SSL_HANDSHAKE is dropped after the handshake, so I've removed the logic
around smaller sizes. It's much simpler when we can use CBS_stow and
CBB_finish without extra bounds-checking.
Change-Id: Idafaa5d69e171aed9a8759f3d44e52cb01c40f39
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11567
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Now not only the pointers but also the list itself is released after the
handshake completes.
Change-Id: I8b568147d2d4949b3b0efe58a93905f77a5a4481
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11528
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's weird and makes things more confusing. Only use it for local
preferences as there is a default. Peer preferences can be read
directly. Also simplify the logic for requiring a non-empty peer group
list for ECDHE. The normal logic will give us this for free.
Change-Id: I1916155fe246be988f20cbf0b1728380ec90ff3d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11527
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This function is now only ever called as a client, so there are no peer
preferences to check against. It is also now only called on peer curves,
so it only needs to be compared against local preferences.
Change-Id: I87f5b10cf4fe5fef9a9d60aff36010634192e90c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11526
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These functions are only called once. It ends up being not much code if
just done inline.
Change-Id: Ic432b313a6f7994ff9f51436cffbe0c3686a6c7c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11525
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This releases memory associated with them after the handshake. Note this
changes the behavior of |SSL_get0_certificate_types| and
|SSL_get_client_CA_list| slightly. Both functions now return NULL
outside of the handshake. But they were already documented to return
something undefined when not called at the CertificateRequest.
A survey of callers finds none that would care. (Note
SSL_get_client_CA_list is used both as a getter for the corresponding
server config setter and to report client handshake properties. Only the
latter is affected.) It's also pretty difficult to imagine why a caller
would wish to query this stuff at any other time, and there are clear
benefits to dropping the CA list after the handshake (some servers send
ABSURDLY large lists).
Change-Id: I3ac3b601ff0cfa601881ce77ae33d99bb5327004
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11521
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I5d4fc0d3204744e93d71a36923469035c19a5b10
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BUG=77
Change-Id: If568412655aae240b072c29d763a5b17bb5ca3f7
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BUG=77
Change-Id: Id8c45e98c4c22cdd437cbba1e9375239e123b261
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This function is used by NGINX to enable specific curves for ECDH from a
configuration file. However when building with BoringSSL, since it's not
implmeneted, it falls back to using EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name() wich doesn't
support X25519.
Change-Id: I533df4ef302592c1a9f9fc8880bd85f796ce0ef3
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BUG=106
Change-Id: Iaa12aeb67627f3c22fe4a917c89c646cb3dc1843
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This GREASEs cipher suites, groups, and extensions. For now, we'll
always place them in a hard-coded position. We can experiment with more
interesting strategies later.
If we add new ciphers and curves, presumably we prefer them over current
ones, so place GREASE values at the front. This prevents implementations
from parsing only the first value and ignoring the rest.
Add two new extensions, one empty and one non-empty. Place the empty one
in front (IBM WebSphere can't handle trailing empty extensions) and the
non-empty one at the end.
Change-Id: If2e009936bc298cedf2a7a593ce7d5d5ddbb841a
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We'd previously been assuming we'd want to predict P-256 and X25519 but,
on reflection, that's nonsense. Although, today, P-256 is widespread and
X25519 is less so, that's not the right question to ask. Those servers
are all 1.2.
The right question is whether we believe enough servers will get to TLS
1.3 before X25519 to justify wasting 64 bytes on all other connections.
Given that OpenSSL has already shipped X25519 and Microsoft was doing
interop testing on X25519 around when we were shipping it, I think the
answer is no.
Moreover, if we are wrong, it will be easier to go from predicting one
group to two rather than the inverse (provided we send a fake one with
GREASE). I anticipate prediction-miss HelloRetryRequest logic across the
TLS/TCP ecosystem will be largely untested (no one wants to pay an RTT),
so taking a group out of the predicted set will likely be a risky
operation.
Only predicting one group also makes things a bit simpler. I haven't
done this here, but we'll be able to fold the 1.2 and 1.3 ecdh_ctx's
together, even.
Change-Id: Ie7e42d3105aca48eb9d97e2e05a16c5379aa66a3
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This is in preparation for using the supported_versions extension to
experiment with draft TLS 1.3 versions, since we don't wish to restore
the fallback. With versions begin opaque values, we will want
version_from_wire to reject unknown values, not attempt to preserve
order in some way.
This means ClientHello.version processing needs to be separate code.
That's just written out fully in negotiate_version now. It also means
SSL_set_{min,max}_version will notice invalid inputs which aligns us
better with upstream's versions of those APIs.
This CL doesn't replace ssl->version with an internal-representation
version, though follow work should do it once a couple of changes land
in consumers.
BUG=90
Change-Id: Id2f5e1fa72847c823ee7f082e9e69f55e51ce9da
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This will make it a little easier to store the normalized version rather
than the wire version. Also document the V2ClientHello behavior.
Change-Id: I5ce9ccce44ca48be2e60ddf293c0fab6bba1356e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11121
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One less field to reset on renego and save a pointer of post-handshake
memory.
Change-Id: Ifc0c3c73072af244ee3848d9a798988d2c8a7c38
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11086
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This isn't hugely important since the hs object will actually be
released at the end of the handshake, but no sense in holding on to them
longer than needed.
Also release |public_key| when we no longer need it and document what
the fields mean.
Change-Id: If677cb4a915c75405dabe7135205630527afd8bc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10360
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This withdraws support for -DBORINGSSL_ENABLE_RC4_TLS, and removes the
RC4 AEADs.
Change-Id: I1321b76bfe047d180743fa46d1b81c5d70c64e81
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Reason for revert: Right now in TLS 1.3, certificate_auth is exactly
the same as whether we're doing resumption. With the weird reauth
stuff punted to later in the spec, having extra state is just more
room for bugs to creep in.
Original issue's description:
> Determining certificate_auth and key_exchange based on SSL.
>
> This allows us to switch TLS 1.3 to use non-cipher based negotiation
> without needing to use separate functions between 1.3 and below.
>
> BUG=77
>
> Change-Id: I9207e7a6793cb69e8300e2c15afe3548cbf82af2
> Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10803
> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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>
Change-Id: I240e3ee959ffd1f2481a06eabece3af554d20ffa
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This allows us to switch TLS 1.3 to use non-cipher based negotiation
without needing to use separate functions between 1.3 and below.
BUG=77
Change-Id: I9207e7a6793cb69e8300e2c15afe3548cbf82af2
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peer_sigalgs should live on SSL_HANDSHAKE. This both releases a little
bit of memory after the handshake is over and also avoids the bug where
the sigalgs get dropped if SSL_set_SSL_CTX is called at a bad time. See
also upstream's 14e14bf6964965d02ce89805d9de867f000095aa.
This only affects consumers using the old SNI callback and not
select_certificate_cb.
Add a test that the SNI callback works as expected. In doing so, add an
SSL_CTX version of the signing preferences API. This is a property of
the cert/key pair (really just the key) and should be tied to that. This
makes it a bit easier to have the regression test work with TLS 1.2 too.
I thought we'd fixed this already, but apparently not... :-/
BUG=95
Change-Id: I75b02fad4059e6aa46c3b05183a07d72880711b3
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Change-Id: Ie60744761f5aa434a71a998f5ca98a8f8b1c25d5
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Having two copies of this is confusing. This field is inherently tied to
the certificate chain, which lives on SSL_SESSION, so this should live
there too. This also wasn't getting reset correctly on SSL_clear, but
this is now resolved.
Change-Id: I22b1734a93320bb0bf0dc31faa74d77a8e1de906
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One less thing to keep track of.
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/549 got merged.
Change-Id: Ide66e547140f8122a3b8013281be5215c11b6de0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10482
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BUG=75
Change-Id: Ied864cfccbc0e68d71c55c5ab563da27b7253463
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Now that ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list is uninteresting, it can be an
implementation detail of ssl3_choose_cipher. This removes a tiny amount
of duplicated TLS 1.2 / TLS 1.3 code.
Change-Id: I116a6bb08bbc43da573d4b7b5626c556e1a7452d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10221
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It's odd that a function like ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list secretly has side
effects all over the place. This removes the need for the TLS 1.3 code
to re-query the version range, and it removes the requirement that the
RI extension be first.
Change-Id: Ic9af549db3aaa8880f3c591b8a13ba9ae91d6a46
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Between TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3, and the early callback, we've got a lot of
ClientHello parsers. Unify everything on the early callback's parser. As
a side effect, this means we can parse a ClientHello fairly succinctly
from any function which will let us split up ClientHello states where
appropriate.
Change-Id: I2359b75f80926cc7d827570cf33f93029b39e525
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tls13_process_certificate can take a boolean for whether anonymous is
allowed. This does change the error on the client slightly, but I think
this is correct anyway. It is not a syntax error for the server to send
no certificates in so far as the Certificate message allows it. It's
just illegal.
Change-Id: I1af80dacf23f50aad0b1fbd884bc068a40714399
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Extend the DTLS mock clock to apply to sessions too and test that
resumption behaves as expected.
Change-Id: Ib8fdec91b36e11cfa032872b63cf589f93b3da13
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We broke this to varying degrees ages ago.
This is the logic to implement the variations of rules in TLS to discard
sessions after a failed connection, where a failed connection could be
one of:
- A connection that was not cleanly shut down.
- A connection that received a fatal alert.
The first one is nonsense since close_notify does not actually work in
the real world. The second is a vaguely more plausible but...
- A stateless ticket-based server can't drop sessions anyway.
- In TLS 1.3, a client may receive many tickets over the lifetime of a
single connection. With an external session cache like ours which may,
in theory, but multithreaded, this will be a huge hassle to track.
- A client may well attempt to establish a connection and reuse the
session before we receive the fatal alert, so any application state we
hope to manage won't really work.
- An attacker can always close the connection before the fatal alert, so
whatever security policy clearing the session gave is easily
bypassable.
Implementation-wise, this has basically never worked. The
ssl_clear_bad_session logic called into SSL_CTX_remove_session which
relied on the internal session cache. (Sessions not in the internal
session cache don't get removed.) The internal session cache was only
useful for a server, where tickets prevent this mechanism from doing
anything. For a client, we since removed the internal session cache, so
nothing got removed. The API for a client also did not work as it gave
the SSL_SESSION, not the SSL, so a consumer would not know the key to
invalidate anyway.
The recent session state splitting change further broke this.
Moreover, calling into SSL_CTX_remove_session logic like that is
extremely dubious because it mutates the not_resumable flag on the
SSL_SESSION which isn't thread-safe.
Spec-wise, TLS 1.3 has downgraded the MUST to a SHOULD.
Given all that mess, just remove this code. It is no longer necessary to
call SSL_shutdown just to make session caching work.
Change-Id: Ib601937bfc5f6b40436941e1c86566906bb3165d
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Save a little bit of typing at the call site.
Change-Id: I818535409b57a694e5e0ea0e9741d89f2be89375
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We will now send tickets as a server and accept them as a
client. Correctly offering and resuming them in the handshake will be
implemented in a follow-up.
Now that we're actually processing draft 14 tickets, bump the draft
version.
Change-Id: I304320a29c4ffe564fa9c00642a4ace96ff8d871
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Change-Id: Id6a7443246479c62cbe0024e2131a2013959e21e
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OpenSSL 1.1.0 added a function to tell if an SSL* is DTLS or not. This
is probably a good idea, especially since SSL_version returns
non-normalized versions.
BUG=91
Change-Id: I25c6cf08b2ebabf0c610c74691de103399f729bc
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BUG=74
Change-Id: I72d52c1fbc3413e940dddbc0b20c7f22459da693
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Change-Id: I5cc194fc0a3ba8283049078e5671c924ee23036c
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To prevent configuration/established session confusion, the handshake
session state is separated into the configured session (ssl->session)
and the newly created session (ssl->s3->new_session). Upon conclusion of
the handshake, the finalized session is stored
in (ssl->s3->established_session). During the handshake, any requests
for the session (SSL_get_session) return a non-resumable session, to
prevent resumption of a partially filled session. Sessions should only
be cached upon the completion of the full handshake, using the resulting
established_session. The semantics of accessors on the session are
maintained mid-renego.
Change-Id: I4358aecb71fce4fe14a6746c5af1416a69935078
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This finishes getting rid of ssl_read_bytes! Now we have separate
entry-points for the various cases. For now, I've kept TLS handshake
consuming records partially. When we do the BIO-less API, I expect that
will need to change, since we won't have the record buffer available.
(Instead, the ssl3_read_handshake_bytes and extend_handshake_buffer pair
will look more like the DTLS side or Go and pull the entire record into
init_buf.)
This change opts to make read_app_data drive the message to completion
in anticipation of DTLS 1.3. That hasn't been specified, but
NewSessionTicket certainly will exist. Knowing that DTLS necessarily has
interleave seems something better suited for the SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD
internals to drive.
It needs refining, but SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD is now actually a half-decent
abstraction boundary between the higher-level protocol logic and
DTLS/TLS-specific record-layer and message dispatchy bits.
BUG=83
Change-Id: I9b4626bb8a29d9cb30174d9e6912bb420ed45aff
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With the previous DTLS change, the dispatch layer only cares about the
end of the handshake to know when to drop the current message. TLS 1.3
post-handshake messages will need a similar hook, so convert it to this
lower-level one.
BUG=83
Change-Id: I4c8c3ba55ba793afa065bf261a7bccac8816c348
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For TLS 1.3, we will need to process more complex post-handshake
messages. It is simplest if we use the same mechanism. In preparation,
allow ssl3_get_message to be called at any point.
Note that this stops reserving SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH in init_buf
right off the bat. Instead it will grow as-needed to accomodate the
handshake. SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH is rather larger than we probably
need to receive, particularly as a server, so this seems a good plan.
BUG=83
Change-Id: Id7f4024afc4c8a713b46b0d1625432315594350e
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Alas, we will need a version fallback for TLS 1.3 again.
This deprecates SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV. Rather than supplying a
boolean, have BoringSSL be aware of the real maximum version so we can
change the TLS 1.3 anti-downgrade logic to kick in, even when
max_version is set to 1.2.
The fallback version replaces the maximum version when it is set for
almost all purposes, except for downgrade protection purposes.
BUG=chromium:630165
Change-Id: I4c841dcbc6e55a282b223dfe169ac89c83c8a01f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8882
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
It really should take a few more parameters and save a bit of
long-winded initialization work.
Change-Id: I2823f0aa82be39914a156323f6f32b470b6d6a3b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8876
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
[Tests added by davidben.]
Change-Id: I0d54a4f8b8fe91b348ff22658d95340cdb48b089
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8850
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Share a bit more of it between TLS 1.2 and 1.3.
Change-Id: I43c9dbf785a3d33db1793cffb0fdbd3af075cc89
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8849
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This adds three more formats to the SSLKEYLOGFILE format to support TLS
1.3:
EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET <client_random> <early_traffic_secret>
HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET <client_random> <handshake_traffic_secret>
TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 <client_random> <traffic_secret_0>
(We don't implement 0-RTT yet, so only the second two are implemented.)
Motivations:
1. If emitted the non-traffic secrets (early, handshake, and master) or
the IKMs, Wireshark needs to maintain a handshake hash. I don't
believe they need to do this today.
2. We don't store more than one non-traffic secret at a time and don't
keep traffic secrets for longer than needed. That suggests three
separate lines logged at different times rather than one line.
3. If 0-RTT isn't used, we probably won't even compute the early traffic
secret, so that further suggests three different lines.
4. If the handshake didn't get far enough to complete, we won't have an
TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 to log at all. That seems like exactly when
Wireshark would be handy, which means we want to log secrets as they
are computed.
MT from NSS has ACK'd over email that this format would be acceptable
for them, so let's go with it.
Change-Id: I4d685a1355dff4d4bd200310029d502bb6c511f9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8841
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
