In TLS 1.2, resumption's benefits are more-or-less subsumed by False
Start. TLS 1.2 resumption lifetime is bounded by how much traffic we are
willing to encrypt without fresh key material, so the lifetime is short.
Renewal uses the same key, so we do not allow it to increase lifetimes.
In TLS 1.3, resumption unlocks 0-RTT. We do not implement psk_ke, so
resumption incorporates fresh key material into both encrypted traffic
(except for early data) and renewed tickets. Thus we are both more
willing to and more interested in longer lifetimes for tickets. Renewal
is also not useless. Thus in TLS 1.3, lifetime is bound separately by
the lifetime of a given secret as a psk_dhe_ke authenticator and the
lifetime of the online signature which authenticated the initial
handshake.
This change maintains two lifetimes on an SSL_SESSION: timeout which is
the renewable lifetime of this ticket, and auth_timeout which is the
non-renewable cliff. It also separates the TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 timeouts.
The old session timeout defaults and configuration apply to TLS 1.3, and
we define new ones for TLS 1.3.
Finally, this makes us honor the NewSessionTicket timeout in TLS 1.3.
It's no longer a "hint" in 1.3 and there's probably value in avoiding
known-useless 0-RTT offers.
BUG=120
Change-Id: Iac46d56e5a6a377d8b88b8fa31f492d534cb1b85
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13503
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Move to explicit hashing everywhere, matching TLS 1.2 with TLS 1.3. The
ssl_get_message calls between all the handshake states are now all
uniform so, when we're ready, we can rewire the TLS 1.2 state machine to
look like the TLS 1.3 one. (ssl_get_message calls become an
ssl_hs_read_message transition, reuse_message becomes an ssl_hs_ok
transition.)
This avoids some nuisance in processing the ServerHello at the 1.2 / 1.3
transition.
The downside of explicit hashing is we may forget to hash something, but
this will fail to interop with our tests and anyone else, so we should
be able to catch it.
BUG=128
Change-Id: I01393943b14dfaa98eec2a78f62c3a41c29b3a0e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13266
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This aligns the TLS 1.2 state machine closer with the TLS 1.3 state
machine. This is more work for the handshake, but ultimately the
plan is to take the ssl_get_message call out of the handshake (so it is
just the state machine rather than calling into BIO), so the parameters
need to be folded out as in TLS 1.3.
The WrongMessageType-* family of tests should make sure we don't miss
one of these.
BUG=128
Change-Id: I17a1e6177c52a7540b2bc6b0b3f926ab386c4950
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13264
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This resolves a TODO, trims per-connection memory, and makes more sense.
These masks have nothing to do with certificate configuration.
Change-Id: I783e6158e51f58cce88e3e68dfa0ed965bdc894c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13368
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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The TLS 1.2 state machine now looks actually much closer to the TLS 1.3
one on the write side. Although the write states still have a BIO-style
return, they don't actually send anything anymore. Only the BIO flush
state does. Reads are still integrated into the states themselves
though, so I haven't made it match TLS 1.3 yet.
BUG=72
Change-Id: I7708162efca13cd335723efa5080718a5f2808ab
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13228
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
On the TLS side, we introduce a running buffer of ciphertext. Queuing up
pending data consists of encrypting the record into the buffer. This
effectively reimplements what the buffer BIO was doing previously, but
this resizes to fit the whole flight.
As part of this, rename all the functions to add to the pending flight
to be more uniform. This CL proposes "add_foo" to add to the pending
flight and "flush_flight" to drain it.
We add an add_alert hook for alerts but, for now, only the SSL 3.0
warning alert (sent mid-handshake) uses this mechanism. Later work will
push this down to the rest of the write path so closure alerts use it
too, as in DTLS. The intended end state is that all the ssl_buffer.c and
wpend_ret logic will only be used for application data and eventually
optionally replaced by the in-place API, while all "incidental" data
will be handled internally.
For now, the two buffers are mutually exclusive. Moving closure alerts
to "incidentals" will change this, but flushing application data early
is tricky due to wpend_ret. (If we call ssl_write_buffer_flush,
do_ssl3_write doesn't realize it still has a wpend_ret to replay.) That
too is all left alone in this change.
To keep the diff down, write_message is retained for now and will be
removed from the state machines in a follow-up change.
BUG=72
Change-Id: Ibce882f5f7196880648f25d5005322ca4055c71d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13224
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This was replaced by the more general CLIENT_RANDOM scheme that records
the master secret. Support was added in Wireshark 1.8.0, released in
June 2012. At this point, ECDHE is sufficiently widely deployed that
anyone that cares about this feature must have upgraded their Wireshark
by now.
Change-Id: I9b708f245ec8728c1999daf91aca663be7d25661
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13263
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is the first part to removing the buffer BIO. The eventual end
state is the SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD is responsible for maintaining one
flight's worth of messages. In TLS, it will just be a buffer containing
the flight's ciphertext. In DTLS, it's the existing structure for
retransmit purposes. There will be hooks:
- add_message (synchronous)
- add_change_cipher_spec (synchronous)
- add_warning_alert (synchronous; needed until we lose SSLv3 client auth
and TLS 1.3 draft 18; draft 19 will switch end_of_early_data to a
handshake message)
- write_flight (BIO; flush_flight will be renamed to this)
This also preserves the exact return value of BIO_flush. Eventually all
the BIO_write calls will be hidden behind BIO_flush to, to be consistent
with other BIO-based calls, preserve the return value.
BUG=72
Change-Id: I74cd23759a17356aab3bb475a8ea42bd2cd115c9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13222
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Instead, add ssl_has_certificate to the ssl3_send_cert_verify check. If
writing the empty Certificate does not complete synchronously (it almost
always does due to the buffer BIO), but if the buffer boundary is at
exactly the wrong place, write_message will need a retry but, having
cleared cert_request, we never re-enter ssl3_send_client_certificate.
This will later be moot when we've gotten rid of the buffer BIO, but
this is cleaner anyway and is closer to the TLS 1.3 code.
With this change, blindly taking away the BIO buffer in TLS (which is
not what we want since we want the entire flight in one write but is a
nice sanity check), only the SSL 3.0 no client certificate tests fail.
They too rely on some writes completing synchronously due to SSL 3.0
sending a warning alert. There is a similar bug when
tlsext_servername_callback returns SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING.
Those will be resolved after reworking the write path since it's a bit
of a mess.
Change-Id: I56b4df6163cae1df263cf36f0d93046d0375a5ac
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13052
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Rather than doing it right before outputing, treat this as a part of the
pipeline to finalize the certificate chain, and run it right after
cert_cb to modify the certificate configuration itself. This means
nothing else in the stack needs to worry about this case existing.
It also makes it easy to support in both TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3.
Change-Id: I6a088297a54449f1f5f5bb8b5385caa4e8665eb6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12966
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Most C standard library functions are undefined if passed NULL, even
when the corresponding length is zero. This gives them (and, in turn,
all functions which call them) surprising behavior on empty arrays.
Some compilers will miscompile code due to this rule. See also
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2016/06/26/nonnull.html
Add OPENSSL_memcpy, etc., wrappers which avoid this problem.
BUG=23
Change-Id: I95f42b23e92945af0e681264fffaf578e7f8465e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12928
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This removes another dependency on the crypto/x509 code.
Change-Id: Ia72da4d47192954c2b9a32cf4bcfd7498213c0c7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12709
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
So we can report it cleanly out of DevTools, it should behave like
SSL_get_curve_id and be reported on resumption too.
BUG=chromium:658905
Change-Id: I0402e540a1e722e09eaebadf7fb4785d8880c389
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12694
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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The only accessor for this field is the group/curve ID. Switch to only
storing that so no cipher checks are needed to interpret it. Instead,
ignore older values at parse time.
Change-Id: Id0946d4ac9e7482c69e64cc368a9d0cddf328bd3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12693
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This change removes the use of |X509_get_pubkey| from the TLS <= 1.2
code. That function is replaced with a shallow parse of the certificate
to extract the public key instead.
Change-Id: I8938c6c5a01b32038c6b6fa58eb065e5b44ca6d2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12707
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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This currently only works for certificates parsed from the network, but
if making several connections that share certificates, some KB of memory
might be saved.
BUG=chromium:671420
Change-Id: I1c7a71d84e1976138641f71830aafff87f795f9d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12706
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This change adds a STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) to an SSL_SESSION which
contains the raw form of the received certificates. The X509-based
members still exist, but their |enc| buffer will alias the
CRYPTO_BUFFERs.
(This is a second attempt at
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/12163/.)
BUG=chromium:671420
Change-Id: I508a8a46cab89a5a3fcc0c1224185d63e3d59cb8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12705
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OpenSSL includes a leaf certificate in a certificate chain when it's a
client, but doesn't when it's a server. This is also reflected in the
serialisation of sessions.
This change makes the internal semantics consistent: the leaf is always
included in the chain in memory, and never duplicated when serialised.
To maintain the same API, SSL_get_peer_cert_chain will construct a copy
of the chain without the leaf if needed.
Since the serialised format of a client session has changed, an
|is_server| boolean is added to the ASN.1 that defaults to true. Thus
any old client sessions will be parsed as server sessions and (silently)
discarded by a client.
Change-Id: Ibcf72bc8a130cedb423bc0fd3417868e0af3ca3e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12704
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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state is now initialized to SSL_ST_INIT in SSL_HANDSHAKE. If there is no
handshake present, we report SSL_ST_OK. This saves 8 bytes of
per-connection post-handshake memory.
Change-Id: Idb3f7031045caed005bd7712bc8c4b42c81a1d04
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12697
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This avoids needing a extra state around client certificates to avoid
calling the callbacks twice. This does, however, come with a behavior
change: configuring both callbacks won't work. No consumer does this.
(Except bssl_shim which needed slight tweaks.)
Change-Id: Ia5426ed2620e40eecdcf352216c4a46764e31a9a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12690
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This reverts commits 5a6e616961 and
e8509090cf. I'm going to unify how the
chains are kept in memory between client and server first otherwise the
mess just keeps growing.
Change-Id: I76df0d94c9053b2454821d22a3c97951b6419831
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12701
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Change-Id: Ie947ab176d10feb709c6e135d5241c6cf605b8e8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12700
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This change adds a STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) to an SSL_SESSION which
contains the raw form of the received certificates. The X509-based
members still exist, but their |enc| buffer will alias the
CRYPTO_BUFFERs.
The serialisation format of SSL_SESSIONs is also changed, in a backwards
compatible way. Previously, some sessions would duplicate the leaf
certificate in the certificate chain. These sessions can still be read,
but will be written in a way incompatible with older versions of the
code. This should be fine because the situation where multiple versions
exchange serialised sessions is at the server, and the server doesn't
duplicate the leaf certifiate in the chain anyway.
Change-Id: Id3b75d24f1745795315cb7f8089a4ee4263fa938
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12163
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
There is no need to retain it beyond this point.
Change-Id: Ib5722ab30fc013380198b1582d1240f0fe0aa770
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12620
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The remaining direct accesses are in functions which expect to be called
in and out of the handshake. Accordingly, they are NULL-checked.
Change-Id: I07a7de6bdca7b6f8d09e22da11b8863ebf41389a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12343
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Change-Id: I5ef0fe5cc3ae0d5029ae41db36e66d22d76f6158
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12341
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This removes all explicit ssl->s3->hs access in those files.
Change-Id: I801ca1c894936aecef21e56ec7e7acb9d1b99688
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12318
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This takes care of many of the explicit ssl->s3->hs accesses.
Change-Id: I380fae959f3a7021d6de9d19a4ca451b9a0aefe5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12317
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This cuts down on a lot of unchecked ssl->s3->hs accesses. Next is
probably the mass of extensions callbacks, and then we can play
whack-a-mole with git grep.
Change-Id: I81c506ea25c2569a51ceda903853465b8b567b0f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12237
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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We currently look up SSL_HANDSHAKE off of ssl->s3->hs everywhere, but
this is a little dangerous. Unlike ssl->s3->tmp, ssl->s3->hs may not be
present. Right now we just know not to call some functions outside the
handshake.
Instead, code which expects to only be called during a handshake should
take an explicit SSL_HANDSHAKE * parameter and can assume it non-NULL.
This replaces the SSL * parameter. Instead, that is looked up from
hs->ssl.
Code which is called in both cases, reads from ssl->s3->hs. Ultimately,
we should get to the point that all direct access of ssl->s3->hs needs
to be NULL-checked.
As a start, manage the lifetime of the ssl->s3->hs in SSL_do_handshake.
This allows the top-level handshake_func hooks to be passed in the
SSL_HANDSHAKE *. Later work will route it through the stack. False Start
is a little wonky, but I think this is cleaner overall.
Change-Id: I26dfeb95f1bc5a0a630b5c442c90c26a6b9e2efe
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12236
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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We missed that the TLS 1.3 code was inconsistent with the TLS 1.2 code.
Only on the server did we push an error code. But consistency between
client and server is probably worthwhile so, fix the 1.2 code to match
for now.
Change-Id: I17952c72048697dc66eacf0f144a66ced9cb3be8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12260
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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It's all of one bit, but having it on the SSL object means we need
manually to reset it on renego.
Change-Id: I989dacd430fe0fa63d76451b95f036a942aefcfe
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12229
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This is to allow for PSK binders to be munged into the ClientHello as part of
draft 18.
BUG=112
Change-Id: Ic4fd3b70fa45669389b6aaf55e61d5839f296748
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12228
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This change renames |peer| to |x509_peer| and |cert_chain| to
|x509_chain| in |SSL_SESSION|. It also renames |x509| to |x509_leaf| and
|chain| to |x509_chain| in |CERT|. (All with an eye to maybe making
them lazily initialised in the future).
This a) catches anyone who might be accessing these members directly and
b) makes space for |CRYPTO_BUFFER|-based values to take the unprefixed
names.
Change-Id: I10573304fb7d6f1ea03f9e645f7fc0acdaf71ac2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12162
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is already manually released at the end of the handshake. With this
change, it can happen implicitly, and SSL3_STATE shrinks further by
another pointer.
Change-Id: I94b9f2e4df55e8f2aa0b3a8799baa3b9a34d7ac1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12121
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The distinction for full handshakes is not meaningful (the timestamp is
currently the start of the handshake), but for renewed sessions, we
currently retain the timestamp of the original issuance.
Instead, when minting or receiving tickets, adjust session->time and
session->timeout so that session->time is the ticket issuance time.
This is still not our final TLS 1.3 behavior (which will need a both
renewable and non-renewable times to honor the server ticket lifetime),
but it gets us closer and unblocks handling ticket_age_add from TLS 1.3
draft 18 and sends the correct NewSessionTicket lifetime.
This fixes the ticket lifetime hint which we emit on the server to
mirror the true ticket lifetime. It also fixes the TLS 1.3 server code
to not set the ticket lifetime hint. There is no need to waste ticket
size with it, it is no longer a "hint" in TLS 1.3, and even in the TLS
1.3 code we didn't fill it in on the server.
Change-Id: I140541f1005a24e53e1b1eaa90996d6dada1c3a1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12105
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This is only used in one place where we don't take advantage of it being
sorted anyway.
Change-Id: If6f0d04e975db903e8a93c57c869ea4964c0be37
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12062
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
TLS 1.3 ciphers are now always enabled and come with a hard-coded
preference order.
BUG=110
Change-Id: Idd9cb0d75fb6bf2676ecdee27d88893ff974c4a3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12025
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Channel ID for TLS 1.3 uses the same digest construction as
CertificateVerify. This message is signed with the Channel ID key and
put in the same handshake message (with the same format) as in TLS 1.2.
BUG=103
Change-Id: Ia5b2dffe5a39c39db0cecb0aa6bdc328e53accc2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11420
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SSL_HANDSHAKE is dropped after the handshake, so I've removed the logic
around smaller sizes. It's much simpler when we can use CBS_stow and
CBB_finish without extra bounds-checking.
Change-Id: Idafaa5d69e171aed9a8759f3d44e52cb01c40f39
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11567
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This releases memory associated with them after the handshake. Note this
changes the behavior of |SSL_get0_certificate_types| and
|SSL_get_client_CA_list| slightly. Both functions now return NULL
outside of the handshake. But they were already documented to return
something undefined when not called at the CertificateRequest.
A survey of callers finds none that would care. (Note
SSL_get_client_CA_list is used both as a getter for the corresponding
server config setter and to report client handshake properties. Only the
latter is affected.) It's also pretty difficult to imagine why a caller
would wish to query this stuff at any other time, and there are clear
benefits to dropping the CA list after the handshake (some servers send
ABSURDLY large lists).
Change-Id: I3ac3b601ff0cfa601881ce77ae33d99bb5327004
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11521
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
BUG=77
Change-Id: If568412655aae240b072c29d763a5b17bb5ca3f7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10840
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: I73f9fd64b46f26978b897409d817b34ec9d93afd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11080
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This GREASEs cipher suites, groups, and extensions. For now, we'll
always place them in a hard-coded position. We can experiment with more
interesting strategies later.
If we add new ciphers and curves, presumably we prefer them over current
ones, so place GREASE values at the front. This prevents implementations
from parsing only the first value and ignoring the rest.
Add two new extensions, one empty and one non-empty. Place the empty one
in front (IBM WebSphere can't handle trailing empty extensions) and the
non-empty one at the end.
Change-Id: If2e009936bc298cedf2a7a593ce7d5d5ddbb841a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11241
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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This is in preparation for using the supported_versions extension to
experiment with draft TLS 1.3 versions, since we don't wish to restore
the fallback. With versions begin opaque values, we will want
version_from_wire to reject unknown values, not attempt to preserve
order in some way.
This means ClientHello.version processing needs to be separate code.
That's just written out fully in negotiate_version now. It also means
SSL_set_{min,max}_version will notice invalid inputs which aligns us
better with upstream's versions of those APIs.
This CL doesn't replace ssl->version with an internal-representation
version, though follow work should do it once a couple of changes land
in consumers.
BUG=90
Change-Id: Id2f5e1fa72847c823ee7f082e9e69f55e51ce9da
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11122
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Plain PSK omits the ServerKeyExchange when there is no hint and includes
it otherwise (it should have always sent it), while other PSK ciphers
like ECDHE_PSK cannot omit the hint. Having different capabilities here
is odd and RFC 4279 5.2 suggests that all PSK ciphers are capable of
"[not] provid[ing] an identity hint".
Interpret this to mean no identity hint and empty identity hint are the
same state. Annoyingly, this gives a plain PSK implementation two
options for spelling an empty hint. The spec isn't clear and this is not
really a battle worth fighting, so I've left both acceptable and added a
test for this case.
See also https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/275217/. This is also
consistent with Android's PskKeyManager API, our only consumer anyway.
https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/PskKeyManager.html
Change-Id: I8a8e6cc1f7dd1b8b202cdaf3d4f151bebfb4a25b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11087
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
One less field to reset on renego and save a pointer of post-handshake
memory.
Change-Id: Ifc0c3c73072af244ee3848d9a798988d2c8a7c38
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11086
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
