We have a lot of options that don't do anything.
Change-Id: I1681fd07d1272547d4face87917ce41029bbf0de
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4731
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There's multiple different versions of this check, between
s->s3->have_version (only works at some points), s->new_session (really
weird and not actually right), s->renegotiate (fails on the server
because it's always 2 after ClientHello), and s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len
(super confusing). Add an explicit bit with clear meaning. We'll prune
some of the others later; notably s->renegotiate can go away when
initiating renegotiation is removed.
This also tidies up the extensions to be consistent about whether
they're allowed during renego:
- ALPN failed to condition when accepting from the server, so even
if the client didn't advertise, the server could.
- SCTs now *are* allowed during renego. I think forbidding it was a
stray copy-paste. It wasn't consistently enforced in both ClientHello
and ServerHello, so the server could still supply it. Moreover, SCTs
are part of the certificate, so we should accept it wherever we accept
certificates, otherwise that session's state becomes incomplete. This
matches OCSP stapling. (NB: Chrome will never insert a session created
on renego into the session cache and won't accept a certificate
change, so this is moot anyway.)
Change-Id: Ic9bd1ebe2a2dbe75930ed0213bf3c8ed8170e251
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4730
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
As of crbug.com/484543, Chromium's SSLClientSocket is not sensitive to whether
renegotiation is enabled or not. Disable it by default and require consumers to
opt into enabling this protocol mistake.
BUG=429450
Change-Id: I2329068284dbb851da010ff1fd398df3d663bcc3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4723
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Derived from upstream's new evp_test. The tests were taken from upstream
but tweaked so the diff from the old cipher_test.txt is more obvious.
Change-Id: Ic82593a8bb6aaee9b69fdc42a8b75516b03c1c5a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4707
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The generic RC4 implementation may read and write just past the end of the
buffer; when input and output are aligned, it always reads an RC4_CHUNK at a
time. It appropriately masks off and preserves the excess bytes off the end, so
this can only have practical effects if it crosses a page boundary. There's an
alignment check, so that can't happen; page boundaries are always aligned. But
it makes ASan unhappy and strictly speaking is a memory error.
Instead, fall through to the generic codepath which just reads it byte by byte.
This should fix the other bot failure.
Change-Id: I3cbd3bfc6cb0537e87f3252dea12d40ffa78d590
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4722
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
As with CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32, NULL in and out are legal in the
degenerate case when len is 0. This fixes one of the two failures on the bots.
Change-Id: If6016dfc3963d9c06c849fc8eba9908556f66666
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4721
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
crypto/test contains not tests, but a test support library that should be
linked into each test.
Change-Id: If1c85eda2a3df1717edd38575e1ec792323c400b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4720
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I3002d95d2b9db4dd05e1c56ef6ae410315b97ab9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4710
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change makes it safe to call EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup after a failed
EVP_AEAD_CTX_init.
Change-Id: I608ed550e08d638cd7e941f5067edd3da4c850ab
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4692
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
(The huge if-else was hard to visually parse.)
Change-Id: Ic2c94120f345085b619304181e861f662a931a29
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4691
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This imports the EVP_PKEY test data of upstream's evptests.txt, but
modified to fit our test framework and with a new test driver. The
remainder of the test data will be imported separately into aead_test
and cipher_test.
Some minor changes to the test format were made to account for test
framework differences. One test has different results since we don't
support RSA signatures with omitted (rather than NULL) parameters.
Otherwise, the biggest difference in test format is that the ad-hoc
result strings are replaced with checking ERR_peek_error.
Change-Id: I758869abbeb843f5f2ac6c1cbd87333baec08ec3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4703
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This matches how upstream imported that test. evp_test will be used for
the subset of upstream's evp_test which land in our crypto/evp layer.
(Some of crypto/evp is in crypto/cipher for us, so those tests will be
in a ported cipher_test.)
Change-Id: Ic899442794b66350e73a706bb7c77a6ff3d2564b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4702
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This adds a file-based test framework to crypto/test. It knows how to
parse formats similar to either upstream's evp_test and our aead_test.
hmac_test has been converted to that with tests from upstream's
evp_test. Upstream tests it against the deprecated EVP_PKEY_HMAC API,
which will be tested by running evp_test against the same input file, to
avoid having to duplicate the test vectors. hmac_test runs those same
inputs against the supported HMAC_CTX APIs.
Change-Id: I9d2b6adb9be519760d1db282b9d43efd6f9adffb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4701
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Nothing should call ssl3_setup_read_buffer or ssl3_setup_write_buffer unless it
intends to write into the buffer. This way buffer management can later be an
implementation detail of the record layer.
Change-Id: Idb0effba00e77c6169764843793f40ec37868b61
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4687
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
NULL in and out are legal in the degenerate case when len is 0.
Change-Id: Ibf0600a4f635a03103b1ae914918fdcf23a75a39
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4705
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Like the non-stitched variant, this "AEAD" uses the output buffer as
scratch space for the MAC. Thus it should require that max_out_len is
large enough to fit that, even though it will never return that large of
input.
Change-Id: I5b30b0756408c2e433448f540e7c65251336d2f8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4704
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's completely redundant with the extend bit. If extend is 0, we're reading a
new record, and rbuf.len is passed. Then it needs to get clamped by ssl3_read_n
post alignment anyway. If extend is 1, we're reading the rest of the current
record and max is always n. (For TLS, we actually could just read more, but not
for DTLS. Basically no one sets it on the TLS side of things, so instead, after
WebRTC's broken DTLS handling is fixed, read_ahead can go away altogether and
DTLS/TLS record layers can be separated.)
This removes ssl3_read_n's callers' dependency on ssl3_setup_read_buffer
setting up rbuf.len.
Change-Id: Iaf11535d01017507a52a33b19240f42984d6cf52
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4686
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
They date to https://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2533, but no
particularly good justification was given for them. It seems it was just a
bandaid because d1_pkt.c forgot to initialize the buffer. I went through
codesearch for all accesses to SSL3_BUFFER::buf and SSL::packet. They seem
appropriately guarded but for this one.
Change-Id: Ife4e7afdb7a7c137d6be4791542eb5de6dd5b1b6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4685
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
s->packet points into the read buffer. It shouldn't leave a dangling pointer.
Change-Id: Ia7def2f50928ea9fca8cb0b69d614a92f9f47f57
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4684
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There's no real need to ever disable it, so this is one fewer configuration to
test. It's still disabled for DTLS, but a follow-up will resolve that.
Change-Id: Ia95ad8c17ae8236ada516b3968a81c684bf37fd9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4683
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
inttypes.h kindly requires a feature macro in C++ on some platforms, due
to a bizarre footnote in C99 (see footnote 191 in section 7.8.1). As
bn.h is a public header, we must leak this wart to the consumer. On
platforms with unfriendly inttypes.h headers, using BN_DEC_FMT1 and
friends now require the feature macro be defined externally.
This broke the Chromium Android Clang builder:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.linux/builders/Android%20Clang%20Builder%20%28dbg%29/builds/59288
Change-Id: I88275a6788c7babd0eae32cae86f115bfa93a591
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4688
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change |EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name| to report |ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE|
itself, so that reporting of |EC_R_UNKNOWN_GROUP| is not confused by
the caller's addition of a spurious |ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE|.
Change-Id: Id3f5364f01eb8e3597bcddd6484bc03d5578befb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4690
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Trusty doesn't have setjmp.h and nor does it have threads.
Change-Id: I005f7a009a13e6632513be9fab2bbe62294519a4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4660
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
With DTLSv1_get_timeout de-ctrl-ified, the type checker complains about
OPENSSL_timeval. Existing callers all use the real timeval.
Now that OPENSSL_timeval is not included in any public structs, simply
forward-declare timeval itself in ssl.h and pull in winsock2.h in internal
headers.
Change-Id: Ieaf110e141578488048c28cdadb14881301a2ce1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4682
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Nothing ever uses those structs. This to avoid having any structs in the
public header which use struct timeval.
In doing so, move the protocol version constants up to ssl.h so dtls1.h
may be empty. This also removes TLS1_get_version and TLS1_get_client_version
as they're unused and depend on TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR. This still lets tls1.h
be included independently from ssl.h (though I don't think anyone ever includes
it...).
Change-Id: Ieac8b90cf94f7f1e742a88bb75c0ee0aa4b1414c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4681
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is used with a platform API, so it should use the corresponding
platform type, saving us the size assert. It's ever defined in an
internal header, so we can freely use windows.h and friends.
Change-Id: Idc979309436adcf54524c835ddc2c98c3870d2e2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4680
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The interface for this is very similar to upstream, but the code is
quite different.
Support for “resuming” (i.e. calling |CMAC_Final| and then computing the
CMAC for an extension of the message) has been dropped. Also, calling
|CMAC_Init| with magic argument to reset it has been replaced with
|CMAC_Reset|.
Lastly, a one-shot function has been added because it can save an
allocation and that's what most callers actually appear to want to do.
Change-Id: I9345220218bdb16ebe6ca356928d7c6f055d83f6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4630
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This reverts commit 68de407b5f. The NaCl fix has
rolled into Chromium.
Change-Id: I9fd6a6ae727c95fa89b8ce27e301f2a748d0acc9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4651
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Per earlier review comment. The number is wrong anyway. (Neither version does
anything since init_buf is initialized to a large size and most functions don't
bother sizing it. Future work should rewrite all of this to use a CBB.)
Change-Id: I3b58672b328396459a34c6403f8bfb77c96efe9c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4650
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
generate_build_files.py is a generalisation of update_gypi_and_asm.py
that works for both Chromium and Android. In the future, these projects
will drop their copies of update_gypi_and_asm.py and will use this
script instead.
Change-Id: Ie32ce629ef44a6c070e329c7bc5e4531205b9709
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4631
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
With SSL_get0_raw_cipherlist gone, there's no need to hold onto it.
Change-Id: I258f8bfe21cc354211a777660df680df6c49df2a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4616
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The only place using it is export keying material which can do the
version check inline.
Change-Id: I1893966c130aa43fa97a6116d91bb8b04f80c6fb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4615
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
clang-format got a little confused there.
Change-Id: I46df523e8a7813a2b4e243da3df22851b3393873
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4614
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's only called for client certificates with NULL. The interaction with
extra_certs is more obvious if we handle that case externally. (We
shouldn't attach extra_certs if there is no leaf.)
Change-Id: I9dc26f32f582be8c48a4da9aae0ceee8741813dc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4613
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Shawn Willden
David Benjamin
Matt Braithwaite
Adam Langley