Fuchsia isn't POSIX and doesn't have /etc. This CL adds the
location for the system certificate store on Fuchsia.
Change-Id: I2b48e0e13525a32fa5e2c5c48b8db41d76c26872
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19224
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
X.509 functions and the like should not vary their behaviour based on
the configured locale, but tolower(3), strcasecmp(3) and strncasecmp(3)
change behaviour based on that.
For example, with tr_TR.utf8, 'I' is not the upper-case version of 'i'.
Change-Id: I896a285767ae0c22e6ce06b9908331c625e90af2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18412
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This imports bf5b8ff17dd7039b15cbc6468cd865cbc219581d and
a696708ae6bbe42f409748b3e31bb2f3034edbf3 from upstream. I missed them at
some point.
Change-Id: I882d995868e4c0461b7ca51a854691cf4faa7260
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17384
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Rather than adding a new mode to EVP_PKEY_CTX, upstream chose to tie
single-shot signing to EVP_MD_CTX, adding functions which combine
EVP_Digest*Update and EVP_Digest*Final. This adds a weird vestigial
EVP_MD_CTX and makes the signing digest parameter non-uniform, slightly
complicating things. But it means APIs like X509_sign_ctx can work
without modification.
Align with upstream's APIs. This required a bit of fiddling around
evp_test.cc. For consistency and to avoid baking details of parameter
input order, I made it eagerly read all inputs before calling
SetupContext. Otherwise which attributes are present depend a lot on the
shape of the API we use---notably the NO_DEFAULT_DIGEST tests for RSA
switch to failing before consuming an input, which is odd.
(This only matters because we have some tests which expect the operation
to abort the operation early with parameter errors and match against
Error. Those probably should not use FileTest to begin with, but I'll
tease that apart a later time.)
Upstream also named NID_Ed25519 as NID_ED25519, even though the
algorithm is normally stylized as "Ed25519". Switch it to match.
Change-Id: Id6c8f5715930038e754de50338924d044e908045
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17044
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
These are never referenced within the library or externally. Some of the
constants have been unused since SSLeay.
Change-Id: I597511208dab1ab3816e5f730fcadaea9a733dff
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17025
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: I4e0da85857e820f8151e2fb50d699f14fedee97b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16966
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
The only place it is used is EC_KEY_{dup,copy} and no one calls that
function on an EC_KEY with ex_data. This aligns with functions like
RSAPublicKey_dup which do not copy ex_data. The logic is also somewhat
subtle in the face of malloc errors (upstream's PR 3323).
In fact, we'd even changed the function pointer signature from upstream,
so BoringSSL-only code is needed to pass this pointer in anyway. (I
haven't switched it to CRYPTO_EX_unused because there are some callers
which pass in an implementation anyway.)
Note, in upstream, the dup hook is also used for SSL_SESSIONs when those
are duplicated (for TLS 1.2 ticket renewal or TLS 1.3 resumption). Our
interpretation is that callers should treat those SSL_SESSIONs
equivalently to newly-established ones. This avoids every consumer
providing a dup hook and simplifies the interface.
(I've gone ahead and removed the TODO(fork). I don't think we'll be able
to change this API. Maybe introduce a new one, but it may not be worth
it? Then again, this API is atrocious... I've never seen anyone use argl
and argp even.)
BUG=21
Change-Id: I6c9e9d5a02347cb229d4c084c1e85125bd741d2b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16344
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Instead of a script which generates macros, emit static inlines in
individual header (or C files). This solves a few issues with the
original setup:
- The documentation was off. We match the documentation now.
- The stack macros did not check constness; see some of the fixes in
crypto/x509.
- Type errors did not look like usual type errors.
- Any type which participated in STACK_OF had to be made partially
public. This allows stack types to be defined an internal header or
even an individual file.
- One could not pass sk_FOO_free into something which expects a function
pointer.
Thanks to upstream's 411abf2dd37974a5baa54859c1abcd287b3c1181 for the
idea.
Change-Id: Ie5431390ccad761c17596b0e93941b0d7a68f904
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16087
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
A follow-up change will add a CRYPTO_BUFFER variant. This makes the
naming match the header and doesn't require including x509.h. (Though
like ssl.h and pkcs8.h, some of the functions are implemented with code
that depends on crypto/x509.)
Change-Id: I5a7de209f4f775fe0027893f711326d89699ca1f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15128
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
BUG=187
Change-Id: I5775ce0886041b0c12174a7d665f3af1e8bce511
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14505
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
OPENSSL_free will handle NULL.
Change-Id: I18593a015cd4a081c2eeebf0cd738a024d02a97d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14373
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
It still depends on crypto/x509, but we will need a CRYPTO_BUFFER
version of PKCS7_get_certificates for Chromium. Start with this.
BUG=54
Change-Id: I62dcb9ba768091ce37dc9fe819f4f14ac025219c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14372
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
asn1_template_noexp_d2i call ASN1_item_ex_free(&skfield,...) on error.
Reworked error handling in asn1_item_ex_combine_new:
- call ASN1_item_ex_free and return the correct error code if
ASN1_template_new failed.
- dont call ASN1_item_ex_free if ASN1_OP_NEW_PRE failed.
Reworked error handing in x509_name_ex_d2i and x509_name_encode.
(Imported from upstream's 748cb9a17f4f2b77aad816cf658cd4025dc847ee.)
I believe the tasn1_new.c change is a no-op since we have no
ASN1_OP_NEW_PRE hooks anymore. I'm not sure what the commit message is
referring to with ASN1_template_new. It also seems odd as
ASN1_item_ex_free should probably be able to survive *pval being NULL.
Whatever.
We'd previously tried to fix x509_name_ex_d2i, but I think ours wasn't
quite right. (This thing is a mess...) I've aligned that function with
upstream.
Change-Id: Ie71521cd8a1ec357876caadd13be1ce247110f76
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13831
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
We compare pointer/length pairs constantly. To avoid needing to type it
everywhere and get GTest's output, add a StringPiece-alike for byte
slices which supports ==, !=, and std::ostream.
BUG=129
Change-Id: I108342cbd2c6a58fec0b9cb87ebdf50364bda099
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13625
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Otherwise we could pass a negative value into |d2i_X509|.
Change-Id: I52a35dd9648269094110b69eddd7667a56ec8253
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13363
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The motiviation is that M2Crypto passes an ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME to
this function. This is not distinct from ASN1_UTCTIME (both are
asn1_string_st), but ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME uses a 4-digit year in its
string representation, whereas ASN1_UTCTIME uses a 2-digit year.
ASN1_UTCTIME_print previously did not return an error on such inputs.
So, stricten (?) the function, ensuring that it checks for trailing
data, and rejects values that are invalid for their place. Along the
way, clean it up and add tests.
Change-Id: Ia8298bed573f2acfdab96638ea69c78b5bba4e4b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13082
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Most C standard library functions are undefined if passed NULL, even
when the corresponding length is zero. This gives them (and, in turn,
all functions which call them) surprising behavior on empty arrays.
Some compilers will miscompile code due to this rule. See also
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2016/06/26/nonnull.html
Add OPENSSL_memcpy, etc., wrappers which avoid this problem.
BUG=23
Change-Id: I95f42b23e92945af0e681264fffaf578e7f8465e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12928
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
X509_STORE_set0_additional_untrusted allows one to set a stack of
additional untrusted certificates that can be used during chain
building. These will be merged with the untrusted certificates set on
the |X509_STORE_CTX|.
Change-Id: I3f011fb0854e16a883a798356af0a24cbc5a9d68
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12980
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
d2i_X509 will free an existing |X509*| on parse failure. Thus
|X509_parse_from_buffer| would double-free the result on error.
Change-Id: If2bca2f1e1895bc426079f6ade4b82008707888d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12635
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
We've taken to writing bssl::UniquePtr in full, so it's not buying
us much.
Change-Id: Ia2689366cbb17282c8063608dddcc675518ec0ca
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12628
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: I0e1d79e85a2d20ab4105b81d39cdbbd692ba67da
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12221
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
In https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/11920/2, I addressed a
number of comments but then forgot to upload the change before
submitting it. This change contains the changes that should have been
included in that commit.
Change-Id: Ib70548e791f80abf07a734e071428de8ebedb907
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12160
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
The naming breaks layering, but it seems we're stuck with it. We don't
seem to have bothered making first-party code call it BIO_print_errors
(I found no callers of BIO_print_errors), so let's just leave it at
ERR_print_errors.
Change-Id: Iddc22a6afc2c61d4b94ac555be95079e0f477171
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11960
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
d2i_X509_from_buffer parses an |X509| from a |CRYPTO_BUFFER| but ensures
that the |X509_CINF.enc| doesn't make a copy of the encoded
TBSCertificate. Rather the |X509| holds a reference to the given
|CRYPTO_BUFFER|.
Change-Id: I38a4e3d0ca69fc0fd0ef3e15b53181844080fcad
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11920
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
At some point, we'll forget to look in the commit message.
Change-Id: I3153aab679209f4f11f56cf3f883c4c74a17af1d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11800
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: I51e5a7dac3ceffc41d3a7a57157a11258e65bc42
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11721
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Unhandled critical CRL extensions were not detected if they appeared
after the handled ones. (Upstream GitHub issue 1757). Thanks to John
Chuah for reporting this.
(Imported from upstream's 3ade92e785bb3777c92332f88e23f6ce906ee260.)
This additionally adds a regression test for this issue, generated with
der-ascii. The signatures on the CRLs were repaired per notes in
https://github.com/google/der-ascii/blob/master/samples/certificates.md
Change-Id: I74a77f92710e6ef7f46dcde5cb6ae9350084ddcb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11720
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Macros need a healthy dose of parentheses to avoid expression-level
misparses. Most of this comes from the clang-tidy CL here:
https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/235696/
Also switch most of the macros to use do { ... } while (0) to avoid all
the excessive comma operators and statement-level misparses.
Change-Id: I4c2ee51e347d2aa8c74a2d82de63838b03bbb0f9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11660
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
If asn1_item_ex_combine_new fails in one of the ASN1_template_new calls
just before the ASN1_OP_NEW_POST call, ASN1_item_ex_free will free the
temporary object which ultimately calls ASN1_OP_FREE_POST. This means
that ASN1_OP_FREE_POST needs to account for zero-initialized objects.
Change-Id: I56fb63bd5c015d9dfe3961606449bc6f5b1259e3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11403
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
One of Chromium's toolchains can't handle this for some reason. See also
empty_crls and empty in TestVerify.
Change-Id: I5e6a849f3042288da2e406882ae5cfec249a86ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11340
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
We used upstream's reformat script, but they had stuck hyphens
everywhere to tell indent to leave a comment alone. Fix this one since
it was especially hard to read.
Change-Id: I9f43bd57dbcf66b79b775ad10ee67867d815ed33
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11243
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The MinGW setup on Android already defines this stat macro.
Change-Id: Ia8e89195c06ec01d4b5a2fa7357fb8d2d500aa06
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11124
Reviewed-by: Kenny Root <kroot@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
For consistency and to avoid a pedantic GCC warning (even though it's
mostly old legacy code).
Change-Id: Iea63eb0a82ff52914adc33b83e48450f4f6a49ef
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11021
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
(Imported from upstream's a404656a8b40d9f1172e5e330f7e2d9d87cabab8)
Change-Id: I4ddebfbaeab433bae7c1393a8258d786801bb633
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10920
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Now that we have the extern "C++" trick, we can just embed them in the
normal headers. Move the EVP_CIPHER_CTX deleter to cipher.h and, in
doing so, take away a little bit of boilerplate in defining deleters.
Change-Id: I4a4b8d0db5274a3607914d94e76a38996bd611ec
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10804
Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Unlike the Scoped* types, bssl::UniquePtr is available to C++ users, and
offered for a large variety of types. The 'extern "C++"' trick is used
to make the C++ bits digestible to C callers that wrap header files in
'extern "C"'.
Change-Id: Ifbca4c2997d6628e33028c7d7620c72aff0f862e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10521
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This gets cURL building against both BoringSSL as it is and BoringSSL
with OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER set to 1.1.0.
BUG=91
Change-Id: I5be73b84df701fe76f3055b1239ae4704a931082
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10180
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
If two CRLs are equivalent then use the one with a later lastUpdate field:
this will result in the newest CRL available being used.
(Imported from upstream's 325da8231c8d441e6bb7f15d1a5a23ff63c842e5 and
3dc160e9be6dcaeec9345fbb61b1c427d7026103.)
Change-Id: I8c722663b979dfe08728d091697d8b8204dc265c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8947
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
One less random environment variable for us to be sensitive to. (We
should probably unwind all this proxy cert stuff. I don't believe they
are ever enabled.)
Change-Id: I74993178679ea49e60c81d8416e502cbebf02ec9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8948
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
tag2nbyte had -1 at 18th position, but underlying ASN1_mbstring_copy
supports NumericString. tag2nbyte is also used in do_print_ex which will
not be broken by setting 1 at 18th position of tag2nbyte
(Imported from upstream's bd598cc405e981de259a07558e600b5a9ef64bd6.)
Change-Id: Ie063afcaac8a7d5046cdb385059b991b92cd6659
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8946
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
It seems risky in the context of cross-signed certificates when the
same certificate might have multiple potential issuers. Also rarely
used, since chains in OpenSSL typically only employ self-signed
trust-anchors, whose self-signatures are not checked, while untrusted
certificates are generally ephemeral.
(Imported from upstream's 0e76014e584ba78ef1d6ecb4572391ef61c4fb51.)
This is in master and not 1.0.2, but having a per-certificate signature
cache when this is a function of signature and issuer seems dubious at
best. Thanks to Viktor Dukhovni for pointing this change out to me.
(And for making the original change upstream, of course.)
Change-Id: Ie692d651726f14aeba6eaab03ac918fcaedb4eeb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8880
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Upstream have added |EVP_PKEY_up_ref|, but their version returns an int.
Having this function with a different signature like that is dangerous
so this change aligns BoringSSL with upstream. Users of this function in
Chromium and internally should already have been updated.
Change-Id: I0a7aeaf1a1ca3b0f0c635e2ee3826aa100b18157
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8736
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
