OpenSSL includes a leaf certificate in a certificate chain when it's a
client, but doesn't when it's a server. This is also reflected in the
serialisation of sessions.
This change makes the internal semantics consistent: the leaf is always
included in the chain in memory, and never duplicated when serialised.
To maintain the same API, SSL_get_peer_cert_chain will construct a copy
of the chain without the leaf if needed.
Since the serialised format of a client session has changed, an
|is_server| boolean is added to the ASN.1 that defaults to true. Thus
any old client sessions will be parsed as server sessions and (silently)
discarded by a client.
Change-Id: Ibcf72bc8a130cedb423bc0fd3417868e0af3ca3e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12704
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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state is now initialized to SSL_ST_INIT in SSL_HANDSHAKE. If there is no
handshake present, we report SSL_ST_OK. This saves 8 bytes of
per-connection post-handshake memory.
Change-Id: Idb3f7031045caed005bd7712bc8c4b42c81a1d04
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12697
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This is to free up moving ssl->state into SSL_HANDSHAKE. ssl->state
serves two purposes right now. First, it is the state tracking for
SSL_HANDSHAKE. Second, it lets the system know there is a handshake
waiting to complete.
Instead, arrange things so that, if there is a handshake waiting to
complete, hs is not NULL. That means we need to initialize it when
creating a new connection and when discovering a renego.
Note this means we cannot make initializing an SSL_HANDSHAKE depend on
client vs. server.
Change-Id: I585a8d7e700c4ffe4d372248d34c44106ad7e7a0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12696
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This avoids needing a extra state around client certificates to avoid
calling the callbacks twice. This does, however, come with a behavior
change: configuring both callbacks won't work. No consumer does this.
(Except bssl_shim which needed slight tweaks.)
Change-Id: Ia5426ed2620e40eecdcf352216c4a46764e31a9a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12690
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is never used. Removing it allows us to implement the old callback
using the new one.
Change-Id: I4be70cc16e609ce79b51836c19fec565c67ff3d6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12689
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Callers doing more interesting things than read and write tend to use
SSL_get_error. SSL_want_{read,write} are still used, however.
Change-Id: I21e83cc8046742857051f755868d86deffd23d81
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12688
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reduce the amount of boilerplate needed to add more of these. Also tidy
things up a little.
Change-Id: I90ea7f70dba5a2b38a1fb716faff97eb4f6afafc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12687
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
One of them is used in the new minimal SSL BIO, but cURL doesn't consume
it, so let's just leave it out. A consumer using asynchronous
certificate lookup is unlikely to be doing anything with SSL BIOs.
Change-Id: I10e7bfd643d3a531d42a96a8d675611d13722bd2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12686
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This was done by running:
./fuzz/cert -merge=1 ../fuzz/cert_corpus ~/openssl/fuzz/corpora/x509
I bumped the max_len while doing so because some of those are rather
large.
Change-Id: Ic2caa09d5ff9ab05b46363940a91a03f270cbad8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12682
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The error value is -2, but at this point ret has already been set to
some running answer and must be reset to -2.
(This is unreachable. BN_rshift only fails on caller or malloc error,
and it doesn't need to malloc when running in-place.)
Change-Id: I33930da84b00d1906bdee9d09b9504ea8121fac4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12681
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
For folks who prefer the named length constants, the current ones aren't
sufficient because the shared key isn't the private key or a public
value.
Well, it does have the same type as a public value, but it looks silly
to write:
uint8_t secret_key[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN];
Change-Id: I391db8ee73e2b4305d0ddd22f6d99f6abbc6b45b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12680
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This is to free up the hs->state name for the upper-level handshake
state.
Change-Id: I1183a329f698c56911f3879a91809edad5b5e94e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12695
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Change-Id: Ib9df4e8f797c9af3362354cc6716171fd65600de
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12720
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Change-Id: Iaac633616a54ba1ed04c14e4778865c169a68621
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12703
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This reverts commits 5a6e616961 and
e8509090cf. I'm going to unify how the
chains are kept in memory between client and server first otherwise the
mess just keeps growing.
Change-Id: I76df0d94c9053b2454821d22a3c97951b6419831
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12701
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Change-Id: Ie947ab176d10feb709c6e135d5241c6cf605b8e8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12700
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This currently only works for certificates parsed from the network, but
if making several connections that share certificates, some KB of memory
might be saved.
Change-Id: I0ea4589d7a8b5c41df225ad7f282b6d1376a8db4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12164
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
This change adds a STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) to an SSL_SESSION which
contains the raw form of the received certificates. The X509-based
members still exist, but their |enc| buffer will alias the
CRYPTO_BUFFERs.
The serialisation format of SSL_SESSIONs is also changed, in a backwards
compatible way. Previously, some sessions would duplicate the leaf
certificate in the certificate chain. These sessions can still be read,
but will be written in a way incompatible with older versions of the
code. This should be fine because the situation where multiple versions
exchange serialised sessions is at the server, and the server doesn't
duplicate the leaf certifiate in the chain anyway.
Change-Id: Id3b75d24f1745795315cb7f8089a4ee4263fa938
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12163
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
A recent change to curl[1] added support for HTTPS proxies, which
involves running a TLS connection inside another TLS connection. This
was done by using SSL BIOs, which we removed from BoringSSL for being
crazy.
This change adds a stripped-down version of the SSL BIO to decrepit in
order to suport curl.
[1] cb4e2be7c6
Change-Id: I9cb8f2db5b28a5a70724f6f93544297c380ac124
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12631
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Right now the only way to set an OCSP response is SSL_CTX_set_ocsp_response
however this assumes that all the SSLs generated from a SSL_CTX share the
same OCSP response, which is wrong.
This is similar to the OpenSSL "function" SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp,
the main difference being that this doesn't take ownership of the OCSP buffer.
In order to avoid memory duplication in case SSL_CTX has its own response,
a CRYPTO_BUFFER is used for both SSL_CTX and SSL.
Change-Id: I3a0697f82b805ac42a22be9b6bb596aa0b530025
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12660
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All callers were long since updated.
Change-Id: Ibdc9b186076dfbcbc3bd7dcc72610c8d5a522cfc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12624
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Prior to 87eab4902d, due to some
confusions between configuration and connection state, SSL_clear had the
side effect of offering the previously established session on the new
connection.
wpa_supplicant relies on this behavior, so restore it for TLS 1.2 and
below and add a test. (This behavior is largely incompatible with TLS
1.3's post-handshake tickets, so it won't work in 1.3. It'll act as if
we configured an unresumable session instead.)
Change-Id: Iaee8c0afc1cb65c0ab7397435602732b901b1c2d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12632
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size_t at the public API, uint8_t on the SSL structs since everything
fits in there comfortably.
Change-Id: I837c3b21e04e03dfb957c1a3e6770300d0b49c0b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12638
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It is impossible to have an SSL* without a corresponding method.
Change-Id: Icaf826a06aaaa2c7caf98b1e4a950f9c1d48e6bd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12621
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There is no need to retain it beyond this point.
Change-Id: Ib5722ab30fc013380198b1582d1240f0fe0aa770
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12620
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These too have no reason to be called across files.
Change-Id: Iee477e71f956c2fa0d8817bf2777cb3a81e1c853
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12585
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
s3_lib.c is nearly gone. ssl_get_cipher_preferences will fall away once
we remove the version-specific cipher lists. ssl_get_algorithm_prf and
the PRF stuff in general needs some revising (it was the motivation for
all the SSL_HANDSHAKE business). I've left ssl3_new / ssl3_free alone
for now because we don't have a good separation between common TLS/DTLS
connection state and state internal to the TLS SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD.
Leaving that alone for now as there's lower-hanging fruit.
Change-Id: Idf7989123a387938aa89b6a052161c9fff4cbfb3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12584
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
d2i_X509 will free an existing |X509*| on parse failure. Thus
|X509_parse_from_buffer| would double-free the result on error.
Change-Id: If2bca2f1e1895bc426079f6ade4b82008707888d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12635
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This was useful when we were transitioning NPN off in Chromium, but now
there are no callers remaining.
Change-Id: Ic619613d6d475eea6bc258c4a90148f129ea4a81
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12637
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Change-Id: I6514d68435ac4b7e2c638c7612b57bde5886bbba
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12629
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We've taken to writing bssl::UniquePtr in full, so it's not buying
us much.
Change-Id: Ia2689366cbb17282c8063608dddcc675518ec0ca
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12628
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This was only used by Chromium and was since replaced with a custom BIO.
Though it meant a new ring buffer implementation, custom BIOs seem a
better solution for folks who wish to do particularly complicated
things, until the new SSL API is available. External-buffer BIO pairs
were effectively a really confusing and leaky abstraction over a ring
buffer anyway.
Change-Id: I0e201317ff87cdccb17b2f8c260ee5bb06c74771
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12626
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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Change-Id: Ida26e32a700c68e1899f9f6ccff73e2fa5252313
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12633
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This allows a consumer to disable Channel ID (for instance, it may be
enabled on the SSL_CTX and later disabled on the SSL) without reaching
into the SSL struct directly.
Deprecate the old APIs in favor of these.
BUG=6
Change-Id: I193bf94bc1f537e1a81602a39fc2b9a73f44c73b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12623
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This is an API which we added, so only first-party code could be
conditioning on it.
Change-Id: I08217fcae47585b22142df05622e31b6dfb6e4d6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12622
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Each of these functions is called only once, but they're interspersed
between s3_lib.c and ssl_lib.c.
Change-Id: Ic496e364b091fc8e01fc0653fe73c83c47f690d9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12583
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It's our ClientHello representation. May as well name it accordingly.
Also switch away from calling the variable name ctx as that conflicts
with SSL_CTX.
Change-Id: Iec0e597af37137270339e9754c6e08116198899e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12581
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The various key schedule cleanups have removed the need for this enum.
Change-Id: I3269aa19b834815926ad56b2d919e21b5e2603fe
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12582
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
AES-GCM-SIV is an AEAD with nonce-misuse resistance. It can reuse
hardware support for AES-GCM and thus encrypt at ~66% the speed, and
decrypt at 100% the speed, of AES-GCM.
See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-gcmsiv-02
This implementation is generic, not optimised, and reuses existing AES
and GHASH support as much as possible. It is guarded by !OPENSSL_SMALL,
at least for now.
Change-Id: Ia9f77b256ef5dfb8588bb9ecfe6ee0e827626f57
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Change-Id: I1e28ba84de59336cab432d1db3dd9c6023909081
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Change-Id: Ie46d45cdb07c692a789594e13040a1ce9d6cf83d
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The remaining direct accesses are in functions which expect to be called
in and out of the handshake. Accordingly, they are NULL-checked.
Change-Id: I07a7de6bdca7b6f8d09e22da11b8863ebf41389a
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Change-Id: I84a8ff1d717f3291403f6fc49668c84f89b910da
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Change-Id: I5ef0fe5cc3ae0d5029ae41db36e66d22d76f6158
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Change-Id: Id8543a88929091eb004a5205a30b483253cdaa25
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This removes all explicit ssl->s3->hs access in those files.
Change-Id: I801ca1c894936aecef21e56ec7e7acb9d1b99688
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This takes care of many of the explicit ssl->s3->hs accesses.
Change-Id: I380fae959f3a7021d6de9d19a4ca451b9a0aefe5
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This change will cause getrandom to be used in preference to
/dev/urandom when supported by the kernel.
This will also cause BoringSSL-using processes to block until the
entropy pool is initialised on systems that support getrandom(2).
Change-Id: I2d3a17891502c85884c77138ef0f3a719d7ecfe6
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