Prior to 82639e6f we used thread-local data for the PRNG state. That
change switched to using a mutex-protected pool instead in order to save
memory in heavily-threaded applications.
However, the pool mutex can get extremely hot in cases where the PRNG is
heavily used. 8e8f2504 was a short-term work around, but supporting both
modes is overly complex.
This change moves back to the state of the prior to 82639e6f. The best
way to review this is to diff the changed files against '82639e6f^' and
note that the only difference is a comment added in rand.c:
https://paste.googleplex.com/4997991748337664
Change-Id: I8febce089696fa6bc39f94f4a1e268127a8f78db
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/34024
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We switched from thread-local storage to a mutex-pool in 82639e6f53
because, for highly-threaded processes, the memory used by all the
states could be quite large. I had judged that a mutex-pool should be
fine, but had underestimated the PRNG requirements of some of our jobs.
This change makes rand.c support using either thread-locals or a
mutex-pool. Thread-locals are used if fork-unsafe buffering is enabled.
While not strictly related to fork-safety, we already have the
fork-unsafe control, and it's already set by jobs that care a lot about
PRNG performance, so fits quite nicely here.
Change-Id: Iaf1e0171c70d4c8dbe1e42283ea13df5b613cb2d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/31564
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This CL omits the RandTest.Fork unit test on Fuchsia, which does not
have fork(). Fuchsia has a bug (SEC-140) to create a suitable
replacement test.
Change-Id: Ic42f9149c24dc7321bfac1c718e9ecbb4a18b5d0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/32504
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
BoringSSL depends on the platform's locking APIs to make internal global
state thread-safe, including the PRNG. On some single-threaded embedded
platforms, locking APIs may not exist, so this dependency may be disabled
with a build flag.
Doing so means the consumer promises the library will never be used in any
multi-threaded address space. It causes BoringSSL to be globally thread-unsafe.
Setting it inappropriately will subtly and unpredictably corrupt memory and
leak secret keys.
Unfortunately, folks sometimes misinterpreted OPENSSL_NO_THREADS as skipping an
internal thread pool or disabling an optionally extra-thread-safe mode. This is
not and has never been the case. Rename it to
OPENSSL_NO_THREADS_CORRUPT_MEMORY_AND_LEAK_SECRETS_IF_THREADED to clarify what
this option does.
Update-Note: As a first step, this CL makes both OPENSSL_NO_THREADS and
OPENSSL_NO_THREADS_CORRUPT_MEMORY_AND_LEAK_SECRETS_IF_THREADED work. A later CL
will remove the old name, so migrate callers after or at the same time as
picking up this CL.
Change-Id: Ibe4964ae43eb7a52f08fd966fccb330c0cc11a8c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/32084
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We're a far cry from the good old days when we just read from /dev/urandom
without any fuss...
In particular, the threading logic is slightly non-trivial and probably worth
some basic sanity checks. Also write a fork-safety test, and test the
fork-unsafe-buffering path.
The last one is less useful right now, since fork-unsafe-buffering is a no-op
with RDRAND enabled (although we do have an SDE bot...), but it's probably
worth exercising the code in
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/31564.
Change-Id: I14b1fc5216f2a93183286aa9b35f5f2309107fb2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/31684
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
The fipsmodule is still separate as that's a lot of build mess. (Though
that too may be worth pulling in eventually. CMake usually has different
opinions on generated files if they're in the same directory. We might
be able to avoid the set_source_properties(GENERATED) thing.)
Change-Id: Ie1f9345009044d4f0e7541ca779e01bdc5ad62f6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/31586
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change moves to the final version of zx_cprng_draw, which cannot
fail. If the syscall would fail, either the operating system terminates
or the kernel kills the userspace process (depending on where the error
comes from).
Change-Id: Iea9563c9f63ea5802e2cde741879fa58c19028f4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29424
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This version doesn't have short reads. We'll eventually rename the
syscall back to zx_cprng_draw once all the clients have migrated to the
new semantics.
Change-Id: I7a7f6751e4d85dcc9b0a03a533dd93f3cbee277f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29084
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This is to keep Chromium building.
Bug: chromium:765754
Change-Id: I312f747e27e53590a948305f80abc240bfd2063c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20344
Reviewed-by: Aaron Green <aarongreen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Fuchsia needed to rename Magenta to Zircon. Several syscalls and status
codes changed as a result.
Change-Id: I64b5ae4537ccfb0a318452fed34040a2e8f5012e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20324
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
crypto/{asn1,x509,x509v3,pem} were skipped as they are still OpenSSL
style.
Change-Id: I3cd9a60e1cb483a981aca325041f3fbce294247c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19504
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Someone tried to build us with Ubuntu's MinGW. This is too old to be
supported (the tests rather badly fail to build), but some of the fixes
will likely be useful for eventually building Clang for Windows
standalone too.
Change-Id: I6d279a0da1346b4e0813de51df3373b7412de33a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19364
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Change-Id: I84b9a7606aaf28e582c79ada47df95b46ff2c2c2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18624
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Bug: chromium:731280
Change-Id: I87161a3400ac5119401ec157df5843249971327a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17246
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Green <aarongreen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Support for platforms that we don't support FIPS on doesn't need to be
in the module. Also, functions for dealing with whether fork-unsafe
buffering is enabled are left out because they aren't implementing any
cryptography and they use global r/w state, making their inclusion
painful.
Change-Id: I71a0123db6f5449e9dfc7ec7dea0944428e661aa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15084
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
