We have need to normalize other versions during version negotiation, but
almost all will be post-negotiation. Hopefully later this can be
replaced with a value explicitly stored on the object and we do away
with ssl->version.
Change-Id: I595db9163d0af2e7c083b9a09310179aaa9ac812
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6841
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
The various SSL3_ENC_METHODs ought to be defined in the same file their
functions are defined in, so they can be static.
Change-Id: I34a1d3437e8e61d4d50f2be70312e4630ea89c19
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6840
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
This is a companion to SSL_get_rc4_state and SSL_get_ivs which doesn't
require poking at internal state. Partly since it aligns with the
current code and partly the off chance we ever need to get
wpa_supplicant's EAP-FAST code working, the API allows one to generate
more key material than is actually in the key block.
Change-Id: I58bc3f2b017482dbb8567dcd0cd754947a95397f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6839
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
There's not much point in putting those in the interface as the
final_finished_mac implementation is itself different between SSL 3.0
and TLS.
Change-Id: I76528a88d255c451ae008f1a34e51c3cb57d3073
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6838
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
As things stand now, they don't actually do anything.
Change-Id: I9f8b4cbf38a0dffabfc5265805c52bb8d7a8fb0d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6837
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Both are connection state rather than configuration state. Notably this
cuts down more of SSL_clear that can't just use ssl_free + ssl_new.
Change-Id: I3c05b3ae86d4db8bd75f1cd21656f57fc5b55ca9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6835
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
It's the same between TLS and SSL 3.0. There's also no need for the
do_change_cipher_spec wrapper (it no longer needs checks to ensure it
isn't called at a bad place). Finally fold the setup_key_block call into
change_cipher_spec.
Change-Id: I7917f48e1a322f5fbafcf1dfb8ad53f66565c314
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6834
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
That we're half and half is really confusing.
Change-Id: I1c2632682e8a3e63d01dada8e0eb3b735ff709ce
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6785
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This unifies the ClientKeyExchange code rather nicely. ServerKeyExchange
is still pretty specialized. For simplicity, I've extended the yaSSL bug
workaround for clients as well as servers rather than route in a
boolean.
Chrome's already banished DHE to a fallback with intention to remove
altogether later, and the spec doesn't say anything useful about
ClientDiffieHellmanPublic encoding, so this is unlikely to cause
problems.
Change-Id: I0355cd1fd0fab5729e8812e4427dd689124f53a2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6784
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The new curve is not enabled by default.
As EC_GROUP/EC_POINT is a bit too complex for X25519, this introduces an
SSL_ECDH_METHOD abstraction which wraps just the raw ECDH operation. It
also tidies up some of the curve code which kept converting back and
force between NIDs and curve IDs. Now everything transits as curve IDs
except for API entry points (SSL_set1_curves) which take NIDs. Those
convert immediately and act on curve IDs from then on.
Note that, like the Go implementation, this slightly tweaks the order of
operations. The client sees the server public key before sending its
own. To keep the abstraction simple, SSL_ECDH_METHOD expects to
generate a keypair before consuming the peer's public key. Instead, the
client handshake stashes the serialized peer public value and defers
parsing it until it comes time to send ClientKeyExchange. (This is
analogous to what it was doing before where it stashed the parsed peer
public value instead.)
It still uses TLS 1.2 terminology everywhere, but this abstraction should also
be compatible with TLS 1.3 which unifies (EC)DH-style key exchanges.
(Accordingly, this abstraction intentionally does not handle parsing the
ClientKeyExchange/ServerKeyExchange framing or attempt to handle asynchronous
plain RSA or the authentication bits.)
BUG=571231
Change-Id: Iba09dddee5bcdfeb2b70185308e8ab0632717932
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6780
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Then deprecate the old functions. Thanks to upstream's
6977e8ee4a for the idea.
Change-Id: I916abd6fca2a3b2a439ec9902d9779707f7e41eb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6622
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Right now your options are:
- Bounce on a reference and deal with cleanup needlessly.
- Manually check the type tag and peek into the union.
We probably have no hope of opaquifying this struct, but for new code, let's
recommend using this function rather than the more error-prone thing.
Change-Id: I9b39ff95fe4264a3f7d1e0d2894db337aa968f6c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6551
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Later when TLS 1.3 comes around, we'll need SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version too. In
the meantime, hide the SSL_TLSV1_2 messiness behind a reasonable API.
Change-Id: Ibcc17cccf48dd99e364d6defdfa5a87d031ecf0a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6452
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
In doing so, simplify the mess around serializing the public key.
Channel ID specifies that you write x and y concatenated. Rather than
using the X9.62 serialization and chopping bits off, get the affine
coordinates and write them out in the same way we write r and s.
Also unify the P-256 sanity check around SSL_set1_tls_channel_id and
actually check the curve NID.
BUG=468889
Change-Id: I228877b736c9722e368d315064ce3ae6893adfc0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6201
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
ssl.h should be first. Also two lines after includes and the rest of the
file.
Change-Id: Icb7586e00a3e64170082c96cf3f8bfbb2b7e1611
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5892
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change adds the ability to configure ciphers specifically for
TLS ≥ 1.0. This compliments the existing ability to specify ciphers
for TLS ≥ 1.1.
This is useful because TLS 1.0 is the first version not to suffer from
POODLE. (Assuming that it's implemented correctly[1].) Thus one might
wish to reserve RC4 solely for SSLv3.
[1] https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/12/08/poodleagain.html
Change-Id: I774d5336fead48f03d8a0a3cf80c369692ee60df
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5793
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Gets another field out of the SSL_SESSION.
Change-Id: I9a27255533f8e43e152808427466ec1306cfcc60
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5756
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This begins decoupling the transport from the SSL state machine. The buffering
logic is hidden behind an opaque API. Fields like ssl->packet and
ssl->packet_length are gone.
ssl3_get_record and dtls1_get_record now call low-level tls_open_record and
dtls_open_record functions that unpack a single record independent of who owns
the buffer. Both may be called in-place. This removes ssl->rstate which was
redundant with the buffer length.
Future work will push the buffer up the stack until it is above the handshake.
Then we can expose SSL_open and SSL_seal APIs which act like *_open_record but
return a slightly larger enum due to other events being possible. Likewise the
handshake state machine will be detached from its buffer. The existing
SSL_read, SSL_write, etc., APIs will be implemented on top of SSL_open, etc.,
combined with ssl_read_buffer_* and ssl_write_buffer_*. (Which is why
ssl_read_buffer_extend still tries to abstract between TLS's and DTLS's fairly
different needs.)
The new buffering logic does not support read-ahead (removed previously) since
it lacks a memmove on ssl_read_buffer_discard for TLS, but this could be added
if desired. The old buffering logic wasn't quite right anyway; it tried to
avoid the memmove in some cases and could get stuck too far into the buffer and
not accept records. (The only time the memmove is optional is in DTLS or if
enough of the record header is available to know that the entire next record
would fit in the buffer.)
The new logic also now actually decrypts the ciphertext in-place again, rather
than almost in-place when there's an explicit nonce/IV. (That accidentally
switched in https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/4792/; see
3d59e04bce96474099ba76786a2337e99ae14505.)
BUG=468889
Change-Id: I403c1626253c46897f47c7ae93aeab1064b767b2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5715
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
They're not called (new in 1.0.2). We actually may well need to
configure these later to strike ECDSA from the list on Chrome/XP
depending on what TLS 1.3 does, but for now striking it from the cipher
suite list is both necessary and sufficient. I think we're better off
removing these for now and adding new APIs later if we need them.
(This API is weird. You pass in an array of NIDs that must be even
length and alternating between hash and signature NID. We'd also need a
way to query the configured set of sigalgs to filter away. Those used to
exist but were removed in
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/5347/. SSL_get_sigalgs is
an even uglier API and doesn't act on the SSL_CTX.)
And with that, SSL_ctrl and SSL_CTX_ctrl can *finally* be dropped. Don't
leave no-op wrappers; anything calling SSL_ctrl and SSL_CTX_ctrl should
instead switch to the wrapper macros.
BUG=404754
Change-Id: I5d465cd27eef30d108eeb6de075330c9ef5c05e8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5675
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
I'm not sure why one would ever want to externally know the curve list
supported by the server. The API is new as of 1.0.2 and has no callers.
Configuring curves will be much more useful when Curve25519 exists and the API
isn't terribly crazy, so keep that API around and promote it to a real
function.
BUG=404754
Change-Id: Ibd5858791d3dfb30d53dd680cb75b0caddcbb7df
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5674
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
I'm not sure why I made a separate one. (Not quite how the V2ClientHello
code will look in the buffer-free API yet. Probably the future
refactored SSL_HANDSHAKE gadget will need separate entry points to
consume a handshake message or V2ClientHello and the driver deals with
framing.)
This also means that ssl3_setup_read_buffer is never called external to
ssl3_read_n.
BUG=468889
Change-Id: I872f1188270968bf53ee9d0488a761c772a11e9e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5713
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This isn't called and, with the fixed-DH client cert types removed, is
only useful if a server wishes to not accept ECDSA certificates or
something.
BUG=404754
Change-Id: I21d8e1a71aedf446ce974fbeadc62f311ae086db
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5673
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These are unused (new as of 1.0.2). Although being able to separate the
two stores is a reasonable thing to do, we hope to remove the
auto-chaining feature eventually. Given that, SSL_CTX_set_cert_store
should suffice. This gets rid of two more ctrl macros.
BUG=404754,486295
Change-Id: Id84de95d7b2ad5a14fc68a62bb2394f01fa67bb4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5672
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Rather than support arbitrarily many handshake hashes in the general
case (which the PRF logic assumes is capped at two), special-case the
MD5/SHA1 two-hash combination and otherwise maintain a single rolling
hash.
Change-Id: Ide9475565b158f6839bb10b8b22f324f89399f92
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5618
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The handshake hash is initialized from the buffer as soon as the cipher
is known. When adding a message to the transcript, independently update
the buffer and rolling hash, whichever is active. This avoids the
complications around dont_free_handshake_buffer and EMS.
BUG=492371
Change-Id: I3b1065796a50fd1be5d42ead7210c2f253ef0aca
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5615
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's purely the PRF function now, although it's still different from the
rest due to the _DEFAULT field being weird.
Change-Id: Iaea7a99cccdc8be4cd60f6c1503df5be2a63c4c5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5614
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The split was only needed for buffering records. Likewise, the extra
seq_num field is now unnecessary.
This also fixes a bug where dtls1_process_record will push an error on
the queue if the decrypted record is too large, which dtls1_get_record
will ignore but fail to clear, leaving garbage on the error queue. The
error is now treated as fatal; the reason DTLS silently drops invalid
packets is worrying about ease of DoS, but after SSL_AEAD_CTX_open, the
packet has been authenticated. (Unless it's the null cipher, but that's
during the handshake and the handshake is already DoS-able by breaking
handshake reassembly state.)
The function is still rather a mess. Later changes will clean this up.
BUG=468889
Change-Id: I96a54afe0755d43c34456f76e77fc4ee52ad01e3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5557
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The only point format that we ever support is uncompressed, which the
RFC says implementations MUST support. The TLS 1.3 and Curve25519
forecast is that point format negotiation is gone. Each curve has just
one point format and it's labeled, for historial reasons, as
"uncompressed".
Change-Id: I8ffc8556bed1127cf288d2a29671abe3c9b3c585
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5542
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's never called anywhere and doesn't return anything interesting.
Change-Id: I68e7e9cd7b74a72f61092ac5d2b5d2390e55a228
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5540
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Now that 11c0f8e54c has landed, none of
the cases of the switch in |ssl3_ctrl| ever break and so the “return 1”
at the end of the function is unreachable. MSVC is unhappy about that.
Change-Id: I001dc63831ba60d93b622ac095297e2febc5f078
Also document them in the process. Almost done!
BUG=404754
Change-Id: I3333c7e9ea6b4a4844f1cfd02bff8b5161b16143
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5355
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is unused. It seems to be distinct from the automatic chain
building and was added in 1.0.2. Seems to be an awful lot of machinery
that consumers ought to configure anyway.
BUG=486295
Change-Id: If3d4a2761f61c5b2252b37d4692089112fc0ec21
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5353
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Without certificate slots this function doesn't do anything. It's new in
1.02 and thus unused, so get rid of it rather than maintain a
compatibility stub.
BUG=486295
Change-Id: I798fce7e4307724756ad4e14046f1abac74f53ed
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5352
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This allows us to remove the confusing EVP_PKEY argument to the
SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD wrapper functions. It also simplifies some of the
book-keeping around the CERT structure, as well as the API for
configuring certificates themselves. The current one is a little odd as
some functions automatically route to the slot while others affect the
most recently touched slot. Others still (extra_certs) apply to all
slots, making them not terribly useful.
Consumers with complex needs should use cert_cb or the early callback
(select_certificate_cb) to configure whatever they like based on the
ClientHello.
BUG=486295
Change-Id: Ice29ffeb867fa4959898b70dfc50fc00137f01f3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5351
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is in preparation for folding away certificate slots. extra_certs
and the slot-specific certificate chain will be the same.
SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs already falls back to the slot-specific
chain if missing. SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs_only is similar but
never falls back. This isn't very useful and is confusing with them
merged, so remove it.
BUG=486295
Change-Id: Ic708105bcf453dfe4e1969353d7eb7547ed2981b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5350
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's never used and is partially broken right now; EVP_PKEY_DH doesn't
work.
Change-Id: Id6262cd868153ef731e3f4d679b2ca308cfb12a3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5343
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
With SSL2 gone, there's no need for this split between the abstract
cipher framework and ciphers. Put the cipher suite table in ssl_cipher.c
and move other SSL_CIPHER logic there. With that gone, prune the
cipher-related hooks in SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD.
BUG=468889
Change-Id: I48579de8bc4c0ea52781ba1b7b57bc5b4919d21c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4961
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
They're redundant with each other.
Change-Id: I17e7ff8c4e0b1486986dd866fd99673fa2aaa494
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4959
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
All ciphers are implemented by an EVP_AEAD.
Change-Id: Ifa754599a34e16bf97e1a4b84a271c6d45462c7c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4958
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The ctrl hooks are left alone since they should just go away.
Simplifying the cipher story will happen in the next CL.
BUG=468889
Change-Id: I979971c90f59c55cd5d17554f1253158b114f18b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4957
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This still needs significant work, especially the close_notify half, but
clarify the interface and get *_read_bytes out of SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD.
read_bytes is an implementation detail of those two and get_message
rather than both an implementation detail of get_message for handshake
and a (wholly inappropriate) exposed interface for the other two.
BUG=468889
Change-Id: I7dd23869e0b7c3532ceb2e9dd31ca25ea31128e7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4956
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD table needs work, but this makes it clearer
exactly what the shared interface between the upper later and TLS/DTLS
is.
BUG=468889
Change-Id: I38931c484aa4ab3f77964d708d38bfd349fac293
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4955
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
When the peer or caller requests a renegotiation, OpenSSL doesn't
renegotiate immediately. It sets a flag to begin a renegotiation as soon
as record-layer read and write buffers are clear. One reason is that
OpenSSL's record layer cannot write a handshake record while an
application data record is being written. The buffer consistency checks
around partial writes will break.
None of these cases are relevant for the client auth hack. We already
require that renego come in at a quiescent part of the application
protocol by forbidding handshake/app_data interleave.
The new behavior is now: when a HelloRequest comes in, if the record
layer is not idle, the renegotiation is rejected as if
SSL_set_reject_peer_renegotiations were set. Otherwise we immediately
begin the new handshake. The server may not send any application data
between HelloRequest and completing the handshake. The HelloRequest may
not be consumed if an SSL_write is pending.
Note this does require that Chromium's HTTP stack not attempt to read
the HTTP response until the request has been written, but the
renegotiation logic already assumes it. Were Chromium to drive the
SSL_read state machine early and the server, say, sent a HelloRequest
after reading the request headers but before we've sent the whole POST
body, the SSL state machine may racily enter renegotiate early, block
writing the POST body on the new handshake, which would break Chromium's
ERR_SSL_CLIENT_AUTH_CERT_NEEDED plumbing.
BUG=429450
Change-Id: I6278240c3bceb5d2e1a2195bdb62dd9e0f4df718
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4825
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
tls1_enc is now SSL_AEAD_CTX_{open,seal}. This starts tidying up a bit
of the record-layer logic. This removes rr->input, as encrypting and
decrypting records no longer refers to various globals. It also removes
wrec altogether. SSL3_RECORD is now only used to maintain state about
the current incoming record. Outgoing records go straight to the write
buffer.
This also removes the outgoing alignment memcpy and simply calls
SSL_AEAD_CTX_seal with the parameters as appropriate. From bssl speed
tests, this seems to be faster on non-ARM and a bit of a wash on ARM.
Later it may be worth recasting these open/seal functions to write into
a CBB (tweaked so it can be malloc-averse), but for now they take an
out/out_len/max_out trio like their EVP_AEAD counterparts.
BUG=468889
Change-Id: Ie9266a818cc053f695d35ef611fd74c5d4def6c3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4792
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The only place using it is export keying material which can do the
version check inline.
Change-Id: I1893966c130aa43fa97a6116d91bb8b04f80c6fb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4615
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
clang-format got a little confused there.
Change-Id: I46df523e8a7813a2b4e243da3df22851b3393873
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4614
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
David Benjamin
Adam Langley