This was dropped in d27441a9cb due to lack
of use, but node.js now needs it.
Change-Id: I1e207d4b46fc746cfae309a0ea7bbbc04ea785e8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7270
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
C has implicit conversion of |void *| to other pointer types so these
casts are unnecessary. Clean them up to make the code easier to read
and to make it easier to find dangerous casts.
Change-Id: I26988a672e8ed4d69c75cfbb284413999b475464
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7102
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
dh_tmp can only contain parameters, now that DHE always generates keys fresh
for each connection.
Change-Id: I56dad4cbec7e21326360d79df211031fd9734004
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6702
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Then deprecate the old functions. Thanks to upstream's
6977e8ee4a718a76351ba5275a9f0be4e530eab5 for the idea.
Change-Id: I916abd6fca2a3b2a439ec9902d9779707f7e41eb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6622
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It has no callers. I prepped for its removal earlier with
c05697c2c5
and then completely forgot.
Thanks to upstream's 6f78b9e824c053d062188578635c575017b587c5 for
the reminder. Quoth them:
> This only gets used to set a specific curve without actually checking
> that the peer supports it or not and can therefor result in handshake
> failures that can be avoided by selecting a different cipher.
It's also a very confusing API since it does NOT pass ownership of the
EC_KEY to the caller.
Change-Id: I6a00643b3a2d6746e9e0e228b47c2bc9694b0084
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6621
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Or at least group them together and make a passing attempt to document
them. The legacy X.509 stack itself remains largely untouched and most
of the parameters have to do with it.
Change-Id: I9e11e2ad1bbeef53478c787344398c0d8d1b3876
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5942
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Allow configuring digest preferences for the private key. Some
smartcards have limited support for signing digests, notably Windows
CAPI keys and old Estonian smartcards. Chromium used the supports_digest
hook in SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD to limit such keys to SHA1. However,
detecting those keys was a heuristic, so some SHA256-capable keys
authenticating to SHA256-only servers regressed in the switch to
BoringSSL. Replace this mechanism with an API to configure digest
preference order. This way heuristically-detected SHA1-only keys may be
configured by Chromium as SHA1-preferring rather than SHA1-requiring.
In doing so, clean up the shared_sigalgs machinery somewhat.
BUG=468076
Change-Id: I996a2df213ae4d8b4062f0ab85b15262ca26f3c6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5755
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex was implemented with a memcpy, which doesn't work well when
some of the pointers need to be copied, and ssl_verify_cert_chain didn't
account for set_ex_data failing.
Change-Id: Ieb556aeda6ab2e4c810f27012fefb1e65f860023
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5911
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
SSL_get_client_CA_list is one of those dreaded functions which may query either
configuration state or handshake state. Moreover, it does so based on
|ssl->server|, which may not be configured until later. Also check
|ssl->handshake_func| to make sure |ssl| is not in an indeterminate state.
This also fixes a bug where SSL_get_client_CA_list wouldn't work in DTLS due to
the incorrect |ssl->version| check.
Change-Id: Ie564dbfeecd2c8257fd6bcb148bc5db827390c77
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5827
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Quite a lot of consumers of the SSL stack will never need to touch files from
the SSL stack, but enough do that we can't just ditch them. Toss that all into
their own file so a static linker can drop it.
Change-Id: Ia07de939889eb09e3ab16aebcc1b6869ca8b75a0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5820
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Move cert_chain to the SSL_SESSION. Now everything on an SSL_SESSION is
properly serialized. The cert_chain field is, unfortunately, messed up
since it means different things between client and server.
There exists code which calls SSL_get_peer_cert_chain as both client and
server and assumes the existing semantics for each. Since that function
doesn't return a newly-allocated STACK_OF(X509), normalizing between the
two formats is a nuisance (we'd either need to store both cert_chain and
cert_chain_full on the SSL_SESSION or create one of the two variants
on-demand and stash it into the SSL).
This CL does not resolve this and retains the client/server difference
in SSL_SESSION. The SSL_SESSION serialization is a little inefficient
(two copies of the leaf certificate) for a client, but clients don't
typically serialize sessions. Should we wish to resolve it in the
future, we can use a different tag number. Because this was historically
unserialized, existing code must already allow for cert_chain not being
preserved across i2d/d2i.
In keeping with the semantics of retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs,
cert_chain is not retained when that flag is set.
Change-Id: Ieb72fc62c3076dd59750219e550902f1ad039651
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5759
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's completely redundant with the copy in the SSL_SESSION except it
isn't serialized.
Change-Id: I1d95a14cae064c599e4bab576df1dd156da4b81c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5757
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Gets another field out of the SSL_SESSION.
Change-Id: I9a27255533f8e43e152808427466ec1306cfcc60
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5756
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
They're not called (new in 1.0.2). We actually may well need to
configure these later to strike ECDSA from the list on Chrome/XP
depending on what TLS 1.3 does, but for now striking it from the cipher
suite list is both necessary and sufficient. I think we're better off
removing these for now and adding new APIs later if we need them.
(This API is weird. You pass in an array of NIDs that must be even
length and alternating between hash and signature NID. We'd also need a
way to query the configured set of sigalgs to filter away. Those used to
exist but were removed in
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/5347/. SSL_get_sigalgs is
an even uglier API and doesn't act on the SSL_CTX.)
And with that, SSL_ctrl and SSL_CTX_ctrl can *finally* be dropped. Don't
leave no-op wrappers; anything calling SSL_ctrl and SSL_CTX_ctrl should
instead switch to the wrapper macros.
BUG=404754
Change-Id: I5d465cd27eef30d108eeb6de075330c9ef5c05e8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5675
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This isn't called and, with the fixed-DH client cert types removed, is
only useful if a server wishes to not accept ECDSA certificates or
something.
BUG=404754
Change-Id: I21d8e1a71aedf446ce974fbeadc62f311ae086db
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5673
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These are unused (new as of 1.0.2). Although being able to separate the
two stores is a reasonable thing to do, we hope to remove the
auto-chaining feature eventually. Given that, SSL_CTX_set_cert_store
should suffice. This gets rid of two more ctrl macros.
BUG=404754,486295
Change-Id: Id84de95d7b2ad5a14fc68a62bb2394f01fa67bb4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5672
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
In the ancient times, before ex_data and OpenSSL, SSLeay supported a
single app_data slot in various types. Later app_data begat ex_data, and
app_data was replaced by compatibility macros to ex_data index zero.
Today, app_data is still in use, but ex_data never reserved index zero
for app_data. This causes some danger where, if the first ex_data
registration did not use NULL callbacks, the registration's callbacks
would collide with app_data.
Instead, add an option to the types with app_data to reserve index zero.
Also switch SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx to always return zero
rather than allocate a new one. It used to be that you used
X509_STORE_CTX_get_app_data. I only found one consumer that we probably
don't care about, but, to be safe and since it's easy, go with the
conservative option. (Although SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx wasn't
guaranteed to alias app_data, in practice it always did. No consumer
ever calls X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index.)
Change-Id: Ie75b279d60aefd003ffef103f99021c5d696a5e9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5313
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Since it resets leaf, private key, and chain, it makes sense to also
clear custom key method tables.
Change-Id: If511b8f15a44674c31d068d36984e9189c5a9071
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5356
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Also document them in the process. Almost done!
BUG=404754
Change-Id: I3333c7e9ea6b4a4844f1cfd02bff8b5161b16143
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5355
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is unused. It seems to be distinct from the automatic chain
building and was added in 1.0.2. Seems to be an awful lot of machinery
that consumers ought to configure anyway.
BUG=486295
Change-Id: If3d4a2761f61c5b2252b37d4692089112fc0ec21
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5353
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This allows us to remove the confusing EVP_PKEY argument to the
SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD wrapper functions. It also simplifies some of the
book-keeping around the CERT structure, as well as the API for
configuring certificates themselves. The current one is a little odd as
some functions automatically route to the slot while others affect the
most recently touched slot. Others still (extra_certs) apply to all
slots, making them not terribly useful.
Consumers with complex needs should use cert_cb or the early callback
(select_certificate_cb) to configure whatever they like based on the
ClientHello.
BUG=486295
Change-Id: Ice29ffeb867fa4959898b70dfc50fc00137f01f3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5351
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The distinction was not well-enforced in the code. In fact, it wasn't
even possible to use the RSA_SIGN slot because ssl_set_pkey and
ssl_set_cert would always use the RSA_ENC slot.
A follow-up will fold away the mechanism altogether, but this is an easy
initial simplfication.
BUG=486295
Change-Id: I66b5bf3e6dc243dac7c75924c1c1983538e49060
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5349
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Turns out the safer/simpler method still wasn't quite right. :-)
session->sess_cert isn't serialized and deserialized, which is poor. Duplicate
it manually for now. Leave a TODO to get rid of that field altogether as it's
not especially helpful. The certificate-related fields should be in the
session. The others probably have no reason to be preserved on resumptions at
all.
Test by making bssl_shim.cc assert the peer cert chain is there or not as
expected.
BUG=501220
Change-Id: I44034167629720d6e2b7b0b938d58bcab3ab0abe
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5170
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This doesn't even change behavior. Unlike local configuration, the peer
can never have multiple certificates anyway. (Even with a renego, the
SESS_CERT is created anew.)
This does lose the implicit certificate type check, but the certificate
type is already checked in ssl3_get_server_certificate and later checked
post-facto in ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm (except that one seems to
have some bugs like it accepts ECDSA certificates for RSA cipher suites,
to be cleaned up in a follow-up). Either way, we have the certificate
mismatch tests for this.
BUG=486295
Change-Id: I437bb723bb310ad54ee4150eda67c1cfe43377b3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5044
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
|SSL_CTX| and |X509_STORE| have grown their own locks. Several static
locks have been added to hack around not being able to use a
|CRYPTO_once_t| in public headers. Lastly, support for calling
|SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id| concurrently with active connections
has been removed. No other property of an |SSL_CTX| works like that.
Change-Id: Iff5fe3ee3fdd6ea9c9daee96f850b107ad8a6bca
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4775
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change converts the reference counts in crypto/ to use
|CRYPTO_refcount_t|. The reference counts in |X509_PKEY| and |X509_INFO|
were never actually used and so were dropped.
Change-Id: I75d572cdac1f8c1083c482e29c9519282d7fd16c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4772
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
With SSL_get0_raw_cipherlist gone, there's no need to hold onto it.
Change-Id: I258f8bfe21cc354211a777660df680df6c49df2a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4616
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
clang-format got a little confused there.
Change-Id: I46df523e8a7813a2b4e243da3df22851b3393873
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4614
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's only called for client certificates with NULL. The interaction with
extra_certs is more obvious if we handle that case externally. (We
shouldn't attach extra_certs if there is no leaf.)
Change-Id: I9dc26f32f582be8c48a4da9aae0ceee8741813dc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4613
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These are never used and no flags are defined anyway.
Change-Id: I206dc2838c5f68d87559a702dcb299b208cc7e1e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4493
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is a really dumb API wart. Now that we have a limited set of curves that
are all reasonable, the automatic logic should just always kick in. This makes
set_ecdh_auto a no-op and, instead of making it the first choice, uses it as
the fallback behavior should none of the older curve selection APIs be used.
Currently, by default, server sockets can only use the plain RSA key exchange.
BUG=481139
Change-Id: Iaabc82de766cd00968844a71aaac29bd59841cd4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4531
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The rest of ssl/ still includes things everywhere, but this at least fixes the
includes that were implicit from ssl/internal.h.
Change-Id: I7ed22590aca0fe78af84fd99a3e557f4b05f6782
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4281
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Match the other internal headers.
Change-Id: Iff7e2dd06a1a7bf993053d0464cc15638ace3aaa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4280
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There's multiple sets of APIs for selecting the curve. Fold away
SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE as failing to set it is either a no-op or a bug. With
that gone, the consumer only needs to control the selection of a curve, with
key generation from then on being uniform. Also clean up the interaction
between the three API modes in s3_srvr.c; they were already mutually exclusive
due to tls1_check_ec_tmp_key.
This also removes all callers of EC_KEY_dup (and thus CRYPTO_dup_ex_data)
within the library.
Change-Id: I477b13bd9e77eb03d944ef631dd521639968dc8c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4200
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Quite a few functions reported wrong function names when pushing
to the error stack.
Change-Id: I84d89dbefd2ecdc89ffb09799e673bae17be0e0f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4080
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
A casual grep would suggest this function has the same problems as
CVE-2015-0291, but the structure is memset to 0, so the calls are unnecessary.
Also use BUF_memdup rather than an OPENSSL_malloc + mempcy pair.
Change-Id: Id605374d99cff32e2dccb7f9b8a9da226faf7715
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4051
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It created the cert structure in SSL_CTX or SSL if it was NULL, but they can
never be NULL as the comments already said.
(Imported from upstream's 2c3823491d8812560922a58677e3ad2db4b2ec8d.)
Change-Id: I97c7bb306d6f3c18597850db9f08023b2ef74839
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4042
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
More modern versions of GCC (at least with aarch64) are warning about an
unused value in these locations. It's incorrect, but I guess that the
macro is confusing it.
Using a (void) tag is a little ugly but solves the problem.
Change-Id: If6ba5083ab6e501c81e7743ae1ed99a89565e57c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2810
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
PR#3613
(Imported from upstream's fc3968a25ce0c16cab8730ec0d68a59856158029)
We don't care about GOST, but removing redundant code is reasonable. Also
switch that CRYPTO_add to EVP_PKEY_dup. Missed a spot.
Change-Id: I768ec546d987fb3d8bc3decf7ebf1a5590fbb6c2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2477
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
tls1_process_sigalgs now only determines the intersection between the peer
algorithms and those configured locally. That list is queried later to
determine the hash algorithm to use when signing CertificateVerify or
ServerKeyExchange.
This is needed to support client auth on Windows where smartcards or CAPI may
not support all hash functions.
As a bonus, this does away with more connection-global state. This avoids the
current situation where digests are chosen before keys are known (for
CertificateVerify) or for slots that don't exist.
Change-Id: Iec3619a103d691291d8ebe08ef77d574f2faf0e8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2280
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CERT_PKEY_SIGN isn't meaningful since, without strict mode, we always fall back
to SHA-1 anyway. So the digest is never NULL when CERT_PKEY_SIGN is computed.
The entire valid_flags is now back to it's pre-1.0.2 check of seeing if the
certificate and key are configured.
This finally removes the sensitivity between valid_flags and selecting the
digest, so we can defer choosing the digest all we like.
Change-Id: I9f9952498f512d7f0cc799497f7c5b52145a48af
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2288
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It doesn't depend on the cipher now that export ciphers are gone. It need only
be called once. Also remove the valid bit; nothing ever reads it. Its output is
also only used within a function, so make mask_k and mask_a local variables.
So all the configuration-based checks are in one place, change the input
parameter from CERT to SSL and move the PSK and ECDHE checks to the mask
computation. This avoids having to evaluate the temporary EC key for each
cipher.
The remaining uses are on the client which uses them differently (disabled
features rather than enabled ones). Those too may as well be local variables,
so leave a TODO.
Change-Id: Ibcb574341795d4016ea749f0290a793eed798874
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2287
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
