I see no internal users and the existence of a THIRD version encoding
complicates all version-checking logic. Also convert another version check to
SSL_IS_DTLS that was missed earlier.
Change-Id: I60d215f57d44880f6e6877889307dc39dbf838f7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1550
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
- DTLS server code didn't account for the new ClientHello state. This looks
like it only matters if a DTLS server uses select_certificate_cb and returns
asynchronously.
- State A transitions immediately to B and is redundant. No code distinguishes
A and B.
- The ssl_get_message call transitions to the second state (originally C). This
makes the explicit transition to C a no-op. More of a problem,
ssl_get_message may return asynchronously and remain in its second state if the
handshake body had not completed yet. Fix this by splitting state C in two.
Combined with the above change, this results in only the top few states getting
reshuffled.
This fixes the server async tests.
Change-Id: I46703bcd205988b118217b6424ba4f88e731be5a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1412
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Use same logic when determining when to expect a client certificate for
both TLS and DTLS.
PR#3452
(Imported from upstream's 666a597ffb9bcf3ba2d49e711fcca28df91eff9d)
Change-Id: Ia267255a32c0b3b9a7da1c53f13ef6f620ff5ec1
This removes the last case where the server generates an RSA key for the
ServerKeyExchange. Remove the code for this. Client support to accept them
still remains.
Leave the APIs for now, but they don't do anything anymore.
Change-Id: I84439e034cc575719f5bc9b3e501165e12b62107
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1286
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Now the only case where temporary RSA keys are used on the server end is
non-signing keys.
Change-Id: I55f6c206e798dd28548c386fdffd555ccc395477
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1285
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Also fix a place where fixes for the condition for sending ServerKeyExchange in
s3_srvr.c were never propogated to d1_srvr.c. Tidy up that logic to use
ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange and simplify the PSK check.
Change-Id: Ie36d378f733e59a8df405bc869f2346af59bd574
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1283
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This drops the bits of logic that allowed Certificate messages to be optional
for a KRB5 cipher suite.
Change-Id: I2a71b7c13d7e76f4f5542d4074169f80f3617240
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1154
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
PSK identity hint can be stored in SSL_CTX and in SSL/SSL_SESSION,
similar to other TLS parameters, with the value in SSL/SSL_SESSION
taking precedence over the one in SSL_CTX. The value in SSL_CTX is
shared (used as the default) between all SSL instances associated
with that SSL_CTX, whereas the value in SSL/SSL_SESSION is confined
to that particular TLS/SSL connection/session.
The existing implementation of TLS-PSK does not correctly distinguish
between PSK identity hint in SSL_CTX and in SSL/SSL_SESSION. This
change fixes these issues:
1. SSL_use_psk_identity_hint does nothing and returns "success" when
the SSL object does not have an associated SSL_SESSION.
2. On the client, the hint in SSL_CTX (which is shared between
multiple SSL instances) is overwritten with the hint received from
server or reset to NULL if no hint was received.
3. On the client, psk_client_callback is invoked with the hint from
SSL_CTX rather than from current SSL/SSL_SESSION (i.e., the one
received from the server). Issue #2 above masks this issue.
4. On the server, the hint in SSL/SSL_SESSION is ignored and the hint
from SSL_CTX is sent to the client.
5. On the server, the hint in SSL/SSL_SESSION is reset to the one in
SSL_CTX after the ClientKeyExchange message step.
This change fixes the issues by:
* Adding storage for the hint in the SSL object. The idea being that
the hint in the associated SSL_SESSION takes precedence.
* Reading the hint during the handshake only from the associated
SSL_SESSION object.
* Initializing the hint in SSL object with the one from the SSL_CTX
object.
* Initializing the hint in SSL_SESSION object with the one from the
SSL object.
* Making SSL_use_psk_identity_hint and SSL_get_psk_identity_hint
set/get the hint to/from SSL_SESSION associated with the provided
SSL object, or, if no SSL_SESSION is available, set/get the hint
to/from the provided SSL object.
* Removing code which resets the hint during handshake.
Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta).
(This change contains substantial changes from the original and
effectively starts a new history.)
