crypto/{asn1,x509,x509v3,pem} were skipped as they are still OpenSSL
style.
Change-Id: I3cd9a60e1cb483a981aca325041f3fbce294247c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19504
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Rather than comparing against both endpoints, subtract the minimum and
rely on unsigned wraparound to do both comparisons at once. This seems
to be slightly faster.
In addition, constant_time_lt_8 becomes much simpler if it can assume
that |a| and |b| have the same MSB. But we can arrange that by casting
up to |crypto_word_t| (which is otherwise happening anyway).
Change-Id: I82bd676e487eb7bb079ba7286df724c1c380bbb4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16445
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
With the constant-time base64 decode, base64_ascii_to_bin is a bit more
expensive. This check is redundant with the one in base64_decode_quad,
though it does mean syntax error reporting will be slightly deferred by
four bytes.
Change-Id: I71f23ea23feba2ee5b41df79ce09026fb56996d3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16444
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is not actually sensible, but it seemed really funny. PEM files
sometimes carry private keys so, in principle, we'd probably prefer not
to leak the contents when we encode or decode them?
Change-Id: I7b056612bd7f22c28853bc89f56aee1f5103b8fb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15047
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Most C standard library functions are undefined if passed NULL, even
when the corresponding length is zero. This gives them (and, in turn,
all functions which call them) surprising behavior on empty arrays.
Some compilers will miscompile code due to this rule. See also
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2016/06/26/nonnull.html
Add OPENSSL_memcpy, etc., wrappers which avoid this problem.
BUG=23
Change-Id: I95f42b23e92945af0e681264fffaf578e7f8465e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12928
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is very far from all of it, but I did some easy ones before I got
bored. Snapshot the progress until someone else wants to continue this.
BUG=22
Change-Id: I2609e9766d883a273e53e01a75a4b1d4700e2436
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9132
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This code has caused a long history of problems. This change rewrites it
completely with something that is, hopefully, much simplier and robust
and adds more testing.
Change-Id: Ibeef51f9386afd95d5b73316e451eb3a2d7ec4e0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8033
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
See also upstream's 172c6e1e14defe7d49d62f5fc9ea6a79b225424f, but note our
values have different types. In particular, because we put in_len in a size_t
and C implicitly requires that all valid buffers' lengths fit in a ptrdiff_t
(signed), the overflow was impossible, assuming EVP_ENCODE_CTX::length is
untouched externally.
More importantly, this function is stuck taking an int output and has no return
value, so the only plausible contract is the caller is responsible for ensuring
the length fits anyway. Indeed, callers all call EVP_EncodeUpdate in bounded
chunks, so upstream's analysis is off.
Anyway, in theory that logic could locally overflow, so tweak it slightly. Tidy
up some of the variable names while I'm here.
Change-Id: Ifa78707cc26c11e0d67019918a028531b3d6738c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7847
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Including string.h in base.h causes any file that includes a BoringSSL
header to include string.h. Generally this wouldn't be a problem,
although string.h might slow down the compile if it wasn't otherwise
needed. However, it also causes problems for ipsec-tools in Android
because OpenSSL didn't have this behaviour.
This change removes string.h from base.h and, instead, adds it to each
.c file that requires it.
Change-Id: I5968e50b0e230fd3adf9b72dd2836e6f52d6fb37
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3200
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This fixes several of the problems with the old API.
- Padding was completely ignored.
- ='s in the middle of the input were accepted.
- It tries to be helpful and strips leading/trailing whitespace.
Change-Id: I99b9d5e6583f7eaf9bf0b6ee9ca39799811b58dc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1602
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Several callers of EVP_EncodeBlock are doing ad-hoc versions of this
function without any overflow checks.
Change-Id: I4d0cad2347ea8c44b42465e8b14b2783db69ee8f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1511
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Windows doesn't have ssize_t, sadly. There's SSIZE_T, but defining an
OPENSSL_SSIZE_T seems worse than just using an int.
Change-Id: I09bb5aa03f96da78b619e551f92ed52ce24d9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1352
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Another signedness error. Leave a TODO to possibly resolve EVP_DecodeBlock's
ignoring padding. Document some of the Init/Update/Finish versions' behavior.
Change-Id: I78a72c3163f8543172a7008b2d09fb10e003d957
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1230
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
When I switched the base64 code to use size_t, I missed that one of the
loops was counting down, not up, and depended on the loop variable going
negative.
Additionally this change fixes a bug in NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_encode where
the size of the result buffer was incorrectly calculated and a possible
memory leak.
Change-Id: Ibdf644244291274f50b314f3bb13a61b46858ca1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1220
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
https://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2608
Previously, this input to the base64 code:
================================================================================-
Would cause the output length of EVP_DecodeUpdate to be negative. When
that happened in the base64 BIO, it would crash. In PEM decoding, the
ASN.1 code actually maintains signed lengths and manages to simply error
out!
Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta).
(This change contains substantial changes from the original and
effectively starts a new history.)
