Lacking C++, this instead adds a mess of macros. With this done, all the
function-pointer-munging "_of" macros in asn1.h can also be removed.
Update-Note: A number of *really* old and unused ASN.1 macros were
removed.
Bug: chromium:785442
Change-Id: Iab260d114c7d8cdf0429759e714d91ce3f3c04b2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/32106
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Reason codes across libraries may collide. One must never check
ERR_GET_REASON without also checking ERR_GET_LIB.
Change-Id: I0b58ce27a5571ab173d231c1a673bce1cf0427aa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/32110
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This format is kind of silly, but it seems not completely unused? Add a
basic test for it before I rewrite it to fix the function pointer casts.
Change-Id: Ib2d1563419b72cf468180b9cda4d13e216b7eb3a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/32108
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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It's a little bit shorter.
Change-Id: Ia1ba55d20ee4f2519a017871f5f5949081569e1a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/32104
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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The fipsmodule is still separate as that's a lot of build mess. (Though
that too may be worth pulling in eventually. CMake usually has different
opinions on generated files if they're in the same directory. We might
be able to avoid the set_source_properties(GENERATED) thing.)
Change-Id: Ie1f9345009044d4f0e7541ca779e01bdc5ad62f6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/31586
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
I believe that case was the only way that X509_check_purpose could
return anything other than zero or one. Thus eliminate the last use of
X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT.
Change-Id: If2f071dfa934b924491db2b615ec17390564e7de
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30344
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Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
OpenSSL 1.0.2 (and thus BoringSSL) accepts keyUsage certSign or a
Netscape CA certificate-type in lieu of basicConstraints in an
intermediate certificate (unless X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) is set.
Update-Note: This change tightens the code so that basicConstraints is required for intermediate certificates when verifying chains. This was previously only enabled if X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT was set, but that flag also has other effects.
Change-Id: I9e41f4c567084cf30ed08f015a744959982940af
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30185
Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
This change adds a new flag, X509_V_FLAG_REQUIRE_CA_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS,
which causes basicConstraints with isCA to be required for intermediate
CA certificates. Without this, intermediates are also acceptable if
they're missing basicConstraints, but include either a certSign
keyUsage, or a CA Netscape certificate type.
This is a short-term change for patching. I'll undo a lot of it and make
this the default in the next change.
Change-Id: I7f42ffd76c57de3037f054108951e230c1b4e415
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30184
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bssl::UniquePtr and FOO_up_ref do not play well together. Add a helper
to simplify this. This allows us to write things like:
foo->cert = UpRef(bar->cert);
instead of:
if (bar->cert) {
X509_up_ref(bar->cert.get());
}
foo->cert.reset(bar->cert.get());
This also plays well with PushToStack. To append something to a stack
while taking a reference, it's just:
PushToStack(certs, UpRef(cert))
Change-Id: I99ae8de22b837588a2d8ffb58f86edc1d03ed46a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29584
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Copy of OpenSSL change
80770da39e.
This additionally fixes some bugs which causes time validation to
fail when the current time and certificate timestamp are near the
2050 UTCTime/GeneralizedTime cut-off.
Update-Note: Some invalid X.509 timestamps will be newly rejected.
Change-Id: Ie131c61b6840c85bed974101f0a3188e7649059b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29125
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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gcc-8 complains that struct Test shadows class Test from googletest.
Change-Id: Ie0c61eecebc726973c6aaa949e338da3d4474977
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28524
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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These were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
Change-Id: I261e0e0ccf82544883c4a2ef5c5dc4a651c0c756
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28329
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
PyOpenSSL calls this function these days. Tested by roundtripping with
ourselves and also manually confirming our output interoperates with
OpenSSL. (For anyone repeating this experiment, the OpenSSL
command-line tool has a bug and does not correctly output friendlyName
attributes with non-ASCII characters. I'll send them a PR to fix this
shortly.)
Between this and the UTF-8 logic earlier, the theme of this patch series
seems to be "implement in C something I last implemented in
JavaScript"...
Change-Id: I258d563498d82998c6bffc6789efeaba36fe3a5e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28328
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Update-Note: This changes causes BoringSSL to be stricter about handling
Unicode strings:
· Reject code points outside of Unicode
· Reject surrogate values
· Don't allow invalid UTF-8 to pass through when the source claims to
be UTF-8 already.
· Drop byte-order marks.
Previously, for example, a UniversalString could contain a large-valued
code point that would cause the UTF-8 encoder to emit invalid UTF-8.
Change-Id: I94d9db7796b70491b04494be84249907ff8fb46c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28325
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
(Imported from upstream's 7e6c0f56e6)
Change-Id: I1d060055c923f78311265510a3fbe17a34ecc1d4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28084
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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|set| should be evaluated to determine whether to insert/append before
it is reused as a temporary variable.
When incrementing the |set| of X509_NAME_ENTRY, the inserted entry
should not be incremented.
Thanks to Ingo Schwarze for extensive debugging and the initial
fix.
(Imported from upstream bbf27cd583)
Change-Id: Ib45d92fc6d52d7490b01d3c475eafc42dd6ef721
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28005
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: I156552df15de5941be99736cca694db4677e2b2a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27744
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Change-Id: If3d93648cf6561c02c208895526ae1f1cbfa2b51
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27524
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This change follows up from e759a9cd with more extensive changes and
tests:
If a name checking function (like |X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host|) fails,
it now poisons the |X509_VERIFY_PARAM| so that all verifications will
fail. This is because we have observed that some callers are not
checking the return value of these functions.
Using a length of zero for a hostname to mean |strlen| is now an error.
It also an error for email addresses and IP addresses now, and doesn't
end up trying to call |strlen| on a (binary) IP address.
Setting an email address with embedded NULs now fails. So does trying to
configure an empty hostname or email with (NULL, 0).
|X509_check_*| functions in BoringSSL don't accept zero lengths (unlike
OpenSSL). It's now tested that such calls always fail.
Change-Id: I4484176f2aae74e502a09081c7e912c85e8d090b
Update-Note: several behaviour changes. See change description.
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/26764
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
BoringSSL does not generally support this quirk but, in this case, we
didn't make it a fatal error and it's instead a silent omission of
hostname checking. This doesn't affect Chrome but, in case something is
using BoringSSL and using this trick, this change makes it safe.
BUG=chromium:824799
Change-Id: If417817b997b9faa9963c09dfc95d06a5d445e0b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/26724
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
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This is a reland of https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2330. I
believe I've now cleared the fallout.
Android's attestion format uses some ludicrously large tag numbers:
https://developer.android.com/training/articles/security-key-attestation.html#certificate_schema
Add support for these in CBS/CBB. The public API does not change for
callers who were using the CBS_ASN1_* constants, but it is no longer the
case that tag representations match their DER encodings for small tag
numbers. When passing tags into CBS/CBB, use CBS_ASN1_* constants. When
working with DER byte arrays (most commonly test vectors), use the
numbers themselves.
Bug: 214
Update-Note: The in-memory representation of CBS/CBB tags changes.
Additionally, we now support tag numbers above 30. I believe I've now
actually cleared the fallout of the former. There is one test in
Chromium and the same test in the internal repository that needs
fixing.
Change-Id: I49b9d30df01f023c646d31156360ff69c91626a3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24404
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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The newer clang-cl is unhappy about the tautological comparison on
Windows, but the comparison itself is unnecessary anyway, since the
values will never exceed uint32_t.
I think the reason it's not firing elsewhere is because on other 64-bit
platforms, it is not tautological because long is 64-bit. On other
32-bit platforms, I'm not sure we actually have a standalone trunk clang
builder right now.
Update-Note: UTF8_getc and UTF8_putc were unexported. No one appears to
be calling them. (We're a crypto library, not a Unicode library.)
Change-Id: I0949ddea3131dca5f55d04e672c3ccf2915c41ab
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/23844
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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This reverts commit 66801feb17. This
turned out to break a lot more than expected. Hopefully we can reland it
soon, but we need to fix up some consumers first.
Note due to work that went in later, this is not a trivial revert and
should be re-reviewed.
Change-Id: I6474b67cce9a8aa03f722f37ad45914b76466bea
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/23644
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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This avoids taking quadratic time to pretty-print certificates with
excessively large integer fields. Very large integers aren't any more
readable in decimal than hexadecimal anyway, and the i2s_* functions
will parse either form.
Found by libFuzzer.
Change-Id: Id586cd1b0eef8936d38ff50433ae7c819f0054f3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/23424
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Matches the OpenSSL 1.1.0 spelling, which is what we advertise in
OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER now. Otherwise third-party code which uses it
will, in the long term, need ifdefs. Note this will require updates to
any existing callers (there appear to only be a couple of them), but it
should be straightforward.
Change-Id: I9dd1013609abca547152728a293529055dacc239
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/23325
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There is also no need to make the struct public. Also tidy up includes a
bit.
Change-Id: I188848dfd8f9ed42925b2c55da8dc4751c29f146
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22126
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Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Some of the complaints seem a bit questionable or their replacements
problematic, but not using strcat, strcpy, and strncpy is easy and
safer.
Change-Id: I64faf24b4f39d1ea410e883f026350094975a9b5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22125
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Right now, compiling with the stock gcc on debian, cmake is compiling
with -Wall which gives an error because -Wunused-value.
The gcc version is gcc (Debian 4.7.2-5) 4.7.2.
Change-Id: Iafd4cc14a22fe788d4c7bdb05202fd856f0c6395
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/21144
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Although we are derived from 1.0.2, we mimic 1.1.0 in some ways around
our FOO_up_ref functions and opaque libssl types. This causes some
difficulties when porting third-party code as any OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER
checks for 1.1.0 APIs we have will be wrong.
Moreover, adding accessors without changing OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER can
break external projects. It is common to implement a compatibility
version of an accessor under #ifdef as a static function. This then
conflicts with our headers if we, unlike OpenSSL 1.0.2, have this
function.
This change switches OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER to 1.1.0 and atomically adds
enough accessors for software with 1.1.0 support already. The hope is
this will unblock hiding SSL_CTX and SSL_SESSION, which will be
especially useful with C++-ficiation. The cost is we will hit some
growing pains as more 1.1.0 consumers enter the ecosystem and we
converge on the right set of APIs to import from upstream.
It does not remove any 1.0.2 APIs, so we will not require that all
projects support 1.1.0. The exception is APIs which changed in 1.1.0 but
did not change the function signature. Those are breaking changes.
Specifically:
- SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb is now const-correct.
- X509_get0_signature is now const-correct.
For C++ consumers only, this change temporarily includes an overload
hack for SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb that keeps the old callback working.
This is a workaround for Node not yet supporting OpenSSL 1.1.0.
The version number is set at (the as yet unreleased) 1.1.0g to denote
that this change includes https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4384.
Bug: 91
Change-Id: I5eeb27448a6db4c25c244afac37f9604d9608a76
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10340
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Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
First, I spelled the wildcard name constraint in many_constraints.pem
wrong. It's .test, not *.test for name constraints. (This doesn't matter
for some_names*.pem, but it does to avoid a false negative in
many_names3.pem.)
Second, the CN of certs should be a host, not "Leaf". OpenSSL 1.1.0
checks "host-like" CNs against name constraints too and "Leaf" is
host-like.
I've also made the generator deterministic and checked it in, as PEM
blobs are not reviewable.
Change-Id: I195d9846315168a792cca829aff25c986339b8f5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20584
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This guards against the name constraints check consuming large amounts
of CPU time when certificates in the presented chain contain an
excessive number of names (specifically subject email names or subject
alternative DNS names) and/or name constraints.
Name constraints checking compares the names presented in a certificate
against the name constraints included in a certificate higher up in the
chain using two nested for loops.
Move the name constraints check so that it happens after signature
verification so peers cannot exploit this using a chain with invalid
signatures. Also impose a hard limit on the number of name constraints
check loop iterations to further mitigate the issue.
Thanks to NCC for finding this issue.
Change-Id: I112ba76fe75d1579c45291042e448850b830cbb7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19164
Reviewed-by: Martin Kreichgauer <martinkr@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Martin Kreichgauer <martinkr@google.com>
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Fuchsia isn't POSIX and doesn't have /etc. This CL adds the
location for the system certificate store on Fuchsia.
Change-Id: I2b48e0e13525a32fa5e2c5c48b8db41d76c26872
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19224
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
X.509 functions and the like should not vary their behaviour based on
the configured locale, but tolower(3), strcasecmp(3) and strncasecmp(3)
change behaviour based on that.
For example, with tr_TR.utf8, 'I' is not the upper-case version of 'i'.
Change-Id: I896a285767ae0c22e6ce06b9908331c625e90af2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18412
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Rather than adding a new mode to EVP_PKEY_CTX, upstream chose to tie
single-shot signing to EVP_MD_CTX, adding functions which combine
EVP_Digest*Update and EVP_Digest*Final. This adds a weird vestigial
EVP_MD_CTX and makes the signing digest parameter non-uniform, slightly
complicating things. But it means APIs like X509_sign_ctx can work
without modification.
Align with upstream's APIs. This required a bit of fiddling around
evp_test.cc. For consistency and to avoid baking details of parameter
input order, I made it eagerly read all inputs before calling
SetupContext. Otherwise which attributes are present depend a lot on the
shape of the API we use---notably the NO_DEFAULT_DIGEST tests for RSA
switch to failing before consuming an input, which is odd.
(This only matters because we have some tests which expect the operation
to abort the operation early with parameter errors and match against
Error. Those probably should not use FileTest to begin with, but I'll
tease that apart a later time.)
Upstream also named NID_Ed25519 as NID_ED25519, even though the
algorithm is normally stylized as "Ed25519". Switch it to match.
Change-Id: Id6c8f5715930038e754de50338924d044e908045
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17044
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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These are never referenced within the library or externally. Some of the
constants have been unused since SSLeay.
Change-Id: I597511208dab1ab3816e5f730fcadaea9a733dff
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17025
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: I4e0da85857e820f8151e2fb50d699f14fedee97b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16966
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The only place it is used is EC_KEY_{dup,copy} and no one calls that
function on an EC_KEY with ex_data. This aligns with functions like
RSAPublicKey_dup which do not copy ex_data. The logic is also somewhat
subtle in the face of malloc errors (upstream's PR 3323).
In fact, we'd even changed the function pointer signature from upstream,
so BoringSSL-only code is needed to pass this pointer in anyway. (I
haven't switched it to CRYPTO_EX_unused because there are some callers
which pass in an implementation anyway.)
Note, in upstream, the dup hook is also used for SSL_SESSIONs when those
are duplicated (for TLS 1.2 ticket renewal or TLS 1.3 resumption). Our
interpretation is that callers should treat those SSL_SESSIONs
equivalently to newly-established ones. This avoids every consumer
providing a dup hook and simplifies the interface.
(I've gone ahead and removed the TODO(fork). I don't think we'll be able
to change this API. Maybe introduce a new one, but it may not be worth
it? Then again, this API is atrocious... I've never seen anyone use argl
and argp even.)
BUG=21
Change-Id: I6c9e9d5a02347cb229d4c084c1e85125bd741d2b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16344
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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David Benjamin
Adam Langley
Jesse Selover
Daniel Hirche
Steven Valdez
Joshua Liebow-Feeser
Adam Langley
Daniel Wagner-Hall
Martin Kreichgauer
Aaron Green
Kári Tristan Helgason