Bug: 124
Change-Id: Iff02be9df2806572e6d3f860b448f598f85778c3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20107
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Found with libFuzzer.
Bug: chromium:763097
Change-Id: I806bcfc714c0629ff7f725e37f4c0045d4ec7ac6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20105
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We forgot to reset that value.
Change-Id: Ic869cb61da332983cc40223cbbdf23b455dd9766
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20084
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Change-Id: I4dea223825da4e4ab0bc789e738f470f5fe5d659
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20044
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For historical reasons, TLS allows ServerHellos (and ClientHellos)
without extensions to omit the extensions fields entirely.
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4296 reports this is even
necessary for compatibility with extension-less clients. We continue to
do so, but add a test for it anyway.
Change-Id: I63c2e3a5f298674eb21952fca6914dad07d7c245
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19864
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The fuzzer should discover this instantly, but it's a sufficiently
important failure case (don't accidentally drop the certificate on the
floor or anything weird like that) that it's probably worth testing.
Change-Id: I684932c2e8a88fcf9b2318bf46980d312c66f6ef
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We have fancy -on-initial and -on-resume prefixes now that can apply to
every flag.
Change-Id: I6195a97f663ebc94db320ca35889c213c700a976
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19666
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We currently forbid the server certificate from changing on
renegotiation. This means re-verifying the certificate is pointless and
indeed the callback being called again seems to surprise consumers more
than anything else.
Carry over the initial handshake's SCT lists and OCSP responses (don't
enforce they don't change since the server may have, say, picked up new
OCSP responses in the meantime), ignore new ones received on
renegotiation, and don't bother redoing verification.
For our purposes, TLS 1.2 renegotiation is an overcomplicated TLS 1.3
KeyUpdate + post-handshake auth. The server is not allowed to change
identity.
Bug: 126
Change-Id: I0dae85bcf243943b1a5a97fa4f30f100c9e6e41e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19665
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I messed up https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8883 and caused
both sides to believe they had sent the final Finished. Use next_message
to detect whether our last flight had a reply.
Change-Id: Ia4d8c8eefa818c9a69acc94d63c9c863293c3cf5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19604
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This loosens the earlier restriction to match Channel ID. Both may be
configured and offered, but the server is obligated to select only one
of them. This aligns with the current tokbind + 0-RTT draft where the
combination is signaled by a separate extension.
Bug: 183
Change-Id: I786102a679999705d399f0091f76da236be091c2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19124
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CertificateVerify must be sent after a non-empty Certificate msg for:
1) TLS1.2 client
2) TLS1.3 client and server
This CL adds tests for those use cases.
Change-Id: I696e9dd74dcd523c6f8868a4fb9ada28fd67746d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19044
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This is analogous to needing to test that Finished is enforced in False
Start.
Change-Id: I168a72ac51b0f75156aaf6ccc9724ae66ce1e734
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18986
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
These should use the shim/runner combined setting.
Change-Id: Iad6abb4e76f6e5accef446696aa4132073eca06a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18984
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reuse_message and V2ClientHellos each caused messages to be
double-reported.
Change-Id: I8722a3761ede272408ac9cf8e1b2ce383911cc6f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18764
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This would only come up if the peer didn't pack records together, but
it's free to handle. Notably OpenSSL has a bug where it does not pack
retransmits together.
Change-Id: I0927d768f6b50c62bacdd82bd1c95396ed503cf3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18724
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I'm not that fast when debugging.
Change-Id: I37a120a77e9a35ac5255ad760513b983f83d9bd7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18605
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This also serves as a certificate verification callback for
CRYPTO_BUFFER-based consumers. Remove the silly
SSL_CTX_i_promise_to_verify_certs_after_the_handshake placeholder.
Bug: 54, chromium:347402
Change-Id: I4c6b445cb9cd7204218acb2e5d1625e6f37aff6f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17964
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Due to SSL 3.0 legacy, TLS 1.0 through 1.2 allow ClientHello and
ServerHello messages to omit the extensions field altogether, rather
than write an empty field. We broke this in
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/17704/ when we needed to a
second ServerHello parsing path.
Fix this and add some regression tests to explicitly test both the
omitted and empty extensions ClientHello and ServerHello cases.
Bug: chromium:743218
Change-Id: I8297ba608570238e19f12ea44a9fe2fe9d881d28
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17904
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is in an attempt to debug the Mac flakiness. The timestamps will
hopefully help narrow down the order of operations here.
Bug: 199
Change-Id: I8b8dd7222e3a57a8b055b8bc1b7731334e0fcdf0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17886
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This implements PR #1051
(https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1051).
Local experiments were not able to replicate the claims in the PR, but
implement this anyway for comparison purposes.
Change-Id: Ic9baf5e671f9a44565020466a553dd08f5ec0f1b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17844
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Adding it to tlsVersions is sort of pointless when we don't test it.
Change-Id: Ie0c0167cef887aee54e5be90bf7fc98619c1a6fb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17708
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TLS 1.3 deployment is currently blocked by buggy middleboxes
throughout the ecosystem. As an experiment to better understand these bugs
and the problems they are causing, implement TLS 1.3 variants with
alternate encodings. These are still the same protocol, only encoded
slightly differently. We will use what we learn from these experiments to
guide the TLS 1.3 deployment strategy and proposals to the IETF, if any.
These experiments only target the basic 1-RTT TLS 1.3 handshake. Based on
what we learn from this experiment, we may try future variations to
explore 0-RTT and HelloRetryRequest.
When enabled, the server supports all TLS 1.3 variants while the client
is configured to use a particular variant.
Change-Id: I532411d1abc41314dc76acce0246879b754b4c61
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17327
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Not sure why it was expanded out like that.
Change-Id: I6899dbd23130ed7196c45c2784330b2a4fe9bdba
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17666
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Like other handshake properties, when in 0-RTT on the client,
SSL_version should report the predicted version. This used to work on
accident because of how ssl->version got set in handshake_client.c early
(and that TLS 1.4 does not exist), but we no longer do that.
Change-Id: Ifb63a22b795fe8964ac553844a46040acd5d7323
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17664
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We were missing AES256 and 3DES. Though this test dates to the old
record-splitting code which was much scarier than the new one.
Change-Id: Ia84a8c1a2bbd79fa70941f80cf6393013e4f13d5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17543
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This was a workaround for triple handshake put in way back, before
extended master secret.
Change-Id: Ie0112fa6323522b17c90a833d558f7182586d2c3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17541
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Also mirror the structure of the TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 code a bit.
Change-Id: I7b34bf30de63fa0bd47a39a90570846fb2314ad5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17539
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We've never actually written tests for equipreference groups at the
BoringSSL level.
Change-Id: I571c081534efbfa8e7b84846fafed0b772721da1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17538
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: I90286da596d5822d4cfedf40995d80cf76adaf97
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17536
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Otherwise the fuzzer gets stuck at renegotiations.
Bug: 104
Change-Id: If37f9ab165d06e37bfc5c423fba35edaabed293b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17532
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This allows us to fill in holes in our fuzzer coverage, notably client
resumption (and thus early data) and server client certificates. The
corpora are not refreshed yet. This will be done in upcoming changes.
Also add an option for debugging fuzzers. It's very useful to test it on
transcripts and make sure that fuzzer mode successfully makes things
compatible.
Bug: 104
Change-Id: I02f0be4045d1baf68efc9a4157f573df1429575d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17531
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This is in preparation for supporting multiple TLS 1.3 variants.
Change-Id: Ia2caf984f576f1b9e5915bdaf6ff952c8be10417
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17526
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SSL_set_max_proto_version(TLS1_3_DRAFT_VERSION) worked unintentionally.
Fix that. Also add an error when it fails.
Change-Id: I1048fede7b163e1c170e17bf4370b468221a7077
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17525
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WatchGuard's bug is very distinctive. Report a dedicated error code out
of BoringSSL so we can better track this.
Bug: chromium:733223
Change-Id: Ia42abd8654e7987b1d43c63a4f454f35f6aa873b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17328
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BUG=76
Change-Id: If58a73da38e46549fd55f84a9104e2dfebfda43f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14164
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This doesn't hugely matter, but I noticed it was some missing coverage.
Change-Id: I3e425d47fbbeaacd9da2ae883f34e89b4562ec11
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17184
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Change-Id: I1a17860245b7726a24576f5e1bddb0645171f28e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16486
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https://build.chromium.org/p/client.boringssl/builders/linux_fips_rel/builds/115
appears to have failed because we were hanging on Accept() forever.
Impose a timeout on that and waiting for the process to return so we at
least can see what stdout/stderr was received so far.
Change-Id: Ief7f7759d02a3fbfc504d2f214b742672b0fe9e6
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The C side no longer supports DHE, so there is no longer a need for the
Go side to anymore.
Change-Id: I5084177becd369779a4008a41f4838cb31adcfde
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This doesn't actually measure what we need(*) and, because of that, it's
way more noisy than expected.
(*) We want to know whether the pool has been initialised, not whether
it currently thinks it has a lot of bits, but we can't get what we want
without getrandom() support in the kernel.
Change-Id: I20accb99a592739c786a25c1656aeea050ae81a3
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