Change-Id: I5d4fc0d3204744e93d71a36923469035c19a5b10
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BUG=77
Change-Id: If568412655aae240b072c29d763a5b17bb5ca3f7
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BUG=77
Change-Id: Id8c45e98c4c22cdd437cbba1e9375239e123b261
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cURL calls this function if |OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER| is in [0x10002003,
0x10002fff], which it now is for BoringSSL after 0aecbcf6.
Change-Id: I3f224f73f46791bd2232a1a96ed926c32740a6f6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11461
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This function is used by NGINX to enable specific curves for ECDH from a
configuration file. However when building with BoringSSL, since it's not
implmeneted, it falls back to using EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name() wich doesn't
support X25519.
Change-Id: I533df4ef302592c1a9f9fc8880bd85f796ce0ef3
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Change-Id: I73f9fd64b46f26978b897409d817b34ec9d93afd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11080
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This GREASEs cipher suites, groups, and extensions. For now, we'll
always place them in a hard-coded position. We can experiment with more
interesting strategies later.
If we add new ciphers and curves, presumably we prefer them over current
ones, so place GREASE values at the front. This prevents implementations
from parsing only the first value and ignoring the rest.
Add two new extensions, one empty and one non-empty. Place the empty one
in front (IBM WebSphere can't handle trailing empty extensions) and the
non-empty one at the end.
Change-Id: If2e009936bc298cedf2a7a593ce7d5d5ddbb841a
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Upstream makes 0 mean "min/max supported version". Match that behavior,
although call it "default" instead. It shouldn't get you TLS 1.3 until
we're ready to turn it on everywhere.
BUG=90
Change-Id: I9f122fceb701b7d4de2ff70afbc1ffdf370cb97e
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We'd previously been assuming we'd want to predict P-256 and X25519 but,
on reflection, that's nonsense. Although, today, P-256 is widespread and
X25519 is less so, that's not the right question to ask. Those servers
are all 1.2.
The right question is whether we believe enough servers will get to TLS
1.3 before X25519 to justify wasting 64 bytes on all other connections.
Given that OpenSSL has already shipped X25519 and Microsoft was doing
interop testing on X25519 around when we were shipping it, I think the
answer is no.
Moreover, if we are wrong, it will be easier to go from predicting one
group to two rather than the inverse (provided we send a fake one with
GREASE). I anticipate prediction-miss HelloRetryRequest logic across the
TLS/TCP ecosystem will be largely untested (no one wants to pay an RTT),
so taking a group out of the predicted set will likely be a risky
operation.
Only predicting one group also makes things a bit simpler. I haven't
done this here, but we'll be able to fold the 1.2 and 1.3 ecdh_ctx's
together, even.
Change-Id: Ie7e42d3105aca48eb9d97e2e05a16c5379aa66a3
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The old numbers violate a MUST-level requirement in TLS 1.2 to not
advertise anonymous (0x0700 ends in 0x00). The spec has been updated
with new allocations which avoid these.
BUG=webrtc:6342
Change-Id: Ia5663ada98fa1ebf0f8a7f50fe74a0e9206c4194
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11131
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Found by libFuzzer and then one more mistake caught by valgrind. Add a
test for this case.
Change-Id: I92773bc1231bafe5fc069e8568d93ac0df4c8acb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11129
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Upstream added these functions after we did but decided to change the
names slightly. I'm not sure why they wanted to add the "proto" in
there, but align with them nonetheless so the ecosystem only has one set
of these functions.
BUG=90
Change-Id: Ia9863c58c9734374092051f02952b112806040cc
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This is in preparation for using the supported_versions extension to
experiment with draft TLS 1.3 versions, since we don't wish to restore
the fallback. With versions begin opaque values, we will want
version_from_wire to reject unknown values, not attempt to preserve
order in some way.
This means ClientHello.version processing needs to be separate code.
That's just written out fully in negotiate_version now. It also means
SSL_set_{min,max}_version will notice invalid inputs which aligns us
better with upstream's versions of those APIs.
This CL doesn't replace ssl->version with an internal-representation
version, though follow work should do it once a couple of changes land
in consumers.
BUG=90
Change-Id: Id2f5e1fa72847c823ee7f082e9e69f55e51ce9da
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This will make it a little easier to store the normalized version rather
than the wire version. Also document the V2ClientHello behavior.
Change-Id: I5ce9ccce44ca48be2e60ddf293c0fab6bba1356e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11121
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wpa_supplicant in AOSP has now been updated, so these all can go. We're
just left with the AES keywrap business.
Change-Id: Ie4c3e08902a2a1f9b43e1907116c7d85791ad5e9
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One less field to reset on renego and save a pointer of post-handshake
memory.
Change-Id: Ifc0c3c73072af244ee3848d9a798988d2c8a7c38
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11086
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
On 64-bit systems the SSL structure is 1/16th padding. This change
reorders some fields and changes one to a bitfield in order to reduce
the memory usage a little.
Change-Id: Id7626a44d22652254717d544bdc2e08f1b0d705f
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This withdraws support for -DBORINGSSL_ENABLE_RC4_TLS, and removes the
RC4 AEADs.
Change-Id: I1321b76bfe047d180743fa46d1b81c5d70c64e81
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Conscrypt would like to write a CTS test that the callback isn't set
unexpectedly.
Change-Id: I11f987422daf0544e90f5cff4d7aaf557ac1f5a2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11060
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Now that we have the extern "C++" trick, we can just embed them in the
normal headers. Move the EVP_CIPHER_CTX deleter to cipher.h and, in
doing so, take away a little bit of boilerplate in defining deleters.
Change-Id: I4a4b8d0db5274a3607914d94e76a38996bd611ec
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Change-Id: I431c6e5b8f7de4663ba3db52f6fe0062caaf88ba
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Unlike the Scoped* types, bssl::UniquePtr is available to C++ users, and
offered for a large variety of types. The 'extern "C++"' trick is used
to make the C++ bits digestible to C callers that wrap header files in
'extern "C"'.
Change-Id: Ifbca4c2997d6628e33028c7d7620c72aff0f862e
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Changing parameters on renegotiation makes all our APIs confusing. This
one has no reason to change, so lock it down. In particular, our
preference to forbid Token Binding + renego may be overridden at the
IETF, even though it's insane. Loosening it will be a bit less of a
headache if EMS can't change.
https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/unbearable/current/msg00690.html
claims that this is already in the specification and enforced by NSS. I
can't find anything to this effect in the specification. It just says
the client MUST disable renegotiation when EMS is missing, which is
wishful thinking. At a glance, NSS doesn't seem to check, though I could
be misunderstanding the code.
Nonetheless, locking this down is a good idea anyway. Accurate or not,
take the email as an implicit endorsement of this from Mozilla.
Change-Id: I236b05991d28bed199763dcf2f47bbfb9d0322d7
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nginx consumes these error codes without #ifdefs. Continue to define
them for compatibility, even though we never emit them.
BUG=95
Change-Id: I1e991987ce25fc4952cc85b98ffa050a8beab92e
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peer_sigalgs should live on SSL_HANDSHAKE. This both releases a little
bit of memory after the handshake is over and also avoids the bug where
the sigalgs get dropped if SSL_set_SSL_CTX is called at a bad time. See
also upstream's 14e14bf6964965d02ce89805d9de867f000095aa.
This only affects consumers using the old SNI callback and not
select_certificate_cb.
Add a test that the SNI callback works as expected. In doing so, add an
SSL_CTX version of the signing preferences API. This is a property of
the cert/key pair (really just the key) and should be tied to that. This
makes it a bit easier to have the regression test work with TLS 1.2 too.
I thought we'd fixed this already, but apparently not... :-/
BUG=95
Change-Id: I75b02fad4059e6aa46c3b05183a07d72880711b3
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Chromium has switched to better APIs.
Change-Id: I26209b3a03c6a0db1ddce2f1fc99c8750cf6e56a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10501
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Having two copies of this is confusing. This field is inherently tied to
the certificate chain, which lives on SSL_SESSION, so this should live
there too. This also wasn't getting reset correctly on SSL_clear, but
this is now resolved.
Change-Id: I22b1734a93320bb0bf0dc31faa74d77a8e1de906
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As documented by OpenSSL, it does not interact with session resumption
correctly:
https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/ssl/SSL_set_verify_result.html
Sadly, netty-tcnative calls it, but we should be able to get them to
take it out because it doesn't do anything. Two of the three calls are
immediately after SSL_new. In OpenSSL and BoringSSL as of the previous
commit, this does nothing.
The final call is in verify_callback (see SSL_set_verify). This callback
is called in X509_verify_cert by way of X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb.
As soon as X509_verify_cert returns, ssl->verify_result is clobbered
anyway, so it doesn't do anything.
Within OpenSSL, it's used in testdane.c. As far as I can tell, it does
not actually do a handshake and just uses this function to fake having
done one. (Regardless, we don't need to build against that.)
This is done in preparation for removing ssl->verify_result in favor of
session->verify_result.
Change-Id: I7e32d7f26c44f70136c72e58be05a3a43e62582b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10485
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Change-Id: I2e1ee319bb9852b9c686f2f297c470db54f72279
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BUG=75
Change-Id: Ied864cfccbc0e68d71c55c5ab563da27b7253463
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The server should not be allowed select a protocol that wasn't
advertised. Callers tend to not really notice and act as if some default
were chosen which is unlikely to work very well.
Change-Id: Ib6388db72f05386f854d275bab762ca79e8174e6
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If cert_cb runs asynchronously, we end up repeating a large part of very
stateful ClientHello processing. This seems to be mostly fine and there
are few users of server-side cert_cb (it's a new API in 1.0.2), but it's
a little scary.
This is also visible to external consumers because some callbacks get
called multiple times. We especially should try to avoid that as there
is no guarantee that these callbacks are idempotent and give the same
answer each time.
Change-Id: I212b2325eae2cfca0fb423dace101e466c5e5d4e
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Between TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3, and the early callback, we've got a lot of
ClientHello parsers. Unify everything on the early callback's parser. As
a side effect, this means we can parse a ClientHello fairly succinctly
from any function which will let us split up ClientHello states where
appropriate.
Change-Id: I2359b75f80926cc7d827570cf33f93029b39e525
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It was renamed to ticket_liftetime_hint in
1e6f11a7ff, which breaks Qt.
Change-Id: I9c6d3097fe96e669f06a4e0880bd4d7d82b03ba8
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EKR is unlikely to resolve this TODO anytime soon.
Change-Id: I2cf6b4ad4f643048d1a683d60b4b90e2b1230aae
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Only X509_up_ref left (it's still waiting on a few external callers).
BUG=89
Change-Id: Ia2aec2bb0a944356cb1ce29f3b58a26bdb8a9977
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9141
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Inch towards OpenSSL 1.1.0 compatibility.
BUG=91
Change-Id: Ia45b6bdb5114d0891fdffdef0b5868920324ecec
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We broke this to varying degrees ages ago.
This is the logic to implement the variations of rules in TLS to discard
sessions after a failed connection, where a failed connection could be
one of:
- A connection that was not cleanly shut down.
- A connection that received a fatal alert.
The first one is nonsense since close_notify does not actually work in
the real world. The second is a vaguely more plausible but...
- A stateless ticket-based server can't drop sessions anyway.
- In TLS 1.3, a client may receive many tickets over the lifetime of a
single connection. With an external session cache like ours which may,
in theory, but multithreaded, this will be a huge hassle to track.
- A client may well attempt to establish a connection and reuse the
session before we receive the fatal alert, so any application state we
hope to manage won't really work.
- An attacker can always close the connection before the fatal alert, so
whatever security policy clearing the session gave is easily
bypassable.
Implementation-wise, this has basically never worked. The
ssl_clear_bad_session logic called into SSL_CTX_remove_session which
relied on the internal session cache. (Sessions not in the internal
session cache don't get removed.) The internal session cache was only
useful for a server, where tickets prevent this mechanism from doing
anything. For a client, we since removed the internal session cache, so
nothing got removed. The API for a client also did not work as it gave
the SSL_SESSION, not the SSL, so a consumer would not know the key to
invalidate anyway.
The recent session state splitting change further broke this.
Moreover, calling into SSL_CTX_remove_session logic like that is
extremely dubious because it mutates the not_resumable flag on the
SSL_SESSION which isn't thread-safe.
Spec-wise, TLS 1.3 has downgraded the MUST to a SHOULD.
Given all that mess, just remove this code. It is no longer necessary to
call SSL_shutdown just to make session caching work.
Change-Id: Ib601937bfc5f6b40436941e1c86566906bb3165d
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We will now send tickets as a server and accept them as a
client. Correctly offering and resuming them in the handshake will be
implemented in a follow-up.
Now that we're actually processing draft 14 tickets, bump the draft
version.
Change-Id: I304320a29c4ffe564fa9c00642a4ace96ff8d871
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OpenSSL 1.1.0 added a function to tell if an SSL* is DTLS or not. This
is probably a good idea, especially since SSL_version returns
non-normalized versions.
BUG=91
Change-Id: I25c6cf08b2ebabf0c610c74691de103399f729bc
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SSL_set_bio is a nightmare.
In f715c42322, we noticed that, among
other problems, SSL_set_bio's actual behavior did not match how
SSL_set_rfd was calling it due to an asymmetry in the rbio/wbio
handling. This resulted in SSL_set_fd/SSL_set_rfd calls to crash. We
decided that SSL_set_rfd's believed semantics were definitive and
changed SSL_set_bio.
Upstream, in 65e2d672548e7c4bcb28f1c5c835362830b1745b, decided that
SSL_set_bio's behavior, asymmetry and all, was definitive and that the
SSL_set_rfd crash was a bug in SSL_set_rfd. Accordingly, they switched
the fd callers to use the side-specific setters, new in 1.1.0.
Align with upstream's behavior and add tests for all of SSL_set_bio's
insanity. Also export the new side-specific setters in anticipation of
wanting to be mostly compatible with OpenSSL 1.1.0.
Change-Id: Iceac9508711f79750a3cc2ded081b2bb2cbf54d8
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Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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Change-Id: Idf9db184348140972e57b2a8fa30dc9cb8b2e0f2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9065
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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To prevent configuration/established session confusion, the handshake
session state is separated into the configured session (ssl->session)
and the newly created session (ssl->s3->new_session). Upon conclusion of
the handshake, the finalized session is stored
in (ssl->s3->established_session). During the handshake, any requests
for the session (SSL_get_session) return a non-resumable session, to
prevent resumption of a partially filled session. Sessions should only
be cached upon the completion of the full handshake, using the resulting
established_session. The semantics of accessors on the session are
maintained mid-renego.
Change-Id: I4358aecb71fce4fe14a6746c5af1416a69935078
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8612
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This finishes getting rid of ssl_read_bytes! Now we have separate
entry-points for the various cases. For now, I've kept TLS handshake
consuming records partially. When we do the BIO-less API, I expect that
will need to change, since we won't have the record buffer available.
(Instead, the ssl3_read_handshake_bytes and extend_handshake_buffer pair
will look more like the DTLS side or Go and pull the entire record into
init_buf.)
This change opts to make read_app_data drive the message to completion
in anticipation of DTLS 1.3. That hasn't been specified, but
NewSessionTicket certainly will exist. Knowing that DTLS necessarily has
interleave seems something better suited for the SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD
internals to drive.
It needs refining, but SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD is now actually a half-decent
abstraction boundary between the higher-level protocol logic and
DTLS/TLS-specific record-layer and message dispatchy bits.
BUG=83
Change-Id: I9b4626bb8a29d9cb30174d9e6912bb420ed45aff
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9001
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This was only used so we knew when we had a current message to discard
and when we didn't. With init_msg being tracked better, we can use that
instead.
As part of this, switch the V2ClientHello hack to not using
reuse_message. Otherwise we have to fill in init_msg and friends in two
places.
The next change will require that we have a better handle on the "is
there a current message" boolean.
BUG=83
Change-Id: I917efacbad10806d492bbe51eda74c0779084d60
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8987
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
WebRTC want to be able to send a random alert. Add an API for this.
Change-Id: Id3113d68f25748729fd9e9a91dbbfa93eead12c3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8950
Reviewed-by: Taylor Brandstetter <deadbeef@webrtc.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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