Update-Note: This changes causes BoringSSL to be stricter about handling
Unicode strings:
· Reject code points outside of Unicode
· Reject surrogate values
· Don't allow invalid UTF-8 to pass through when the source claims to
be UTF-8 already.
· Drop byte-order marks.
Previously, for example, a UniversalString could contain a large-valued
code point that would cause the UTF-8 encoder to emit invalid UTF-8.
Change-Id: I94d9db7796b70491b04494be84249907ff8fb46c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28325
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
If we don't have OID data for an object then we should fail if we
are asked to encode the ASN.1 for that OID.
(Imported from upstream's f3f8e72f494b36d05e0d04fe418f92b692fbb261.)
Change-Id: I3c3d3a3b236bca374fde3c0d02504140f2992602
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27065
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Constructed types with a recursive definition could eventually exceed
the stack given malicious input with excessive recursion. Therefore we
limit the stack depth.
CVE-2018-0739
Credit to OSSFuzz for finding this issue.
(Imported from upstream's 9310d45087ae546e27e61ddf8f6367f29848220d.)
BoringSSL does not contain any such structures, but import this anyway
with a test.
Change-Id: I0e84578ea795134f25dae2ac8b565f3c26ef3204
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/26844
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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|ASN1_INTEGER_set| and |BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER| disagree about how to encode
zero. OpenSSL master has aligned around the behaviour of the latter
(i.e. a single zero byte) so fix |ASN1_INTEGER_set| to do that. (This is
also the form that DER requires.)
At the same time, fix undefined behaviour when negative a |long| whose
value is |LONG_MIN|.
Change-Id: I1198de35e61a286ac6472e99152f3d22fda59044
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24485
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The newer clang-cl is unhappy about the tautological comparison on
Windows, but the comparison itself is unnecessary anyway, since the
values will never exceed uint32_t.
I think the reason it's not firing elsewhere is because on other 64-bit
platforms, it is not tautological because long is 64-bit. On other
32-bit platforms, I'm not sure we actually have a standalone trunk clang
builder right now.
Update-Note: UTF8_getc and UTF8_putc were unexported. No one appears to
be calling them. (We're a crypto library, not a Unicode library.)
Change-Id: I0949ddea3131dca5f55d04e672c3ccf2915c41ab
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/23844
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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OBJ_txt2obj is currently implemented using BIGNUMs which is absurd. It
also depends on the giant OID table, which is undesirable. Write a new
one and expose the low-level function so Chromium can use it without the
OID table.
Bug: chromium:706445
Change-Id: I61ff750a914194f8776cb8d81ba5d3eb5eaa3c3d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/23364
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
An embedded item wasn't allocated separately on the heap, so don't
free it as if it was.
Issue discovered by Pavel Kopyl
(Imported from upstream's cdc3307d4257f4fcebbab3b2b44207e1a399da05 and
65d414434aeecd5aa86a46adbfbcb59b4344503a.)
I do not believe this is actually reachable in BoringSSL, even in the
face of malloc errors. The only field which sets ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE is in
X509_ATTRIBUTE. That field's value is X509_ATTRIBUTE_SET which cannot
fail to initialize. (It is a CHOICE whose initialization consists of
setting the selector to -1 and calling the type's callback which is
unset for this type.)
Change-Id: I29c080f8a4ddc2f3ef9c119d0d90a899d3cb78c5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22365
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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(Credit to libFuzzer for finding this.)
Change-Id: I0353d686d883703d39145c5bdd1e56368a587a35
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22324
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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Although we are derived from 1.0.2, we mimic 1.1.0 in some ways around
our FOO_up_ref functions and opaque libssl types. This causes some
difficulties when porting third-party code as any OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER
checks for 1.1.0 APIs we have will be wrong.
Moreover, adding accessors without changing OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER can
break external projects. It is common to implement a compatibility
version of an accessor under #ifdef as a static function. This then
conflicts with our headers if we, unlike OpenSSL 1.0.2, have this
function.
This change switches OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER to 1.1.0 and atomically adds
enough accessors for software with 1.1.0 support already. The hope is
this will unblock hiding SSL_CTX and SSL_SESSION, which will be
especially useful with C++-ficiation. The cost is we will hit some
growing pains as more 1.1.0 consumers enter the ecosystem and we
converge on the right set of APIs to import from upstream.
It does not remove any 1.0.2 APIs, so we will not require that all
projects support 1.1.0. The exception is APIs which changed in 1.1.0 but
did not change the function signature. Those are breaking changes.
Specifically:
- SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb is now const-correct.
- X509_get0_signature is now const-correct.
For C++ consumers only, this change temporarily includes an overload
hack for SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb that keeps the old callback working.
This is a workaround for Node not yet supporting OpenSSL 1.1.0.
The version number is set at (the as yet unreleased) 1.1.0g to denote
that this change includes https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4384.
Bug: 91
Change-Id: I5eeb27448a6db4c25c244afac37f9604d9608a76
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10340
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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crypto/asn1 routinely switches between int and long without overflow
checks. Fortunately, it funnels everything into a common entrypoint, so
we can uniformly bound all inputs to something which comfortably fits in
an int.
Change-Id: I340674c6b07820309dc5891024498878c82e225b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20366
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Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Thes are remnants of some old setup.
Change-Id: I09151fda9419fbe7514f2f609f70284965694bfa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20365
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING takes length as a long but uses it as an int. Check bounds
before doing so. Previously, excessively large inputs to the function could
write a single byte outside the target buffer. (This is unreachable as
asn1_ex_c2i already uses int for the length.)
Thanks to NCC for finding this issue.
Change-Id: I7ae42214ca620d4159fa01c942153717a7647c65
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19204
Reviewed-by: Martin Kreichgauer <martinkr@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Martin Kreichgauer <martinkr@google.com>
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There are still a ton of them, almost exclusively complaints that
function declaration and definitions have different parameter names. I
just fixed a few randomly.
Change-Id: I1072f3dba8f63372cda92425aa94f4aa9e3911fa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18706
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Instead of a script which generates macros, emit static inlines in
individual header (or C files). This solves a few issues with the
original setup:
- The documentation was off. We match the documentation now.
- The stack macros did not check constness; see some of the fixes in
crypto/x509.
- Type errors did not look like usual type errors.
- Any type which participated in STACK_OF had to be made partially
public. This allows stack types to be defined an internal header or
even an individual file.
- One could not pass sk_FOO_free into something which expects a function
pointer.
Thanks to upstream's 411abf2dd37974a5baa54859c1abcd287b3c1181 for the
idea.
Change-Id: Ie5431390ccad761c17596b0e93941b0d7a68f904
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16087
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME and ASN1_UTCTIME may be specified using offsets,
even though that's not supported within certificates. [davidben: This
commit message seems off as crypto/x509 does not reject them. It merely
has a comment telling you that it's doing it wrong.]
To convert the offset time back to GMT, the offsets are supposed to be
subtracted, not added. e.g. 1759-0500 == 2359+0100 == 2259Z.
(Imported from upstream's d2335f30970ed3edc1c7c11700ab7f34396cf086.)
Change-Id: Id0d4c5b650e77db3b04b15e66b069807f6f31266
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15834
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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If ret is allocated, it may be leaked on error.
(Imported from upstream's cdfb7809b6a365a0a7874afd8f8778c5c572f267 and
ffcdb0e6efb6fb7033b2cd29e8cca2e2fe355c14.)
Change-Id: I50ed9ad072cf80461d9527d0834b596a8c32e3d3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14315
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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These too appear to be unused now that the core parsers use CBS. They
also were buggy as they silently ignored sign bits. This removes all
ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS definitions. (The code to use them still exists as
we're not ready to diverge on tasn_*. Current thinking is we'll
eventually just ditch the code rather than do so.)
Change-Id: I8d20e2989460dd593d62368cfbd083d5de1ee2a1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14324
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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These have no consumers remaining. Upstream recently had a long series
of bugfixes for these types (2cbd4d98673d99cd7cb10715656b6d3727342e77,
e5afec1831248c767be7c5844a88535dabecc01a,
9abe889702bdc73f9490f611f54bf9c865702554,
2e5adeb2904dd68780fb154dbeb6e3efafb418bb). Rather than worry about this,
just remove the code.
Change-Id: I90f896aad096fc4979877e2006131e76c9ff023b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14323
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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These are only used by crypto/asn1 and not externally.
Change-Id: I2e6a28828fd81a4e3421eed1e98f0a65197f4b88
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13868
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Noticed this comparing our and upstream's ASN.1 code. Somehow I missed
this line in cb852981cd. This change is a
no-op as our only ASN1_EX_COMBINE field is an ASN1_CHOICE which does not
read aclass.
Change-Id: I011f2f6eadd3939ec5f0b346c4eb7d14e406e3cd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13833
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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asn1_template_noexp_d2i call ASN1_item_ex_free(&skfield,...) on error.
Reworked error handling in asn1_item_ex_combine_new:
- call ASN1_item_ex_free and return the correct error code if
ASN1_template_new failed.
- dont call ASN1_item_ex_free if ASN1_OP_NEW_PRE failed.
Reworked error handing in x509_name_ex_d2i and x509_name_encode.
(Imported from upstream's 748cb9a17f4f2b77aad816cf658cd4025dc847ee.)
I believe the tasn1_new.c change is a no-op since we have no
ASN1_OP_NEW_PRE hooks anymore. I'm not sure what the commit message is
referring to with ASN1_template_new. It also seems odd as
ASN1_item_ex_free should probably be able to survive *pval being NULL.
Whatever.
We'd previously tried to fix x509_name_ex_d2i, but I think ours wasn't
quite right. (This thing is a mess...) I've aligned that function with
upstream.
Change-Id: Ie71521cd8a1ec357876caadd13be1ce247110f76
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13831
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Most C standard library functions are undefined if passed NULL, even
when the corresponding length is zero. This gives them (and, in turn,
all functions which call them) surprising behavior on empty arrays.
Some compilers will miscompile code due to this rule. See also
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2016/06/26/nonnull.html
Add OPENSSL_memcpy, etc., wrappers which avoid this problem.
BUG=23
Change-Id: I95f42b23e92945af0e681264fffaf578e7f8465e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12928
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj() function leaks an ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME
object on an error path.
(Imported from upstream's fe71bb3ad97ed01ccf92812891cc2bc3ef3dce76.)
Thanks to Jinguang Dong for pointing out the bug.
Change-Id: I2c14662bb03b0cf957bd277bda487f05f07e89e7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12185
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
d2i_X509_from_buffer parses an |X509| from a |CRYPTO_BUFFER| but ensures
that the |X509_CINF.enc| doesn't make a copy of the encoded
TBSCertificate. Rather the |X509| holds a reference to the given
|CRYPTO_BUFFER|.
Change-Id: I38a4e3d0ca69fc0fd0ef3e15b53181844080fcad
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11920
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
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Macros need a healthy dose of parentheses to avoid expression-level
misparses. Most of this comes from the clang-tidy CL here:
https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/235696/
Also switch most of the macros to use do { ... } while (0) to avoid all
the excessive comma operators and statement-level misparses.
Change-Id: I4c2ee51e347d2aa8c74a2d82de63838b03bbb0f9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11660
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
For consistency and to avoid a pedantic GCC warning (even though it's
mostly old legacy code).
Change-Id: Iea63eb0a82ff52914adc33b83e48450f4f6a49ef
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11021
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Unlike the Scoped* types, bssl::UniquePtr is available to C++ users, and
offered for a large variety of types. The 'extern "C++"' trick is used
to make the C++ bits digestible to C callers that wrap header files in
'extern "C"'.
Change-Id: Ifbca4c2997d6628e33028c7d7620c72aff0f862e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10521
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Check for error return in BN_div_word().
(Imported from upstream's d871284aca5524c85a6460119ac1b1e38f7e19c6.)
This function is only called from crypto/obj to convert strings like
"1.2.3.4.5" to OIDs. We may wish to see about rewriting it just so it's
out of the way.
Change-Id: Ia8379d2dd30606f6a81ce24dee8852312cb7f127
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10365
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These functions are unused. Upstream recently needed to limit recursion
depth on this function in 81f69e5b69b8e87ca5d7080ab643ebda7808542c. It
looks like deeply nested BER constructed strings could cause unbounded
stack usage. Delete the function rather than import the fix.
Change-Id: I7868080fae52b46fb9f9147543c0f7970d8fff98
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10368
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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These are never used internally or externally. Upstream had some
bugfixes to them recently. Delete them instead.
Change-Id: I44a6cce1dac2c459237f6d46502657702782061b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10364
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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(Imported from upstream's b10c10422a9ec4db426be3ef99031f0807d2ded0,
ff8b6b92f44c682ad78f60c32ec154e0bfabebb2, and
134ab5139a8d41455a81d9fcc31b3edb8a4b2f5c.)
Change-Id: Icf1661a4d0249ae5af72cda15b12822b86e35a82
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10361
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We'd gotten rid of the macros, but not the underlying asn1_GetSequence
which is unused. Sadly this doesn't quite get rid of ASN1_(const_)?CTX.
There's still some code in the rest of crypto/asn1 that uses it.
Change-Id: I2ba8708ac5b20982295fbe9c898fef8f9b635704
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9113
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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(Imported from upstream's a9b23465243b6d692bb0b419bdbe0b1f5a849e9c,
5e102f96eb6fcdba1db2dba41132f92fa492aea0, and
9bda72880113b2b2262d290b23bdd1d3b19ff5b3.)
Change-Id: Ib608acb86cc128cacf20811c21bf6b38b0520106
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8944
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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The selector field could be omitted because it has a DEFAULT value.
In this case *sfld == NULL (sfld can never be NULL). This was not
noticed because this was never used in existing ASN.1 modules.
(Imported from upstream's c4210673313482edacede58d92e92c213d7a181a.)
svaldez and I stared at this for a while and we believe this change is
correct. It's also irrelevant because our only remaining ADB (ANY
DEFINED BY) table is POLICYQUALINFO which does not allow its selector to
be omitted. Also, if it did, it would be a slight change in behavior.
We'd switch from using POLICYQUALINFO's default_tt (filling in an
ASN1_ANY) to its null_tt (which doesn't exist, so error).
Change-Id: If6a929e3dafca18431775b01958d0dae1c09f3b4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8943
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This reverts commits:
8d79ed674019fdcb52348d79ed6740
Because WebRTC (at least) includes our headers in an extern "C" block,
which precludes having any C++ in them.
Change-Id: Ia849f43795a40034cbd45b22ea680b51aab28b2d
This change scatters the contents of the two scoped_types.h files into
the headers for each of the areas of the code. The types are now in the
|bssl| namespace.
Change-Id: I802b8de68fba4786b6a0ac1bacd11d81d5842423
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8731
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We currently have the situation where the |tool| and |bssl_shim| code
includes scoped_types.h from crypto/test and ssl/test. That's weird and
shouldn't happen. Also, our C++ consumers might quite like to have
access to the scoped types.
Thus this change moves some of the template code to base.h and puts it
all in a |bssl| namespace to prepare for scattering these types into
their respective headers. In order that all the existing test code be
able to access these types, it's all moved into the same namespace.
Change-Id: I3207e29474dc5fcc344ace43119df26dae04eabb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8730
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
These are more remnants of CMS. Nothing uses them directly. Removing them means
more code we don't have to think about when importing upstream patches.
Also take out a bunch of dead prototypes nearby.
Change-Id: Ife094d9d2078570006d1355fa4e3323f435be608
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8244
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
These are more pretty-printers for generic ASN.1 structures. They're never
called externally and otherwise are only used in the X509V3_EXT_PARSE_UNKNOWN
mode for the X509 pretty-print functions. That makes unknown extensions
pretty-print as ASN.1 structures.
This is a rather useless feature, so have that fall through to
X509V3_EXT_DUMP_UNKNOWN which does a hexdump instead.
(The immediate trigger is I don't know what |op| is in upstream's
8c918b7b9c93ba38790ffd1a83e23c3684e66f57 and don't think it is worth the time
to puzzle that out and verify it. Better ditch this code completely.)
Change-Id: I0217906367d83056030aea64ef344d4fedf74763
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8243
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
These functions are never instantiated. (They're a remnant of the PKCS#7 and
CMS bits.) Next time upstream touches this code, we don't have to puzzle
through the diff and import it.
Change-Id: I67c2102ae13e8e0527d858e1c63637dd442a4ffb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8242
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
(Imported from upstream's f792c663048f19347a1bb72125e535e4fb2ecf39.)
Change-Id: If9bbb10de3ea858076bd9587d21ec331e837dd53
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8171
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
