crypto/{asn1,x509,x509v3,pem} were skipped as they are still OpenSSL
style.
Change-Id: I3cd9a60e1cb483a981aca325041f3fbce294247c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19504
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Support for platforms that we don't support FIPS on doesn't need to be
in the module. Also, functions for dealing with whether fork-unsafe
buffering is enabled are left out because they aren't implementing any
cryptography and they use global r/w state, making their inclusion
painful.
Change-Id: I71a0123db6f5449e9dfc7ec7dea0944428e661aa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15084
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The changes to delocate.go are needed because modes/ does things like
return the address of a module function. Both of these need to be
changed from referencing the GOT to using local symbols.
Rather than testing whether |ghash| is |gcm_ghash_avx|, we can just keep
that information in a flag.
The test for |aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks| is more problematic, but I
believe that it's superfluous and can be dropped: if you passed in a
stream function that was semantically different from
|aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks| you would already have a bug because
|CRYPTO_gcm128_[en|de]crypt_ctr32| will handle a block at the end
themselves, and assume a big-endian, 32-bit counter anyway.
Change-Id: I68a84ebdab6c6006e11e9467e3362d7585461385
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15064
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Fork-unsafe buffering was a mode that could be enabled by applications
that were sure that they didn't need to worry about state duplication.
It saved reads to urandom.
Since everything is now going through the CTR-DRBG, we can get the same
effect by simply not reading additional data from urandom in this case.
This change drops the buffering from urandom.c and, instead, implements
fork-unsafe buffering as a mode that skips reading additional data from
urandom, which only happened when RDRAND wasn't available anyway.
Since we expect the power-on self-tests to call into the PRNG, this
change also makes the flag capable of changing at any point by using a
mutex rather than a once. This is split into a separate file so that it
doesn't have to go into the FIPS module—since it uses r/w data that
would be a pain.
Change-Id: I5fd0ead0422e770e35758f080bb1cffa70d0c8da
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14924
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This isn't actually used yet, but implements CTR-DRBG from SP 800-90Ar1.
Specifically, it always uses AES-256 and no derivation function.
Change-Id: Ie82b829590226addd7c165eac410a5d584858bfd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14891
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
By doing this the compiler can notice that much of the code is unused in
the case that we know that we can't have a hardware RNG (i.e. ARM).
Change-Id: I72d364a30080364d700f855640e0164c2c62f0de
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6001
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Missed a mention of CRYPTO_have_hwrand.
Change-Id: I9756d80105c2fcee487a7badbf4d82f375b5652d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5640
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Since the caller must check for CRYPTO_hwrand failures anyway, there's not much
point in doing the CRYPTO_have_hwrand check externally.
(As a bonus, CRYPTO_hwrand no longer compiles to abort() on ARM, so linker
deduplicating won't confuse Chrome's crash reporter...)
Change-Id: I2191d835fbda5b70812f14cd9a873a5e35c30c6d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5630
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
I mistakenly believed that only RDSEED could fail. However, the Intel
manuals state that RDRAND can fail too.
I can't actually observe it failing, even with all cores running RDRAND in a
tight loop. In any case, the ChaCha20 masking means that it wouldn't be
a big deal anyway.
Still, this change tests the carry flag after RDRAND and the code falls
back to |CRYPTO_sysrand| if RDRAND has a hiccup. (The Intel manuals
suggest[1] calling RDRAND in a loop, ten times, before considering it to
have failed. But a single failure appears to be such a rare event that
the complexity in the asm code doesn't seem worth it.)
This change also adds an asm function to fill a buffer with random data.
Otherwise the overhead of calling |CRYPTO_rdrand|, and bouncing the data
in and out of memory starts to add up.
Thanks to W. Mark Kubacki, who may have reported this. (There's some
confusion in the bug report.)
Before:
Did 6148000 RNG (16 bytes) operations in 1000080us: 98.4 MB/s
Did 649000 RNG (256 bytes) operations in 1000281us: 166.1 MB/s
Did 22000 RNG (8192 bytes) operations in 1033538us: 174.4 MB/s
After:
Did 6573000 RNG (16 bytes) operations in 1000002us: 105.2 MB/s
Did 693000 RNG (256 bytes) operations in 1000127us: 177.4 MB/s
Did 24000 RNG (8192 bytes) operations in 1028466us: 191.2 MB/s
[1] Intel Reference Manual, section 7.3.17.1.
Change-Id: Iba7f82e844ebacef535472a31f2dd749aad1190a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5180
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Beyond generally eliminating unnecessary includes, eliminate as many
includes of headers that declare/define particularly error-prone
functionality like strlen, malloc, and free. crypto/err/internal.h was
added to remove the dependency on openssl/thread.h from the public
openssl/err.h header. The include of <stdlib.h> in openssl/mem.h was
retained since it defines OPENSSL_malloc and friends as macros around
the stdlib.h functions. The public x509.h, x509v3.h, and ssl.h headers
were not changed in order to minimize breakage of source compatibility
with external code.
Change-Id: I0d264b73ad0a720587774430b2ab8f8275960329
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4220
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This saves about 6-7k of error data.
Change-Id: Ic28593d4a1f5454f00fb2399d281c351ee57fb14
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3385
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Chromium does not like static initializers, and the CPU logic uses one to
initialize CPU bits. However, the crypto library lacks an explicit
initialization function, which could complicate (no compile-time errors)
porting existing code which uses crypto/, but not ssl/.
Add an explicit CRYPTO_library_init function, but make it a no-op by default.
It only does anything (and is required) if building with
BORINGSSL_NO_STATIC_INITIALIZER.
Change-Id: I6933bdc3447fb382b1f87c788e5b8142d6f3fe39
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1770
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Previously, public headers lived next to the respective code and there
were symlinks from include/openssl to them.
This doesn't work on Windows.
This change moves the headers to live in include/openssl. In cases where
some symlinks pointed to the same header, I've added a file that just
includes the intended target. These cases are all for backwards-compat.
Change-Id: I6e285b74caf621c644b5168a4877db226b07fd92
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1180
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
David Benjamin
Adam Langley
Adam Langley
David Benjamin
Brian Smith
Adam Langley