried to
avoid the memmove in some cases and could get stuck too far into the buffer and
not accept records. (The only time the memmove is optional is in DTLS or if
enough of the record header is available to know that the entire next record
would fit in the buffer.)
The new logic also now actually decrypts the ciphertext in-place again, rather
than almost in-place when there's an explicit nonce/IV. (That accidentally
switched in https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/4792/; see
3d59e04bce96474099ba76786a2337e99ae14505.)
BUG=468889
Change-Id: I403c1626253c46897f47c7ae93aeab1064b767b2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5715
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This consists mostly of re-adding OpenSSL's implementation of PBKDF2
(very loosely based upon e0d26bb3). The meat of it, namely
|PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC|, was already present, but unused.
In addition, |PKCS8_encrypt| and |PKCS8_decrypt| must be changed to
not perform UCS-2 conversion in the PBES2 case.
Change-Id: Id170ecabc43c79491600051147d1d6d3c7273dbc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5745
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
arm_arch.h is included from ARM asm files, but lives in crypto/, not
openssl/include/. Since the asm files are often built from a different
location than their position in the source tree, relative include paths
are unlikely to work so, rather than having crypto/ be a de-facto,
second global include path, this change moves arm_arch.h to
include/openssl/.
It also removes entries from many include paths because they should be
needed as relative includes are always based on the locations of the
source file.
Change-Id: I638ff43d641ca043a4fc06c0d901b11c6ff73542
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5746
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Match the other stack-allocated types in that we expose a wrapper function to
get them into the zero state. Makes it more amenable to templates like
ScopedOpenSSLContext.
Change-Id: Ibc7b2b1bc0421ce5ccc84760c78c0b143441ab0f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5753
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The fact that |value_free| expects to free() value->section is
inconsistent with the behavior of |add_string|, which adds a reference
to an existing string.
Along the way, add a |CONF_VALUE_new| method to simplify things a bit.
Change-Id: I438abc80575394e4d8df62a4fe2ff1050e3ba039
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5744
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
As I read it:
1. |_LHASH| contains
2. buckets of |LHASH_ITEMS|, which contain
3. |CONF_VALUE|s, which contain
4. various bits of data.
The previous code was freeing #1 and #2 in |lh_free|, and #4 in
|value_free_contents|, but was failing to free the |CONF_VALUE|s
themselves. The fix is to call |value_free| rather than
|value_free_contents|.
Change-Id: I1d5b48692ca9ac04df688e45d7fc113dc5cd6ddf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5742
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change makes |EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str|, which is used by
|PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey|, recognize "DSA" as well as "EC" and "RSA".
Change-Id: I39cce12f600cec6a71df75312a41f8395429af62
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5743
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
MSAN appears to have a bug that causes this code to be miscompiled when
compiled with optimisations. In order to prevent that bug from holding
everything up, this change disables that code when MEMORY_SANITIZER is
defined. The generic elliptic-curve code can pick up the slack in that
case.
Change-Id: I7ce26969b3ee0bc0b0496506f06a8cf9b2523cfa
(I couldn't find an authoritative source of test data, including in
OpenSSL's source, so I used OpenSSL's implementation to produce the
test ciphertext.)
This benefits globalplatform.
Change-Id: Ifb79e77afb7efed1c329126a1a459bbf7ce6ca00
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5725
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Note that while |DES_ede2_cbc_encrypt| exists, I didn't use it: I
think it's easier to see what's happening this way.
(I couldn't find an authoritative source of test data, including in
OpenSSL's source, so I used OpenSSL's implementation to produce the
test ciphertext.)
This benefits globalplatform.
Change-Id: I7e17ca0b69067d7b3f4bc213b4616eb269882ae0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5724
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
|DES_ecb_encrypt| was already present.
This benefits globalplatform.
Change-Id: I2ab41eb1936b3026439b5981fb27e29a12672b66
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5723
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is harmless, but it wasn't annoted with |(void)| so Coverity
complained about it.
Change-Id: Ie3405b0c0545944d49973d4bf29f8aeb6b965211
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5612
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
If get_issuer fails, some of these calls return rather than jumping to common
cleanup code.
Change-Id: Iacd59747fb11e9bfaae86f2eeed88798ee08203e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5711
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
(Imported from upstream's 25efcb44ac88ab34f60047e16a96c9462fad39c1 and
56353962e7da7e385c3d577581ccc3015ed6d1dc.)
Change-Id: I2ff22fc9da23868de02e6f31c50a3f1d0c6dec1a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5710
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The function BN_MONT_CTX_set was assuming that the modulus was non-zero
and therefore that |mod->top| > 0. In an error situation that may not be
the case and could cause a seg fault.
This is a follow on from CVE-2015-1794.
(Imported from upstream's 512368c9ed4d53fb230000e83071eb81bf628b22.)
The CVE itself doesn't affect us as the bit strength check in the DHE logic
excludes zero.
Also add tests to bn_test for a couple of division by zero cases. (This and
BN_div.)
Change-Id: Ibd8ef98d6be48eb95110021c23cd8e278656764d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5690
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
BN_bin2bn takes a size_t as it should, but it passes that into bn_wexpand which
takes unsigned. Switch bn_wexpand and bn_expand to take size_t before they
check bounds against INT_MAX.
BIGNUM itself still uses int everywhere and we may want to audit all the
arithmetic at some point. Although I suspect having bn_expand require that the
number of bits fit in an int is sufficient to make everything happy, unless
we're doing interesting arithmetic on the number of bits somewhere.
Change-Id: Id191a4a095adb7c938cde6f5a28bee56644720c6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5680
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Move the bn_expand call inside decode_hex; it's an implementation detail of
hex-decoding. decode_dec instead works with BN_mul_word and BN_add_word so it
can just rely on BN internally expanding things and check the return value.
Also clean up the decode_hex loop so it's somewhat more readable and check for
INT_MAX in bn_x2bn. It uses int over size_t rather pervasively, but while I'm
here at least make that function check overflow.
BUG=517474
Change-Id: I4f043973ee43071a02ea5d4313a8fdaf12404e84
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5679
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
“!= 0” is implicit in if statements and it looks very weird here.
Change-Id: I7f4e71c479b8ff9821a040f1c542b15af19b8aed
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5720
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
