cfd50c63 switched to using the add/dbl of p224_64.c, but the outputs
weren't contracted before being returned and could be out of range,
giving invalid results.
Change-Id: I3cc295c7ddbff43375770dbafe73b37a668e4e6b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/33184
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Now the only allocations in ECDSA are the ECDSA_SIG input and output.
Change-Id: If1fcde6dc2ee2c53f5adc16a7f692e22e9c238de
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/33069
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Alas, it is reachable by way of the legacy custom curves API. Add a
basic test to ensure those codepaths work.
Change-Id: If631110045a664001133a0d07fdac4c67971a15f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/26970
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Probably worth having actual test vectors for these, rather than
checking our code against itself. Additionally, small negative numbers
have, in the past been valuable test vectors (see long comment in
point_add from OpenSSL's ecp_nistp521.c).
Change-Id: Ia5aa8a80eb5b6d0089c3601c5fec2364e699794d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/26848
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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p224_felem_neg does not produce an output within the tight bounds
suitable for p224_felem_contract. This was found by inspection of the
code.
This only affects the final y-coordinate output of arbitrary-point
multiplication, so it is a no-op for ECDH and ECDSA.
Change-Id: I1d929458d1f21d02cd8e745d2f0f7040a6bb0627
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/26847
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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Rather than writing the answer into the output, it wrote it into some
awkwardly-named temporaries. Thanks to Daniel Hirche for reporting this
issue!
Bug: chromium:825273
Change-Id: I5def4be045cd1925453c9873218e5449bf25e3f5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/26785
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This isn't strictly necessary now that BIGNUMs are safe, but we get to
rely on type-system annotations from EC_SCALAR. Additionally,
EC_POINT_mul depends on BN_div, while the EC_SCALAR version does not.
Change-Id: I75e6967f3d35aef17278b94862f4e506baff5c23
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/26424
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This has no behavior change, but it has a semantic one. This CL is an
assertion that all BIGNUM functions tolerate non-minimal BIGNUMs now.
Specifically:
- Functions that do not touch top/width are assumed to not care.
- Functions that do touch top/width will be changed by this CL. These
should be checked in review that they tolerate non-minimal BIGNUMs.
Subsequent CLs will start adjusting the widths that BIGNUM functions
output, to fix timing leaks.
Bug: 232
Change-Id: I3a2b41b071f2174452f8d3801bce5c78947bb8f7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25257
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The order (and later the field) are used to size stack-allocated fixed
width word arrays. They're also entirely public, so this is fine.
Bug: 232
Change-Id: Ie98869cdbbdfea92dcad64a300f7e0b47bef6bf2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25256
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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(Just happened to see these as I went by.)
Change-Id: I348b163e6986bfca8b58e56885c35a813efe28f6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25725
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Processing off-curve points is sufficiently dangerous to worry about
code that doesn't check the return value of
|EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates| and |EC_POINT_oct2point|. While we
have integrated on-curve checks into these functions, code that ignores
the return value will still be able to work with an invalid point
because it's already been installed in the output by the time the check
is done.
Instead, in the event of an off-curve point, set the output point to the
generator, which is certainly on the curve and hopefully safe.
Change-Id: Ibc73dceb2d8d21920e07c4f6def2c8249cb78ca0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25724
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This makes it easier going to and from non-minimal BIGNUMs and words
without worrying about the widths which are ultimately to become less
friendly.
Bug: 232
Change-Id: Ia57cb29164c560b600573c27b112ad9375a86aad
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25245
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp already rejects coordinates which
are out of range. There's no need to double-check.
Change-Id: Id1685355c555dda66d2a14125cb0083342f37e53
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24688
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is to simplify
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/24445/.
Setting or changing an EC_KEY's group after the public or private keys
have been configured is quite awkward w.r.t. consistency checks. It
becomes additionally messy if we mean to store private keys as
EC_SCALARs (and avoid the BIGNUM timing leak), whose size is
curve-dependent.
Instead, require that callers configure the group before setting either
half of the keypair. Additionally, reject EC_KEY_set_group calls that
change the group. This will simplify clearing one more BIGNUM timing
leak.
Update-Note: This will break code which sets the group and key in a
weird order. I checked calls of EC_KEY_new and confirmed they all
set the group first. If I missed any, let me know.
Change-Id: Ie89f90a318b31b6b98f71138e5ff3de5323bc9a6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24425
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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We check that the private key is less than the order, but we forgot the
other end.
Update-Note: It's possible some caller was relying on this, but since
that function already checked the other half of the range, I'm
expecting this to be a no-op change.
Change-Id: I4a53357d7737735b3cfbe97d379c8ca4eca5d5ac
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/23665
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Rejecting values where we'd previous called BN_nnmod may have been
overly ambitious. In the long run, all the supported ECC APIs (ECDSA*,
ECDH_compute_key, and probably some additional new ECDH API) will be
using the EC_SCALAR version anyway, so this doesn't really matter.
Change-Id: I79cd4015f2d6daf213e4413caa2a497608976f93
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/23584
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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|EC_POINT_mul| is almost exclusively used with reduced scalars, with
this exception. This comes from consumers following NIST SP 800-56A
section 5.6.2.3.2. (Though all our curves have cofactor one, so this
check isn't useful.)
Add a test for this so we don't accidentally break it.
Change-Id: I42492db38a1ea03acec4febdd7945c8a3933530a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/23084
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Currently we only check that the underlying EC_METHODs match, which
avoids the points being in different forms, but not that the points are
on the same curves. (We fixed the APIs early on so off-curve EC_POINTs
cannot be created.)
In particular, this comes up with folks implementating Java's crypto
APIs with ECDH_compute_key. These APIs are both unfortunate and should
not be mimicked, as they allow folks to mismatch the groups on the two
multiple EC_POINTs. Instead, ECDH APIs should take the public value as a
byte string.
Thanks also to Java's poor crypto APIs, we must support custom curves,
which makes this particularly gnarly. This CL makes EC_GROUP_cmp work
with custom curves and adds an additional subtle requirement to
EC_GROUP_set_generator.
Annoyingly, this change is additionally subtle because we now have a
reference cycle to hack around.
Change-Id: I2efbc4bd5cb65fee5f66527bd6ccad6b9d5120b9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22245
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This is the last of the non-GTest tests. We never did end up writing
example files or doc.go tooling for them. And probably examples should
be in C++ at this point.
Bug: 129
Change-Id: Icbc43c9639cfed7423df20df1cdcb8c35f23fc1a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17669
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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The names in the P-224 code collided with the P-256 code and thus many
of the functions and constants in the P-224 code have been prefixed.
Change-Id: I6bcd304640c539d0483d129d5eaf1702894929a8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15847
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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